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CASE NO.:

Writ Petition (civil) 35 of 2002

PETITIONER:

Sunil Kumar Goyal

RESPONDENT:

Vs.

Rajasthan Public Service Commission

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/05/2003

BENCH:

CJI. & S.B. Sinha.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 67 of 2002

S.B. SINHA, J :

The petitioners herein are aspirants of joining Rajasthan Judicial

Service. They are working as Legal Assistants in the Education Department

of the State of Rajasthan. Prior thereto they practiced as lawyers but they

had not completed three years' period as was necessary in terms of the rules

as thence existing.

The contention of the petitioners in these Writ Petitions is that they

having been allowed to appear at the written examination and having been

called for interview, their candidature could not have been cancelled on the

purported ground of non-completion of three years' practice in terms of the

All India Judges' Association and Others Vs Union of India [(2002) 4 SCC

247]; keeping in view the fact that they have been representing their

department before the district courts and Tribunal like lawyers in respect

whereof they had affirmed the requisite affidavits and filed certificates

granted by the Competent Authority.

Further contention of the petitioners is that having regard to the

decisions of this Court in All India Judges' Association and Others (supra)

wherein this Court has laid down the law that practice at the Bar would not

be necessary for joining the Judicial Service; this Court should set aside the

impugned directions issued by the respondent â\200\223 Commission.

It is not in dispute that three years' minimum practice was a pre-

requisite at the relevant time for being eligible to enter in the judicial

service.

In All India Judges' Association and Others Vs. Union of India and

Others [(1993) 4 SCC 288], it was inter alia directed:

"52â\200¦.(a) The legal practice of three years should

be made one of the essential qualifications for

recruitment to the judicial posts at the lowest rung

in the judicial hierarchy.

Further, wherever the recruitment of the judicial

officers at the lowest rung is made through the

Public Service Commission, a representative of the

High Court should be associated with the selection

process and his advice should prevail unless there

are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting it,

which reasons should be recorded in writing.

The rules for recruitment of the judicial officers

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should be amended forthwith to incorporate the

above directions."

In the said decision, this Court was inter alia considering the question

as regard uniform hierarchy and designation. It was opined:

"20â\200¦â\200¦In this connection, it may be pointed out

that under Article 233(2) of the Constitution, no

person is eligible to be appointed a District Judge

unless he has been an advocate or a pleader for not

less than seven years while Articles 217(2)(b) and

124(3)(b) require at least ten years' practice as an

advocate of a High Court for the appointment of a

persons to the posts of the Judge of the High Court

and the Judge of the Supreme Court,

respectivelyâ\200¦.."

A bare perusal of the aforementioned paragraph would leave no

manner of doubt that the minimum legal practice of three years was

prescribed as an essential qualification to be eligible for being appointed as

Judicial Officer so as to ensure recruitment of competent, independent and

honest judicial officers for the purpose of strengthening the administration of

justice and the confidence of public in it.

This Court, therefore, laid down the law to the effect that a candidate

must have three years' practice at the Bar.

The petitioners herein admittedly did not complete the said period of

three years of active practice at the Bar. They joined services prior thereto.

They might have been representing their department while in service before

the Tribunal but we fail to understand as to how they could appear before the

Court like lawyers. Be that as it may, representing the employer in a Court

or Tribunal would not amount to practice at the Bar and as such the criteria

laid down by this Court would not stand satisfied.

Our attention was drawn to an order of this Court passed in I.A. Nos.

31, 32 of 1995 in Review Petition No. 249 of 1992 in Writ Petition No. 1022

of 1989. In that case also it was observed :

"There is no doubt in our minds that what was

intended by the provision was that a candidate for

appointment to judicial office should be a person

who has had three years experience of practice as

an advocate. He must be a lawyer in the sense that

he regularly practices before a court or tribunal,

who appears for his clients before the court or

tribunal. It may be that in a given case he may do

so only for a client who is his employer."

Further, it was directed:

"We, therefore, direct the legal Assistants who are

the applicants in I.As. 7, 8, 9 and 10 to place on

affidavit before the Rajasthan Public Service

Commission within a period of one week from

today a statement of what precisely their work as

Legal Assistant involves. It is only if that work

involves regularly appearing before courts or

tribunals that they would fall within the

requirements of the provision aforementioned and,

being eligible, should be allowed to complete the

selection process."

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It may be true that pursuant to or in furtherance of said directions the

petitioners had filed affidavits but evidently the impugned order has been

passed by the respondent â\200\223 Public Service Commission being not satisfied as

regard fulfillment of requirement of the statutory rules as then existed.

The rules were framed by the State pursuant to the directions of this

Court in All India Judges Association's case (supra) and thus as regard the

question as to whether the petitioners held the requisite qualifications or not,

the Commission was required to satisfy itself in that behalf on the materials

placed on record as to whether the petitioners fulfilled the said criteria or

not. Ex-facie we do not find the decision of the Commission to be so

arbitrary so as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The learned counsel may be correct that in All India Judges'

Association and Others Vs Union of India [(2002) 4 SCC 247] this Court

has directed dispensation of practice at the Bar; keeping in view of the

subsequent events. However, in no uncertain terms it was categorically

stated that before a Judicial Officer is entrusted to decide the fate of the

litigants, he must undergo rigorous judicial training of one year preferably

two years. It is not in dispute that the State of Rajasthan has amended the

rules pursuant to the directions of this Court. The petitioners, therefore, are

now eligible to appear at the ensuing examination.

Our attention has, however, been drawn to a recent decision of this

Court in Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Anr. Vs. Harish Kumar

Purohit and Others [2003(3) SCALE 571] wherein this Court held that the

High Court has committed an illegality in directing the Commission to de-

reserve the 11 posts although they were meant to be filled up by the

candidates belonging to the reserved categories. In view of the

aforementioned decision alone, this Court cannot presume that the said 11

vacancies would be dereserved and the petitioners would be eligible to fill

up the vacancies wherefor they be given an opportunity to appear at the

interview.

It is not in dispute that all other eligible candidates have been

interviewed and select-list has been finalized. It will, therefore, not be

proper for this Court to reopen the selection process and direct the

respondent-Commission to take the viva-voce test of the petitioners.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no

merit in these Writ Petitions which are, therefore, dismissed. However, in

the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.