2026 INSC 568 1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO (s). 3383-3385 OF 2025

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH …..APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

A.K.GABA ETC. ....RESPONDENT(s)

J U D G M E N T

PRASANNA B VARALE, J.

1. The present appeals arise from the impugned order dated

27.05.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,

Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal Nos. 967, 964 and 963 of 2014,

wherein the High Court allowed all the three appeals of the accused

respondents and acquitted the respondents of the charges levelled

2

against them. Aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the

present appeals.

BRIEF FACTS

2. The factual matrix of the case is that on 05.01.1995, R.K.

Srivastava, Superintendent, Central Excise, A.K. Gaba, Inspector,

Central Excise and Alok Gupta, Inspector, Central Excise had visited

M/s Prime Products, Kursi Road, Barabanki and also inspected the

adjoining factory, namely, M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd. R.K. Srivastava

along with other co-accused persons had seized all the available

records of M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd. without giving any

acknowledgement. Thereafter, the complainant Kuldeep Tiwari,

Retainer Consultant, visited the office of R.K. Srivastava on

10.01.1995 at about 10.00 P.M. and asked him to return all the

documents which they have taken away with them from the factory

but R.K. Srivastava had said to the complainant that unless he made

the payment of Rs.80,000/- as an illegal gratification, the documents

will not be returned to him. Feeling aggrieved, complainant Kuldeep

Tiwari lodged a First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as

‘F.I.R’) with Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Lucknow.

3

3. Thereafter, on 10.01.1995, at about 7.00 pm., complainant

alongwith shadow witness visited the office of R.K. Srivastava, where

accused, namely, A. K. Gaba and Alok Gupta were also present at

that time, R.K. Srivastava had demanded Rs.80,000/- as an illegal

gratification. On 14.01.1995, complainant alongwith the shadow

witnesses again visited the residence of Shri R.K. Srivastava with Rs.

80,000/- where the brother of the accused P.K. Srivastava was

allegedly also found sitting there. The team of the C.B.I. raided the

house of the accused, namely, R.K. Srivastava and Rs.60,000/- were

recovered from the bedroom and Rs. 20,000/- were also recovered

from the pocket of jacket of P. K. Srivastava. Both hands of R.K.

Srivastava. P.K. Srivastava and Dushyant Kumar were dipped in the

solution, on this solution turned pink. As such, R.K. Srivastava and

other accused persons were allegedly caught red -handed. After

completing the process of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed

on 11.11.1997 by the investigating agency i.e. CBI against the

accused persons for the offences under Section 120-B Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) r/w Section 7, Section

13(2) r/w13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘P.C. Act’) and Section 114 and 201 IPC read with

4

Section 7 & 13(2) P.C. Act in the Court of Special Judge, Lucknow.

Criminal Case No. 05/1997 was registered against all accused.

4. The Special Judge, Lucknow vide order dated 26.07.2014,

convicted the accused persons Shri R.K. Srivastav, Shri A.K. Gaba,

Shri Dushyant Kumar, Shri Alok Gupta U/s 120B of IPC R/W

Section 7 and 13 (1)(d) R/w Section 13(2) P.C. Act and acquitted P.K.

Srivastava by giving benefit of doubt.

5. Aggrieved by the order, the respondents herein filed Criminal

Appeal Nos. 976, 963 and 964 of 2014 before the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench challenging the order

passed by the Special Judge, Lucknow. On appreciation of evidence

in record, the High Court vide order dated 27.05.2019 allowed all the

three criminal appeals and acquitted the respondents herein.

6. Aggrieved by the said judgement of the High Court, the

appellant i.e. State of Uttar Pradesh is before us.

CONTENTIONS

7. The counsel for the appellant has contended that the High

Court has not correctly appreciated the oral and documentary

evidence produced by the prosecution. The counsel submitted that

the respondents A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta were present on

5

10.01.1995 at the time when the initial demand of bribe of Rs.

80,000/- was made by R.K. Srivastava, and that they were also

present on 07.01.1995 when the records were seized from the factory

premises of M/s. Amoli Ceraplast Ltd. without issue of any seizure

receipt. It is submitted that accused Dushyant Kumar was also

present on 14.01.1995 when R.K. Srivastava accepted the bribe in

cash in the presence of the independent witness, and was the one

who counted the bribe money after its acceptance. The couns el

further submitted that the accused failed to explain the recovery of

the bribe money and the seized records of M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd.

Based on the above, the counsel contended that there is enough

evidence to establish that the respondents were party to the criminal

conspiracy, and that the respondents cannot be acquitted merely

because the independent witnesses have turned hostile when the

demand and acceptance of bribe in the present case has been

adequately proved. It is the submission of the counsel for appellant

that as the respondents were charged for the offences under Section

120-B IPC read with Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) P.C. Act,

and have not been charged under Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)

(d) P.C. Act, thus there is no legal requirement to prove the

6

ingredients of Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act as

substantive offences against them.

8. Per Contra, the counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that

respondent was convicted by Trial Court along with other accused

merely on the basis of presumption that he was part of conspiracy of

demand made by accused No. 1 and also because he was present on

14.01.1995 on the spot. The counsel submitted that the Ld. Trial

Court had failed to appreciate that respondent was subordinate to

the main accused No. 1 and being a junior officer, he was required to

follow the protocol by accompanying his senior officer i.e. accused

No. 1. Learned counsel further submitted that as per the case of

prosecution, the accused no. 5 was also present at the spot, when

the recovery was affected and certain recovery was also made from

him. Learned counsel further submits that though this was an

allegation against accused no. 5, the Trial Court on appreciation of

the evidence acquitted accused no. 5. Learned counsel further

submits that respondent no. 2 was on a better footing than accused

no. 5 as there was neither recovery of the trapped money nor there

was any evidence to show that record was seized at the instance of

respondent no. 2. It is further submitted by learned counsel that

7

there is absolutely no legal evidence against the accused persons. It

is also submitted that though a submission was made on behalf of

learned counsel for the appellant that accused failed to explain the

recovery of seizure record of M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd., the record is

contrary to this submission. Learned counsel submits that in the

statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’), the accused persons

specifically denied this question in respect of seizure of the record.

Learned counsel further submits that the High Court had

reappreciated and scrutinized the entire evidence in proper

perspective and arrived at a conclusion that the learned Trial Court

committed an error in holding the accused persons guilty and

awarding the sentence. As such, the High Court allowed appeals and

set aside the judgment and order of the Trial Court. It is further

submitted by the counsel that the lack of independent witness was

fatal to the case of prosecution as under the circumstances,

prosecution witnesses were scrutinized with greater care. Learned

counsel in support of his submissions placed reliance on the

judgment of Shyamal Saha & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal

1. It

1

(2014) 12 SCC 321

8

was further submitted that the ingredient of abuse of position as a

public servant is sine-qua-non to prove an offence punishable under

Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act as has been held in State of Gujarat

vs. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi

2 and State by Special

Police Establishment vs. D. Krishnamurthy

3. The counsel

submitted that as the accused no. 1 had been charged under Section

7 of the P.C. Act whereas other officers were charged under Section

7 read with 120B of IPC. Learned counsel submitted that as per the

prosecution, the main accused was accused no. 1 but accused no. 1

was not charged with Section 120B of IPC. In this fact situation, the

theory of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution utterly fails.

ANALYSIS

9. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant as well as learned

Counsel for the respondent. We have also perused relevant

documents on record and the judgment passed by the High Court.

10. We find considerable merit in the submission of learned counsel

for the respondents. In our opinion, the High Court thoroughly

reappreciated the evidence in its proper perspective. The High Court

2

(1972) 2 SCC 392

3

(1995) Suppl. (3) SCC 702

9

was also justified in observing that the prosecution miserably failed

to establish its case against the accused persons. The evidence was

wholly insufficient to establish even the basic requirements such as

demand and acceptance. It will be useful for all purposes to refer to

the observations of the High Court in its judgment dated 27.05.2019

to that effect and it reads thus:

“...All the prosecution witnesses did not support the

prosecution case except P.W.5. who had stated in his testimony

that accused appellants were involved in taking illegal

gratification….

……it is summarized that the necessary and essential

ingredients of "demand" and "acceptance" of the bribe

money is absolutely lacking in this case, so far as the

accused appellants are concerned. The explanation of the

accused-appellants regarding their presence in the home or

outside the house of R.K. Srivastava for discharging the

protocol duty of R.K. Pandey is found consistent with the

evidence of D.W.4 (Sri Chandra Bhan Dubey) who booked the

Guest House for R.K. Pandey and the statement of PW -10

Driver Suresh Chandra Misra, who told in his testimony that

he was directed by Dr. R.K. Shrivastava in evening of

13.01.1995 that as Assistant Collector R.K. Pandey was

coming from Allahabad so, he, alongwith Dushyant Kumar

would be receiving Pandey, so he should come to them on

14.01.1995, the learned Trial Court has totally discarded this

piece of the witnesses on the ground unknown to the law….

….while all the three Inspectors, including both the appellants,

were charged under Section 120 B (Criminal Conspiracy) of the

IPC but main accused and alleged chief conspirator R.K.

Srivastava was not charged under Section 120 -B of IPC.

Thus, the appellants were subjected to trial without

linkage with prime accused who alone is allegedly involved

in demand, acceptance and recovery of bri be amount in

whole case. Both the appellants, namely, A.K. Gaba and Alok

Gupta were not present in the official chamber o f R.K.

Srivastava on 10.01.1995 which is evident from the

10

statements/ cross examinations of many prosecution

witnesses…..

….Kuldeep Tewari, complainant has stated in his

testimony that he had a tape recorder to record the

conversation that took place in the evening of 10.01.1995

and this recording was never adduced as evidence which

could pin point the participants of the alleged meeting on

10.01.1995. Tape Recorder has been concealed by the

prosecution in order to implicate A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta

falsely. The Learned Trial Court has also ignored

concealment of vital evidence i.e. Tape Recorder,

concealed by the prosecution in the ju dgment causing

grave injustice to appellants, namely, A.K. Gaba and Alok

Gupta.

…..The judgment dated 26.07.2014 reveals that while passing

the judgment, learned Trial Judge has not discussed the

details of Cross examination of the Prosecution witnesses.

Thus, the appellants were denied natural justice as

evidence emerging out from cross examination conducted

by defense on prosecution witnesses. This omissi on has

resulted in to erroneous judgment…

….The Learned trial Court's order is based on presumption,

as the Judge has used the words "Sambhavtah" and

"Prateet hota hai" many times before presuming as to why

the complainant Kuldeep Tewari did not implicate

appellants. This is against the entire spirit of law as no person

can be inculpated and exculpated at the same stake. The very

uses of these words shake the confidence in the justice system

and unless and until the guilt of the accused is proved up to

hilt by cogent & corroborative evidence, every accused is liable

to be discharged.

….It is well settled position of law that the demand for the

bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the

offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read

with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. ….The proof of demand,

thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and

offence under of permeating mandate for an Sections 7 and

13 of the Act.

[Emphasis Supplied]

11

11. It is a well settled position of law that the demand for the bribe

money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of

the P.C. Act. The High Court made reference to certain cases in

support of the legal position i.e. B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P

4; P.

Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of

Andhra Pradesh and Anr

5, Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi

6,;

and Rakesh Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh

7, as such, the

High Court was justified in observing that mere recovery of tainted

money divorced from the other circumstances under which it was

allegedly paid would not by itself be sufficient to sustain conviction.

12. In Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana

8, this Court observed

that mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient unless there is

substantive evidence regarding demand and acceptance of illegal

gratification. The Court held:

25. Reliance on behalf of the appellant was placed upon the

judgment of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu [(2009) 3 SCC 779

: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] where in the facts of the case the

Court took the view that mere recovery of money from the

accused by itself is not enough in absence of substantive

4

.2014) 13 SCC 55

5

(2015) 10 SCC 152

6

(2016) 3 SCC 108

7

(2012) 13 SCC 552

8

(2010) 4 SCC 450

12

evidence for demand and acceptance. The Court held that

there was no voluntary acceptance of the money knowing it to

be a bribe and giving advantage to the accused of the evidence

on record, the Court in paras 18 and 20 of the judgment held

as under: (SCC pp. 784 & 785-86)........”

(emphasis supplied)

13. The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the

present case where the prosecution has failed to establish the

foundational fact of demand beyond reasonable doubt.

14. Likewise, in C.M. Sharma v. State of Andhra Pradesh

9, this

Court reiterated that recovery of tainted money divorced from proof

of demand cannot by itself establish guilt and hold that:

21. Mr.

Rai, lastly submits that from the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses the worst which can be said against the appellant is

that currency notes were recovered from him. That itself, in his

submission, does not constitute the offence. He submits that

to bring home the charge the prosecution is required to prove

beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had demanded the

illegal gratification and accepted the same voluntarily. In

support of the submission reliance has been placed on a

decision of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC

779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and our attention has been drawn

to SCC para 18 of the judgment which reads as follows: (SCC

p. 784)

“18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 4 SCC 725

: 1980 SCC (Cri) 159] this Court took the view that (at SCC

p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced

from the circumstances under which it is paid is not

9

(2010) 15 SCC 1

13

sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive

evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery

by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution

against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to

prove payment of bribe or to show tha t the accused

voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe.”

23. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the

broad submission of Mr Rai that demand of illegal

gratification is a sine qua non to constitute the offence

under the Act. Further mere recovery of currency notes

itself does not constitute the offence under the Act, unless

it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused

voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. In

the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that both

the ingredients to bring the Act within the mischief of Sections

7 and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Act are satisfied.

(emphasis supplied)

15. In Mukhtiar Singh (Since Deceased) through LRs v. State of

Punjab

10, this Court held that:

14. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy [P. Satyanarayana Murthy

v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] ,

this Court took note of its verdict in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.

[B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC

(Cri) 543] underlining that mere possession and recovery of

currency notes from an accused without proof of demand

would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as

10

(2017) 8 SCC 136

14

Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It was recounted as

well that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal

gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse

of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing

or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. Not

only the proof of demand thus was held to be an

indispensable essentiality and an inflexible statutory

mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act,

it was held as well qua Section 20 of the Act, that any

presumption thereunder would arise only on such proof of

demand. This Court thus in P. Satyanarayana Murthy [P.

Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 :

(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] on a survey of its earlier decisions on the

pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 and the proof thereof

summed up its conclusions as hereunder: (SCC p. 159, para

23)

“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is

the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)

and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the

charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount

allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof,

dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be

sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections

of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove

the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere

recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence

under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his

conviction thereunder.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. The proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of

the offence and in absence thereof, the presumption under Section

20 of the P.C. Act would not arise. Where prosecution evidence is

15

inconsistent and material witnesses turn hostile, benefit of doubt

must necessarily endure to the accused.

17. The High Court, in the present case, rightly noticed that the

prosecution evidence regarding demand itself was doubtful and

unreliable, particularly when the complainant and several material

witnesses failed to support the prosecution version. Therefore, the

statutory presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act could not

have been invoked against the respondents.

18. In the present case, the complainant, independent witnesses

and other material witnesses having not supported the prosecution

case in material particulars, the High Court was justified in extending

benefit of doubt to the respondents.

19. This Court also finds substance in the reasoning adopted by the

High Court that the prosecution failed to establish the charge of

conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. On a well-settled principle that

for establishing the charge of conspiracy, the pre -requisite is

satisfactory evidence to show that there was meeting of mind of the

accused so as to hatch up the conspiracy and then to act so as to

give effect to the hatched conspiracy. On this aspect also, the

prosecution miserably failed. It may not be out of place to refer to

16

judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu

11,

this Court held:

90. In Nalini case [(1999) 5 SCC 253 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691]

S.S.M. Quadri, J., pointed out that the meeting of the minds

of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by

illegal means is a sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy.

Judge Learned Hand, in Van Riper v. United States [13 F 2d

961 (2nd Cir, 1926)] said of conspiracy:

“When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end,

they become ad hoc agents for one another and have made

a partnership in crime.”

97. Mostly, conspiracies are proved by circumstantial

evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. Usually

both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have

to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of

the accused (per Wadhwa, J. in Nalini case [(1999) 5 SCC 253

: 1999 SCC (Cri) 691] at p. 516). The well-known rule governing

circumstantial evidence is that each and every incriminating

circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence

and “the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events

from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of

the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis

against the guilt is possible” (Tanviben Pankajkumar case

[Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7

SCC 156 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1004] , SCC p. 185, para 45). G.N.

Ray, J. in Tanviben Pankajkumar [Tanviben Pankajkumar

Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 : 1997 SCC (Cri)

1004] observed that this Court should not allow suspicion

to take the place of legal proof.

(emphasis supplied)

11

(2005) 11 SCC 600

17

20. Similarly, in Esher Singh v. State of A.P.

12, this Court

observed:

38. …….We are aware of the fact that direct independent

evidence of criminal conspiracy may not ordinarily and is

generally not available and its existence invariably is a matter

of inference except as rare exceptions. The inferences are

normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a

purpose in common between the conspirators. This Court in

V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 665 : 1980

SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy there

must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that there

was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an

offence. There must be a meeting of minds resulting in

ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the

commission of an offence and where the factum of

conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances,

the prosecution has to show that the circumstan ces give

rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an

agreement between two or more persons to commit an

offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution

has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the

accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a

case, when taken together on their face value, should

indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for

the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act

which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a

few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held

to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission

of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all

means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the

object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied on for

the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point

of time than the actual commission of the offence in

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

12

(2004) 11 SCC 585

18

(emphasis supplied)

21. The conspiracy cannot be inferred merely on the basis of

suspicion or association and that there must be cogent material

indicating meeting of minds between the accused persons. To

establish a charge of conspiracy, knowledge about indulgence in

either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. The

offence is complete when there is meeting of minds.

22. In the case at hand, except alleging presence of the respondents

at certain places during the relevant period, the prosecution has

failed to produce any substantive evidence indicating prior agreement

or concert between the respondents and the principal accused R.K.

Srivastava.

23. The High Court has rightly noted that even according to the

prosecution story, the principal allegation of demand was against

R.K. Srivastava alone. No independent material has been brought on

record to show that the respondents actively participated in the

alleged demand or shared the criminal intent necessary to constitute

conspiracy.

24. Another significant aspect which cannot be ignored is the

withholding of best evidence by the prosecution.

19

25. The High Court also noticed a very interesting facet which led

to withholding the best evidence. It was the case of the prosecution

reflected through the complainant that a tape recorder was used for

recording of the conversation of demand being made by the accused

to the complainant. For the reasons best known to the investigating

agency, this very material piece of evidence was not at all seized by

the investigating agency and there is no explanation whatsoever

which would be offered by prosecution.

26. We may refer to the judgment of this Court in Tomaso Bruno

v. State of Uttar Pradesh

13, this Court held that:

28. The High Court held that even though the appellants

alleged that the footage of CCTV is being concealed by the

prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the

accused did not invoke Section 233 CrPC and they did not

make any application for production of CCTV camera footage.

The High Court further observed that the accused were not

able to discredit the testimony of PW 1, PW 12 and PW 13

qua there being no relevant material in the CCTV camera

footage. Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies

upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in

the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the

prosecution in possession of the best evidence, CCTV

footage ought to have produced the same. In our

considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse

inference against the prosecution under Section 114

Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution

13 (2015) 7 SCC 178

20

withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had

it been produced.

(emphasis supplied)

27. The adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution

where material electronic evidence is withheld without justification.

The failure of the prosecution to produce the alleged tape-recorded

conversation assumes greater significance because the same could

have conclusively established the persons present at the time of

alleged demand and the exact nature of the conversation.

28. For all the reasons stated above, High Court has rightly found

fault with the reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Court, observing

that the conviction was substantially based on presumptions and

conjectures rather than legally admissible evidence.

29. It is equally important to bear in mind the settled principles

governing interference against acquittal.

30. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka

14, this Court

summarized the principles governing appeals against acquittal and

held that:

42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the

following general principles regarding powers of the appellate

14

(2007) 4 SCC 415

21

court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal

emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,

reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the

order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power

and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach

its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and

compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very

strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring

mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers

of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such

phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of

language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court

to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the

court to review the evidence and to come to its ow n

conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that

in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour

of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is

available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be

innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of

law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the

presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,

reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the

basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court

should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by

the trial court.

(emphasis supplied)

22

31. In the State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Mannan

15, this court

discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an order of

acquittal and held that:

“13. In coming to this conclusion, we are reminded of the

well-settled principle that when the court has to exercise

its discretion in an appeal arising against an order of

acquittal, the court must remember that the innocence

of the accused is further re-established by the judgment

of acquittal rendered by the High Court . Against such

decision of the High Court, the scope of interference by this

Court in an order of acquittal has been very succinctly laid

down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh

v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 715 : (1961) 3 SCR 120

: (1961) 1 Cri LJ 766] . At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as His

Lordship then was) culled out the principles as follows : (AIR

pp. 719-20, para 9)

(emphasis supplied)

32. Similarly, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P.

16, it was held that:

34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a

possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be

formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such

an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the

hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or

wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement.

But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take

the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the

arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of

any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the

basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be

the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand,

15

(2011) 8 SCC 65

16

(2017) 5 SCC 719

23

denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at

regardless of the fact whether it is agreed upon or not by the

higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two

situations has to be kept in mind. So long as the view

taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed,

regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the

same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be

interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over

and above the view of the trial court.

(emphasis supplied)

33. The presumption of innocence gets strengthened by an order of

acquittal and unless the findings recorded by the High Court are

perverse or wholly unreasonable, interference under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India is unwarranted.

34. In the case on hand, the High Court has meticulously

re-appreciated the entire evidence on record and assigned cogent

reasons while extending benefit of doubt to the respondents. The view

taken by the High Court is certainly a plausible and possible view

arising from the evidence available on record.

35. This court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution, does not ordinarily interfere with an order of acquittal

unless the findings are manifestly illegal, perverse or result in

miscarriage of justice. No such exceptional circumstance is made out

in the present case.

24

36. The prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable

doubt the essential ingredients of demand, acceptance and criminal

conspiracy. The findings recorded by the High Court neither suffer

from perversity nor can they be termed contrary to law.

37. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting

the respondents does not warrant interference.

38. The criminal appeals, being devoid of merit, are accordingly

dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

........................................J.

[PANKAJ MITHAL]

.........................................J.

[PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 27, 2026.