In the High Court at Calcutta

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

W.P.L.R.T. No. 19 of 2026

Sridam Mahata and Others

Vs.

The State of West Bengal and Others

For the petitioners : Mr. Balailal Sahoo,

Mr. Amit Bikram Mahata,

Mr. Aditya Bikram Mahata.

For the State : Mr. Chandi Charan De, AGP,

Ms. Saswati Chatterjee.

Heard & reserved on : 02.03.2026

Judgment on : 10.03.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present writ petition has been preferred against a judgment of the

West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, whereby the learned

Tribunal dismissed the Original Application of the writ petitioners,

complaining of inaction on the part of the concerned Block Land and

Land Development Officer (BL & LRO) in the matter of disposal of the

petitioners‟ representation for correction of the Records of Rights (RoR) in

their name.

2. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the subject-land originally

belonged to the landlord Rajendra Narayan Singh Deo, who allegedly

2

settled the property in favour of one Chhutu Mahato and his two

brothers, namely Behari Mahato and Kunja Mahato, by dint of an

Amalnama. Subsequently, the landlord realised rent from the settles,

granting receipts acknowledging them as raiyats. A suit for recovery of

arrear rents bearing Rent Suit No. 2056 of 1953-54 was also instituted,

acknowledging the said settlement.

3. The petitioners claim that Chhutu Mahato, Behari Mahato and Kunja

Mahato (the predecessors-in-interest of the writ petitioners) reclaimed

some of the property and converted the land into „Gora‟ (cultivable) land

and amalgamated some khas waste land of the landlord and converted

the same into Gora land, cultivating the same. Behari Mahato and

Kunja Mahato died intestate, leaving behind their respective legal heirs.

During the RS operation, the subject-plot, bearing CS Dag No. 1537, was

recorded as RS Plot No. 3561, appertaining to R.S. Khatian No. 411,

having an area of 6.36 acres, in the names of Chhutu Mahato, Behari

Mahato and Kunja Mahato , who were in actual physical possession in

respect of the said land, upon paymen t of rent and taxes to the

prescribed authority. Subsequently, on December 17, 1989, an Amin

came from the office of the BL & LRO, Purulia-II and disclosed that the

land had vested in the State and possession thereof would be taken

soon.

4. The writ petitioners, claiming to be the successors-in-interest of the

original settlees, instituted Title Suit No. 10 of 1990 for declaration of

their title and permanent injunction, which was decreed on April 19,

3

1994. The State, one of the defendants in the said suit, challenged the

said judgment and decree by preferring an appeal before the learned

Civil Judge (Senior Division), Additional Court at Purulia, giving rise to

Title Appeal No. 756 of 1994. The said appeal was dismissed on contest

by judgment and decree dated February 20, 1999, affirming the decision

of the Trial Court. The said decree remains unchallenged and has thus

attained finality.

5. Thereafter, the petitioners made several representations before the

concerned authority for correction of the RoR in their name on the basis

of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court. Failing to elicit

any response in that regard from the authorities, the petitioners filed

applications before the concerned authority under Section 51A of the

West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the

1955 Act”) and the concerned authority initiated, on the basis thereof,

Objection Case Nos. 1172 of 2019 and 1318 of 2019 respectively.

6. A coordinate Bench of this Court, in WPLRT No. 34 of 2014, directed the

concerned Revenue Officer to correct the RoR in the light of the judgment

and decree passed by the said Court.

7. A date was fixed on February 3, 2020 in respect of the aforesaid two

Objection Cases, but the said cases were not concluded.

8. Being thus constrained, the petitioners filed a further representation for

correction of RoR in their names on the basis of the judgment and decree

passed by the Civil Court. In view of no steps being taken for disposal of

4

the same, Original Application No. 3287 of 2024 (LRTT) was filed by the

petitioners before the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal.

9. However, subsequently, the petitioner submitted before the Tribunal that

they intended to withdraw the said Original Application as the

representation giving rise to the same suffered from the defect of non-

signing by all the interested applicants and prayed for liberty to submit a

fresh corrected representation before the concerned BL & LRO for the

self-same cause of action, to which the representative of the Government

did not raise any objection. Accordingly, OA No. 3287 of 2024 (LRTT) was

disposed of as withdrawn vide order dated January 21, 2025 on the

above terms.

10. Thereafter, a corrected representation was filed by the petitioners, but

the authorities again sat tight over the matter, prompting the writ

petitioners to move the Tribunal afresh, giving rise to OA No. 2640 of

2025 (LRTT).

11. However, by the impugned judgment dated November 4, 2025, the

learned Tribunal dismissed the said application on contest on the

premise that the decree passed by the Civil Court was a nullity, in view

of the Civil Court having no jurisdiction due to the bar under Section

57B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, “the

1953 Act”).

12. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of the Tribunal, the present writ

petition has been preferred.

5

13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues, by placing reliance

on an unreported judgment of this Court in WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba

Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal and others) and WPLRT 5 of

2026 (Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs. The State

of West Bengal and others), that the Tribunal cannot ignore the decree of

the Civil Court at the drop of a hat and such decree is otherwise binding.

14. Thus, it is argued that the learned Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in

nullifying the decree of the Civil Court and dismissing the Original

Application filed by the writ petitioners.

15. Learned counsel further places reliance on another Division Bench

judgment of this Court in the matter of Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State

of West Bengal & Ors., reported at 2003(1) CHN 1, where it was held,

inter alia, that the Tribunal does not have the power to nullify the Civil

Court‟s decree.

16. Next placing reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this

Court in the matter of Sunil Kumar Laha & Anr. versus The State of West

Bengal, reported at CAL. LT. 1992(2) HC 274, it is argued that once the

State Government accepts rent from a post-vesting transferee, it cannot

backtrack and treat the land as vested land without taking recourse to

law after serving notice under Section 10(2) of 1953 Act.

17. It is argued that, in the present case, the State Government accepted

rent from the writ petitioners and they were accepted as raiyats. Thus,

the State cannot resile from such position and declare the land to be

vested.

6

18. It is next argued by the writ petitioners that the State has taken a stand

to the effect that the subject-land is a “forest” within the contemplation

of the Bihar Private Forests Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the

Bihar Act”).

19. By placing reliance on the judgments passed by the Civil Courts, learned

counsel for the petitioners argues that it was found by both the Trial

Court and the Appellate Court that no notification issued under Section

14 of the Bihar Act was produced by the concerned authorities. Since

such notification is a sine qua non for a land to be declared “private

forest” or “private protected forest”, the stand taken by the State that the

subject-land is a “forest” cannot be sustained. Learned counsel takes

the court through the relevant provisions of the Bihar Act in such

context.

20. The learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP) cites an unreported

coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the matter of WPLRT No. 154

of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West Bengal and

others), which was relied on by the learned Tribunal as well, for the

proposition that if a Civil Court‟s decree is passed without jurisdiction,

the same is a nullity ab initio and may not be relied on by the Tribunal.

It is argued that, if granted some time, the learned AGP shall endeavour

to search whether there is any notification under Section 14 of the Bihar

Act in respect of the subject-lands.

21. It is further argued that, in view of the specific bar under Section 57B of

the 1953 Act, the Civil Courts did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on

7

the disputes with regard to the subject-land. Thus, it is submitted that

the learned Tribunal was justified in passing the impugned judgment.

22. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

23. The following issues fall for consideration in the present writ petition:

(i) Effect of Civil Courts’ decree vis-à-vis the bar under Section 57B of

the 1953 Act;

(ii) Applicability of the Bihar Act to the subject-property;

(iii) Whether the State is barred by estoppel from treating the subject-

land as vested.

24. The above issues are decided as follows:

(i) Effect of Civil Courts’ decree vis-à-vis the bar under Section

57B of the 1953 Act

25. Two apparently conflicting judgments of this Court have been relied on

by the parties respectively. In Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

1

, this Court

held that the Civil Court‟s decree, being a nullity, cannot be given effect

to and/or be construed to override the vesting in favour of the State,

whereas in Naba Kumar Basak (supra)

2

, the Division Bench had observed

that the Civil Court‟s decree is binding on the Tribunal and cannot be

ignored by the latter at the drop of a hat.

26. To resolve the apparent conflict, the contexts of the two judgments are

required to be examined.

1

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

2

WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal and others)

and WPLRT 5 of 2026 (Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others)

8

27. In Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

3

, the court was dealing with the decree of a

Civil Court in favour of a post-vesting transferee. The said decree was

held to be a nullity by operation of Section 57B(2), Clauses (a), (b) and (c)

of the 1953 Act, whereas in Naba Kumar Basak (supra)

4

, the Civil Court

had declared a Patta granted in favour of the defendants to be void, being

without any foundation. Considering the facts and circumstances of the

case, it was held that since the Civil Court had declared the title and

possession of the plaintiffs/petitioners, consequentially declaring the

Patta in favour of the defendants/respondents to be void, the Civil

Courts‟ jurisdiction could not be said to be barred by Section 61 of the

1955 Act. Accordingly, it was also observed that neither the Tribunal nor

any authority under the 1955 Act has the power to declare the title or

possession of a person, which comes within the exclusive domain of the

Civil Court, due to which the decree of the Civil Court is binding and

cannot be ignored at the drop of a hat by the Tribunal or by any other

forum or authority.

28. In this regard, we are to consider that the 1953 Act and the 1955 Act

envisage two different regimes. As noted in Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

3

,

upon a notification being issued under Section 4 of the 1953 Act, the

effect of the same, as provided under Section 5 of the said Act, would be

that the concerned estates would vest in the State free from all

incumbrances. Section 57B(2) of the 1953 Act provides that no Civil

3

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

4

WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal and others)

and WPLRT 5 of 2026 (Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others)

9

Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any

estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to–

(a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published,

revised, made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of

Chapter V,

(b) a dispute involving determination of the question, either expressly

or by implication, whether a raiyat or an intermediary is or is not

entitled to retain under the provisions of the said Act such land or

estate or right in such estate, as the case may be; or

(c) any matter which under any of the provisions of the Act is to be, or

has already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined

by the State Government or any authority specified therein.

29. More importantly, Section 57B(2) provides that any such suit or

application which is pending before a Civil Court immediately before the

commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second

Amendment) Act, 1973 shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the

matters referred to in Clauses (a), (b) or (c).

30. As opposed thereto, a Patta under the 1955 Act is granted under Section

49 of the said Act in respect of lands at the disposal of the State

Government. Section 61 of the said provides that notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law for

the time being in force or in any decree, judgment, decision or award of

any court, tribunal or authority, no court shall have jurisdiction to

determine any question relating to any land or conne cted with any

10

matter which is required to be or which has been enquired into or

decided by any Revenue Officer or prescribed authority or any officer or

authority under the provisions of the 1955 Act.

31. Conspicuously, as opposed to Section 61 of the 1955 Act, which operates

as a general bar, Section 57B(2) of the 1953 Act, apart from providing a

specific bar in respect of disputes involving determination of the question

covered by the said Act, expressly or by implication, stipulates that any

suit or application which is pending before a Civil Court with regard to

the disputes covered by Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 57B(2) shall

abate insofar as it relates to any of the said provisions. Thus, whereas

the objection as to bar under Section 61 of the 1955 Act can be raised

during the pendency of a civil suit and, if decided by the Civil Court in

the negative, such decision becomes final and binding between the

parties, by operation of Section 57B (2), the suit itself abates, thereby

denuding the Civil Court of inherent jurisdiction to pass any decree

therein. Even under sub-section (1) of Section 57B of the 1953 Act, if

any of the aforesaid matters is in issue before a Civil Court on the date of

preparation of Records of Rights under Section 39(1) of the said Act, the

civil suit shall be stayed and shall, on the expiry of the appeal period

prescribed under Section 54(3) of the 1955 Act, the suit shall abate so

far as it relates to any of the matters specified therein.

32. Thus, the bar under Section 57B of th e 1953 Act does not stop at

precluding the Civil Court from taking up the issues covered therein but

has the further effect of initially staying and thereafter abating the suit

11

itself if the disputes covered under Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (2) of

Section 57B are in issue in such suit.

33. Seen in such context, the bar under Section 57B of the 1953 Act is much

more comprehensive and denudes the Civil Court of the very jurisdiction

to adjudicate on the suit, whereas Section 61 of the 1955 Act does not

hit at the root of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to continue with the

hearing and adjudication of the suit itself, since there is nothing in

Section 61 of the 1955 Act akin to the provisions of stay and abatement

of the suit as stipulated in Section 57B of the 1953 Act.

34. Examining the judgment of this Court in Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

5

from

such perspective, it is found that in the said case, the Civil Court had

adjudicated on the right, title and interest of a post-vesting transferee,

thereby reversing the vesting of the subject-property in the State, which

fell specifically within the mischief of the bar contemplated in Section

57B. In view of the specific provisions of Section 57B (2) of the 1953 Act,

the suit itself stood abated and, as such, the decree passed therein had

to be construed as a nullity.

35. As opposed thereto, in Naba Kumar Basak (supra)

6

, the primary relief

sought in the suit was a declaration of title and possession and only as a

consequential relief the Patta granted in favour of the defendant was

declared to be void. Moreover, Section 61 did not nullify the effect of the

decree inasmuch as the very jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not

5

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

6

WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal and others)

and WPLRT 5 of 2026 (Jayan ta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others)

12

denuded by abating the suit itself within the contemplation of Section 61

of the 1955 Act.

36. Moreover, there were certain distinguishing features in Gorachand

Bhunia (supra)

7

. The court observed that neither the Tribunal nor any

authority under the 1955 Act has the power to declare the title or

possession of a person, which comes squarely within the ex clusive

domain of the Civil Court. The court was also considering the power of

the Tribunal to direct possession to be delivered to the Patta-holder and

came to the conclusion that once Patta had been granted and possession

handed over, the Tribunal lost power, in the event of any subsequent

instance of dispossession of the Patta holder, to direct restoration of

possession again.

37. The said circumstances are not applicable to the instant case, since this

is not a case of grant of Patta or a bar under Section 61 of the 1955 Act.

38. As opposed thereto, in Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

7

, the court was

considering the vesting of a land under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1953 Act,

which contemplate a complete vesting in the State, upon a notification

under Section 4, free from all incumbrances.

39. It was observed therein by the Division Bench that for the limited

purpose of retention under Section 6 of the 1953 Act, it has been deemed

by courts that the right of retention remains to be exercised by the

intermediaries, with the limited qualification that for the purpose of

retention, the intermediaries may approach the appropriate authority

7

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

13

later. However, in the said case, it was observed that no case of any

application or representation for retention of any land was filed by the

original intermediary, in which context it was held that the Civil Court

lost jurisdiction in view of the express bar under Section 57B of the 1953

Act, rendering the decree passed by it a nullity ab initio.

40. Hence, there is no conflict at all between the propositions laid down in

Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

8

and Naba Kumar Basak (supra)

9

respectively,

since the two judgments were rendered in different paradigms. The ratio

enunciated in Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

8

is not applicable to the present

case at all. On the contrary, the ratio laid down in Naba Kumar Basak

(supra)

9

is germane for the present consideration, since in the present

case, the State has taken a stand that the land was vested under the

1953 Act.

41. The writ petitioners have cited Sudharani Maity (supra)

10

, where a

coordinate Bench of this Court had observed that the Tribunal did not

have the power to set at naught a decree of a Civil Court. However, the

said judgment was rendered in the context of the facts therein and

cannot be said to have laid down a blanket proposition in that regard.

Notably, the Division Bench had observed in the said judgment that at

the juncture when the Tribunal had passed its judgment, several

applications were pending at the behest of the writ petitioners therein for

8

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

9

WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal and others)

and WPLRT 5 of 2026 (Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others)

10

Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & O rs., reported at 2003(1)

CHN 1

14

correction of the entries of the relevant Records of Rights relating to the

lands-in-question. In such backdrop, it was held that the Tribunal had

exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment without

disposing of such applications in the first place.

42. Even otherwise, the judgment in Sudharani Maity (supra)

11

was rendered

in the light of three previous judgments of this Court, which are also

worth examination.

43. In the first of such earlier judgments, in the matter of R.K. Mallick vs.

State of West Bengal, reported at 1975(1) CLJ 154, while deciding the

Constitutional validity of Section 57B(2) and Section 44 of the 1953 Act,

a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that it is open to any

aggrieved party to file a suit if it is found that the determination of rent

or status or incidence of a tenancy relating to the Records of Rights was

done in violation of the principles of natural justice or by an authority

having no jurisdiction in the matter. It was further observed that a civil

suit will not be barred if it is found that the matters coming under

Section 57B (2) were made in violation of the principles of natural justice

or by an authority not empowered or the matters not coming within the

mischief of the said provision. In other words, the said decision impliedly

recognizes the fact that unless such exceptional circumstances as

enumerated therein exist, a civil suit is otherwise barred under Section

57B.

11

Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. , reported at 2003(1)

CHN 1

15

44. Again, a coordinate Bench of this Court, in Tarak Chandra Dholey v.

Satyanarain Singh & Anr., reported at 1975(2) CLJ 246, held that it could

not be said that the Civil Court‟s jurisdiction has been completely taken

away to entertain a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction.

It was further held that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of

disputes not covered by the three different Clauses of Section 57B (2) of

the Act. The court further observed that in a suit for establishment of

title, a person is entitled to prove that the adverse entries in the Record

of Rights were erroneous. It was further held therein that Clause (a) of

Section 57B (2) deprives the Civil Court of its jurisdiction to entertain

suits or applications only relating to alteration of an entry in the Record

of Rights under Chapter V of the Act but there cannot be any question of

excluding the Civil Court‟s jurisdiction to entertain suits in respect of the

matters which do not arise at all or only incidentally arise for adjudication

in such proceedings under Chapter V of the Act.

45. Thirdly, in Ayubali Sardar & Anr. vs. Derajuddin Mallick & Ors., reported

at 1975(2) CLJ 305, it was held that in order to come within the purview

of Section 57B (2) (b) of the 1953 Act, the suit itself must relate to a

dispute and an adjudication involving determination of a question as to

whether the plaintiff, as a raiyat or an intermediary, is or is not entitled

to retain the land in suit under the provisions of the Act. Further, for

the bar to apply, such a question must arise for determination in the suit

and if so arises, the provisions-in-question are not invoked only because

16

a decree in favour of or against the plaintiff may have some ulterior

bearing on what land the plaintiff could claim under the Act.

46. The Division Bench in Sudharani Maity (supra)

12

also considered Union of

India vs. K.N. Sankarappa, reported at (2001) 1 SCC 582, to hold that the

Executive or Legislature, without enacting appropriate legislation, cannot

set at naught a judicial decree.

47. However, the said judgment was rendered in a c ompletely different

context than a specific bar under a statute. In the said judgment, the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court was considering the Constitutionality of Section

6(1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, where a power of revision by the

Central Government was provided in respect of decisions of the Appellate

Tribunal, which included a judicial member. In such context, the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court held that it was a travesty of justice and the rule of law,

which was a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India, that

the Executive or the Government, on which the decision of a quasi -

judicial body is supposed to be binding, would have the power to review

and/or revise the decision of a quasi-judicial Board. In such specific

context, it was observed that S ection 6(1) was ultra vires the

Constitution.

48. As opposed thereto, the bar under Section 57B of the 1953 Act does not

empower the Executive to sit in judgment over a decision of a Civil Court

but merely denudes the Civil Court itself of the power to adjudicate on

issues covered therein. In the absence of any challenge to the vires or

12

Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. , reported at 2003(1)

CHN 1

17

Constitutionality of the said provision, there is no scope for this Court to

venture a foray into such domain.

49. Even in the three judgments considered in Sudharani Maity (supra)

13

, the

bar under Section 57B (2) was not nullified but specific circumstances

exceptions, where the bar to the Civil Court‟s jurisdiction would not

operate absolutely, may be summed up in a nutshell as follows:

(a) there is a violation of the principles of natural justice;

(b) the authority passing the decision is not empowered under Section

57B (2);

(c) the dispute does not come within the mischief of Clauses (a) to (c)

of Section 57B (2); and

(d) the principal prayer in the suit is declaration of title (which the

authorities under the relevant statute are not empowered to

adjudicate), and the reliefs claimed regarding the records-of-rights

are consequential in nature.

50. Thus, by necessary implication, the primacy of the bar under Section

57B (2) was recognized in all other cases.

51. The proposition laid down in Sudharani Maity (supra)

13

has to be read

down in the context in which it was delivered and cannot be said to be a

blanket proposition nullifying the bar under Section 57B in all cases.

52. Coming to the facts of the present case in the above backdrop, the Civil

Courts (both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court), had granted a

decree declaring the title and possession of the plaintiffs/petitioners.

13

Sudharani Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. , reported at 2003(1)

CHN 1

18

The said jurisdiction, as held in Tarak Chandra Dholey (supra)

14

and

Ayubali Sardar (supra)

15

as well as Naba Kumar Basak (supra)

16

, comes

within the exclusive domain of the Civil Court.

53. Secondly, the adjudication of the Civil Courts was not in respect of

disputes specifically covered by Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 57B (2) of the

1953 Act, as enumerated above. As such, in the present case, the Civil

Court‟s decree is binding on the State, which was a party in the said

suit. In fact, the specific question of the bar under Section 57B was

raised and turned down in the said suit and the connected appeal. The

Appellate Court‟s decree, affirming that of the Trial Court, remains

unchallenged and has attained finality. Thus, the same cannot be

rendered a nullity by a subsequent pronouncement of the Tribunal.

Hence, the reliance of the Tribunal on Gorachand Bhunia (supra)

17

is

misplaced; rather, the proposition laid down in Naba Kumar Basak

(supra)

16

would be more apt in the circumstances of the present case.

54. Thus, this issue is decided in favour of the writ petitioners, by holding

that the Civil Court‟s decree is conclusive and binding on the State and

the Tribunal, being not covered by the bar under Section 57B(2) of the

1953 Act.

14

Tarak Chandra Dholey v. Satyanarain Singh & Anr. , reported at 1975(2) CLJ

246

15

Ayubali Sardar & Anr. vs. Derajuddin Mallick & Ors. , reported at 1975(2) CLJ

305

16

WPLRT 3 of 2026 (Naba Kumar Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal a nd others)

and WPLRT 5 of 2026 (Jayanta Kumar Basak @ Jayanta Basak and others Vs.

The State of West Bengal and others)

17

WPLRT No. 154 of 2025 (Gorachand Bhunia and others -vs- The State of West

Bengal and others)

19

(ii) Applicability of the Bihar Act to the subject-property

55. The State Seeks to rely on the provisions of the Bihar Act to argue that

the subject-property was a “forest” under the said Act and, as such, the

writ petitioners do not have any right thereto. However, the said

argument of the State is a contradiction in terms in view of its stand that

the land-in-question has vested in the State. Section 2(a) of the Bihar

Act categorically excludes the operation of the said Act to any land which

is vested in the Government. Thus, the dual stands taken by the State -

that the property vested in the State Government on the one hand and

that it is a “forest” covered by the Bihar Act on the other - are mutually

exclusive.

56. Section 61 of the 1953 Act provides that on the issue of a notification

under Section 60 in respect of “Transferred Territories”, pertaining to

territories transferred from the State of Bihar to the State of West Bengal

by Section 3 of the Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Act,

1956, the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 shall stand repealed, and the

provisions of the 1953 Act would apply mutatis mutandis. Going by the

said provision, there had to be a previous vesting of the subject-land

under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 for the provisions of the 1953

Act to apply. However, Section 57B (1) of the 1953 Act applies the bar

under the said provision where an order has been made under sub -

section (1) of Section 39 of the 1953 Act itself. Even Clauses (a) to (c) of

sub-section (2) of Section 57B contemplate matters relating to entries in

Records of Rights, questions as to the entitlement of retention of land by

20

raiyats and intermediaries and other matters within the provisions of the

1953 Act itself. Section 39(1) of the 1953 Act also provides that subject

to the provisions of sub-section (4) thereof, the State Government may,

“for carrying out the purposes of this Act”, make an order directing

preparation of Records of Rights.

57. Thus, since the present lands come under the category of transferred

territories, Section 61 would apply mutatis mutandis and the bar under

Section 57B, which is only applicable to orders made or action taken

under the 1953 Act itself, are not directly applicable. Such bar would be

applicable in terms if the vesting itself was under Sections 4 and 5 of the

1953 Act itself.

58. Although the eco-system provided in Sections 60 and 61 of the 1953 Act

also comes broadly within “matters within the provisions of” the said Act,

the vesting having taken place allegedly under the Bihar Land Reforms

Act, 1950, the subject-land would be deemed to vest in the State of West

Bengal only by operation of the legal fiction of “Transferred Territories”.

On a conjoint reading of Sections 61 and 57B of the 1953 Act, it is

evident that the bar under the latter provision is attracted only when the

offending action itself, be it vesting, recording of names or the like, takes

place under the 1953 Act itself and not under the Bihar Land Reforms

Act, 1950 or any other statute. Such view is bolstered by the use of the

expression “mutatis mutandis” in Section 61, necessarily excluding the

applicability of the provisions of the 1953 Act (including the bar under

21

Section 57B) where the intention of the 1953 Act, as evident from its

plain language, is otherwise.

59. From another perspective, both in the suit and the connected appeal, the

Civil Courts held categorically that despite getting opportunities, the

State failed to produce any notification under Section 14 of the Bihar

Act, which is a sine qua non for a land to be a „private forest‟ under the

said Act. The very plinth of the State‟s case is that the subject-land was

a private forest. However, in the absence of any notification in that

regard, such claim of the State falls flat. The State got ample time and

opportunity, from the institution of the civil suit in the year 1990 till

date, to produce such notification under Section 14 of the Bihar Act, if

any. Having failed to do so, we are unable to accede to the request of the

State at the stage of final hearing of the present writ petition, to grant

adjournment for it to further search for such notification. The writ

petitioners have been running from pillar to post despite having a decree

passed by a competent civil court in their favour from as long back as on

April 19, 1994, that too in a suit in which the State itself was a party.

Hence, it would be a travesty of justice and abuse of the process of court

if, at this stage, such further opportunity is granted to the State.

60. A conjoint reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the Bihar Act makes it

abundantly clear that the elements of public interest and a notification

under Section 14 are essential pre-requisites of applicability of the said

Act to a land. Such a notification has wider ramifications in respect of

adherence to principles of natural justice, since Section 15, read with

22

Clause (c) of Section 14(1), of the Bihar Act affords to “any landlord

whose interests are likely to be affected” the opportunity of filing

objection and to be heard on the same. However, in the present case,

such notification under Section 14 of the Bihar Act is conspicuous by its

absence. Furthermore, no ingredient of „public interest‟, as essentially

required under Section 13 of the Bihar Act, has also been made out.

61. In view of the above, the provisions of the Bihar Act are not applicable in

the present case at all.

62. Thus, this issue is also decided in favour of the writ petitioners and

against the State.

(iii) Whether the State is barred by estoppel from treating the

subject-land as vested

63. In Sunil Kumar Laha (supra)

18

, a learned Single Judge of this Court held

that once the State Government accepts rent from a raiyat, it cannot

backtrack and treat the land as a vested land. In the present case, the

predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners as well as the writ petitioners

have all along paid rent, which was accepted by t he State, thus,

accepting the petitioners and the predecessors to be raiyats.

Accordingly, the names of the predecessors of the writ petitioners were

also recorded in the CS Records of Rights. During the RS operations as

well, no dispute was raised in that regard. It is only much subsequent

thereto, the State has raised a bogey of the subject-land having vested in

18

Sunil Kumar Laha & Anr. versus The Stat e of West Bengal, reported at CAL.

LT. 1992(2) HC 274

23

the State. Having once accepted the writ petitioners and their

predecessors as raiyats by accepting rent from them consistently, the

State cannot now resile from such position and do a volte-face to claim

that the subject-land has vested in it. The principle of estoppel squarely

applies. Thus, from the Said perspective as well, the claim of the State

that the subject-property has vested in its cannot stand the scrutiny of

judicial review.

64. As a caveat, it must be noted that this Court is not unmindful of the

legal position that the doctrine of Estoppel may not be applicable to the

State where only instances of stray and unilateral payment of rent has

been shown and/or where the rent is paid to a different authority and

under a different statutory regime than that against or under which

Estoppel is claimed.

65. However, in the present case, the Civil Courts have specifically found

that that the predecessors-in-interest of the writ petitioners consistently

paid rents to the Government for the period between the years 1966 and

1991. Moreover, their names were also recorded as raiyats in the C.S.

Records-of-rights in respect of the subject-land, which was depicted as

„Danga‟ (as opposed to „forest‟) all along. Such acceptance of rent and

recording of their names was done under the aegis of the Land

Department of the State, against which Estoppel is claimed, that too

within the statutory paradigm of the land laws of the State of West

Bengal. Thus, the doctrine of Estoppel squarely applies to the State,

24

which cannot, all on a sudden, perform a volte face and claim the land to

have vested in it.

66. This issue is accordingly decided in favour of the writ petitioners as well.

CONCLUSION

67. In view of the above findings, this Court is of the opinion that the learned

Tribunal acted palpably without jurisdiction in dismissing the original

application of the writ petitioners. Rather, instead of perpetuating the

agony of the writ petitioners, the learned Tribunal ought to have directed

the concerned BL & LRO outright to correct the entries in the Records of

Rights by incorporating the names of the petitioners, instead of rejecting

the writ petitioners‟ Original Application, even without further subjecting

them to procedural wrangles by sending the matter back to the

concerned BL & LRO for a further reconsideration of the writ petitioners‟

representation.

68. Accordingly, W.P.L.R.T. No. 19 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby

setting aside the impugned judgment dated November 4, 2025 passed by

the Fourth Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in

Original Application No. 2640 of 2025 (LRTT).

69. The Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, Purulia-II (respondent no. 3

herein) is directed to correct the Records-of-Rights in respect of the

subject-land by entering the names of the writ petitioners therein and

effecting the necessary consequential rectifications to the Records-of-

25

Rights in respect of the character of the subject-land and the capacity in

which the writ petitioners hold the same.

70. Such exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible, positively

within three months from the date of communication of this order to

respondent no. 3.

71. There will be no order as to costs.

72. The parties to the present writ petition and all concerned shall act on the

server copy of this judgment, coupled with a covering letter issued by the

learned Advocates for the parties, if any, for the purpose of compliance,

instead of insisting upon prior production of a certified copy of this

judgment.

73. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon

compliance of all requisite formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)