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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 30 of 2005

PETITIONER:

State of Haryana

RESPONDENT:

Mahender Singh & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/2007

BENCH:

S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2005

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2005

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2007 in

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2005

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. A circular letter issued by the State of Haryana laying down criteria

for pre-mature release of the prisoners has been declared to be

unconstitutional by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court

by reason of the impugned judgment.

2. Respondents herein are life convicts. They were chargesheeted for

commission of an offence of murder of Ran Singh, Rattan Singh and Satbir

Singh. They have been found guilty thereof by a judgment of conviction

and sentence dated 25.01.1988. Indisputably, their appeals before the High

Court as also this Court [since reported in (1995) 5 SCC 187] had been

dismissed.

3. The State of Punjab in exercise of its power conferred upon it under

the Prisons Act, 1894 made rules. They have statutory force. Sub-rules (a),

(b), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 2 read as under:

"(a) "prisoner" includes a person committed to

prison in default of furnishing security to keep the

peace or be of good behaviour;

(b) "class I prisoner" means a thug, a robber by

administration of poisonous drugs or a

professional, hereditary or specially dangerous

criminal convicted of heinous organized crime,

such as dacoity;

(c) "class 2 prisoner" means a dacoit or other

person convicted of heinous organized crime, not

being a professional, hereditary, or specially

dangerous criminal;

(d) "class 3 prisoner" means a prisoner other

than a class 1 or class 2 prisoner;

(f) "life convict" means \026

(i) a class 1 or class 2 prisoner whose

sentence amounts to twenty-five years'

imprisonment, or

(ii) a class 3 prisoner whose sentence

amounts to twenty years' imprisonment"

4. Rules 20 and 21 of the said Rules read thus:

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"20. When a life-convict being a class 1 prisoner

has earned such remission as entitles him to

release, the Superintendent shall report accordingly

to the Local Government with a view to the

passing of orders under section 401 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898.

21. Save as provided by rule 20, when a

prisoner has earned such remission as entitles him

to release, the Superintendent shall release him."

5. It, however, appears that on 12.07.1910, a note was appended to the

existing Rules 20 and 21 which is in the following terms:

"The intention of these rules is (a) that the cases of

class I life-convicts, or class II or class III life-

convict who have more than one sentence for

offences committed either before their admission

to Jail or while in jail, and of any other life-

convicts in whose cases the local Government may

have deemed it desirable, should be submitted for

the special orders of the local Government as to

whether release should be granted, and if so, on

what conditions (such conditions must, it should be

noted, be prescribed by order under section 401,

Code of Criminal Procedure), and (b) that all other

convicts should, on the expiry of their sentences,

less the periods of remission earned, be released

unconditionally without any special orders from

the Local Government."

The Punjab Rules were amended on 9.03.1962, in terms whereof, 'life

convict' has been defined to mean 'prisoner whose sentence amounts to 20

years imprisonment'.

6. Indisputably, the State of Punjab had been issuing instructions in

relation to pre-mature release of the convicts from time to time. In the year

1988, when the respondents were convicted, the Rules which were

applicable were of 27.02.1984; relevant portion whereof is as under:

"The Haryana Government vide letter No. 7483/2JJ/77/30099 dated

28.11.1987 had directed that cases of life convicts of the following two

categories be put up to the State Level Committee for review of their

premature release and final decision of the State Government thereon. The

categories are:

1.

Adult male life convicts

After completion of 8-1/2 years of

substantive sentence and 14 years

sentence including remission.

2.

Female and Juvenile life

convicts who were below 20

years of age at the time of

commission of offence.

After completion of 6 years of

substantive sentence and 10 years

sentence including remission."

7. On or about 28.09.1988, the said instructions were amended in the

following terms:

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"(a).

Convicts whose death

sentence has been commuted

to life imprisonment by the

President of India or by the

Governor of Haryana on

acceptance of mercy petition.

Their cases will be reviewed after

completion of 14 years actual

sentence including

undertrial/detention period. In case

of very good conduct in jail for 12

years, their cases will be considered

after 12 years of actual

imprisonment including undertrial/

detention period.

(b)

Juvenile life convicts below

the age of 18 years at the time

of commission of offence and

female life convicts.

Their cases may be considered after

6 years actual sentence including

undertrial/ detention period,

provided the total of period of such

detention including remissions is

not less than 10 years.

(c)

Adult life convicts (above 18

years) not convicted for

heinous crimes as defined in

(d) below.

Their cases may be considered after

completion of 8 = years of

substantive detention including

undertrial/ detention period,

provided that the total period of

such detention including remissions

is not less than 14 years.

(d)

Adult life convicts involved

in heinous crimes such as

dowry deaths, bride burning,

husband killing and cases

disclosing great depravity of

character and greed and those

involving extreme brutality,

murder with rape, murder

while undergoing life

sentence, organized and

professional crimes of

heinous nature like dacoity

with murder and life convicts,

who are dangerous and

hardened criminals as

evidenced for example from

cumulative sentences,

persistent bad conduct in the

prison and those who could

not for some definite reasons

be prematurely released

without danger to public

safety.

After undergoing 14 years actual

detention including undertrial/

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detention period.

(e)

Persons sentenced to life

imprisonment inclusive of

those convicted of crimes

under (d) above and in whose

cases death sentence has been

commuted to life

imprisonment but who are

suffering from terminal

illness like cancer or

tuberculosis likely to result in

death in the near future.

These prisoners may be considered

for release irrespective of the

detention undergone on report of

Medical Board designated by the

Government. Medical re-

examination of the convict should

be done 3 months after such release

for the confirmation of the disease.

Conditions of release should

contain the provision regarding

medical re-examination and re-

admission to the prison if patient is

not found to be suffering from such

a disease or is on the road to

recovery."

8. From the 1984 and 1988 instructions, it would appear that there did

not exist any category of a life convict involved in a heinous crime apart

from the ones stated therein.

Yet again on 19.11.1991, the policy was modified to the following

effect:

"2(b)

Adult life convicts who have

been imprisoned for life but

whose cases are not covered

under (a) above and who have

committed crime which are

not considered heinous as

mentioned in clause (a)

above.

Their cases may be considered after

completion of 10 years of actual

sentence including their trial

period, provided that the total

period of such sentence including

remission is not less than 14 years.

*** *** ***

5. Such cases will be put to the Governor through the Minister for Jails

and the Chief Minister, with full background of the prisoner and

recommendations of the State Level Committee, alongwith the copy of

judgment etc. for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution of India."

9. Similar provisions were again made by reason of a policy statement

made on 4.02.1993.

10. Concededly, the Government of India, Ministry of Home issued

instructions for revising the rules made under Section 59(5) of the Prisons

Act, 1894 wherein the following recommendations were made:

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"1\005"Transportation for life" or "Imprisonment for

life" should be taken to mean imprisonment for 20

years in practice. However, in treating

"transportation or imprisonment for life" as a term

of 20 years' imprisonment, necessary distinction

between different classes of prisoners can be

adequately allowed for, when reckoning

remissions before release of prisoners".

*** *** ***

3. In view of the decision referred to in para 1

above, according to which the period of 25 years'

imprisonment in case of class I and II prisoners,

has been reduced to 20 years. The Government of

India consider that it would be desirable to amend

the relevant Remission Rules also for the purpose.

As, however, those powers are vested in the State

Government under section 59(5) of the Prisons

Act, 1894, I am to suggest that the State

Government may consider taking necessary steps

to amend the relevant provisions of the Remission

Rules at an early date \026 This Ministry may be

informed of the action taken in the matter."

11. Paragraphs 516-B and 635 of the Punjab Jail Manual read as under:

"516-B. ( a) With the exception of females and of

males who were under 20 years of age at the time

of commission of offence, the cases of every

convicted prisoner sentenced to :

(i) Imprisonment for life,

(ii) Imprisonment/s for life and term/s of

imprisonment,

(iii) Cumulative periods of rigorous imprisonment

aggregating to more than 14 years,

( iv ) A single sentence of more than 20 years:

(a) who has undergone a period of detention in jail

amounting together with remission earned to 14

years, shall be submitted through the Inspector-

General of Prisons, Punjab for the orders of the

State Government,

(b) the case of a female prisoner and of a male

prisoner under 20 years of age at the time of

commission of offence , who is undergoing\027

(i) Imprisonment/s for life,

( ii) Imprisonment/s for life and a term/s of

imprisonment,

(iii) Cumulative periods of rigorous imprisonment

aggregating to more than 10 years or,

(iv) A single sentence of more than 20 years shall

be submitted through the Inspector-General of

Prisons, Punjab, for the orders of the State

Government when the prisoner has undergone a

period of detention in jail amounting together with

remission earned to 10 years,

( v ) Notwithstanding anything contained above, a

Superintendent, Jail may, in his discretion, refer at

any time, for the orders of the State Government

through the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab,

the case of any prisoner sentenced to imprisonment

for life whose sentence might in the

Superintendent's opinion be suitably commuted

into a term of imprisonment.

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635. Scale of award of remission \026 Ordinary

remission shall be awarded on the following scale

\026

(a) two days per month for thoroughly good

conduct and scrupulous attention to all prison

regulations.

(b) two days per month for industry and the due

performance of the daily task imposed.

12. Paragraph 647 is in pari materia with Rule 20 of the Statutory Rules.

13. The State of Haryana, however, formulated a policy in regard to pre-

mature release of life convicts in terms whereof the cases for remission were

required to be considered after completion of 10 years of actual

imprisonment and 14 years including remission. The said policy, however,

was reformulated on or about 12.04.2002; the relevant portion whereof is as

under:

"Convicts whose death sentence has

been commuted to life imprisonment

and convicts who have been

imprisonment for life having

committed a heinous crime such as :-

(i) Murder after rape repeated chained

rape/ unnatural offences.

(ii) Murder with intention for the

ransom.

(iii) Murder of more than two persons.

(iv) Persons convicted for second time

for murder.

(v) Sedition with murder.

Their cases may be considered after

completion of 20 years of actual

sentence and 25 years total

sentence with remissions.

(a) Convicts who have been

imprisoned for life having committed

a heinous crime such as:

(i) Murder with wrongful confinement

for extortion/ robbery.

(ii) Murder while undergoing life

sentence

(iii) Murder with dacoity

(iv) Murder with offence under TADA

Act, 1987

(v) Murder with untouchability

(offences) Act, 1955

(vi) Murder in connection with dowry.

(vii) Murder of a child under the age

14 years.

Their cases may be considered after

completion of 14 years of actual

sentence including their trial

period, provided that the total

period of such sentence including

remissions is not less than 20

years."

14. The writ petition preferred by the respondents questioning the

constitutionality of the said policy decision has been allowed by the High

Court on the premise that no discrimination could be made inter se amongst

the life convicts; all of them being similarly situated and, thus, the purported

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classification on the ground of number of murders was arbitrary and

discriminatory.

15. The State of Haryana is, thus, before us.

16. Mr. P.N. Misra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant, submitted that the State having an unfettered right to formulate a

policy decision in regard to remission of sentence, the High Court

committed a manifest error in arriving at the aforementioned conclusion;

particularly, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 54 and 55

of the Indian Penal Code and Section 433A of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

17. The learned counsel would contend that the executive government of

the State in exercise of its constitutional power under Article 161 of the

Constitution of India can formulate such a policy decision and the same has

been approved by this Court and in that view of the matter it can also

reformulate the policy from time to time.

18. Article 14, learned counsel would contend, does not forbid reasonable

classification. Such a policy decision having been formulated for the benefit

of the convicts themselves, as in terms of Section 433A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, a convict does not have any constitutional or statutory

right of remission of sentence, cannot be held to be unconstitutional.

19. Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the right to be considered

for obtaining remission itself is a fundamental right. According to the

learned counsel, the said policy decision, if taken into consideration in the

backdrop of the criminal case in which the respondents had been convicted,

would lead to an inference of hardship inasmuch as although they have been

found to be guilty for murder of more than one person, the same arose out of

a land dispute, and although not accepted by the Trial Court, a plea of self-

defence was also raised.

20. Mr. B. Malik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some of

the respondents, supplemented the submissions of Mr. Hansaria stating that

no policy decision could be formulated in derogation of the Statutory Rules

and in any event, the said policy decision would have prospective operation

and, thus, would not apply in the fact of this case, as the respondents have

been convicted in the year 1988.

21. The State indisputably is entitled to take a prison policy as contra-

distinguished from a sentencing policy. The Prisons Act, 1894 was enacted

to amend the law relating to Prisons. Sub-section (5) of Section 59 thereof

empowers the State Government to make rules for the award of marks and

shortening of sentences. The State of Punjab, pursuant to the said power,

framed rules.

22. The Rules put the convicts into three categories. It also defines the

term 'life convicts'. Whereas a classification had been made from amongst

the convicts having regard to the gravity of the offences committed by them,

indisputably no classification has been made on the basis of the number of

deaths which might have taken place at the hands of the persons. The State

apart from making the Statutory Rules, as noticed hereinbefore, had been

issuing executive instructions.

23. Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for power to

suspend or remit sentences. Section 433 provides for power to commute

sentence. Section 433A, which was inserted in the Code of Criminal

Procedure by Act No. 45 of 1978 and which came into force with effect

from 18.12.1978, provides that 'notwithstanding anything contained in

Section 432, no convict shall be released from prison unless he has served at

least 14 years of imprisonment where a sentence of imprisonment for life

has been imposed'.

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24. We may also notice Sections 54 and 55 of the Indian Penal Code

which read as under:

"54 - Commutation of sentence of death : In every

case in which sentence of death shall have been

passed, the appropriate Government may, without

the consent of the offender, commute the

punishment for any other punishment provided by

this Code.

55 - Commutation of sentence of imprisonment for

life : In every case in which sentence of

imprisonment for life shall have been passed, the

appropriate Government may, without the consent

of the offender, commute the punishment for

imprisonment of either description for a term not

exceeding fourteen years."

25. It is true that no convict has a fundamental right of remission or

shortening of sentences. It is also true that the State in exercise of its

executive power of remission must consider each individual case keeping in

view the relevant factors. The power of the State to issue general

instructions, so that no discrimination is made, is also permissible in law.

26. The question, however, which would inter alia arise for consideration

is as to whether new policy decision adopted by the State of Haryana will

have a prospective operation.

27. At the point of time when the respondents were convicted, viz., in the

year 1988, for consideration of their cases for remission, the following

conditions were required to be fulfilled:

(i) They should have undergone at least 8 = years of the substantive

or actual sentence

(ii) They should have also undergone 14 years of sentence including

the period of remission earned.

Indisputably, however, the same was subject to Section 433A of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.

28. Validity or otherwise of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal

Procedure came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this

Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India and Others [(1981) 1 SCC 107]

wherein this Court inter alia held:

"54. The major submissions which deserve high

consideration may now be taken up. They are three

and important in their outcome in the prisoners'

freedom from behind bars. The first turns on the

"prospectivity" (loosely so called) or otherwise of

Section 433-A. We have already held that Article

20(1) is not violated but the present point is

whether, on a correct construction, those who have

been convicted prior to the coming into force of

Section 433-A are bound by the mandatory limit.

If such convicts are out of its coils their cases must

be considered under the remission schemes and

"short-sentencing" laws. The second plea, revolves

round "pardon jurisprudence", if we may coarsely

call it that way, enshrined impregnably in Articles

72 and 161 and the effect of Section 433-A

thereon. The power to remit is a constitutional

power and any legislation must fail which seeks to

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curtail its scope and emasculate its mechanics.

Thirdly, the exercise of this plenary power cannot

be left to the fancy, frolic or frown of Government,

State or Central, but must embrace reason,

relevance and reformation, as all public power in a

republic must. On this basis, we will have to

scrutinise and screen the survival value of the

various remission schemes and short-sentencing

projects, not to test their supremacy over Section

433-A, but to train the wide and beneficent power

to remit life sentences without the hardship of

fourteen fettered years."

29. In regard to the first point, it was held that a person convicted before

coming into force of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure goes

out of the pale thereof and will enjoy the benefits as had accrued to him.

In regard to the second point, it was held that Articles 72 and 161 of

the Constitution of India must yield to Section 433A of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

The Constitution Bench was of the opinion that remission schemes

offer healthy motivation for better behaviour, inner improvement and

development of social fibre. It was observed that remission and short

sentencing scheme provides for good guidelines for exercise of pardon

power, a jurisdiction meant to be used as often and as systematically as

possible and not to be abused, much as the temptation so to do may press

upon the men of power.

It was also opined:

"(10) Although the remission rules or short-

sentencing provisions proprio vigore may not

apply as against Section 433-A, they will override

Section 433-A if the Government, Central or State,

guides itself by the selfsame rules or schemes in

the exercise of its constitutional power. We regard

it as fair that until fresh rules are made in keeping

with experience gathered, current social conditions

and accepted penological thinking \027 a desirable

step, in our view \027 the present remission and

release schemes may usefully be taken as

guidelines under Articles 72/161 and orders for

release passed. We cannot fault the Government, if

in some intractably savage delinquents, Section

433-A is itself treated as a guideline for exercise of

Articles 72/161. These observations of ours are

recommendatory to avoid a hiatus, but it is for

Government, Central or State, to decide whether

and why the current Remission Rules should not

survive until replaced by a more wholesome

scheme."

30. However, in Sadhu Singh and Others v. State of Punjab [(1984) 2

SCC 310], although this Court noticed the aforementioned binding precedent

in Maru Ram (supra) without dwelling upon the question in depth, while

interpreting the provisions of paragraph 516-B of the Jail Manual, opined

that the same does not have the force of a statutory rule and, thus, it would

be open to the State Government to alter or amend or even withdraw such

executive instruction stating:

"6\005In other words any existing executive

instructions could be substituted by issuing fresh

executive instructions for processing the cases of

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lifers for premature release but once issued these

must be uniformly and invariably applied to all

cases of lifers so as to avoid the charge of

discrimination under Article 14."

The contention that those convicts who had been sentenced to death

but whose sentence on mercy petitions has been commuted to life

imprisonment will be governed by the 1976 instructions was negatived.

This Court, however, upheld the right of two convicts whose cases

were entitled to be considered for pre-mature release immediately in view of

1976 instructions. Unfortunately, the attention of this court was not drawn

to the relevant paragraphs of the decision in Maru Ram(supra).

31. We may notice that the question has been considered by this Court in

State of Punjab and Others v. Joginder Singh and Others [(1990) 2 SCC 661]

wherein it was held:

"9....Even in such cases Section 433-A of the Code

or the executive instruction of 1976 does not insist

that the convict pass the remainder of his life in

prison but merely insists that he shall have served

time for at least 14 years. In the case of other

'lifers' the insistence under the 1971 amendment is

that he should have a period of at least 8 1/2 years

of incarceration before release. The 1976

amendment was possibly introduced to make the

remission scheme consistent with Section 433-A of

the Code. Since Section 433-A is prospective, so

also would be the 1971 and 1976 amendments.

*** *** ***

11. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the

view taken by the High Court in this behalf. We

may make it clear that paragraph 516-B insofar as

it stands amended or modified by the 1971 and

1976 executive orders is prospective in

character\005"

[Emphasis supplied]

[See also State of Haryana and Another v. Ram Diya [(1990) 2 SCC

701 and Rajender and Others v. State of Haryana [(1995) 5 SCC 187].

32. A right to be considered for remission, keeping in view the

constitutional safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of the

Constitution of India, must be held to be a legal one. Such a legal right

emanates from not only the Prisons Act but also from the Rules framed

thereunder. Although no convict can be said to have any constitutional

right for obtaining remission in his sentence, he in view of the policy

decision itself must be held to have a right to be considered therefor.

Whether by reason of a statutory rule or otherwise if a policy decision has

been laid down, the persons who come within the purview thereof are

entitled to be treated equally. [State of Mysore and Another v. H.

Srinivasmurthy (1976) 1 SCC 817]

It is now well-settled that any guidelines which do not have any

statutory flavour are merely advisory in nature. They cannot have the force

of a statute. They are subservient to the legislative act and the statutory

rules. [See Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and Others

(1981) 1 SCC 166, J.R. Raghupathy and Others v. State of A.P. and Others

(1988) 4 SCC 364 and Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India 1990

(Supp) SCC 440]

33. Whenever, thus, a policy decision is made, persons must be treated

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equally in terms thereof. A' fortiori the policy decision applicable in such

cases would be which was prevailing at the time of his conviction. [See

Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Shimla v. Prem Lata Sood and

Ors., 2007 (7) SCALE 737]

34. Furthermore, if the Punjab Rules are applicable in the State of

Haryana in view of the State Reorganisation Act, no executive instruction

would prevail over the Statutory Rules. The Rules having defined 'convicts'

in terms whereof a 'life convict' was entitled to have his case considered

within the parameters laid down therein, the same cannot be taken away by

reason of an executive instruction by redefining the term 'life convict'. It is

one thing to say that the 'life convict' has no right to obtain remission but it

is another thing to say that they do not have any right to be considered at all.

Right to be considered emanates from the State's own executive instructions

as also the Statutory Rules.

Strong reliance, however, has been placed by Mr. Misra on Mohd.

Munna v. Union of India and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 417]. In that case, a

writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the

appellant therein stating that as he had undergone 21 years of imprisonment

he should be set at liberty forthwith having regard to the provisions of

Clause 751(c) of the West Bengal Jail Code and Section 6 of the West

Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992. Claim for damages was also

advanced. It was in that factual backdrop, this Court held:

"14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons

Act and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer

any authority or power to commute or remit

sentence. It only provides for the regulation of the

prisons and for the terms of the prisoners confined

therein. Therefore, the West Bengal Correctional

Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not

confer any special right on the petitioner herein."

In the said decision, unfortunately, again Maru Ram(supra) was not

considered. In any event, the respondents had inter alia prayed for payment

of damages.

35. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Misra on Epuru Sudhakar and

Another v. Govt. of A.P. and Others [(2006) 8 SCC 161]. Therein, a

Division Bench opined:

"65. Exercise of executive clemency is a matter of

discretion and yet subject to certain standards. It is

not a matter of privilege. It is a matter of

performance of official duty. It is vested in the

President or the Governor, as the case may be, not

for the benefit of the convict only, but for the

welfare of the people who may insist on the

performance of the duty. This discretion, therefore,

has to be exercised on public considerations alone.

The President and the Governor are the sole judges

of the sufficiency of facts and of the

appropriateness of granting the pardons and

reprieves. However, this power is an enumerated

power in the Constitution and its limitations, if

any, must be found in the Constitution itself.

Therefore, the principle of exclusive cognizance

would not apply when and if the decision

impugned is in derogation of a constitutional

provision. This is the basic working test to be

applied while granting pardons, reprieves,

remissions and commutations."

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There may not be any dispute with regard to the said proposition of

law. But herein we are concerned with the right of the respondents to be

considered for remission and not what should be the criteria when the matter

is taken up for grant thereof.

36. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court might not be

correct in holding that the State has no power to make any classification at

all. A classification validly made would not offend Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. We, thus, although do not agree with all the

reasonings of the High Court, sustain the judgment for the reasons stated

hereinbefore.

It appears that during pendency of the Special Leave, Respondent

Nos. 6 and 11 have already been directed to be released. No order, therefor,

is required to be passed in their case. So far as the cases of other

respondents are concerned, the same may be considered by the appropriate

authority in the light of the observations made hereinabove.

37. The appeals are dismissed with the aforementioned observations. In

view of the findings aforementioned, it is not necessary to pass any order in

the contempt matter. The contempt application is dismissed. No costs.