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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 213 of 2024

Sukanta Chattopadhyay

Vs.

Kakali Bhattacharya

For the Petitioner : Mr. Apalak Basu

Mr. Nilanjan Pal

Mr. Swapnamoy Sarkar

For the Opposite Party : Mr. Manabendra Thakur

Mr. Umer Sadhique

Mr. Partha Sarathi Das

Ms. Swarnali Ghosh

Ms. Maria Sharwari

Ms. Purnima Panda

Heard on : 30.03.2026

Judgment on : 04.05.2026

Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. Petitioner herein has assailed the proceeding being CR No. 187 of

2017 under section 500 of IPC presently pending before Learned Judicial

magistrate, 3

rd court ChandanNagar.

2. The petitioner states that he was the Headmaster of a school and

retired from his service on 30.09.2023. The husband of the opposite party

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herein was appointed as an assistant teacher of the said school in March

1988. He was issued a charge sheet on 07.05.2002, calling upon him to give

reply within a fortnight, but he did not give any reply within the stipulated

period. After issuing the aforesaid charge sheet, the school authority sent

proposal on 30.05.2002 to the Secretary of the West Bengal Board of

Secondary Education, for dismissal of the husband of the opposite party

herein from his service. In reply, the Board of Secondary Education by a

letter dated 02.08.2002, requested the school authority to follow the

direction contained in the Board Circular no. S/606 dated 21.06.1982.

3. Thereafter, the managing committee of the said school in its meeting

dated 25.09.2002 vide MC Resolution no. 03(b) resolved to suspend the

husband of the opposite party herein with immediate effect in terms of

aforesaid Board’s circular and as a result he was suspended with effect from

27.09.2002.Therafter the said school by a letter dated 30.09.2002 prayed

before the said Board for granting approval of his suspension, in response to

which the Board granted approval to the aforesaid proposal of the school on

24.12.2002.

4. The husband of the opposite party thereafter filed a writ petition

before this High Court, being WP No. 8238(W) of 2003 challenging the

suspension order and the approval of the said Board. This High Court while

disposing the said Writ Petition directed the school authorities to initiate an

enquiry against him in accordance with law for the purpose of probing the

charges and ultimately after giving an opportunity of hearing to him. If the

school authorities want to inflict any order of punishment, in that case the

same must be subject to the approval of the Director of School Education.

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5. In terms of the aforesaid order of the High Court, the school authority

had initiated the enquiry proceeding and thereafter the enquiry officer

submitted report before the School authority. However, the husband of

opposite party did not reply to the said enquiry report and therefore the

managing committee of the said school in its meeting dated 01.10.2005

proposed to remove him and such proposal was sent to the Director of

school education on 13.01.2006 for necessary approval.

6. During pendency of the said approval, the husband of the opposite

party herein filed another Writ Petition being WP no. 4458(W) of 2006 before

this High Court, praying for releasing the subsistence allowance and other

arrear dues and this Court by an order dated 27.10.2006 was pleased to

dispose of the Writ Petition with certain observations. In terms of the

aforesaid order dated 27.10.2006, the school authority started paying the

subsistence allowance for the husband of the opposite party herein.

Subsequently the Director of school education by a letter dated 24.12.2008

informed the secretary of the said school that he did not approve the act of

dismissal of the husband of the opposite party and also directed the school

authority to reconsider the stage of punishment after observing a fresh

procedure and after giving the incumbent concerned an opportunity of

hearing.

7. Thereafter, the husband of the opposite party again preferred a Writ

Application being WP No.22562 (W) Of 2012 before this High Court

challenging the entire disciplinary proceeding including the order of

suspension, wherein this High Court passed an interim order on 17.04.2013

directing the husband of the opposite party to resume his duties in respect

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of the post of assistant teacher in the said school. Accordingly he joined in

the said school and retired from his service on 31.01.2019. Said writ

petition is still pending for disposal.

8. In the meantime, the husband of the opposite party had filed another

writ petition being no. WPA 1194 of 2018 before this High Court with a

prayer for releasing the subsistence allowance together with arrears and

interest thereupon. One order was passed in the said writ application on

08.08.2023 wherein the respondent no. 3 was directed to consider the

representation dated 08.12.2017 which was annexed with writ petition and

filed on behalf of the writ petitioner upon issuing at least 7days prior

hearing notice to the petitioner and respondent no. 4 and to pass a reasoned

order in accordance with law after giving them an opportunity of hearing.

9. The writ petitioner/husband of the opposite party herein filed an intra

Court Appeal being MAT no. 1830 of 2023 before a Division Bench of this

Court, which court was pleased to dispose of the said appeal without

interfering the aforesaid order passed by the Single Bench on 12.10.2023.

10. It is alleged by the petitioner herein that suppressing such vital

aspect, the opposite party herein being the wife of the said writ petitioner

had taken up an application under section 156(3) of the CrPC inter alia

alleging that her husband who had been discharging his duties honestly,

punctually and with full integrity had been behaved in a step motherly

manner by the petitioner herein being the Head Master of the said

institution and thereby initiated a disciplinary proceeding against her

husband. It is alleged that the school authorities at the instance of the

petitioner had unnecessarily delayed the release of the legitimate dues of the

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husband of the opposite party in spite of dismissal of the Special Leave to

Appeal preferred by the institution. The opposite party had faced serious

difficulties owing to the act of the petitioners and recently the petitioner

being the head of the institution had taken drastic steps against her

husband by illegally and arbitrarily withholding the monthly salary from the

month of March 2017 on the plea of non-resumption of normal duty. The

husband of the opposite party suffered mental shock and trauma for which

he could not impart best education.

11. Learned Magistrate observed that the opposite party could not make

out a case of police investigation but he treated such application as a

complaint and was pleased to take cognizance of the same vide impugned

order dated 29.05.2017.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that he has

suffered grave injustice by being deprived of his post-retiral benefits solely

due to the pendency of the instant proceeding, which is wholly misconceived

and legally untenable. He argued that the complaint is nothing more than a

collateral challenge to disciplinary measure taken by the school authorities

over two decades ago, which have already been subjected to judicial scrutiny

upto the Supreme Court. The Court below despite noting that no material

existed to justify police action, has mechanically taken cognizance under

section 500 of the IPC, without appreciating that the allegations relate solely

to administrative suspension and disciplinary enquiry which are governed

by service jurisprudence. No defamatory imputation against the husband of

the opposite party is evident on record. The allegations are confined to

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alleged harassment and mental trauma arising from suspension, which

cannot in law amount to defamation.

13. He further argued that the complaint is filed by the wife of the

concerned teacher, which is not permissible under section 199 of the Code.

If somebody aggrieved by an action of the school authority, it does not

constitute an offence of defamation as it squarely falls within the exception

to the section 499 of the IPC. The decision to initiate disciplinary proceeding

was a decision by the managing committee of the school. Even otherwise

there was no malice of the petitioner in discharging his official duty.

14. He further argued that the sum and substance of the allegation

revolve around the alleged actions undertaken by the petitioner during his

tenure as a headmaster of a school where the opposite party’s husband was

employed. No sanction as contemplated under section 197 of CrPC has been

obtained. Furthermore, Section 468 of the CrPC imposes a clear statutory

bar on the Court from taking cognizance of offence after the lapse of the

prescribed period of limitation. Therefore once the prescribed period has

expired, the complaint is rendered legally untenable. Section 500 of the IPC

prescribes a maximum punishment of 2 years imprisonment or fine or both

and therefore under section 468(2)(c) of the CrPC, the limitation period for

taking cognizance of such offence is 3 years from the date of alleged cause of

action. He further pointed out that the summoning order passed by the

Court below on 25.09.2017 is bereft of reasons and even if the prosecution

story is accepted in its entirety, the allegations do not disclose the essential

ingredients of section 500 of the IPC. Therefore the petitioner has prayed for

quashing of the impugned proceeding.

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15. Mr, Thakur learned counsel for the opposite party opposed the prayer

made by the petitioner and contended that since the beginning of his career

the husband of the opposite party was dealt with by the petitioner herein at

every stage till the date of his retirement and the petitioner tried to put him

financially crippled. The school authority under the leadership of the

petitioner initiated illegal disciplinary proceeding placing the husband of the

opposite party under suspension and ultimately he was dismissed from

service. The petitioner intentionally made wrong calculation in the service

benefit as also in the pensionary benefit of the husband of the opposite

party. In this way the petitioner herein tried to make the husband of the

opposite party financially crippled. When the husband of the opposite party

applied for a personal loan, the petitioner tried his best so that the husband

of the opposite party could not get that financial assistance. Even the

petitioner without taking any instruction from the husband of the petitioner,

started deducting the EMI of the said loan directly from his salary.

16. In reply to the petitioners argument that sanction under section 197

of Cr.P.C was not taken before taking cognizance, learned counsel for the

opposite party submits that the complaint was lodged by the wife of the said

assistant teacher against the petitioner as her individual entity and

therefore sanction is not required to file the said complaint. Infact the

commission of offence as alleged was committed by the petitioner herein not

only against the husband of the opposite party but also against all the

family members of the opposite party and therefore it is maintainable as

framed by the opposite party.

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17. It is further argued on behalf of the opposite party that the

complainant being an aggrieved person within the meaning and ambit of

section 499 of the IPC has validly instituted the present complaint against

the petitioner. Referring the judgment of John Thomas Vs. Dr. K

Jagadeeshan, AIR 2001 SC 2651 he argued that the collocation of the

words ‘by some persons aggrieved’ definitely indicates that the complaint

need not necessarily be lodged by the defamed person himself. Whether the

complaint has reason to feel hurt on account of the illegal actions taken by

the petitioner is matter to be determined by the Court depending upon the

facts of each case during trial.

18. He further argued that at the stage of exercising inherent power under

section 482 Cr.P.C, this Court ought not conduct a mini trial or evaluate

disputed questions of fact. Deciding the locus standi of the complaint at this

preliminary stage, without trial may amount to pre mature adjudication. The

issue of whether the complainant has locus standi in filing complaint under

section 500 IPC is generally a matter to be determined after evidence is led

and not ordinarily at this stage. In this context he also referred judgment in

Subrmaniyam Swammy Vs. Union of India , (2016) 7 SCC 221.

19. He further submits that it is a settled position of law that the

exception to section 499 IPC are matters of defence and burden squarely lies

upon the accused to establish that his case falls within the ambit of the

claimed exception. The invocation of exception 8 and 9 enumerated under

section 499 of the IPC requires the appreciation of evidence to be laid down

by the accused at trial who claims to be falling under the same and in this

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context he relied upon the judgment of Harbajhan Singh Vs. State of

Punjab, 1965 SCR (3) 235.

20. In this context he further argued that exception 8 and 9 requires

prove of good faith, due care and attention and either lawful authority under

exception 8 or protection of interest/public good under exception 9. The

expression “good faith” under section 52 IPC necessarily involves a factual

inquiry into whether the accused acted with due care and attention. Such

determination requires appreciation of evidence, examination of surrounding

circumstances and testing of the accused persons conduct through cross

examination. While the accused may succeed at trial by establishing his

defence on a preponderance of probability, such evaluation is impermissible

at the quashing stage. As it has been reiterated by the Apex Court in catena

of judgements that the High Court must exercise such power with great

circumspection and restraint, the inherent power is not intended to stifle a

legitimate prosecution nor to conduct a roving inquiry into disputed

questions of fact. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the

complaint is bereft of basic facts, which are absolutely necessary for making

out the offence.

21. In reply to petitioners argument that the complaint filed before learned

magistrate is vague, absurd or misconceived, learned counsel for the

opposite party submits that the complaint clearly discloses specific

allegations and material particulars sufficient to warrant consideration by

the learned magistrate. The learned magistrate has taken cognizance only

after due application of judicial mind and upon being satisfied that a prima

facie case is made out. A complaint is not required to reproduce every

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incriminating material or verbatim statements or the exact words allegedly

spoken or imitated. At the stage of taking cognizance or issuance of process,

the court is only required to examine whether the complaint discloses the

essential ingredients of the alleged offence and makes out a prima facie

case. In this context he relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Balraj

Khanna and Ors. Vs. Moti Ram reported in AIR 1971 SC 1389.

22. The contentions of the petitioners regarding the alleged delay in filing

the present complaint are not sustainable. It is well settled that the question

of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, which necessarily requires

appreciation of evidence and examination of relevant circumstances. Such

an issue cannot be conclusively adjudicated at this preliminary stage while

exercising its inherent jurisdiction. Even if the petitioners are aggrieved on

the ground of limitation, they can raise such objection before the Trial Court

in filing appropriate application seeking dismissal of the complaint on

maintainability ground.

23. The petitioners themselves have approached this High Court after an

inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly seven years from the institutions

of the proceeding before the learned trial court. A petition under section 482

of the Code should not be invoked after such prolonged lapse of time,

particularly when the petitioner has participated in the proceeding without

demur and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on that

ground alone. The instant application under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal procedure is wholly mis conceived devoid of merit and an abuse of

process of law. The allegations disclosed in the complaint/FIR clearly

constitute cognizable offence and prima facie make out a case against the

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petitioner. Therefore the present application is liable to be dismissed in

limine and the Trial Court may be directed to conduct full fledged trial at the

earliest.

Decision

24. Before going further, let me reproduce the relevant portion of the

impugned complaint

“18.That the president of the managing committee of the said institution

and sub division officer, chandannagar sub division chandanangar Hooghly

directed the Head-master to release the dues and outstanding amount to the

husband of the complaint.

19. That in spite of that, the accused person as Head-master did not release

the money to the husband of the complainant.

20. That the accused person as Head-master has done everything with a

dishonest intention and put the husband of the complainant and his family

into a deep financial hardship.

21. That during that crucial juncture the husband of the complainant was

not in a positon to get his son admitted into a reputed school due to financial

hardship.

22. That the husband of the complainant could not give comfort to his family

and he could not give better treatment of his mother and his mother-in-law

because of financial crisis.

23. That the intention of the Head-master was to financially cripple the

husband of the complainant and the said accused person as Head-master

has done it by damaging his salary, which leads to damage of property.

24. That the husband of the complainant and his family are suffering from

financial crisis due to the wrong and malafide action taken against the

salary of the husband of the complainant.

25. That due to the non-release of full salary and dishonestly deducting the

salary without the due consent all the members of the family of the husband

of the complainant suffered from mental shock and trauma for which he

could not give the best education and treatment to his family members due

to the cruel action on the part of the accused person as Head-master of the

said institution.

26. That the mental condition of the husband of the complainant has gone to

such an extent that the complainant apprehends that the husband of the

complainant may commit suicide at any moment. The accused person as

Head-master will be responsible if the husband of the complainant commits

suicide as it is a clear provocation on the part of the accused person as

Head-master.

27. That the complainant brought all the fact to the notice of the officer-in-

charge Bhadreswar P.S. thereby requesting him to take necessary legal

steps against the accused persons as Head –master of the said institution

for the commission of punishable offences under the provisions of the Indian

penal Code 1860 or any other law for the time being in force and investigate

into the matter against the accused person as Head-master and take

immediate steps by threating the said complaint as a first information report

in accordance with law”

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25. The complainant only deposed during initial deposition under section

200 of the Cr.P.C, wherein she has stated that she had filed the instant case

against the petitioner with the allegation of causing mental torture and for

damaging his reputation including his family. Hon’ble Apex Court directed

for payment of the due salary and other benefits including interests to her

husband but the accused person did not comply the order of the Hon’ble

Court and forced her and her other family members to lead the life in

starvation. The reputation of her husband and family members lowered

down in the estimation of others and the petitioner did all these acts with a

view to harass her husband and her family members intentionally and

dishonestly with ulterior motive to defame them and therefore she wants the

punishment of the petitioner.

26. In the above background of filing the complaint, it is clear that the

acts were done by the petitioner, were done in accordance with the

recommendation of the school committee and also in terms of the court’s

order. Therefore, if the aforesaid allegations made in the complaint as well

as in the initial deposition are taken into consideration, it at best amount to

counter allegations made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial

proceeding. A perusal of the complaint, it appears that the complainant is

aggrieved as her husband suffered humiliation owing to the disciplinary

action, taken by the committee when the present petitioner was the Head-

master of the School.

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27. The act of initiating disciplinary proceeding or making any

recommendation with the same as head of the institution cannot by itself

constitute an act of defamation. In order to justify an allegation under

section 500 IPC, it is required that the allegations must satisfy requirement

of section 499 IPC, as also the explanations appended thereto. It is thus

required to be shown by the complainant who claimed herself as aggrieved

person that the imputation which has allegedly caused harm to his

reputation directly or indirectly lowered her husband’s moral and

intellectual character in the estimation of others, under explanation 4 of

section 499. If the moral or intellectual character of the person concerned is

not lowered in the estimation of others, simply making of imputation, if any,

cannot per se lead to commission of offence of defamation.

28. In the instant case neither in the complaint nor in the initial

deposition of the complainant, recorded on solemn affirmation, before the

learned magistrate, she alleged that the reputation and/or moral or

intellectual character of the opposite party no.2 or her husband was lowered

in the estimation of any other person. The complainant had also failed to

bring a single person as witness on her behalf during initial deposition in

support of the imputation that her husband’s moral or intellectual character

has been lowered in the eyes of said person, due to continuance of the

proceedings conducted by the school authority or for any other reason. It is

thus apparent that the complainant has failed to make out a case within the

parameters as provided under section 499 IPC. The opposite party simply

ventilated the alleged harassment or inaction on the part of the petitioner,

without having any element of defamation.

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29. The next question that arises for consideration is whether reading the

complaint and the initial deposition, can it be said that prima facie case

exist for trial or exception seventh/eight/nineth to section 499 applies and

consequently in such a case, calling upon the accused to face trial would be

a travesty of justice. The gravamen of the allegations in the complaint

petition is that the petitioner had intentionally taken some actions against

her husband, which resulted withholding the payment of due salary and

other benefits along with interest, inspite of specific direction of the court

and thereby forced her and other family members under the threat of

starvation and also the reputation of her husband and family members

lowered down in the estimation of others, which the accused did with a view

to harass and defame her and her family members intentionally and

dishonestly.

30. Exception 8 to section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation

to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who

have lawful authority over that person, with regard to the subject matter of

accusation. The averment of the complaint clearly indicates that pursuant to

the recommendation made by the school authority against the husband of

the complainant, the proceedings were conducted and they found him

guilty. Under such circumstances, the fact that the petitioner had made a

recommendation for his termination as decided by the school authority or

allegedly with the excuse of the pendency of the legal proceedings, petitioner

had withheld his dues, are squarely covered by exception VIII to section 499

of the IPC. In the instant case the authority of the petitioner being head of

the institution was never called in question. The background of the

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complaint case makes it clear that the petitioner had not dealt with anything

personally in discharge of his statutory or official duty. Even if for the sake

of argument, if I take it for granted that there were certain imputations in

the recommendation or in the objections filed before the court, that does not

per se categorized as defamation, because every complaint is more or less

having a touch of imputation and there is always a difference between

defamation per se and implied defamation.

31. The petitioner acted in the capacity of a Headmaster of a school and

apparently acted under the recommendation of school authorities. His

authority also remains unchallenged and as such the exception in clause VII

& IX of section 499 also squarely protects him. The decision to initiate

disciplinary proceeding was a decision by the managing committee of the

school. Even otherwise there was no malice and was an act in discharge of

his duties.

32. The other aspect of the matter is, in the present case before initiating

the proceeding or before taking cognizance, no sanction was also taken from

the competent authority though the alleged action undertaken by the

petitioner during his tenure was as a Head-master of a school, where

husband of opposite party was employed.

33. A public servant is protected under section 197 of the Cr.P.C. if two

conditions are satisfied (i) that the accused was a public servant who was

removable from his officer only with sanction with State Government or the

Central Government (ii) he must be accused of an alleged offence to have

been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of

his official duties. It is equally true that no protection can be granted to the

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public servant if the act complained of is not in connection with discharge of

his duties or in exercise of his duty. In fact for invoking protection under

section 197 of the Code, the accusation complained of must be such that

the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty. In the

instant case aforesaid background makes it quite clear that there was

reasonable connection between the acts of the petitioner complained of with

that of the discharge of his official duty and there is apparently nothing to

show that he acted in excess of his duty. The mandatory character of the

protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression ‘no

court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’.

Therefore use of the words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ make it abundantly clear that the

bar on exercise of power by the court to take cognizance of any offence is

absolute and complete and therefore, very cognizance upon the instant

offence is barred and the complaint cannot be taken notice of, without

sanction.

34. Furthermore the petitioner has rightly challenged the wife’s locus to

file the complaint. Infact in the present case the complaint is filed in a

representative capacity by the wife of the concerned teacher. Under section

199 of Cr.P.C no Court shall take cognizance of the offence, except upon a

complaint made by the person aggrieved. I am not unmindful to the

proposition of law that the words “persons aggrieved” do not only mean

“person defamed” and definitely it has wider connotation but where the

person defamed is an adult and a male who acted as a teacher of a school

for a considerable period and is not incapacitated by physical infirmities or

otherwise incapable of attending the court, no other person should be held

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to be competent to make a complaint under section 500. When an architect

of society whose duty as assistant teacher was to play a fundamental role in

shaping minds, nurturing values and moulding the character of future

generations has been allegedly defamed and when he is alive, his wife can

hardly file the complaint, as she cannot be said to be aggrieved by the

alleged defamation, caused to the assistant teacher, merely on the ground

that she also suffered financial crisis due to action or non-action on the part

of the petitioner.

35. The order summoning the petitioner is also a non-speaking order and

is bad in law. Under section 204 of Cr.P.C., the discretion to issue process

must be judicially exercised. The impugned order dated 25.09.2017 is bereft

of reasons. Even if the prosecution story is accepted in its entirety the

allegations do not disclose the essential ingredients of section 500 of IPC.

The complaint suffers from improbabilities and a reasonable person cannot

come to a conclusion that the complaint and the initial deposition

constitutes, even prima facie, offence under section 500 of IPC. Therefore,

continuance of instant proceeding any further would be mere abuse of the

process of the court.

36. In view of above CRR 213 of 2024 is allowed.

37. The impugned proceeding being CR 187 of 2017 under section 500 of

IPC pending before Learned Judicial magistrate, 3

rd court Chandan Nagar is

hereby quashed.

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Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given

to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)