2026:HHC:17932

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 269 of 2013

Reserved on: 31.03.2026

Date of Decision: 18.05.2026

State of H.P. ...Appellant

Versus

Chain Singh & another ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate

General.

For the Respondent : Mr N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate

with M/s Sidharth and Shwetima

Dogra, Advocates.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 04.03.2013, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First

Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide

which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court)

were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forests Act. (Parties shall

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed

before the learned Trial Court for convenience.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned

Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences

punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and

Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act (M.V. Act). It was asserted

that the police received secret information on 13.02.2005 that a

truck bearing registration No. HP-54-2257 was transporting

Khair wood from Bhadukhar Hatli. An entry No. 6

(Ext.PW-15/A) was recorded in the Police Station, ASI Prem

Chand (PW-15), ASI Amreek Singh (PW-10), and Constable Bir

Chand were sent towards Hatli in a vehicle bearing registration

No. HP-7A-2353 being driven by Onkar Chand. A truck bearing

registration No. HP-54-2257 reached the spot after some time.

The police signalled the driver to stop the truck. The driver

identified himself as Chain Singh (accused No.1), and the person

sitting beside the driver identified himself as Balbir Singh

(accused No.2). The police checked the truck and found Khair

logs of different sizes in it. The police asked them for a permit to

transport the Khair logs, but they could not produce any permit.

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The police seized the truck vide memo (Ext.PW-10/A). Prem

Singh prepared a Rukka (Ext.PW-15/B) and handed it over to LHC

Bir Singh with a direction to take it to the Police Station for the

registration of the F.I.R. An F.I.R. (Ext.PW-15/C) was registered in

the Police Station. Prem Singh investigated the matter. He

prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-15/D). Punjab Singh (PW-1)

measured the Khair wood and found its volume to be 1.74 cubic

meters. He prepared the details (Ext.PW-1/A). The Khair wood

was handed over on Sapurdari to the forest officials vide memo

(Ext.PW-1/B). Another list (Ext.PW-5/A) of the Khair wood was

prepared. The documents of the vehicles were seized vide memo

(Ext.PW-10/B). Shashi Pal (PW-9) took the photographs

(Ext.PW-9/A-1 to Ext.PW-9/A-5) whose negatives are Ext.PW-

9/A-6 to Ext.PW-9/A-7. Accused Chain Singh could not produce

his driving license. The statements of witnesses were recorded as

per their version. It was found during the investigation that

Kashmir Singh had taken the contract of removing the Khair

wood in Jungle Ghandra vide Lot No. 103/04-05, and this Khair

wood was being transported without any documents. Hence, the

charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the learned

Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.

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3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they we re

charged with the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forests Act, to which they

pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its

case. Punjab Singh (PW-1) and Balwant Singh (PW-5) were

present during the measurement of the timber. Sushil Kalia (PW-

2) witnessed the recovery. Karnail Singh (PW-3) and Hansraj

(PW-4) had sold the Khair trees to Kashmir Singh. Surinder

Kumar Sharma (PW-6) proved the procedure for the disposal of

the dry Khair trees. Gorakh Singh (PW-7) deposed about the logs

and wood of the Khair tree. Raghubir Dass (PW-8) proved that

the work was allotted to Laxman Singh and no illicit felling was

detected. Shashi Pal (PW-9) took the photographs. ASI Amreek

Singh (PW-10) was a member of the police party who had

effected the recovery. Dy.S.P. Partap Singh (PW-11) had prepared

the challan. S.I. Tara Singh (PW-12) recorded the statements of

the witnesses. Sandeep Kumar (PW-13) witnessed the recovery.

Amar Singh (PW-14) produced the record. Inspector Prem Singh

(PW-15) investigated the matter.

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5. The accused, in their statements recorded under

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the

prosecution's case in its entirety. They claimed that a false case

was made against them due to suspicion. They did not produce

any evidence in defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the police had failed to

join any independent witnesses. The memo of recovery was not

signed by the accused, which mad e the recovery doubtful;

therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of

the Indian Forest Act.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal

asserting that the learned Trial Court had failed to appreciate the

evidence in proper perspective. The statements of prosecution

witnesses were rejected without any cogent reason. Khair wood

was released to Kashmir Singh, which proved the recovery of the

Khair wood. Learned Trial Court erred in drawing an adverse

inference for non-examination of the independent witnesses.

The recovery was effected from a lonely place in the middle of the

night, and it was not possible to join any independent witness.

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The recovery was effected on the spot, and mere failure to obtain

the signatures of the accused was not sufficient to doubt the

prosecution's case. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal

be allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set

aside.

8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate

General for the appellant/State and Mr N.S. Chandel, learned

Senior Advocate, assisted by M/s Sidharth and Shwetima Dogra,

learned counsel for the accused/respondents.

9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned counsel for the

appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in

acquitting the accused. The statements of police officials

corroborated each other. No reason was assigned in their cross-

examination to falsely implicate the accused. The recovery could

not have been held to be doubtful because the signatures of the

accused were not obtained on the memo. The incident had taken

place at a lonely place in the middle of the night, and it was not

possible to join any independent person. Therefore, he prayed

that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by

the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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10. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate for the

respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court has

assigned cogent reasons while acquitting the accused. The

learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court

should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial

Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the

present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given a considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records

carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment

of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176:

(2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of

acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on

misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and

reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have

reached. It was observed at page 440:

“12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position

that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded

by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High

Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent

perversity; that the same is based on a

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misreading/omission to consider material evidence on

record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and

only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is

possible from the evidence available on record.”

13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of

A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed:

“ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has

full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an

appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the

reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after

acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable

views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal

should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only

warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based

on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in

a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate

Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court

for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A

catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more

firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia,

Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @

Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024

INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of

Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra

Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.”

14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. Karnail Singh (PW-3) and Hans Raj (PW-4) stated in

their cross-examination that Kashmir Singh, Contractor , had

stacked the Khair wood at Khatrehar Ghangri da Pul. The police

had seized the Khair wood from that place. Neither of these

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witnesses was re-examined to clarify this part of their

testimonies. They were put forward as witnesses of truth by the

prosecution, and the statements made by them would be binding

upon the prosecution. In similar circumstances, when a witness

had supported the case of the defence, but was not re-examined

by the prosecution to clarify his testimony, it was held in

Ramsewak v. State of M.P., (2004) 11 SCC 259: 2004 SCC OnLine SC

477 that the benefit of the discrepancy would go to the defence. It

was observed at page 265:

“14…. Even assuming that there is some doubt as to the

interpretation of this part of his evidence since the same is

not clarified by the prosecution by way of re-examination,

the benefit of doubt should go to the defence which has, in

specific terms, taken a stand that the FIR came into being

only after the dead body was recovered….”

16. It was held in Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan,

(2010) 3 SCC 538: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1176: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 347

that the defence can take advantage of any statement made in the

cross-examination. It was observed at page 543:

“20. In the present case, the prosecution never declared

PWs 6, 18, 29 and 30 “hostile”. Their evidence did not

support the prosecution. Instead, it supported the defence.

There is nothing in law that precludes the defence from

relying on their evidence.

21. This Court in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of

Delhi) [(2005) 5 SCC 258: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1037] observed:

(SCC pp. 270-71, paras 30-31)

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“30. A similar question came up for consideration

before this Court in Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan

[(2005) 5 SCC 272: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1050]. In that case,

the evidence of the doctor who was examined as a

prosecution witness showed that the deceased was

being told by one K that she should implicate the

accused or else she might have to face prosecution.

The doctor was not declared ‘hostile’. The High

Court, however, convicted the accused. This Court

held that it was open to the defence to rely on the

evidence of the doctor, and it was binding on the

prosecution.

31. In the present case, evidence of PW 1 Ved Prakash

Goel destroyed the genesis of the prosecution that

he had given his Maruti car to the police, in which

the police had gone to the Bahai Temple and

apprehended the accused. When Goel did not

support that case, the accused could rely on that

evidence.”

The proposition of law stated in the said judgment is

equally applicable to the facts in hand.”

17. Therefore, the statements of these witnesses made

the prosecution's case highly suspect that recovery was effected

from the truck by the police. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450:

2008 SCC OnLine SC 1154 that when two versions are appearing on

the record, the version in favour of the accused has to be

preferred to the version which is in favour of the prosecution. It

was observed at page 471:

58. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [(1979) 1 SCC 355: 1979

SCC (Cri) 305] the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 360, para 9)

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“9. … It stems out of the fundamental principle of our

criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to

the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably

probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are

possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a

reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities

must be left out of account. To entitle an accused

person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the

possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in

favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably

probable as that against him. If the preponderance of

probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another

view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of

any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the

evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable,

even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused

person may claim, must be reasonable. ‘A reasonable

doubt, it has been remarked, ‘does not mean some

light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through

the minds of any of us about almost anything at some

time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten by

sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real

doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons.” [Salmond, J. in

his charge to the jury in R. v. Fantle [1959 Cri L Review

584] .] (emphasis supplied)

*****

63. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. [(2002) 4 SCC 85: 2002

SCC (Cri) 736] the Court repeated one of the fundamental

principles of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are

possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing

to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,

the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 89, para 7)

“7. … The golden thread that runs through the web of

administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two

views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,

one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to

his innocence, the view which is favourable to the

accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction

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limitation on the appellate court, but Judge-made

guidelines for circumspection. The paramount

consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage

of justice is avoided.”

****

66. In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna [(2005) 9 SCC

291: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1237], while dealing with an appeal

against acquittal, the Court observed: (SCC p. 299, para 17)

“17. … In such an appeal, the appellate court does not

lightly disturb the findings of fact recorded by the court

below. If, on the basis of the same evidence, two views

are reasonably possible, and the view favouring the

accused is accepted by the court below, that is

sufficient for upholding the order of acquittal.

However, if the appellate court comes to the conclusion

that the findings of the court below are wholly

unreasonable or perverse and not based on the

evidence on record, or suffer from serious illegality,

including ignorance or misreading of evidence on

record, the appellate court will be justified in setting

aside such an order of acquittal.”

67. In State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [(2007) 3 SCC 755 :

(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] this Court relied on State of

Rajasthan v. Raja Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180: 2003 SCC (Cri)

1965] (SCC pp. 186-87, para 7) and observed as under:

(Sanjay Thakran case [(2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)

162], SCC pp. 767-68, para 15)

“15. … ‘7. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be

interfered with because the presumption of innocence

of the accused is further strengthened by an acquittal.

The golden thread that runs through the web of

administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two

views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,

one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to

his innocence, the view which is favourable to the

accused should be adopted. … The principle to be

followed by the appellate court considering the appeal

against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only

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when there are compelling and substantial reasons for

doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly

unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for

interference.”

The Court further held as follows: (SCC p. 768, para 16)

“16. … it is apparent that while exercising the powers in

appeal against the order of acquittal, the court of

appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of

acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is

vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion

arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable

person, and therefore, the decision is to be

characterised as perverse. Merely because two views

are possible, the court of appeal would not take the

view which would upset the judgment delivered by the

court below.”

18. In the present case, the statements of these witnesses

established that the police had taken the Khair wood from the

bridge where they were stacked by the Contractor, and this

version has to be preferred to the version propounded by the

prosecution that the Khair wood was found in the truck bearing

registration No. HP-54-2257.

19. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the

seizure memos (Ext.PW-10/A) of the truck and Khair wood, and

the seizure memo (Ext.PW-10/B) of the documents prepared on

the spot did not contain the signatures of the accused.

20. ASI Amreek Singh (PW-10) stated that the signatures

of the accused were not obtained on the memos (Ext.PW -10/A

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and Ext.PW-10/B). He admitted that, usually, the signatures of

the person producing the articles before the police are obtained

on the seizure memo. No explanation has been provided for not

obtaining the signatures of the accused on the seizure memos.

The absence of the signatures of the accused on seizure memos

supports the statements of Karnail Singh (PW-3) and Hansraj

(PW-4) that the recovery was made from the bridge and not from

the truck.

21. The learned Trial Court had drawn an adverse

inference for non-examination of independent witnesses. It was

submitted that the recovery was effected at a lonely place in the

middle of the night, and it was not possible to join any

independent person. This explanation is stated to be rejected.

22. The police had received prior information at 7:30 p.m

that a truck was transporting timber, which could be recovered

by setting up a Nakka. The recovery was effected at 12:30 a.m.

Therefore, the police had five hours between the information and

the recovery. The police proceeded from the Police Station to the

spot and could have joined any person on the way. The police had

definite information and were not going merely on the patrolling

duty. Therefore, in these circumstances, the absence of

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independent witnesses would assume significance , and the

learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference

against the prosecution for non-examination of independent

witnesses.

23. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will

not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court

even if another view is possible.

24. No other point was urged.

25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is

dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of

26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds

in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like

amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of

this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six

months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave

Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the

leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court

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27. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the

learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

18

th

May 2026 Judge

(ravinder)