R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1638 of 2013

With

R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 734 of 2014

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK

==========================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No

==========================================================

STATE OF GUJARAT

Versus

PATHAN FAKRUDIN KALU BASHIRKHAN & ORS.

==========================================================

Appearance:

MS JYOTI BHATT ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Appellant(s)

No. 1

MR PRATIK B BAROT(3711) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.

1,2,3,4,5,6

==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M.

PRACHCHHAK

Date : 24/08/2026

JUDGMENT

1.Both the appeals arise from the same FIR registered at Mehsana

Taluka Police Station and from the same incident. Therefore, both the

present appeals are decided through this common judgment.

2.The appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under

Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the

judgment and order dated 31.07.2013 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana (hereinafter be referred to as “the

trial Court”) in Sessions Case No.39 of 2012, whereby the trial Court

has acquitted the original accused (respondents herein) from the

Page 1 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and Sections 3 and 7 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

3. Short facts of the prosecution case are that the complainant -

Nasrullakhan Nannamiya Pathan, father of deceased Shabanaben,

registered a complaint against present accused with Mehsana Taluka

Police Station, which was registered as I.C.R.NO.219 of 2011 for the

offences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 306 and 114 of the Indian

Penal Code and Section 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. That, on

04.06.2005, marriage of daughter of the complainant viz. Shabanabibi

was solemnized with accused no.1-Fakrudin Pathan and after

marriage, she was residing at her matrimonial home with accused

persons in joint family. That, in the year 2006, she was subjected to

physical harassment and therefore, she went to Patan at her parental

home, however, after settling matters, she returned back to her

matrimonial home. That, the accused again taunted the deceased

about lack of dowry and how she had been unable to bear children

and accused no.6, Hanifabibi had also subjected the deceased to

mental torture. That, in the year-2009, the accused persons asked the

deceased to bring Rs.50,000/- from her father’s home. That, the

deceased’s father gave her Rs.50,000/- as asked but accused

continued to cause physical and mental harassment to the deceased.

That, the deceased being frustrated with the harassment committed

suicide by hanging herself from a fan. Hence, a complaint was lodged

by the complainant before Mehsana Taluka Police Station for the

aforesaid offences. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was

submitted into the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Mehsana.

3.1The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial

Page 2 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

Court for the aforesaid offences against the accused. On being

explained it to them, the accused have denied having committed any

offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for

trial and hence, the case was tried by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Mehsana.

4.It appears from the records that to prove the case, the

prosecution has examined 17 witnesses and also produced 34

documentary evidences.

5.After closure of the evidence, the statements of the accused

under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 have been

recorded wherein they denied of having committed any offence and

have stated that they are innocent.

6.After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on

records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has

acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them.

7.Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment

and order of acquittal the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred

these appeals.

8.Heard Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for

the appellant – State of Gujarat and Mr. Pratik Barot, learned counsel

for the respondents – accused at length.

9.Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for

the appellant – State of Gujarat has submitted the same facts which

are narrated in the memo of appeal and has also submitted that the

Page 3 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

prosecution has examined witnesses and produced documentary

evidence, despite this fact, the trial Court has not considered the

same in its true and proper perspective in passing the judgment and

order of acquittal. Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor,

while referring to the entire oral as well as documentary evidence,

has assailed the impugned judgment and order and submitted that

the trial Court has not taken into consideration the evidence

connecting the accused to the alleged offence in its proper

perspective and even the prosecution has been able to prove the

charges levelled against the accused. She has submitted that a vital

piece of evidence, namely, the letter written by the deceased,

specifically mentioned that all the present respondents in both the

appeals were responsible for the incident of suicide and that they

should be punished for the said incident. However, this vital piece of

evidence was not properly appreciated by the trial Court while

passing the impugned judgment and order. She has submitted that

the prosecution witnesses had categorically stated before the trial

Court, with regard to the role attributable to each of the accused

regarding the ill-treatment and harassment caused to the deceased,

and the same had been stated in detail in their depositions. However,

the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence led by the

prosecution. She has further contended that since the death of the

deceased had occurred within a period of seven years of her

marriage, the trial Court ought to have drawn the presumptions under

Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act against the

respondents. She has submitted that the witnesses have fully

supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial Court has

not appreciated the same and passed the judgment and order of

acquittal which is illegal and unjust. She has submitted that it is

settled legal position that the evidence of a single witness is sufficient

Page 4 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

for conviction if the same is reliable and trustworthy and in the

present case, though the evidence of all the witnesses are reliable

and trustworthy, without any cogent reason, the trial Court has

disbelieved and discarded the evidence of the witnesses.

9.1According to Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the

trial Court ought to have convicted the accused and ought to have

imposed necessary sentence. She has prayed to allow the present

appeals and to quash and set aside the impugned judgments and

orders of acquittal.

10.Per contra, Mr. Barot, learned counsel for the respondents –

accused has supported the impugned judgments and orders and has

submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error of law and

fact in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them.

He has submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against

the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,

the trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant

has failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused. He has

also submitted that there is no iota of evidence to connect the

accused with the alleged crime in question.

10.1 Mr. Barot, learned counsel has submitted that, from the

evidence of the independent witness, PW-6, Gadhvi Vasantiben

Vijaydan Jethidan, who was a neighbour of the deceased and had

reached the place of the incident first in point of time as a chance

witness, had found that the deceased had hanged herself. Thereafter,

she immediately called another neighbour, Gohil Vinodbhai

Karshanbhai, who was examined by the prosecution as PW-7. He has

submitted that it clearly transpires from their evidences that they had

Page 5 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

never heard any quarrel between the husband and wife. He has

submitted that it was further revealed from the evidence of these

witnesses that only the deceased and her husband were residing in

the said quarter and that no other family members were residing at

the said address, as all of them were residing at different places. He

has submitted that in light of these facts, the allegations made

against the other respondents-accused are not supported by the

evidence of these independent witnesses, and no specific role was

attributed to them. Therefore, under such circumstances, the

prosecution failed to establish the charges against the respondents-

accused.

10.2 Mr. Barot, learned counsel has further contended that so far as

the allegation regarding the demand of Rs.50,000/- by the

respondents-accused is concerned, there was no satisfactory

explanation given by the complainant in his evidence as to on which

date, at what time, and to whom he had handed over the said amount

of Rs.50,000/- and when the complainant was questioned by the

defence, he did not give any satisfactory answer to the said

questions. He has contended that as the amount, if any, was not paid

at the time of the marriage, it could not be said to constitute dowry.

He has submitted that the alleged payment of Rs. 50,000/- was not

proved by the complainant through his evidence, nor did he produce

any documentary evidence to establish that he had paid the said

amount and therefore, the charges under Sections 3 and 7 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act were rightly disbelieved by the trial Court.

10.3 Mr. Barot, learned counsel has submitted that from the

evidence of the Investigating Officer, particularly during his cross-

examination, it was admitted before the trial Court that, during the

Page 6 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

course of the investigation, no evidence was found to show that, for

more than one month prior to the incident, any of the accused had

visited the house of the deceased. He has further submitted that from

the evidence it is revealed that the accused-Fakrudin Pathan, for more

than five days prior to the incident, had remained present at the

hospital at Mehsana, as his father was admitted there and the

accused-Fakrudin Pathan visited his house only for the purpose of

taking bath and changing his clothes. He has submitted that during

the last five days, there was not even a remote allegation of

harassment at the hands of respondent No. 1, supported by any

cogent evidence produced by the prosecution and thus, the trial Court

has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order. He has prayed

to confirm the impugned judgments and dismiss the present appeals.

11.I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and

perused the materials on record. On perusal of the impugned

judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, the

questions that arise for determination are as under:-

(1)whether the trial Court has rightly justified in passing the

judgment and order of acquittal;

(2)whether the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence

led by the prosecution in recording the reasons;

(3)whether there is any illegality, irregularity and perversity in

the impugned judgment and order of acquittal;

(4) whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that

the letter was written by the deceased;

(5)whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the

charge regarding the payment of Rs.50,000/- by the

complainant to the respondents-accused;

Page 7 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

(6)whether the prosecution proved the charges under Sections

498A, 306 and 114 of the IPC, and whether the trial court

failed to draw the statutory presumptions under Sections 113A

and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act against the respondents-

accused;

12.On perusal of the records it appears that accused-Fakrudin

Pathan, married the daughter of the complainant on 04.06.2005, i.e.,

approximately six years prior to the date of the incident. It appears

that a Sata marriage had taken place, the sister-in-law of the

deceased, namely, Merajbibi Pathan, was married to the brother of

the deceased, Vasim Khan Nasrulakhan, and their marriage took place

on 05.06.2005. It appears that on 23.11.2011, the complainant along

with his wife and daughter-in-law-Merajbibi, visited the hospital at

Mehsana on account of the illness of accused-Pathan Bashirkhan

Hasamkhan, who was the father of respondent No. 1 and who was

operated upon at the hospital, and therefore, respondent No. 1, along

with his brother, was present at the hospital to take care of his ailing

father. Thereafter, on 25.11.2011, it was alleged that the deceased

made a telephone call to her father regarding the taunting and ill-

treatment allegedly meted out to her by her sister-in-law – Merajbibi.

However, it appears that there is no evidence produced by the

prosecution to establish that the deceased had made any telephone

call to her father on the 25.11.2011. No telephone call details or other

corresponding evidence have been brought on record by the

prosecution. It appears that on 25.11.2011, on account of the

altercation with her sister-in-law, the deceased committed suicide by

hanging herself. It appears that this information was immediately

conveyed to the complainant and his family members, who

Page 8 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

immediately reached the place of the incident and in their presence,

the inquest panchnama and the statements of the witnesses, as well

as the panchnama of the scene of offence, were recorded.

Initially, the case was registered as an accidental death, being entry

No. 38 of 2011, before the concerned police station, and the

investigation was thereafter proceeded with. It appears that during

the course of the inquest proceedings conducted by the Executive

Magistrate in the presence of independent panch witnesses, the so-

called letter written by the deceased was not found on the body of the

deceased. The body of the deceased was examined in the presence of

independent witnesses, including an examination of her private parts,

but no such letter was found at that time. It is further revealed that

the dead body of the deceased was taken to the hospital in a private

car of the complainant. Therefore, there is every possibility that

during such transit, the said letter was placed on or in the body of the

deceased. Consequently, when the body reached the hospital, the

doctor allegedly recovered the said letter from the dead body.

Therefore, the trial Court has rightly discarded this piece of evidence,

even the independent witnesses did not support the case that the

said letter was found from the body of the deceased. This also

includes the evidence of the Executive Magistrate, who is a

completely independent witness, as well as the Investigating Officer,

who had initially investigated the accidental death entry.

13.So far as the allegation regarding the advancement of a sum of

Rs.50,000/- to the respondents-accused is concerned, PW-1 -

Nasrullakhan Nannamiya Pathan was cross-examined at length by the

defence, but he failed to explain the said allegation. It appears that

the alleged payment of Rs.50,000/- was not proved by the

complainant through his evidence, nor did he produce any

Page 9 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

documentary evidence to establish that he had paid the said amount.

Therefore, the alleged advancement of Rs.50,000/- to the respondents

was also not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It is

further revealed from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that,

during the six-year span of the marriage, the deceased twice went to

her parental home and resided there for approximately 18 months on

one occasion and for one year on the other occasion and it also

appears that her sister-in-law had also not come to the matrimonial

home, i.e., the complainant's home. It appears that the elders and

family members had intervened in the alleged dispute between the

respondents and the deceased and the matter was settled internally

and after the persuasion of the elders, the deceased was again sent

back to her matrimonial home. It appears that during the course of

investigation, it was revealed that, for one month prior to the incident,

no family member of respondent No. 1 had visited the SRP Quarters at

ONGC Colony, Palavasna. Therefore, the statement of the complainant

that, on 25.11.2011, he received a telephone call from the deceased

wherein she had complained against her sister-in-law, Merajbibi,

alleging that she had visited the house, taunted her, and subjected

her to harassment, is not at all established by the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses. Except for the interested witnesses, namely

PW-1, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-13, no other witness has deposed

regarding any harassment or ill-treatment allegedly meted out to the

deceased. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish this

fundamental fact and, more particularly, the basic ingredients of

Sections 306, 498-A and 107 of the IPC, read with Sections 113-A and

113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

14.So far as the allegations under Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act are concerned, no satisfactory evidence has been

Page 10 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

produced by the prosecution. The evidence of PW-1 itself creates

serious doubt regarding this aspect, and, during his cross-

examination, the allegation regarding the advancement of Rs.50,000/-

has been completely washed away. If the evidence of PW-14 and PW-

16 is considered, both being police witnesses, their testimony does

not support the prosecution's case regarding the alleged ill-treatment

or harassment of the deceased. Thus, the prosecution has failed to

establish the charges against the respondents beyond reasonable

doubt. It is well settled, in light of the principles enunciated by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, that unless and until the prosecution places

sufficient evidence before the Court to establish that the deceased

was subjected to harassment or cruelty, the Court cannot draw an

inference against the respondents-accused under Sections 113-A and

113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Unless and until any abetment,

instigation or any provocation is proved by the prosecution as

provided under section 107 of the IPC, the charge under section 306

read with 498A of the IPC cannot stand on its own. In the present

case, there is no cogent evidence to establish any such abetment or

instigation on the part of the respondents-accused.

14.1 At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer and rely upon the

decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ramesh

Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2001 (9) SCC 618,

more particularly, paragraph no. 11 and the case of Ram Pyarey Vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2025 (6) SCC 820, more

particularly, paragraph no. 12, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has observed that for the abetment of suicide punishable u/s 306 of

the IPC, now, it is well settled that the presumption under section 113

B of the Evidence Act is required to be proved that continuous cruelty

was meted out to the deceased.

Page 11 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

14.2The relevant para – 12 of Ram Pyarey (supra) passed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as under:-

“12. The law as regards the abetment of suicide punishable

under Sections 306 of the IPC is now well settled. It appears that

the Courts below laid much emphasis on Section 113B of the

Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Evidence Act").

Section 113A of the Evidence Act talks about presumption.

Section 113A and Section 113B read thus:-

113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a

married woman:- When the question is whether the

commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by

her husband or any relative of her husband and it is

shown that she had committed suicide within a period of

seven years from the date of her marriage and that her

husband or such relative of her husband had subjected

her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to

all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide

had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of

her husband.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty"

shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

113B. Presumption as to dowry death:- When the

question is whether a person has committed the dowry

death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her

death such woman had been subjected by such person to

cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any

demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such

person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, "dowry death"

shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian

Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

15.If the ingredients of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code are

considered, the same have been clearly dealt with by the Hon'ble

Page 12 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

Supreme Court in the case of Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of

Andhra Pradesh reported in (2010) 1 SCC 750. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed that there must be a clear and

proximate act of instigation or abetment on the part of the accused

which has led to the commission of suicide. Unless such an act or

omission on the part of the accused is proved beyond reasonable

doubt, the accused cannot be held guilty of an offence under Section

306 IPC.

15.1The Section 306 of the IPC is reproduced as under:

“Section 306:Abetment of suicide

If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of

such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also

be liable to fine.”

16.At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions in

the case of (1) Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in

(2001) 9 SCC 618, (2) State of Gujarat Vs. Bhaveshbhai Manilalbhai

Patel reported in 2025 (2) GLR 923, (3) Ram Pyare Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh reported in (2025) 6 SCC 820, (4) State of Gujarat Vs. Haji

Haroon Meman reported in 2026 (0) JX (Guj) 105 and (5) State of

Gujarat Vs. Ashwinbhai Naginbhai Tandel reported in 2025 (0) JX(Guj)

357.

17.Therefore, in light of the facts stated hereinabove, the

submissions advanced by both sides, and upon perusal of the

impugned judgment and order, as well as the reasons recorded by the

trial Court in the impugned judgment, it is clear that the prosecution

has miserably failed to establish the charges against the respondents.

Page 13 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

The trial Court has considered the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses individually and in detail and has dealt with the depositions

of each witness. After appreciating the evidence on record, the trial

Court, has rightly recorded the reasons while passing the impugned

judgment. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the trial Court

has not committed any error of facts and law in passing the impugned

judgments and orders and there is no any illegality and infirmity found

in the judgments and orders.

18.It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate

Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the

evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However,

Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is

double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption

of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of

criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be

innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law.

Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption

of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened

by the trial Court.

19.Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis

of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the

finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while

exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the

Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of

acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some

manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived

at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be

characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the

Page 14 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the

judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court

has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the

conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has

committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence

on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such

circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just

decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether

the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with

which they are charged.

20.The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka

reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos.

42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in

[2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated

the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in

paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble

Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of

Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more

particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete

agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

21.It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of

Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-

Page 15 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the

general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa

and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of

the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a

judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:

“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,

reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the

order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such

power and an appellate court on the evidence before it

may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact

and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and

compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very

strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring

mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive

powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.

Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of

language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate

court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of

the court to review the evidence and to come to its own

conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in

case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of

the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is

available to him under the fundamental principle of

criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be

presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a

competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having

secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is

further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial

court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis

of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not

disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge

Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential

for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly

Page 16 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for

discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able

to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It

was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it

would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a

contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is

absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly

finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject

their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of

the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this

light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing

with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant

Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered

judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the

benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”

22.Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears

that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with

the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to

prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the

alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the

evidence on record.

23.On perusal of the impugned judgments and orders, it clearly

transpires that the concerned Court has not committed any error of

fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting

the accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-

appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution

has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused

beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgments and

orders of the concerned Court are sustainable and the present

appeals are liable to be dismissed.

24.In view of the above, the present appeals are devoid of merits

and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, they are dismissed. Both

Page 17 of 18

R/CR.A/1638/2013(GJHC240447932013) JUDGMENT DATED: 24/08/2026

the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the

concerned Court are hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled.

Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court

forthwith.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)

ANUSRI

Page 18 of 18