REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.132 OF 2002

State of U.P. ...Appellant

Versus

Ram Balak and Anr. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. The State of U.P. is in appeal questioning the correctness of

judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which

directed acquittal of the respondents. The learned 5

th

Additional

Sessions Judge found the respondents guilty of offence punishable

under Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in

short the ‘IPC’). Each was sentenced to death sentence for the offence

relatable to Section 302 IPC, life imprisonment for the offence

relatable to Section 376 IPC and 7 years for the offence relatable to

Section 201 IPC. The appellants preferred appeal before the High

Court and a reference was made by the Trial Court under Section 366 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’) for

confirmation of the death sentence. The High Court by the impugned

judgment found that the accusations have not been established by the

prosecution and therefore directed acquittal. Capital reference was

rejected.

2. The prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:

According to prosecution, murder and rape was committed by the

respondents on 17-11-1992 at about 7.00 A.M. in the morning when

Kumari Suneeta, the deceased victim aged about 14 years had gone to

ease herself in the nearby open field in village Jamal Nagar Police

Station Safipur District Unnao. When on 17-11-1992 at about 7.00 A.M.

Kumari Suneeta had gone to attend the call of nature in the nearby

open field, both the accused followed her and after catching hold of

her committed rape upon her and thereafter killed her by

strangulation. They thereafter concealed the dead body of Kumari

Suneeta by throwing it in the nearby Patawar. When she did not return

back to her home, the family members of Kumari Suneeta started

searching for her and ultimately at about 2.00 p.m. the dead body of

the Kumari Suneeta was found in the Patawar. After recovery of the

dead body of Kumari Suneeta, Radhey Lal (PW.1), brother of the

deceased lodged a report about the incident at Police Station Safipur

District Unnao at 3.45 P.M. on the same day. The distance of Police

Station is 6 miles from the place of the incident. Sheo Harsh Tewari

(C.W.2), Sub Inspector was present at the Police Station at the time

when the report was lodged, therefore, he immediately proceeded to the

place of the incident and reached there in the evening. He prepared

inquest report at about 4.30 P.M. and other relevant papers Ext. Ka. 6

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to Ka. 10 and sent the dead body to Mortuary for post-mortem

examination. The Investigating Officer thereafter prepared Site-plan

Ext. Ka.14 and recovered bali, Lutia, Chappal, Chaddhi etc. from the

place of the incident. The investigating Officer also recovered Salwar

and Frock which were found to be wrapped on the neck of the deceased.

It is further said that thereafter the Investigating Officer called

the Dog Squad and on the request of the Investigating Officer, Dog

Squad reached there on 18-l1-1992 at about 12.45 p.m. It is said that

the dogs after smelling the foot-print of the accused from the place

of the incident reached the house of Shiv Balak. On 2.12.1992, the

Investigating Officer arrested Ram Balak and recovered one lutia of

Shiv Balak from the place of the incident on the pointing out of

accused Ram Balak. Shiv Balak subsequently surrendered in Court. The

autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 18-11-1992

by Dr. Satya Prakash, Medical Officer District Hospital, Unnao. Ram

Balak accused after the incident visited the house of Iqbal Ahmad (CW-

1) and confessed his guilt. After completing the investigation the

Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused

persons.

Since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held.

Seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove the version

which rested on circumstantial evidence.

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The learned Trial Judge after scrutinizing the evidence on record

came to the conclusion that the prosecution has successfully proved

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore he

convicted and sentenced the respondents as mentioned above .

The respondents feeling aggrieved from the judgment and order

passed by the trial Court, filed the Criminal Appeal before the High

Court challenging their conviction and sentence as aforesaid.

The stand before the High Court was that there is no evidence at

all against the present respondents and the learned Court below

committed an error in holding that the prosecution by means of

circumstantial evidence has proved the guilt of the respondents beyond

doubt.

In the instant case there is no eye witness account. The

conviction of the respondents is based only on circumstantial

evidence. The learned Trial Judge while convicting the respondents

relied upon five circumstances, namely, (i) the motive behind the

crime was teasing of the deceased by the accused persons and

thereafter they were scolded by the deceased, (ii) the accused persons

were seen on the date and time of the incident near the place of the

incident which led to their involvement, (iii) the police Dog Squad

proved the guilt of the accused persons, (iv) the witnesses had no

reason to implicate the accused persons falsely and (v) there is no

missing link in the prosecution story.

The High Court held that the circumstances do not make a

complete chain of circumstances. There was no evidence to show that

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the accused were last seen in the company of the deceased. Merely

because they were seen near the place of incidence, that cannot be a

ground to show their involvement. The High Court noted that though

there was some reference to the alleged extra judicial confession

before CW-1 by the accused Ram Bali, the said confessional statement

was not confronted to the accused while the statement of accused Ram

Balak was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’). The High Court also found that

the evidence of this witness was not believable. Accordingly, the High

Court directed acquittal.

3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that there is a complete chain of circumstances and

therefore the High Court ought to have upheld the conviction as

recorded by the trial Court.

4. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a

case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt

can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and

circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the

accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of

Rajasthan AIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad

(AIR 1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC

446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Balwinder

Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v.

State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The circumstances from which an

inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved

beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected

with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those

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circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621), it

was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn

from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be

such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the

offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.

5. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C.

Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it

has been observed thus:

“In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the

settled law is that the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved

and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature.

Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and

there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence.

Further the proved circumstances must be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused

and totally inconsistent with his innocence....”.

6. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR 1990 SC

79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial

evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

“(1)the circumstances from which an inference of guilt

is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly

established;

(2)those circumstances should be of a definite

tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the

accused;

(3)the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form

a chain so complete that there is no escape from the

conclusion that within all human probability the crime

was committed by the accused and none else; and

(4)the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain

conviction must be complete and incapable of

explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the

guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only

be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should

be inconsistent with his innocence.

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7. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ 1104),

it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating

circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably

capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be

accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon

must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect

of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the

hypothesis of guilt.

8. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’ Circumstantial

Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be

observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged

as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond

reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden

of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact,

which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct

or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the

nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of

guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence

of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable

hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable

doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be

acquitted”.

9. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on

circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of

law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the this Court as

far back as in 1952.

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10.In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed thus:

“It is well to remember that in cases where the

evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the

circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to

be drawn should be in the first instance be fully

established and all the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such

as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to

be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of

evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused and it must be such as to show that

within all human probability the act must have been

done by the accused.”

11.A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC 1622). Therein, while

dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was

on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the

infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or

plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before

conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully

established. They are:

(1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The

circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may

be’ established;

(2)the facts so established should be consistent only

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that

is to say, they should not be explainable on any other

hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature

and tendency;

(4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis

except the one to be proved; and

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(5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as

not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the accused and must

show that in all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.

12.These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v. Rajaram

(2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh and Anr. (2003

(11) SCC 261).

13.So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is necessary to

take note of two decisions of this court. In State of U.P. v. Satish

[2005 (3) SCC 114] it was noted as follows:

“22.The last seen theory comes into play where the

time-gap between the point of time when the accused and

the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased

is found dead is so small that possibility of any

person other than the accused being the author of the

crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some

cases to positively establish that the deceased was

last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and

possibility of other persons coming in between exists.

In the absence of any other positive evidence to

conclude that the accused and the deceased were last

seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a

conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there

is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused

were seen together by witnesses PWs. 3 and 5, in

addition to the evidence of PW-2.”

14.In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. [2006 (10) SCC

172] it was noted as follows:

“27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play

where the time gap between the point of time when the

accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the

deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of

any person other than the accused being the author of

the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the

courts should look for some corroboration”.

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(See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002(8) SCC 45).)

”

15.A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab

[2005(12) SCC 438]. Factual position in the present case is almost

similar, so far as time gap is concerned.

16.Out of the circumstances highlighted above really none is of any

significance. Learned counsel for the appellant-State highlighted that

the extra judicial confession itself was sufficient to record the

conviction. On a reading of the evidence of CW-1 it is noticed that

accused Ram Balak did not a say a word about his own involvement. On

the contrary he said that he did not do anything and made some

statements about the alleged act of co-accused. Additionally, in his

examination under Section 313 of Code, no question was put to him

regarding his so called extra judicial confession. To add to the

vulnerability, his statement is to the effect that after about 11 days

of the incidence the extra judicial confession was made. Strangely he

stated that he told the police after three days of the incidence about

the extra judicial confession. It is inconceivable that a person would

tell the police after three days of the incidence about the purported

extra judicial confession which according to the witness himself was

made after eleven days.

17.Learned counsel for the State submitted that there may be some

confusion. But it is seen that not at one place, but at different

places this has been repeated by the witness.

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18.Learned counsel for the appellant also refers to a judgment of

this Court in Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR

1970 SC 283) more particularly para 11 that the Dog Squad had proved

the guilt of the accused persons. In this context it is relevant to

take note of what has been stated in para 11 which reads as follows:

“11. It was lastly urged on behalf of the appellant

that the lower courts ought not to have relied upon the

evidence of dog tracking and such evidence was not

admissible in order to prove the guilt of the appellant. The

evidence of tracker dogs has been much discussed. In Canada

and in Scotland it has been admitted. But in the United

States there are conflicting decisions:

There have been considerable uncertainty in

the minds of the Courts as to the reliability of

dogs in identifying criminals and much conflict of

opinion on the question of the admissibility of

their actions in evidence. A survey of the cases

however, reveals that most Courts in which the

question of the admissibility of evidence of

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trailing by blood-hounds has been presented take

the position that upon a proper foundation being

laid by proof that the dogs were qualified to

trail human beings, and that the circumstances

surrounding the trailer were such as to make it

probable that the person trailed was the guilty

party, such evidence is admissible and may be

permitted to go to the jury for what it is worth

as one of the circumstances which may tend to con-

nect the defendant with the Crime. Pare 378, Am.

Juris. 2nd edn. Vol. 29, p. 429.

There are three objections which are usually advanced

against the reception of such evidence. First, since it is

manifest that the dog cannot go into the box and give his

evidence on oath, and consequently submit himself to cross-

examination, the dog's human companion must go into the box

and report the dog's evidence, and this is clearly hearsay.

Secondly, there is a feeling that in criminal cases the life

and liberty of a human being should not be dependent on

canine inferences. And, thirdly, it is suggested that even

if such evidence is strictly admissible under the rules of

evidence it should be excluded because it is likely to have

a dramatic impact on the jury out of proportion to its

value. In R. v. Montgomery, 1866 NI 160 a police constable

observed men stealing wire by the side of a railway line.

They ran away when he approached them. Shortly afterwards

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the police got them on a nearby road. About an hour and half

later the police tracker dog was taken to the base of the

telegraph pole and when he had made a few preliminary sniffs

he set off and tracked continuously until he stopped in

evident perplexity at the spot where the accused had been

put into the police car. At the trial it appeared that other

evidence against the accused that they had been stealing the

wire was inconclusive and that the evidence of the behaviour

of the tracker dog was crucial to sustain the conviction. In

these circumstances the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that

the evidence of the constable who handled the dog on its

tracking and reported the dog's reactions was properly

admitted. The Court did not regard its evidence as a species

of hearsay but instead the dog was described as "a tracking

instrument'' and the handler was regarded as reporting the

movements of the instrument, in the same way that a

constable in traffic case might have reported on the beha-

viour of his speedometer. It was argued in that case that

the tracker dog's evidence could be likened to the type of

evidence accepted from scientific experts describing

chemical reactions, blood tests and the actions of bacilli.

The comparison does not, however, appear to be sound because

the behaviour of chemicals, blood corpuscles and bacilli

contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate

choice. But Dogs are intelligent animals with many thought

processes similar to the thought processes of human beings

and wherever you have thought processes there is always the

risk of error, deception and even self-deception. For these

reasons we are of the opinion that in the present state of

scientific knowledge evidence of dog tracking, even if

admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight.”

19.It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in the

said case this Court had upheld the conviction. Though in the said

case the conviction was upheld, but that was done after excluding the

evidence of Dog Squad. This Court found that the rest of the

prosecution evidence proved the charges for which the appellants

therein had been convicted.

20.Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which

is accordingly dismissed.

.................................J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

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.................................J.

(HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

New Delhi

October 3, 2008

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