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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P.(S) No.5364 of 2025

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The Steel Authority of India Limited its Chairman Corporate

Office, Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi -110001

through Mr. J.T. Kongari, aged about 53 years, son of Late

P.L. Kongari working as General Manager (Law), Steel

Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Limited, P.O. B.S.

City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro (Jharkhand).

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. Dhananjay Kumar (Staff No. 773277, SAIL PERS. No.

C003676), Son of Sri N.N. Singh, The General Manager

(Blast Furnace), Blast Furnace Department, Bokaro

Steel City, Bokaro, Resident of Quarter No 3003, Sector

5A, P.O. Sector 6, P.S. Sector 6, Bokaro Steel City,

District Bokaro 827006 (Jharkhand).-----Respondent

2. The Director (Personnel), Steel Authority of India

Limited, Corporate Office, Ispat Bhawan, P.O. & P.S New

Delhi, New Delhi: 110001.

3. The Director-In-Charge & Appellate Authority, Steel

Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro

Steel City, P.O. B.S. City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro

827001 (Jharkhand).

4. The Executive Director (Project), Steel Authority of India

Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. B.S.

City, P.S. B.S. City,District Bokaro -827001.(Jharkhand)

5. The Executive Director (Works), Steel Authority of India

Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. B.S.

City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro 827001 (Jharkhand).

…Performa Respondents

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate

: Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate

: Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate

For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. Bhanu Kumar, Advocate

------

C.A.V. on 24.03.2026 Pronounced on 06/04/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India directed against the order dated

09.05.2025 passed in O.A./051/00141/2024 whereby and

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whereunder while allowing the original application, the

learned Tribunal has quashed and set aside the order dated

14.12.2023 passed by the disciplinary authority by which

punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of

pay for a period of three years and three months without

cumulative effect has been imposed upon the applicant,

and the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated

27/28.02.2024 has also been set aside with a direction

upon the respondents to restore the pay of the applicant

w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and release the arrears with all

consequential benefits within a period of three months from

the date of receipt of the copy of the order.

Factual Matrix

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made

in the writ petition having been incorporated from the

original application read hereunder as :-

While the Respondent No.1 was posted as General

Manager, Blast Furnace, Bokaro Steel City with charge of

the function of Respondent No. 5, the applicant was

shocked to receive one charge Memorandum dated

10.01.2023 issued by respondent no. 4 under Rule 25 of

SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 for totally

vague, false and indistinct allegations mentioned under

Article-l to V.

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The applicant after receipt of the same submitted

his self-explanatory statement of defence on 20.01.2023 in

detail denying the allegations.

It is the case of the applicant/Respondent No.1 that

without considering the above statement of defense, the

respondent no. 4 appointed Inquiry Officer and Presenting

Officer vide order dated 06.02.2023.

It has been contended by the applicant that the

entire action from the stage of issuance of charge

memorandum upto the appointment of I.O. and P.O. was at

the instance and dictates of Vigilance officials.

The I.O. proceeded with the enquiry under the

influence of higher officials of Vigilance and conducted

perfunctory enquiry in between 02.03.2023 to 17.04.2023.

The P.O. brief was also submitted on 08.05.2023.

The applicant submitted his reply to P.O. brief on

30.05.2023 supported with documents and evidences

showing/proving himself to be innocent.

Apart from above, the applicant has stated that

during his 25 years of service in SAIL, BSL his devotion to

duty is of highest level and integrity is above board which

has been accepted by CGM (MRD) who is senior most CGM

in Works Division of BSL.

The I.O. has submitted his report on 26.07.2023

holding that the charges under Article No. I to IV are not

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established and charge under Article No. V is partially

established.

In this regard, the applicant has submitted that

since the allegation No. V either can be fully proved or

disproved but as per the I.O’s report it is partially

established, hence it is completely vitiated and fit to be

declared as null and void and ab initio wrong.

It has been alleged by the applicant that the

respondent no. 4 has committed wrong while calling reply

from the applicant within 7 days which is in violation of

Rule 26.0(2) of SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules,

1977 which mandatorily gives 15 days' time for giving reply

to I.O’s report.

Applicant then submitted his reply on 25.08.2023

to the I.O’s report denying the finding of the I.O. in respect

of allegation No. V as partially established. He has stated

that the I.O. acted under pressure of the vigilance officials.

The applicant also enclosed various Commendations/

Awards/ Appreciation letters related to his performance in

the company which has been highly rated.

In the meantime, the applicant received an order

dated 14.12.2023 issued by respondent no. 4 whereby

punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of

pay for a period of three years and three months without

cumulative effect has been imposed without application of

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quasi-judicious mind, without giving any disagreement

notice and without competence to impose such

punishment. According to the applicant, the punishment

imposed is vague, per-se illegal and contrary to Rule 23.0

(f) of 1977 rules which clearly speaks about the effect of

punishment after its expiry which was not clarified in the

said punishment order.

It has been alleged by the applicant that without

disagreement notice the respondent no. 4 relying on the

allegations under Article No. 1 to IV of the charge memo

imposed the punishment which is not sustainable in the

eyes of law.

Thereafter, applicant filed Appeal before respondent

no.3 on 28.12.2023 which was rejected vide order dated

27/28.02.2024 and aggrieved thereof the original

application being O.A./051/00141/2024 has been

preferred.

Before the Tribunal, the petitioner (herein)/

respondents in their written statement have denied the

contentions of the applicant and submitted that

Respondent No. 3 who is the competent authority has

appointed Respondent No. 4 as the Disciplinary Authority

as per law.

It has been submitted that the applicant simply

denied all of the charges neither specifically denied nor

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admitted any of the charges. The respondents have alleged

that the applicant being the Engineer I/C of the contract

has acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the

company, shown negligence in the performance of his duty

and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to

duty thereby committed misconduct as per clause 5.0(5),

5.0(6) of SAIL CDA Rules, 1977 and thus violated Rule

4.1(1(i) & (ii) of SAIL, CDA Rules, 1977.

The respondents have alleged irregularities

committed by the applicant in violation of the contractual

terms.

It has further been submitted that there is no

violation of any provision on calling reply from the applicant

within 7 days of I.O. report since the enquiry against the

applicant was initiated on the recommendation of Vigilance.

The respondents have denied the issue of

incompetent authority as the respondent no. 4 has been

appointed as DA by respondent no. 3 who is the competent

authority as per schedule appended to SAIL CDA Rules,

1977. Respondent no. 4 being Executive Director is

competent to be appointed as DA. The respondents have

stated that in the instant case there was no disagreement

as the disagreement has to be shown in a very specific

situation when some difference exists between I.O's

findings and DA's views. While co ntending that the

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applicant is making misinterpretation of the said rule the

respondents have prayed for dismissal of the OA.

The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, vide

its judgment dated 09.05.2025, has quashed and set aside

the order dated 14.12.2023 (passed by the Disciplinary

Authority) and order dated 27/28.02.2024 (passed by the

Appellate Authority) and directed the respondents to

restore the pay of the applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay

the arrears with all consequential benefits within a period

of three months from the date of receipt of the order.

Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the

learned Tribunal, the petitioner - Steel Authority of India

Limited has preferred the instant writ petition.

3. It is evident from the factual aspect that while the

Respondent No.1 was posted as General Manager, Blast

Furnace, Bokaro Steel City, one charge Memorandum

dated 10.01.2023 was issued under Rule 25 of SAIL

Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 wherein five

charges were alleged against the respondent No.1.

The applicant submitted his statement of defence

on 20.01.2023 denying the allegations. Thereafter, the

Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer were appointed

vide order dated 06.02.2023.

The enquiry proceeded and the Inquiry Officer has

submitted its report on 26.07.2023 holding that the

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charges under Article No. I to IV are not established and

charge under Article No. V is partially established.

Thereafter, vide order dated 14.12.2023 ,

punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of

pay for a period of three years and three months without

cumulative effect has been imposed without giving any

disagreement notice.

The Respondent No.1 filed appeal against the order

imposing punishment which was rejected vide order dated

27/28.02.2024 against which the original application being

O.A./051/00141/2024 has been preferred.

The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, vide

order dated 09.05.2025, has quashed and set aside the

order dated 14.12.2023 (passed by the Disciplinary

Authority) and order dated 27/28.02.2024 (passed by the

Appellate Authority) and directed the respondents to

restore the pay of the applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay

the arrears with all consequential benefits within a period

of three months from the date of receipt of the order.

The petitioner - Steel Authority of India Limited has

challenged the aforesaid order of the learned Tribunal

which is the subject matter of the instant appeal.

Submission on behalf of the Petitioner

4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner, has submitted at Bar that although the

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prayer has been made for quashing of the order passed by

the learned Tribunal dated 09.05.2025, but he is restricting

his prayer only for issuance of direction to remit the matter

before the disciplinary authority from the stage of showing

the difference of opinion so as to pass a fresh order after

following the due procedure of law.

5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner that even accepting the fact

that out of 05 charges, 04 charges have not been proved

and 01 charge has partially been proved, the requirement

of law was that the disciplinary authority i.e. respondent

no.4 was to differ with the finding recorded by the Inquiry

Officer so far as the charge which has not been found to be

proved by assigning the reason therein showing the

difference of opinion and by serving the aforesaid difference

of opinion to the delinquent employee, the Respondent No.1

herein, for the purpose of providing an opportunity of

hearing. But that cannot be a ground to quash the order of

punishment by not remitting the matter for passing the

fresh order by the authority after following the due

procedure of law.

6. The argument has been made that if any error has

been committed by the disciplinary authority, the

delinquent employee may not be allowed to take advantage

of technicalities, rather, the charge is to be considered by

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the disciplinary authority based upon the procedure of law

so that the injustice may not be there and delinquent

employee may not be allowed to go escort free. The learned

Tribunal has not considered the aforesaid aspect of the

matter and merely on technicality, the order impugned has

been quashed and set aside without remitting the matter

before the disciplinary authority for passing a fresh order.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent

7. Mr. Bhanu Kumar, learned counsel appearing for

the Respondent No.1-applicant, has submitted that the writ

petitioner was well conscious with the procedure as has

been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab

National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra,

reported in 1998(7) SCC 84 and even then the said

procedure has not been followed and, as such, being a

wrong doer, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to take

advantage of its own wrong.

8. It has been submitted that the memo of charge is of

the year 2023 being issued on 10.01.2023 and since then

two years has already lapsed and, as such, if the matter will

be remitted before the disciplinary authority, it will be

prejudicial to the interest of the applicant and after taking

into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the

Tribunal has not remitted the matter before the disciplinary

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authority, hence, the order passed by the learned Tribunal

may not be interfered with.

Analysis

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal

as available in the impugned order as also the pleading

made on behalf of the parties before the learned Tribunal.

10. The admitted fact herein is that based upon the

memorandum of charge wherein altogether five charges

have been levelled which, for ready reference, are being

referred herein :-

“Article-I Failed to control over-reporting of Work Through Slag

(WTS) by the contractor providing undue benefit to the

contractor as same has been over-reported by under-

loading the tippers thereby inflating the number of

trips of such tippers. This has led to steep increase in

WTS generation, as per the records, during his tenure

as Engineer I/c.

Article-II He did not ensure dumping of WTS as per BSL

requirement in violation to the provisions of the

contract.

Article-III He failed to prevent pilferage by mix-up of low value

and high value scraps for sale to the contractor.

Article-IV As per SOP of the contract, dumping of fresh slag

within the working area of the contractor was not

permitted; however, he did not take adequate steps to

prevent dumping of fresh slag arising at contractor site

from SMS.

Article-V Irregularities in execution of the contract by the

contractor were brought to executing department's

notice by Vigilance; however, he as Engineer I/c has

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evaded taking or initiating action against the

contractor as per contractual terms.”

11. The Inquiry Officer has found 04 charges not proved

while 5

th charge has partially been found to be proved. The

disciplinary authority although was to differ with the

finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer so far as the charges

not found to be proved (04 in number) but instead of

differing with the finding so recorded by the Inquiry Officer,

he straightway has imposed the punishment of reduction

by one stage lower in time scale of pay for a period of three

years and three months without cumulative effect.

12. The Respondent No.1/applicant has raised the

issue that what is the basis of inflicting the punishment in

a situation of charge having not been found to be proved.

The matter has been carried to the appellate authority by

raising the aforesaid point but even the appellate authority

has not found fit to interfere with the decision taken by the

disciplinary authority.

13. The order of punishment was challenged before the

learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, after taking note of

the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari

Mishra (Supra), has quashed and set aside the order dated

14.12.2023 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and order

dated 27/28.02.2024 passed by the Appellate Authority

and directed the respondents to restore the pay of the

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applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay the arrears with all

consequential benefits within a period of three months from

the date of receipt of the order.

14. The issue which has been raised on behalf of the

writ petitioner that the learned Tribunal ought to have

taken into consideration that while quashing the order of

punishment, it should have been remitted before the

authority for passing the order afresh after following the

due procedure of law.

15. Since the order of punishment dated 14.12.2023

and appellate order dated 27/28.02.2024 are not being

questioned, as per the submission made by Mr. Indrajit

Sinha, as recorded above, rather, only the order passed by

the learned Tribunal has been questioned that it should

have been remitted before the authority from the stage

showing difference of opinion from the finding recorded by

the Inquiry Officer.

16. The law is well settled that no one can be allowed to

take advantage of its own wrong as also the proposition of

law that on technicality no one can be allowed to take

advantage.

17. If the disciplinary proceeding is being started then

it is to be given its conclusive end. It is equally settled that

disciplinary authority is proceeding to initiate departmental

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proceeding, then the same must be concluded in

accordance with law.

18. Law with respect to a situation where the Inquiry

Officer has not found the charge proved has already been

propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari

Mishra (Supra) wherein the disciplinary authority has

remedy. The disciplinary authority, in such situation,

should differ with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer by

assigning the reason which shall be communicated to the

delinquent employee for the purpose of defending himself

based upon the difference of opinion shown by the

disciplinary authority upon the finding recorded by the

Inquiry Officer. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid

judgment is being referred hereunder :-

“19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the

principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation

7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority

disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge,

then before it records its own findings on such charge, it

must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and

give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent

before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer

containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the

delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the

disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of

the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we

have already observed, require the authority which has to

take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an

opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a

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representation before the disciplinary authority records its

findings on the charges framed against the officer.”

19. The issue of remand was also a subject matter in

the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj

Behari Mishra (Supra) as per the reference made to that

effect at para 21 and the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the facts of

the aforesaid case, has been pleased not to remit the matter

since the case was of retired employee and more than 14

years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had

superannuated, and hence the Hon’ble Apex Court has

thought it proper not to remit the matter after such long

delay.

“21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31 -12-1983.

During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-

1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record.

More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent

officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the

interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be

remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of

another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such

directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the

decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders

imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release

the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will,

however, be no order as to costs.”

20. This Court, therefore, is now proceeding to examine

that as to whether the principle of not allowing to take

advantage of technicality is to be relaxed in view of the

factual consideration made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

paragraph 21 of the judgment rend ered in the case of

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Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari

Mishra (Supra).

21. Herein, the admitted fact is that the memorandum

of charge was issued on 10.01.2023. Thereafter, the appeal

was preferred and it is now about three years from the date

of issuance of memorandum of charge.

22. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the fact of

the present case is not of such nature where the benefit of

technicality is to be allowed to be taken by the delinquent

employee taking into consideration the fact that the

Respondent No.1 is in service and the memo of charge has

only been issued on 10.01.2023.

23. This Court, in view of the aforesaid, is of the

considered view that the learned Tribunal ought to have

taken into consideration the fact about the benefit being

allowed to be taken by the delinquent employee, the

applicant herein, and ought to have remitted the matter

before the disciplinary authority to pass order afresh as per

the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.

Masilamani v. LIC (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein it has been

held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if Court thinks that

enquiry was not properly conducted then It must remit the

case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to

conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated,

and conclude the same, for ready reference the relevant

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paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as

under :

“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets

aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry

was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the

employee. It must remit the case concerned to the

disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from

the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same.”

24. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Allahabad

Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari (2017) 2 SCC 308 also

throws light on the approach to be adopted but in a more

nuanced manner than what was held in A. Masilamani

(supra). Paragraph 8 of the decision reads as follows:

“8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases

where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either

procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to

remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo

the same afresh. That course could have been followed even

in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to

the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a

proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course

may not have been the only course open in a given situation.

There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or

such other supervening circumstances the writ court

considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct

a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority.

That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case

at hand.”

25. It also needs to be referred herein that the judgment

passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab

National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra

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(Supra) has been placed before the learned Tribunal and

based upon that the order impugned has been passed.

26. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when the

ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab

National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra

(Supra) has been applied in the facts of the present case

then it should have been in entirety i.e., the issue of remand

of the matter ought to have been considered by the learned

Tribunal but having not been considered, the impugned

order, according to our considered view, suffers from an

error.

27. This Court is conscious that while exercising the

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against

the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the power of

judicial review is to be exercised as per the ratio laid down

in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India &

Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 at paragraph 99

wherein it has been held that the High Court is having

power of judicial review to look into the legality and

propriety of the order of the tribunal to the extent that if the

order passed by the tribunal suffers from any perversity or

the order is passed without following the principles of

natural justice or there is error apparent on the face of

order. For ready reference, paragraph 99 of the judgment is

quoted as under:-

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"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that

clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B,

to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts

and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of

the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act

and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other

legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and

323- B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The

jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles

226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of

the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of

our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted

other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role

in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and

32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article

323-A and Article 323- B of the Constitution are possessed

of the competence to test the constitutional validity of

statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these

Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a

Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction

the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will,

nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in

respect of the areas of law for which they have been

constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to

directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they

question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the

legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is

challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional

and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”

28. The power of judicial review has also been

deliberated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is to be

considered while exercising the said power only to the

extent that if any order is being passed found to be having

error on the face of the order or without jurisdiction or

suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of

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the order means that if the order appears on its face having

with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be

exercised.

29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal

Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim,

(2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at paragraph-30 that the

power of judicial review must be exercised by the Court

after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error

apparent on the face of the record and not the same has

been established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30

of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under:-

“30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to

see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an

apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a

decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record

is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record

or whether the error requires examination or argument to

establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of

reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two

opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the

record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan

Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan

Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale,

AIR 1960 SC 137] . ---.”

30. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and

Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordship have held that the

patent error in a decision can be corrected by writ of

certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on

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the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the

aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:-

“11. … An error in the decision or determination itself may

also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a

manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g.

when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the

provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which

can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.

….”

31. The power of judicial review can be exercised if the

order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from an error

and if there is any perversity.

32. The element of perversity has been raised. The

Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State

[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009)

10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse

has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is

arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by

taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the

finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice

of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,

the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,

i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as

under:-

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a

number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001)

1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression

“perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate

authority are not supported by the evidence brought on

2026:JHHC:9834-DB

22

record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of

procedural irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co.

Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse

finding” means a finding which is not only against the

weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence

itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3)

SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this

is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the

authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so

perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at

those findings.

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant

58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious

violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.

In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed

that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one

that is not only against the weight of evidence but is

altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106

NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong

way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or

deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various

dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current

English, 6th Edn.

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in

a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or

unreasonable.”

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,

International Edn.

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and

reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

2026:JHHC:9834-DB

23

Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence

or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English

Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected

behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or

petulant.

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th

Edn.

“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined

as one that is not only against the weight of evidence

but is altogether against the evidence.”

33. This Court, is of the view that when the learned

Tribunal has considered the judgment rendered in the case

of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari

Mishra (Supra), then it should have been considered in its

entirety, i.e., including the issue of remand but having not

done so, the same, according to our considered view, suffers

from perversity.

34. This Court, in view of the legal issues as discussed

hereinabove and the factual aspect of the present case, is

of the view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal

requires modification to the effect that the matter is being

remanded before the disciplinary authority to take decision

afresh after showing the difference of opinion with the

finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, i.e., by following the

law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab

National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mi shra

2026:JHHC:9834-DB

24

(Supra) and communicate it to the delinquent employee

within three weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the

order.

35. The disciplinary authority is further directed to pass

order afresh within a further period of six weeks from the

date of receipt of the explanation which is to be presented

by the Respondent No.1 within two weeks from the date of

receipt of the reason, as directed above.

36. The consequential benefits will depend upon the

final outcome of the said decision.

37. The instant writ petition stands disposed of

accordingly.

38. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,

accordingly disposed of.

I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Deepak Roshan, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.)

Dated 06/04/2026

Birendra/A.F.R.

Uploaded on 07/04/2026