Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4629 OF 2005

SONDUR GOPAL APPELLANT

VERSUS

SONDUR RAJINI RESPONDENT

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.487 OF 2007

RAJINI SONDUR APPELLANT

VERSUS

GOPAL SONDUR & ORS. RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4629 OF 2005

Appellant-husband, aggrieved by the judgment

and order dated 11

th

of April, 2005 passed by the

Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Family

Page 2 Court Appeal No. 11 of 2005 reversing the judgment

and order dated 1

st

of January, 2005 passed by the

Family Court, Mumbai at Bandra in Interim

Application No. 235 of 2004 in Petition No. A-531

of 2004, is before us with the leave of the Court.

Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving

rise to the present appeal are that the marriage

between the appellant-husband and the respondent-

wife took place on 25

th

of June, 1989 according to

the Hindu rites at Bangalore. It was registered

under the provision of the Hindu Marriage Act

also. After the marriage the husband left for

Sweden in the first week of July, 1989 followed by

the wife in November, 1989. They were blessed

with two children namely, Natasha and Smyan.

Natasha was born on 19

th

of September, 1993 in

Sweden. She is a down syndrome child. The couple

purchased a house in Stockholm, Sweden in

December, 1993. Thereafter, the couple applied

for Swedish citizenship which was granted to them

in 1997. In June, 1997, the couple moved to

2

Page 3 Mumbai as, according to the wife, the employer of

the husband was setting up his business in India.

The couple along with child Natasha lived in India

between June, 1997 and mid 1999. In mid 1999, the

husband’s employer offered him a job in Sydney,

Australia which he accepted and accordingly moved

to Sydney, Australia. The couple and the child

Natasha went to Sydney on sponsorship visa which

allowed them to stay in Australia for a period of

4 years. While they were in Australia, in the

year 2000, the husband disposed of the house which

they purchased in Stockholm, Sweden. The second

child, Smyan was born on 9

th

February, 2001 at

Sydney. The husband lost his job on 7

th

July, 2001

and since he no longer had any sponsorship, he had

to leave Australia in the second week of January,

2002. The couple and the children shifted to

Stockholm and lived in a leased accommodation till

October, 2002 during which period the husband had

no job. On 2

nd

of October, 2002, the husband got

another job at Sydney and to join the assignment

he went there on 18

th

of December, 2002. But

3

Page 4 before that on 14

th

of December, 2002, the wife

along with children left for Mumbai. Later, on

31

st

of January, 2003, the wife and the children

went to Australia to join the appellant-husband.

However, the wife and the children came back to

India on 17

th

of December, 2003 on a tourist visa

whereas the husband stayed back in Sydney.

According to the husband, in January, 2004 he was

informed by his wife that she did not wish to

return to Sydney at all and, according to him, he

came back to India and tried to persuade his wife

to accompany him back to Sydney. According to the

husband, he did not succeed and ultimately the

wife filed petition before the Family Court,

Bandra inter alia praying for a decree of judicial

separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage

Act and for custody of the minor children Natasha

and Smyan.

After being served with the notice, the

husband appeared before the Family Court and filed

an interim application questioning the

4

Page 5 maintainability of the petition itself. According

to the husband, they were original citizens of

India but have “acquired citizenship of Sweden in

the year 1996-1999 and as citizens of Sweden

domiciled in Australia”. According to the

husband, the wife along with the children “arrived

in India on 17

th

of December, 2003 on a non-

extendable tourist visa for a period of six months

and they had confirmed air tickets to return to

Sydney on 27

th

of January, 2004” and therefore,

“the parties have no domicile in India and, hence,

the parties would not be governed by the Hindu

Marriage Act”. According to the husband, “the

parties by accepting the citizenship of Sweden

shall be deemed to have given up their domicile of

origin, that is, India” and acquired a domicile of

choice by the combination of residence and

intention of permanent or indefinite residence.

The husband has also averred that the domicile of

the wife shall be that of the husband and since

they have abandoned their domicile of origin and

acquired a domicile of choice outside the

5

Page 6 territories of India, the provisions of the Hindu

Marriage Act shall not apply to them.

Consequently, the petition by the wife for

judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu

Marriage Act and custody of the children is not

maintainable. According to the husband, he did

not have any intention to “give up the domicile of

choice namely the Australian domicile nor have the

parties acquired a third domicile of choice or

resumed the domicile of origin” and, therefore,

provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act would not be

applicable to them. In sum and substance, the plea

of the husband is that they are citizens of Sweden

presently domiciled in Australia which is their

domicile of choice and having abandoned the

domicile of origin i.e. India, the jurisdiction of

the Family Court, Mumbai is barred by the

provisions of Section 1(2) of the Hindu Marriage

Act.

As against this, the case set up by the wife

is that their domicile of origin is India and that

6

Page 7 was never given up or abandoned though they

acquired the citizenship of Sweden and then moved

to Australia. According to the wife, even if it

is assumed that the husband had acquired domicile

in Sweden, she never changed her domicile and

continued to be domiciled in India. The wife has

set up another alternative plea. According to her,

even if it is assumed that she also had acquired

domicile of Sweden, that was abandoned by both of

them when they shifted to Australia and,

therefore, their domicile of origin, that is,

India got revived. In short, the case of the wife

is that both she and her husband are domiciled in

India and, therefore, the Family Court in Mumbai

has jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed

by her seeking a decree for judicial separation

and custody of the children.

The husband in support of his case filed

affidavit of evidence and he has also been cross-

examined by the wife. According to the husband

“even before the marriage he visited Stockholm,

7

Page 8 Sweden in Spring, 1985” and “immediately taken in

by the extraordinary beauty of the place and

warmth and friendliness of the people”. According

to the husband, the first thought which occurred

to him was that “Stockholm is the place where” he

“wanted to live and die”. According to his

evidence, at the time of marriage in 1989, he was

a domicile of Sweden. From this the husband

perhaps wants to convey that he abandoned the

domicile of his birth, that is, India and acquired

Sweden as the domicile of choice. He went on to

say that “keeping in mind wife’s express desire to

be in English speaking country” he “accepted the

offer to move to Sydney, Australia”. His specific

evidence is that “parties herein are Swedish

citizens, domiciled in Australia”, hence,

according to the husband, “only the courts in

Australia will have the jurisdiction to entertain

the petition of this nature”. The husband has

further claimed that “on 5

th

of April, 2004, the

day wife had filed the petition” he “had acquired

domicile status of Sydney, Australia”. As regards

8

Page 9 domicile status on the date of cross-examination,

that is, 17.11.2004, he insisted to be the

domicile of Australia. It is an admitted position

that the day on which husband claimed to be the

domicile of Australia, that is, 05.04.2004, he was

not citizen of that country or had ever its

citizen but had 457 visa which, according to his

own evidence “is a long term business permit and

it is not a domicile document”.

The family court, after taking into

consideration the facts and circumstances of the

case, allowed the application filed by the husband

and held the petition to be not maintainable.

While doing so, the family court observed that “it

cannot be held” that “the husband has never given

up his domicile of origin, i.e., India.” However,

in appeal, the High Court by the impugned order

has set aside the order of the family court and

held the petition filed by the wife to be

maintainable. While doing so, the High Court held

that “the husband has miserably failed to

9

Page 10 establish that he ever abandoned Indian domicile

and/or intended to acquire domicile of his

choice”. Even assuming that the husband had

abandoned his domicile of origin and acquired

domicile of Sweden along with citizenship,

according to the High Court, he abandoned the

domicile of Sweden when he shifted to Australia

and in this way the domicile of India got revived.

Relevant portion of the judgment of the High Court

in this regard reads as follows:

“15.4………It is against this factual

matrix, we are satisfied that the

respondent has miserably failed to

establish that he ever abandon

Indian domicile and/or intended to

acquire domicile of his choice.

16. Even if it is assumed that the

respondent had abandoned his

domicile of origin and acquired

domicile of Sweden alongwith

citizenship in 1997, on his own

showing the respondent abandoned

the domicile of Sweden when he

shifted to Sydney, Australia.

Therefore, keeping the case made

out by the respondent in view and

our findings in so far as

acquisition of Australian domicile

is concerned, it is clear that the

domicile of India got revived

10

Page 11 immediately on his abandoning

Swedish domicile…….”

It is against this order that the husband is

before us with the leave of the court.

We have heard Mr. V.Giri, learned Senior

Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Y.H. Muchhala

and Mr.Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel on

behalf of respondent. Mr. Giri draws our

attention to Section 1 of the Hindu Marriage Act

(hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) and

submits that the Act would apply only to Hindu

domiciled in India. He submits that the parties

having ceased to be the domicile of India, they

shall not be governed by the Act. Mr. Muchhala

joins issue and contends that the benefit of the

Act can be availed of by Hindus in India

irrespective of their domicile. He submits that

there is no direct precedent of this Court on this

issue but points out that a large number of

decisions of different High Courts support his

contention. In this connection, he draws our

11

Page 12 attention to a judgment of Calcutta High Court in

Prem Singh v. Sm.Dulari Bai & Anr. AIR 1973 Cal.

425, relevant portion whereof reads as follows:

“On a fair reading of the

above provisions, it seems clear

from the first section that the Act

is in operation in the whole of

India except in the State of Jammu

and Kashmir and applies also to

Hindus, domiciled in the

territories to which this Act

extends, who are outside the said

territories. This section read with

Section 2(1)(a)(b) makes it equally

clear that as regards the intra-

territorial operation of the Act it

applies to all Hindus, Buddhists,

Jains or Sikhs irrespective of the

question whether they are domiciled

in India or not.”

Reference has also been made to decision of

Gujarat High Court in Nitaben v. Dhirendra

Chandrakant Shukla & Anr. I (1984) D.M.C.252 and

our attention has been drawn to the following:

“Apparently looking, this

argument of Mr. Nanavati is

attractive. But it would not be

forgotten that section 1 of the Act

refers to the extension of the Act

12

Page 13 to the whole of India except the

State of Jammu and Kashmir and also

to the territories to which the Act

is applicable, and further to all

those persons who are domiciles of

those territories but who are

outside the said territories.”

Yet another decision to which reference has

been made is the judgment of the Rajasthan High

Court in Varindra Singh & Anr. v. State of

Rajasthan RLW 2005(3) Raj. 1791 . Paragraphs 13 and

17 which are relevant read as follows:

“13. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1)

of Section 2 of the Act of 1955

makes the Act of 1955 applicable

to all persons who are Hindu by

religion irrespective of the fact

where they reside.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Therefore, Section 2 of the Act

of 1955 is very wide enough to

cover all persons who are Hindu by

religion irrespective of the fact

where they are residing and whether

they are domiciled in Indian

territories or not”

13

Page 14 Lastly, learned Senior Counsel has placed

reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court

in Vinaya Nair & Anr. v. Corporation of Kochi

AIR 2006 Ker. 275 and our attention has been

drawn to the following passage from Paragraph 6

of the judgment which reads as follows:

“A conjoint reading of Ss. 1 and

2 of the Act would indicate that so

far as the second limb of S. 1(2)

of the Act is concerned its intra

territorial operation of the Act

applied to those who reside outside

the territories. First limb of sub-

section (2) of S. 1 and Cls. (a)

and (b) of S.2(1) would make it

clear that the Act would apply to

Hindus reside in India whether they

reside outside the territories or

not.”

Rival submission necessitates examination of

extent and applicability of the Act. Section 1(2)

of the Act provides for extent of the Act. The

same reads as follows:

“1. Short title and extent.-

14

Page 15 (1) xxx xxx xx

(2) It extends to the whole of

India except the State of Jammu and

Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus

domiciled in the territories to

which this Act extends who are

outside the said territories.”

From a plain reading of Section 1(2) of the

Act, it is evident that it has extra-territorial

operation. The general principle underlying the

sovereignty of States is that laws made by one

State cannot have operation in another State. A

law which has extra territorial operation cannot

directly be enforced in another State but such a

law is not invalid and saved by Article 245 (2) of

the Constitution of India. Article 245(2) provides

that no law made by Parliament shall be deemed to

be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-

territorial operation. But this does not mean that

law having extra-territorial operation can be

enacted which has no nexus at all with India. In

our opinion, unless such contingency exists, the

Parliament shall be incompetent to make a law

having extra-territorial operation. Reference in

15

Page 16 this connection can be made to a decision of this

Court in M/s.Electronics Corporation of India

Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. 1989

Supp (2) SCC 642 in which it has been held as

follows:

“9.But the question is

whether a nexus with something in

India is necessary. It seems to us

that unless such nexus exists

Parliament will have no competence

to make the law. It will be noted

that Article 245(1) empowers

Parliament to enact law for the

whole or any part of the territory

of India. The provocation for the

law must be found within India

itself. Such a law may have extra-

territorial operation in order to

sub-serve the object, and that

object must be related to something

in India. It is inconceivable that

a law should be made by Parliament

in India which has no relationship

with anything in India.“

Bearing in mind the principle aforesaid,

when we consider Section 1(2) of the Act, it is

evident that the Act extends to the Hindus of

whole of India except the State of Jammu and

Kashmir and also applies to Hindus domiciled in

16

Page 17 India who are outside the said territory. In

short, the Act, in our opinion, will apply to

Hindus domiciled in India even if they reside

outside India. If the requirement of domicile in

India is omitted altogether, the Act shall have no

nexus with India which shall render the Act

vulnerable on the ground that extra-territorial

operation has no nexus with India. In our opinion,

this extra-territorial operation of law is saved

not because of nexus with Hindus but Hindus

domiciled in India.

At this stage, it shall be useful to refer

to the observation made by the High Court in the

impugned order which is quoted hereunder.

“It is, thus, clear that a

condition of a domicile in India,

as contemplated in Section 1(2) of

H.M.Act, is necessary ingredient to

maintain a petition seeking reliefs

under the H.M.Act. In other words,

a wife, who is domiciled and

residing in India when she presents

a petition, seeking reliefs under

H.M.Act, her petition would be

maintainable in the territories of

India and in the Court within the

17

Page 18 local limits of whose ordinary

civil jurisdiction she resides.”

Now, we revert to the various decisions of

the High Courts relied on by the Senior Counsel

for the respondent-wife; the first in sequence is

the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of

Prem Singh (supra). In this case, the husband

submitted an application for restitution of

conjugal rights inter alia pleading that he had

married his wife according to Hindu rites in

India. After the marriage, they continued to live

as husband and wife and a daughter was born. The

grievance of the husband was that the wife had

failed to return to the matrimonial home which

made him to file an application for restitution of

conjugal rights. The trial court noticed that the

husband was a Nepali and he was not a domicile in

India and therefore, he could not have invoked the

provisions of the Act. While interpreting Sections

1(1) and 2(1) of the Act, the Court held that as

regards the intra-territorial operation of the

Act, it is clear that it applies to Hindus,

18

Page 19 Buddhists, Jaina and Sikhs irrespective of the

question as to whether they are domiciled in India

or not. Having given our most anxious

consideration, we are unable to endorse the view

of the Calcutta High Court in such a wide term. If

this view is accepted, a Hindu living anywhere in

the world, can invoke the jurisdiction of the

Courts in India in regard to the matters covered

under the Act. To say that it applies to Hindus

irrespective of their domicile extends the extra-

territorial operation of the Act all over the

world without any nexus which interpretation if

approved, would make such provision invalid.

Further, this will render the words “domiciled” in

Section 1(2) of the Act redundant. Legislature

ordinarily does not waste its words is an accepted

principle of interpretation. Any other

interpretation would render the word ‘domicile’

redundant. We do not find any compelling reason

to charter this course. Therefore, in our

opinion, the decision of the Calcutta High Court

taking a view that the provisions of the Act would

19

Page 20 apply to a Hindu whether domiciled in the

territory of India or not does not lay down the

law correctly. One may concede to the

applicability of the Act if one of the parties is

Hindu of Indian domicile and the other party a

Hindu volunteering to be governed by the Act.

As regards the passage from the judgment of

the Gujarat High Court in Nitaben (Supra) relied

on by the wife, it does not lay down that the Act

applies to all Hindus, whether they are domiciled

in India or not. In fact, the High Court has held

that it extends to all those persons who are

domiciles of India, excluding Jammu and Kashmir.

So far as the decision of the Rajasthan High

Court in Varindra Singh (supra ) is concerned, it

is true that under Section 1(2) of the Act,

residence in India is not necessary and Section 2

also does not talk about requirement of domicile

for its application. This is what precisely has

been said by the Rajasthan High Court in this

20

Page 21 judgment but, in our opinion, what the learned

Judge failed to notice is that the application of

the Act shall come into picture only when the Act

extends to that area. Hence, in our opinion, the

Rajasthan High Court’s judgment does not lay down

the law correctly. For the same reason, in our

opinion the judgment of the Kerala High Court is

erroneous.

Section 2(1) provides for the application of

the Act. The same reads as follows:

2. Application of Act.- (1) This

Act applies –

(a) to any person who is a Hindu by

religion in any of its forms or

developments, including a

Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a

follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana

or Arya Samaj,

(b) to any person who is a

Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by

religion, and

(c) to any other person domiciled

in the territories to which this

Act extends who is not a Muslim,

Christian, Parsi or Jew by

religion, unless it is proved that

any such person would not have been

21

Page 22 governed by the Hindu law or by any

custom or usage as part of that law

in respect of any of the matters

dealt with herein if this Act had

not been passed.”

This section contemplates application of the

Act to Hindu by religion in any of its forms or

Hindu within the extended meaning i.e. Buddhist,

Jaina or Sikh and, in fact, applies to all such

persons domiciled in the country who are not

Muslims, Christians, Parsi or Jew, unless it is

proved that such persons are not governed by the

Act under any custom or usage. Therefore, we are

of the opinion that Section 2 will apply to Hindus

when the Act extends to that area in terms of

Section 1 of the Act. Therefore, in our considered

opinion, the Act will apply to Hindu outside the

territory of India only if such a Hindu is

domiciled in the territory of India.

There is not much dispute that the wife at

the time of presentation of the petition was

resident of India. In order to defeat the

22

Page 23 petition on the ground of maintainability, Mr.

Giri submits that the wife will follow the

domicile of the husband and when Sweden has become

the domicile of choice, the domicile of origin

i.e. India has come to an end. According to the

husband, the parties had India as the domicile of

origin, but in 1987 the husband moved to Sweden

with an intention to reside there permanently and

acquired the Swedish domicile as his domicile of

choice. After the marriage, the wife also moved to

Sweden to reside permanently there and both of

them acquired Swedish citizenship in 1996-97

thereby giving up their domicile of origin and

embracing Sweden as their domicile of choice.

Further, on account of express desire of the wife

to move to an English speaking country, the family

moved to Australia in June, 1999 with an intention

to reside there permanently and initiated the

process to acquire the permanent resident status

in Australia. On these facts, the husband intends

to contend that they have acquired Swedish

domicile as domicile of choice. Mr. Muchhala,

23

Page 24 however, submits that the specific case of the

husband is that he is a Swedish citizen domiciled

in Australia and, therefore, the appellant cannot

be allowed to contend that he is domiciled in

Sweden. He points out that the husband is making

this attempt knowing very well that his claim of

being the domicile of Australia is not worthy of

acceptance and in that contingency to contend that

the earlier domicile of choice, i.e. Sweden has

revived.

We have bestowed our consideration to the

rival submission and we find substance in the

submission of Mr. Muchhala. In certain

contingency, law permits raising of alternative

plea but the facts of the present case does not

permit the husband to take this course. It is

specific case of the appellant that he is a

Swedish citizen domiciled in Australia and it is

the Australian courts which shall have

jurisdiction in the matter. In order to succeed,

the appellant has to establish that he is a

24

Page 25 domicile of Australia and, in our opinion, he

cannot be allowed to make out a third case that in

case it is not proved that he is a domicile of

Australia, his earlier domicile of choice, that is

Sweden, is revived. In this connection, we deem

it expedient to reproduce the averment made by him

in this regard:

“22……..In the instant case, it is

submitted that in the year 1996 the

applicant acquired citizenship as

well as domicile of Sweden and is

presently domiciled in Australia.

Thus, the Hindu Marriage Act is not

applicable to the parties herein

and the Family Court Mumbai has no

jurisdiction to proceed in the

matter and the petition is not

maintainable under Section 10 of

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”

The appellant has further averred that the

parties never acquired a third domicile of choice,

the same reads as follows:

“19…..In the instant case, there is

no intention to give up the

domicile of choice namely the

Australia domicile and nor have the

parties acquired a third domicile

25

Page 26 of choice or resume the domicile of

origin……….”

Further, the husband in his evidence has

stated that at the time of marriage in 1989, he

was a domicile of Sweden, but it is not his case

that he shall be governed by the Swedish law or

Swedish courts will have jurisdiction. His

specific evidence in this regard reads as follows:

“7……as the parties herein are

Swedish citizens, domiciled in

Australia, and hence it is only the

Courts in Australia that have the

jurisdiction to entertain a

petition of this nature…….”

From the aforesaid, it is evident that the

appellant does not claim to be the domicile of

Sweden but claims to be the domicile of Australia

and, therefore, the only question which requires

our consideration is as to whether Australia is

the husband’s domicile of choice.

Domicile are of three kinds, viz. domicile of

origin, the domicile by operation of law and the

26

Page 27 domicile of choice. In the present case, we are

concerned only with the domicile of origin and

domicile of choice. Domicile of origin is not

necessarily the place of birth. The birth of a

child at a place during temporary absence of the

parents from their domicile will not make the

place of birth as the domicile of the child. In

domicile of choice one is abandoned and another

domicile is acquired but for that, the acquisition

of another domicile is not sufficient. Domicile of

origin prevails until not only another domicile

is acquired but it must manifest intention of

abandoning the domicile of origin. In order to

establish that Australia is their domicile of

choice, the husband has relied on their

residential tenancy agreement dated 25.01.2003 for

period of 18 months; enrollment of Natasha in

Warrawee Public School in April,2003; commencement

of proceedings for grant of permanent resident

status in Australia during October-November, 2003;

and submission of application by the husband and

27

Page 28 wife on 11.11.2003 for getting their permanent

resident status in Australia.

The right to change the domicile of birth is

available to any person not legally dependant and

such a person can acquire domicile of choice. It

is done by residing in the country of choice with

intention of continuing to reside there

indefinitely. Unless proved, there is presumption

against the change of domicile. Therefore, the

person who alleges it has to prove that.

Intention is always lodged in the mind, which can

be inferred from any act, event or circumstance in

the life of such person. Residence, for a long

period, is an evidence of such an intention so

also the change of nationality.

In the aforesaid background, when we consider

the husband’s claim of being domicile of Australia

we find no material to endorse this plea. The

residential tenancy agreement is only for 18

months which cannot be termed for a long period.

28

Page 29 Admittedly, the husband or for that matter, the

wife and the children have not acquired the

Australian citizenship. In the absence thereof, it

is difficult to accept that they intended to

reside permanently in Australia. The claim that

the husband desired to permanently reside in

Australia, in the face of the material available,

can only be termed as a dream. It does not

establish his intention to reside there

permanently. Husband has admitted that his visa

was nothing but a “long term permit” and “not a

domicile document”. Not only this, there is no

whisper at all as to how and in what manner the

husband had abandoned the domicile of origin. In

the face of it, we find it difficult to accept the

case of the husband that he is domiciled in

Australia and he shall continue to be the domicile

of origin i.e. India. In view of our answer that

the husband is a domicile of India, the question

that the wife shall follow the domicile of husband

is rendered academic. For all these reasons, we

are of the opinion that both the husband and wife

29

Page 30 are domicile of India and, hence, shall be covered

by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

As on fact, we have found that both the husband

and wife are domicile of India, and the Act will

apply to them, other contentions raised on behalf

of the parties, are rendered academic and we

refrain ourselves to answer those.

In the result, we do not find any merit in

the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but

without any order as to costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.487 OF 2007

In view of our decision in Civil Appeal No.

4629 of 2005 (Sondur Gopal vs. Sondur Rajini)

holding that the petition filed by the appellant

for judicial separation and custody of the

children is maintainable, we are of the opinion

that the writ petition filed by the respondent for

somewhat similar relief is rendered infructuous.

30

Page 31 On this ground alone, we allow this appeal and

dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent.

……………………………………………………………… J.

(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

……… ..……….………………………………..J.

(V.GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,

JULY 15, 2013.

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