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Serial No. 01

Supplementary List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA

AT SHILLONG

WP(C) No. 84 of 2026

Date of Decision: 22.05.2026

Smti. Deepali Patel,

W/o Shri P. Patel,

Resident of Motinagar, Shillong,

East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya

….. Petitioner

- Vs-

1. State of Meghalaya

Represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya,

Education Department, Shillong.

2. St. Edmund's School, Shillong,

East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.

Represented by its Secretary,

Governing Body/Managing Committee.

3. The Principal,

St. Edmund's School, Laitumkhrah, Shillong,

East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.

4. The Secretary,

Council for Indian School Certificate Examinations (CISCE),

47-48, Nehru Place, Pragati House,

3rd Floor, New Delhi - 110019,

(Respondent No. 4, struck off from the array of parties vide Hon’ble

Court’s order dated 23.03.2026.)

….. Respondents

2026:MLHC:505

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Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge

Appearance:

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. S. Deb, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Ms. S. Kh. Nongrum, GA for R 1.

Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. with

Mr. S. Chanda, Adv. for R 2 & 3.

i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No

Law journals etc.:

ii) Whether approved for publication

in press: Yes/No

JUDGMENT

1. It is the case of the petitioner herein that she has sought admission

for her son who is about five years old in the Institution of the respondent No. 2

headed by the respondent No. 3, the Principal. It is also the case of the petitioner

that she has complied with all the formalities of filling up of the admission form

and has duly submitted the same in time.

2. On 30.05.2025, the respondent No. 3 had issued certain instructions

to all the parents/guardians concerned with regard to the admission process.

Accordingly, her son having been allotted Registration No. 76 was duly selected

for admission. The petitioner was also informed that all necessary/future 2026:MLHC:505

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communication from the respondents would be done so through a specialized

portal known as “eCare”, the credentials of which would be shared/notified on

later dates.

3. The petitioner, in the meantime was diagnosed with allergic

conjunctivitis, for which, she has to undergo medical treatment from 08.12.2025

to 12.12.2025. While undergoing treatment, an SMS was received on her phone

on 11.12.2025, wherein the respondent No. 3 has informed that “the New

Admission Session 2026 induction programme will be held on Saturday the 13

th

December, 2025 at 10:00 am in the School hall. (Please be in the campus by

9:45 am). Both parents and the child need to be present and attendance is

compulsory”. Admittedly, the petitioner due to bonafide inadvertence, failed to

notice the said SMS.

4. Thereafter, on 13.12.2025, the petitioner received a phone call from

the school authorities informing her that the induction programmed had already

commenced and requesting her to attend the said induction programme

forthwith. Accordingly, the petitioner’s husband immediately went to the school

along with her son and even attended the latter half of the said induction

programme. The petitioner has also sent an email to the respondent No. 3 on

14.12.2025, explaining the circumstances which led to the late arrival at the

induction programme and has tendered an unconditional apology in this regard. 2026:MLHC:505

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5. The petitioner, failing to get a response to her email, she and her

husband visited the school and approach the respondent No. 3. However, they

were informed that the petitioner’s minor son’s admission may be

cancelled/forfeited on account of not having attended the induction programme

on time.

6. The petitioner and her husband, then met the respondent No. 2 to

resolve the matter, but there was no positive response nor was there any written

or official communication sent to the petitioner in this regard.

7. On 10.02.2026, before commencement of the class/session, the

petitioner sent another email to the concerned respondent, however, on the same

day the respondent No. 2 vide email (impugned herein), informed the petitioner

that the admission of her son stood forfeited in accordance with admission

guidelines.

8. Faced with such a situation, the petitioner through her counsel, sent

a legal notice dated 16.02.2026 to the respondent No. 2 with a request to reinstate

the admission of her son in Class-KG, however, the same also evoked no

response. In the meantime, classes have already commenced. Being thus

aggrieved by the extremely arbitrary and unjustified action of the relevant

respondents in preventing her son to join the school, the petitioner has now 2026:MLHC:505

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approached this Court with this instant petition.

9. Mr. K. Paul, learned Sr. counsel along with Mr. S. Chanda, learned

counsel has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the

respondent No. 4 having been struck off from the array of parties vide this

Court’s order dated 23.03.2026. Ms. S. Kh. Nongrum, learned GA, has also

entered appearance on behalf of the State respondent No. 1.

10. Before proceeding further, the learned Sr. counsel for the respondent

Nos. 2 and 3 has raised the issue of maintainability of this petition, as such, it

would be proper for this Court to take up this issue at the first instance.

11. Accordingly, the submission of the learned Sr. counsel was heard,

wherein, the argument advanced in this regard, is whether this writ is

maintainable, considering the fact that a writ does not lie against a private body,

the school in this case. Though it is admitted that a writ may be maintainable, if

such private body or Institution performs public duty, however, it needs to be

seen as to whether the action impugned comes within the realm of public duty

or it is an action against a private individual.

12. Reverting to the facts of the case, the learned Sr. counsel has

submitted that there was no fault from the side of the school management as far

as communication of the date of the said induction programme is concerned, the 2026:MLHC:505

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fact being that on 10.12.2025, an SMS was send to the parents of the child,

informing them of the said induction programme to be held on 13.12.2025 at

10.00 am in the School hall, both parents along with the child to be present. This

same message was reiterated on 11.12.2025. However, no response was ever

received from the petitioner or her husband in this regard. Having indicated that

the said induction programme is mandatory, therefore, the failure of the parents

and the child in question to appear at the time fixed have inevitably led to the

school management to issue the said impugned letter dated 10.02.2026,

informing them that the admission of their child stood forfeited and was

therefore cancelled.

13. The learned Sr. counsel went on to submit that the petitioner in this

petition at paragraph 31 has admitted that the respondent No. 2/School is a

private autonomous minority institution, but at paragraph 36 of the same, has

maintained that the school is performing/discharging public functions. The

question which begs an answer is whether the action in rejecting the admission

of the son of the petitioner is an action in performance of public function, or an

altogether private dispute, if at all, submits the learned Sr. counsel.

14. In support of his contention, the learned Sr. counsel has placed

reliance on two case laws, Viz, the case of Shri Lal Singh v. Union of India &

Ors, WP(C) No. 201 of 2014 and others, relevant order dated 08.09.2016 at para 2026:MLHC:505

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17, 19 & 26 and also in the case of St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr v.

Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors, (2023) 4 SCC 498, para 75, 75.1, 75.2, 75.3,

75.5 & 77.

15. In response, Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioner has

submitted that admittedly, the petitioner has intention to get her son admitted

into the respondent No. 2/School and has complied with all the formalities

required for the purpose. In fact, of the three criteria laid down, all three have

been fulfilled, including the admission interview of parents, leading to the

payment of the requisite school fees and was accordingly assigned with

Roll/Registration No. 76. Finally, the petitioner’s son was selected for

admission, and it was informed that the classes would commence in the month

of February, 2026.

16. The learned counsel has however admitted that three SMSs were

received on 10.12.2025 and 11.12.2025 respectively, whereby, they were

informed about the said induction programme. However, due to the fact that at

that point of time, the petitioner was undergoing medical treatment at Bansara

Eye Care Clinic, Shillong for her eye ailment from 08.12.2025 to 12.12.2025 to

be exact, through inadvertence, the said messages were not noticed.

17. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that on 13.12.2025, a 2026:MLHC:505

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phone call was received from the school authorities, informing them about the

said induction programme, and immediately, the husband of the petitioner along

with his son rushed to the school and was able to attend the said programme,

albeit, at a later period of time, that is, in the second half of the day. As a follow

up, the petitioner has sent an email dated 14.12.2025 to the respondent No. 3,

inter-alia, explaining the circumstances which led to the late arrival of her son

on the said date of induction and has also sought an unconditional apology.

18. Receiving no response to the communication dated 14.12.2025,

another email was sent on 10.02.2026, a week before the commencement of the

academic session. To the utmost shock of the petitioner, the respondent No. 2

vide email dated 10.02.2026 itself, informed that the admission of the

petitioner’s son “stood forfeited in accordance with admission guidelines”.

19. It is the submission of the learned counsel that there are no such

admission guidelines in this regard stipulating the rule that admission stood

forfeited or cancelled in case of non-appearance of the parents and child at the

induction programme. In fact, even in the initial admission process, wherein, the

three criteria have been laid down, fulfilment of the same, being the condition

precedent for admission into the said school, no mention has been made about

the said induction programme and the consequences following absence from

such programme. 2026:MLHC:505

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20. Being aggrieved by the action of the school in this regard, the

petitioner has caused a legal notice dated 16.02.2026 to be issued to the school

authority, however, no response to the same have been received, and in the

meantime, classes have already commenced, thereby compelling the petitioner

to approach this Court with this instant application and the prayer made therein,

submits the learned counsel.

21. The learned counsel has further submitted that the action of the

school authorities being arbitrary and unilateral without giving any opportunity

to the petitioner to show cause or be heard in a matter, such cancellation of the

petitioner’s son’s admission is a violation of the basic principle of natural justice,

fairness, equality, proportionality and legitimate expectation, given the fact that

the petitioner has not been conveyed with the decision of the school authority to

cancel the said admission, firstly, on 13.12.2025 or even on 14.12.2025, when

the petitioner has communicated the reasons (supra) for the failure to appear on

time for the said induction programme, and secondly, even in the intervening

period between 13.12.2025 to 10.02.2026, which, if conveyed, would have

enable the petitioner to decide otherwise as far as her son’s admission is

concerned.

22. On the contention of the respondents that this application is not

maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the school in 2026:MLHC:505

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question being private unaided school having no semblance of government

control directly or indirectly, and therefore, does not come within the meaning

of “State” as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution, the learned counsel

has submitted that admittedly, the school is a private educational institution,

however, it is performing/discharging public functions of significant importance,

vis-à-vis, impartation of education, as such, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction,

the action impugned being a grave violation of the fundamental rights of the

petitioner and her son, particularly, Article 14, 21 and 21A of the Constitution,

submits the learned counsel.

23. In support of this contention as far as the issue of maintainability is

concerned, the learned counsel has cited the following cases:

i) Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab and Others (2012) 12

SCC 331, para 11, 12 and 13;

ii) St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) para 1, 2.1(a), 2.2(b),

5, 37, 39, 43, 44, 54, 59, 61, 62, 66, 75.1, 75.2 and 75.3;

iii) Master Jai Kumar v. Aadharshila Vidya Peeth and Ors.,

[WP(C) No. 11229/2024], High Court of Delhi, order dated

23.08.2024, para 16-21; and

iv) Sampath Karthikeya Busa and Anr. v. University Grants 2026:MLHC:505

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Commission, (UGC) and Ors, (Writ Petition Nos. 42467,

42437 and 43364 of 2022) order dated 05.01.2023, High

Court of Telangana, para 4, 9, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 23.

24. In the backdrop of the factual scenario of the case between the parties

herein, facts of which may not be required to be reiterated except, if so

warranted, what is understood is that the respondent No. 2/school has refused to

finally admit the son of the petitioner on account of non-compliance with the

admission process, more particularly because of the failure of the parents of the

said child to attend the induction programme held on 13.12.2025 at 10:00 am in

the school hall.

25. The first issue raised is whether this writ application is maintainable,

in view of the fact that the respondent/school represented by its management is

an entirely private educational institution with no aid or funding or control by

the government. It is however admitted that, if there is an element of public duty

or function carried out by the said school, then such institution would come

within the definition of “State” as could be understood from reading of Article

12 of the Constitution of India, and any dispute pertaining to such institution is

amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

26. In this respect, in the context of the case of the parties herein, it would 2026:MLHC:505

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be beneficial to understand the implication of what the term “public function” or

“public duty” means so as to come to a conclusion as regard the issue of

maintainability. In the case of Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. Sadasivan and Ors,

(2005) 6 SCC 657, at para 11 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as

follows:

11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of

power and neglect of duty by public authorities. However, under our

Constitution, Article 226 is couched in such a way that a writ of

mandamus could be issued even against a private authority.

However, such private authority must be discharging a public

function and the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be

in discharge of a public function. The role of the State expanded

enormously and attempts have been made to create various agencies

to perform the governmental functions. Several corporations and

companies have also been formed by the Government to run

industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be

known as public sector undertakings. However, in the interpretation

given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this Court took the view that

many of these companies and corporations could come within the

sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. At the same time, there are

private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is

difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions

when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body

is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some

collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is

accepted by the public or that section of the public as having

authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when

they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the

public interest. In a book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action

(5th Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell in Chapter 3, para 0.24, it is

stated thus:

"A body is performing a 'public function' when it seeks to

achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the

public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as 2026:MLHC:505

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having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public

functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic

affairs in the public interest. This may happen in a wide variety of

ways. For instance, a body is performing a public function when it

provides 'public goods' or other collective services, such as health

care, education and personal social services, from funds raised by

taxation. A body may perform public functions in the form of

adjudicatory services (such as those of the criminal and civil courts

and tribunal system). They also do so if they regulate commercial

and professional activities to ensure compliance with proper

standards. For all these purposes, a range of legal and

administrative techniques may be deployed, including rule making,

adjudication (and other forms of dispute resolution); inspection;

and licensing.

Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the

State. Charities, self-regulatory organisations and other nominally

private institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange,

Lloyd's of London, churches) may in reality also perform some

types of public function. As Sir John Donaldson, M.R. urged, it is

important for the courts to 'recognise the realities of executive

power' and not allow 'their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and

sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be exerted'. Non-

governmental bodies such as these are just as capable of abusing

their powers as is Government."

27. This trend has continued in subsequent pronouncement, for example,

in the case of St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) at para 2.1, a question was

asked as to whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

is maintainable against a private minority institution, and at para 3, it has been

said that even, if the body performing public duty is amenable to writ

jurisdiction, are all its decisions subject to judicial review or only those decisions

which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under the writ 2026:MLHC:505

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jurisdiction. Also at para 39 of St. Mary’s Education Society (supra), the court

has referred to the case of Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University, reiterating the

proposition that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is

not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy, not only under the ordinary law,

but also by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

28. What is pertinent to note herein is that at para 44 of the said St.

Mary’s Education Society case, it was observed that the impartation of education

by the Appellant 1 therein is a public function. At para 75.2, the following was

observed:

“75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is

imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus

with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law

action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the

extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative

writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having

any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a

writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in

their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service

conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer

had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article

12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law

element.”

29. Again, on the issue of maintainability at para 75.1 of the St. Mary’s

Education Society case, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is

maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or

public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or 2026:MLHC:505

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otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be

shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the

public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of

public function, it must be established that the body or the person was

seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or

a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the

public.”

30. In the case of Lal Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned Sr. counsel

for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the factual matrix of the case involved a dispute

as regard the service conditions of employees of a private educational institution.

This court relying on several authorities in the case of Binny Ltd (supra) and also

the case of Satimbla Sharma and Ors v. St. Paul’s Senior Secondary School

and Ors, (2011) 13 SCC 760, has come to the conclusion that the discretionary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be exercised,

if the rights sought to be enforced are purely of a private character. Similarly, at

para 75.3 of the St. Mary’s Education Society case it was held that:

“75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be

discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus

its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional

court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers

of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter

relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the

statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad

functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal

sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain

of a "public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to

challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the

actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary

contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be 2026:MLHC:505

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recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the

Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being

controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would

remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

31. What could be understood from the above is that in a relationship of

employer-employee even in a private unaided educational institution, certain

category of dispute, for example, terms of contract employment etc., the same

being private in nature, such dispute would not be covered under writ jurisdiction

of a High Court.

32. Viewed thus, it is reiterated that impartation of education by an

educational institution, whether public or private, is a public function, and right

to education, is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21A of the

Constitution. This right was further crystalized by the enactment of “The Right

of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009”. Again, in the

definitions section, at Section 2(n)(iv), the following is found:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

–

(n) "school" means any recognised school imparting

elementary education and includes–

(iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants

to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the

local authority;”

33. Therefore, as far as the aspect of admission or rejection of admission

of a student in the respondents No. 2/Institution is concerned, this Court would 2026:MLHC:505

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hold that the impugned action does have a nexus with that public function, that

is, impartation of education. Accordingly, in the peculiar facts and circumstances

of this case, this writ is found maintainable.

34. The next question which arises, is whether the impugned action of

the respondent school is a violation of the fundamental rights of the son of the

petitioner. A revisit of the factual situation as could be gathered from the

pleadings of the parties, would portray a picture that admittedly, when the

admission process was initiated, the school authorities have accordingly issued

certain instructions to all the applicants, the admission criteria, inter alia, being

that the age criteria for KG Class admission is 5 plus as on 31

st

March 2026 and

that there will be an Admission Interview for the parents and the children, dates

for the Admission Interview to be notified later on the School website/SMS.

There is no denial of the fact that the KG Admission Session 2026 result

published on 31.10.2025 includes the registration number (No.76) of the son of

the petitioner as one of those who have been selected for admission. Thereafter,

there is no further communication from the school in this regard till 10.12.2025,

when an SMS message was sent by the respondent No. 3 to the parents of the

child, informing them that the induction programme will be held on 13.12.2025

at 10:00 am in the School Hall. It was also mentioned in the said message that

attendance is compulsory. 2026:MLHC:505

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35. Again, admittedly the parents of the child failed to attend the said

induction programme at the given time. Though the petitioner has maintained

that the father along with the child had attended the induction programme in the

second half of the day, the same was denied by the respondent No. 3. However,

it cannot be denied that the petitioner has sent an email to the respondent No. 3

on 14.12.2025, with an apology for not attending the said induction programme

with a request for consideration. There is nothing on record to show that this

missive was ever attended to by the school authorities.

36. Ultimately, it was only on 10.02.2026, a week before the session is

to commence, when the parents of the child have sent another email to the school

authorities to understand the situation as far as the admission of their son is

concerned, was a reply sent to them via email on 10.02.2026, informing them

that because of their absence at the induction programme, the admission stood

forfeited. In this regard, this Court has noted that there was no official

communication to the parents by the school authorities as far back as December

2025 that the admission of their son has been denied, thereby meaning that no

opportunity was given to them to offer any show cause or to be heard in the

matter. In fact, if such decision has been conveyed to the parents of the child

officially since the month of December, it would have allowed them to look for

alternatives. But, by February 2026 till date, the admission process in almost all 2026:MLHC:505

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the schools in the city has been closed, which would mean that one precious year

would have been lost to the child’s education.

37. It can also be said that though the assertion of the school authority

that attendance in the said induction programme is compulsory, however, there

is nothing on record right from the stage of the initial admission process,

wherein, it was clearly spelled out that there will be an induction programme,

failure to attend the same, would result in automatic cancellation or forfeiture of

the child’s admission. Under such circumstances, the action or inaction of the

school authorities can only be termed as an action of arbitrariness and certainly

a deprivation of natural justice to the parents and the child in question, falling

within the reach of violation of the fundamental rights of the parents and the

child as enshrined in Article 14 and 21A of the Constitution.

38. Consequently, this Court having held that this writ petition is

maintainable, would also hold that the action of the school authorities in

cancellation of the child’s admission, calls for a mandamus to be issued.

39. In fine, the prayer made in this petition is hereby allowed, the

forfeiture/cancellation of the petitioner’s son Master Arya Patel (Reg. No. 76) in

Class- KG for the Session – 2026 is hereby set aside and quashed. The

respondent No. 2 /school is also directed to immediately allow the child to attend 2026:MLHC:505

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regular classes within 1(one) week from the date of this order.

40. Petition disposed of. No costs.

Judge

2026:MLHC:505