2026:JHHC:25963-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

First Appeal No.253 of 2026

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Surbhe Shaw, Aged about 39 years, wife of Ajit Kumar, resident of Harika

PG, Old Gurrapanapalaya, Bannergatta Road, Bengaluru, P.O & P.S-

Bengaluru, Karnataka. At present residing at Mahashay Bhawan, Bompas

Town, P.S-Deoghar Town, P.O-Devsangh, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand

.......… Petitioner/Appellant

Versus

Ajit Kumar, son of Shiwalak Ray permanent resident of Sunita Niwas,

opposite Primary School, Mankauli, P.S-Kurhani, P.O Kurhani, District

Muzaffarpur, Bihar Pin 844120 At present residing at

1. Flat 124, No.1/2 & 18/2, Adjacent to Vidhana Soudha Layout,

Agrahara Village, Yehlanka Hobli, North Bengaluru-560064,

Karnataka.

2. House No.66 2

nd

Main, Murthy Layout, K. Narayanapura, Kothanur,

Bangalore-560077, Karnataka.

.… … Respondent/Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD

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For the Appellant : Mr. Ankur Anand, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr. Awanish Shekhar, Advocate

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C.A.V on 20.07.2026 Pronounced on 27/08/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant appeal under section 19(i) of the Family Court Act,

1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.11.2025 and the

decree signed on 14.11.2025 passed in Original Suit No.105 of 2024 by

the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Deoghar (in short,

Family Judge) whereby and whereunder the petition filed under Order VII

Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the respondent herein has been

allowed and consequently the petition filed under section 13 (6 & 7) of

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 by the appellant herein for

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appointment of the guardian of the person and property of the minor,

namely, Aastha Ray has been dismissed.

2. The brief facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint needs to be

referred herein as:

(i) The petitioner (appellant herein) is own mother of the minor

daughter Aastha Ray who was born on 27.03.2018 from the wedlock

of the petitioner and respondent-Ajit Kumar.

(ii) The marriage ceremony of the petitioner and respondent was

solemnized on 04.05.2017 at Deoghar and after marriage both went

to Bangalore at their workplace.

(iii) Before the solemnization of marriage between the petitioner and

respondent, the respondent had solemnized first marriage with

Shwetha S. Joshi on 20.10.2009. The respondent did not disclose

about his first marriage before the petitioner.

(iv) The petitioner came to know about the fact of previous marriage of

the respondent on 24.08.2022.

(v) It is averred that from the wedlock of Shwetha S. Joshi and the

respondent one male child was born on 25.07.2013, namely, Ansh

Ray who is now living at U.K.

(vi) The respondent financially harassed the petitioner even before

marriage which continued to an extreme level after marriage.

(vii) The respondent demanded huge amount of money from the

petitioner in the form of repayable loans in September, 2016 before

the wedding for the purpose of constructing his house in Bangalore.

The petitioner with trust on the respondent paid Rs.14,24,000/- to

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him via NEFT/CHQ on several dates from 03.10.2016 to

10.04.2017.

(viii) After marriage the respondent started making illegal demands of the

money from the petitioner for his personal as well as family

requirements.

(ix) The petitioner was forced to borrow a total of Rs.44,88,000/- as

personal loan amount to meet the financial requirement of the

respondent.

(x) Thereafter, the petitioner continued to demand of money from the

petitioner and when the petitioner shown her inability to pay the

same, he deserted her and thrown her out of the house on 27.02.2022

and, since then, the petitioner is residing with her parents.

(xi) Being compelled with the action of the respondent who started

torturing the petitioner, she has filed a suit for judicial separation

from the respondent before Family Court, Deoghar. She has also

lodged a criminal case on 23.10.2022 against the respondent-

husband under sections 498A, 495, 420, 34 IPC and 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act being Deoghar Mahila P.S Case No.41/22.

(xii) The respondent has also filed a suit for divorce against the petitioner

in the Court at Bangalore for which a Transfer Petition is pending

before Hon’ble Apex Court for transfer of the case to Deoghar.

(xiii) The petitioner on several occasion approached the respondent and

requested him to allow her to meet with her minor child but the

respondent refused the said request.

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(xiv) The respondent has no permanent job and thus, he has to travel from

one place to another in search of job and for that reason he could not

take proper care and protect the best interest of the minor child.

(xv) The petitioner has put continuous effort to be in touch with her only

child and she visited her school, namely, prestige School, L.K.G to

see her but she got shocked and surprised to know that the name of

her daughter has been changed from “Aastha Ray” to “Aarohi Rai”.

(xvi) When the minor girl expressed her feeling about the petitioner with

pleasure to the respondent then the minor child was forcefully

removed from the school without any proper notice or obtaining any

Transfer Certificate and she has been deprived of good education

and welfare.

(xvii) The petitioner lodged a complaint in Shivaginagar Police Station for

help on 13.03.2023 whereafter the respondent’s father appeared

there and confirmed that they will take care of her and will allow

the petitioner to meet the minor child.

(xviii) Thereafter, the respondent moved to an undisclosed location and did

not allow the petitioner to get in touch with her only minor child.

(xix) The minor child is not going to any school for her education for the

last one year and thus, the respondent has jeopardized her education

and career.

(xx) In absence of mother’s love and affection the minor child has

become very sad and furious which affected her proper upbringing.

3. On the aforesaid ground, the appellant has prayed for following

reliefs:

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(i) the petitioner may be appointed the guardian of the person and

property of the said minor child, and

(ii) the minor may be given in custody of the petitioner for her

welfare.

4. It needs to mention herein that in Original Suit No.105 of 2024

upon issuance of notices, the respondent has appeared and filed a written

statement. The respondent has stated in his written statement inter alia on

the maintainability of the suit for custody of the minor child stating that

the present suit is not maintainable in present form and is liable to be

dismissed in limine and in lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain and

try the present suit reason being that under section 9 (1) of Guardian and

Wards Act an application for guardianship or custody of a minor, must be

filed in the learned court having jurisdiction over the place where the

minor ordinarily resides.

5. The factum of marriage between the parties is admitted. It is

stated that the minor female child, namely, Aastha Ray @ Arohi aged

about 7 years has been residing with the respondent at Bengaluru,

Karnataka since her birth on 27.03.2018. It is stated that Bengaluru is her

ordinary place of residence as she has been living there continuously under

the care and custody of the respondent and the petitioner has filed the suit

at Deoghar showing her own residence at Deoghar which do not confer

jurisdiction. Therefore, the suit deserves to be dismissed for want of

jurisdiction.

6. It is stated that the female child has been in the exclusive

custody of respondent since birth and the petitioner has not made any prior

effort to seek custody or visitation right indicating abandonment of her

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right. It is stated that the respondent and the petitioner met at Bengaluru

and personal relation grew up in between both and thereafter both decided

to get married after dissolution of marriage of respondent with his earlier

wife. They decided to live together in live in relationship. During that

time, the petitioner took Rs. 14,50,000/- from the respondent for business

revival for her father which subsequently returned by her to the respondent

in installments.

7. It is stated that the allegation of thrown out the petitioner from

the house is totally false. The real fact is that the it was the petitioner who

left matrimonial home voluntarily on 27.02.2022 deserting the respondent

and the minor child without sufficient cause, thereafter respondent

carrying the minor child with entire responsibility of her upbringing,

education, medical care and emotional well-being.

8. The fact of cruelty meted upon the petitioner is denied by saying

that neither any cruelty nor atrocity have ever been committed by the

respondent, rather the petitioner is a persistence and documented patter of

alcohol and suspected drug used by the petitioner resulting in frequent

violent and erratic beahviour and in presence of minor also inflicted

physical cruelty upon the respondent’s mother causing fracture, not only

this petitioner abusive conduct take cutting all ties with her own family

members who leaved her isolated.

9. It is stated that the petitioner has lodged false criminal case

against the respondent to extort the illegal money from him with wild

allegation rather the fact is that no occurrence taken place as alleged in

F.I.R. It is denied that the petitioner never made genuine attempt to even

to reconnect with minor child.

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10. It is stated that the respondent and his family members have

sufficient income as the respondent is an employee of Multinational

company and the family of the respondent have stable income from

agriculture, employment, Army pension as well as Real Estate holding

empire to support of the minors needs.

11. It is stated that it is false to say that the name of the minor child

has been changed as the official name of minor is Arohi Ray and the

transfer of the school of the minor child was done for her welfare and

safety as the child refused any proximity to her mother in presence of the

officials of School.

12. It is stated that the petitioner forcibly entered into the

respondent’s home with the help of paid activist; created nuisance and

assaulted the father of respondent and falsely lodged the complaint against

them, but during course of inquiry the police found the allegation was false

with intent to harass the respondent.

13. It is stated that the minor female child is living with the

respondent along with his parents who are providing stable education,

health, care and emotional support. The minor child is enrolled in reputed

C.B.S.E. School and is healthy and surviving. It is alleged that the minor

child is in good environment and regularly supervised by the respondent

and his parents, rather the petitioner is currently residing in Bengalour

with a man having no lawful or family relationship where minor would be

morally and socially unsafe.

14. It is stated that the minor child under the care of respondent is

doing excellent in school emotionally secure healthy loving suitable and

discipline environment. The respondent and his family are taking all cares

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contrary to the trauma and experience under the petitioner, the welfare of

the female child being obtained age is best served with the respondent who

has been her natural guardian and primary care given since birth.

15. It is stated that the minor child has developed strong emotion

bonds with the respondent being the natural guardian of the minor child

and his family in Bengaluru and any change in custody would cause

irreparable harm to her psychological and physical development. The

respondent has ensured the child holistic growth including education

balance diet regular medical check -up extracurricular activities stable

homely environment.

16. The respondent lastly prayed that the petitioner is not entitled to

get any relief as claimed for and the petition for custody of minor child is

fit to be dismissed with cost.

17. In needs to mention herein as has been taken note by the learned

Family Judge in its order dated 06.11.2025 that the respondent has filed

an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC praying therein to dismiss

the suit due to lack of jurisdiction which was allowed vide order dated

06.11.2025 which is impugned herein in the instant appeal.

Submission on behalf of the appellant:

18. Mr. Ankur Anand, the learned counsel appearing for the

appellant has taken the following grounds while challenging the impugned

judgment:

(i) It has been contended that the learned Family Judge has

not taken into consideration that the appellant is the mother and,

as such, she is having better claim over the minor who needs

guardianship/custody.

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(ii) The learned trial Court has committed a gross error by not

taking into consideration the issue of welfare of the child who can

better be nourished by the mother and ignoring the said fact has

dismissed the petition filed under section 10 of the said Act on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction which is not at all permissible in law.

(iii) The learned Family Judge has erred in allowing the

application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC despite the settled legal

position that rejection of a plaint at the threshold is an exception

and can be exercised only when lack of jurisdiction is apparent on

the face of the plaint itself whereas in the instant case, the

pleadings disclosed substantial facts conferring jurisdiction upon

the Family Court at Deoghar.

(iv) The learned Family Court has erred in applying section

9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 without appreciating

that the expression “ordinarily resides” is a mixed question of law

and fact which requires adjudication after evidence and cannot be

conclusively determined at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(v) The learned Family Court has failed to take into

consideration that multiple matrimonial proceedings are ongoing

between the parties, including judicial separation and divorce,

which are now pending before the learned Family Court, Deoghar,

thereby reinforcing the territorial and functional jurisdiction of the

said Court to decide all matrimonial and linked issues, including

the custody of the minor child.

(vi) The learned Family Court has failed to consider the fact

that in matters relating to custody and guardianship of the minor

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the paramount consideration is of the welfare of the child which

has not taken into consideration while dismissing the suit.

(vii) The learned Family Court has failed to take into

consideration that the appellant being the biological mother and

natural guardian has been completely denied access to her minor

child either physically or through any virtual mode of

communication which has resulted in immense mental agony and

emotional distress to the appellant.

19. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has

submitted that the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, is not

sustainable in the eyes of law and it requires interference by this Court.

Submission on behalf of the respondent:

20. Mr. Awanish Shekhar, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-husband has taken the following grounds:

(i) There is no error in the impugned judgement. The learned

Family Judge has rightly considered the entire issue on the

ground of territorial jurisdiction and has passed the order

impugned as such the same may not be interfered with.

(ii) It has been contended that the issue of welfare is well to be

looked into by the respondent, who is biological father of

the minor child and under his guardianship the minor child

is being looked after properly.

(iii) It has been contended that the mother has taken no care

rather she has left the house on her own and the minor is

living with the respondent and his parents, hence, it is the

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respondent and his parents to be more concerned with the

welfare of the minor.

(iv) It has been contended that the minor child is at present

residing with the respondent at Bengalore and, as such, the

learned Family Court has rightly dismissed the suit for

custody of the minor on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

21. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned Family Judge on

consideration of the aforesaid fact has denied the custody of the minor to

be given in favour of the appellant herein, hence, the impugned judgment

needs no interference.

Analysis:

22. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties,

gone through the impugned judgment/order as well as the Trial Court

Records.

23. It is evident from the factual aspect that the instant Appeal filed

against the order dated 06.11.2025 and decree dated 14.11.2025 passed in

Original Suit No.105 of 2024 by the Family Court, Deoghar, whereby the

learned Family Court allowed the respondent’s (husband) application filed

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and dismissed the appellant’s (wife) petition

under Section 13(6 & 7) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,

1956 seeking guardianship of her minor daughter, Aastha Ray.

24. Petitioner/appellant is the mother of minor Aastha Ray born on

27.03.2018. Marriage with respondent solemnized on 04.05.2017.

Petitioner later discovered respondent’s undisclosed first marriage with

Shwetha S. Joshi (2009) and existence of son Ansh Ray (born 2013). The

petitioner had alleged financial harassment and it has been stated that

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petitioner paid ₹14,24,000 before marriage and borrowed ₹44,88,000 later

to meet respondent’s demands. Petitioner claims desertion on 27.02.2022;

since then, living with parents. The petitioner filed suit for judicial

separation and criminal case under sections 498A, 495, 420, 34 IPC and

Dowry Prohibition Act.

25. It has been alleged by the petitioner that respondent allegedly

denied access to minor child and changed her name to “Aarohi Rai,” and

removed her from school, and kept her away from education for over a

year. The petitioner asserts child’s welfare is compromised without

mother’s care and seeks custody and guardianship and filed the suit before

the learned Family Court Deoghar.

26. Respondent appeared on notice and filed written statement and

admits marriage and child but contests jurisdiction of the leaned Family

Court under Section 9(1) of Guardians and Wards Act and contended that

suit must be filed where minor ordinarily resides, i.e., Bengaluru, not

Deoghar.

27. He had claimed that the petitioner voluntarily left matrimonial

home in 2022 after abandoning child. Respondent has denied cruelty and

alleged that petitioner’s violent behaviour, alcohol/drug use, and abusive

conduct. He had further asserted that petitioner lodged false criminal cases

for extortion.

28. The respondent had stated that he is employed in a multinational

company and family has stable income and provides proper care to minor

child. He had further stated that minor officially named “Arohi Ray,”

enrolled in reputed CBSE school and thriving under respondent’s custody.

The respondent had contended that the custody change would harm child’s

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psychological and physical development and respondent as natural

guardian ensures holistic growth of the Minor.

29. The respondent by way of filing an application under order VII

rule 11 has challenged the jurisdiction of learned Family Court, Deoghar

by taking ground that minor child since present residing at Bengaluru,

therefore Deoghar Family Court having no jurisdiction to decide the issue

of custody of minor.

30. Respondent’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was

allowed by the learned Family Court and the Suit has been dismissed vide

order dated 06.11.2025 for lack of territorial jurisdiction. This dismissal

order dated 06.11.2025 is now challenged under the instant appeal.

31. Upon consideration of the aforesaid factual matrix, the sole and

seminal question which falls for determination before this Court is

(i) Whether the Family Court at Deoghar was vested with territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the mother’s petition under Section 13(6)

and (7) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 for

custody and guardianship of the minor child?

(ii) Whether the dismissal of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code of Civil Procedure stands legally sustainable.

32. Before adverting to the merits of the controversy, it is apposite at

this stage to delineate the ambit and scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, particularly insofar as it pertains to the question

of territorial jurisdiction. For ready reference, the Order VII Rule 11 is

being referred herein which reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint. — The plaint shall be rejected in the following

cases:—

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

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(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being

required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed

by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned

upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required

by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be

fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred

by any law;

[(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9.

[Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the

valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be

extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that

the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from

correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the

case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to

extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]

33. A perusal of Order VII Rule 11 CPC clearly shows that a plaint

can be rejected on the ground enumerated in it. An application for rejection

of plaint can be filed if the allegations made in the plaint even if given face

value and taken to be correct in their entirety, appears to be barred by any

law. However, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11

CPC, averment made in the plaint only has to be seen and the defence

taken by the defendant in their written statement is relevant.

34. The objection to territorial jurisdiction has to be construed after

taking all the averments in the plaint to be correct. InExphar SA v.

Eupharma Laboratories Limited, (2004) 3 SCC 688, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed that when an objection to jurisdiction is raised by

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way of demurrer and not at the trial, the objection must proceed on the

basis that the facts, as pleaded by the initiator of the impugned procedure,

are true. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the objection

as to jurisdiction in order to succeed must demonstrate that granted those

facts, the Court does not have jurisdiction as a matter of law.

35. It is settled position of law that the power of the courts under

Order VII Rule 11 are mandatory in nature and may be exercised at any

stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing

summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial. However, it

has also clarified that the power conferred under Order VII Rule 11 is a

drastic one and that the requirements enumerated therein should be strictly

adhered to, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P.

Neeradha Reddy, (2015) 8 SCC 331.

36. From the settled position of law, it is clear that in order to

consider Order VII Rule 11, the Court has to look into the averments in

the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of

the suit, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v.

Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260. For ready reference, the

relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:

“7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to

reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the

suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position

is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this

Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [Ram Prakash

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Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta, (2007) 10 SCC 59] . In paras 13 to 20,

the Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66)

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14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of

Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7

Rule 11 of the Code that:

‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an

application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court

can exercise the power … at any stage of the suit — before registering

the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before

the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application

under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the

plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written

statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560,

para 9).

15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC

Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was

held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an

application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real

cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely

illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the

Code.

16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not

formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in

the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its

power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground

mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion

of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing

by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.”

(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [T. Arivandandam v. T.V.

Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467] , SCC p. 468.)

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17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and

the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop

Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh

Gill, (1982) 3 SCC 487] , only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected

and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be

rejected.

18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [Raptakos Brett

& Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that

the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out

whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable.

19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [Sopan Sukhdeo

Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus:

(SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)

‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection,

segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in

the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the

cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to

be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to

cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in

isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has

to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without

addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical

sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily

from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same

time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be

adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’

20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the

plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the

same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the

person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint

does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said

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question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire

plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court

has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.”

9. We may also advert to the exposition of this Court in Madanuri Sri

Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra

Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] .

In para 7 of the said decision, this Court has succinctly restated the

legal position as follows: (SCC pp. 178-79)

“7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions

enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe

that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the

Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked

into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If

on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the

suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing

any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule

11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil

action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under

Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint

have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be

read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of

action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe

that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would

always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The

averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the

defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the

defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made

in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if

they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of

action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the

power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting

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of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will

nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the

earlier stage.”

37. In the case of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1

SCC 557 it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the relevant

facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder

are the averments in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit before registering

the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the

conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under

clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the averments in the plaint

are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement

would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.

38. Further, different clauses in Order VII Rule 11 CPC provided in

relation to rejection of plaint should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given

case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than

one ground, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at, reference in

this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in the case of Kamala v. K.T. Eshwara Sa, (2008) 12 SCC 661.

39. Further, it is settled position of law that plaint cannot be rejected

on basis of defendant's allegations in written statements. Court has to read

entire plaint to find whether cause of action disclosed, if it does, then it

cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, reference in this regard be

made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kuldeep

Singh Pathania v. Bikram Singh Jaryal, (2017) 5 SCC 345.

40. This Court, before consideration of the issue involved in the

instant case referred in preceding paragraphs, needs to refer herein the

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provision as contained under Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act,

1890.For ready reference, the same is being quoted as under:

“9. Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.—(1) If the

application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the

minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the

place where the minor ordinarily resides.

(2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the property

of the minor, it may be made either to the District Court having

jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a

District Court having jurisdiction in a place where he has property.

(3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of

a minor is made to a District Court other than that having jurisdiction

in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return

the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of

more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having

jurisdiction.”

41. The aforesaid provision comprises of three sub-sections. Sub-

section (1) thereof provides that if the application is with respect to the

guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District

Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.

42. Sub-section (2) provides that if the application is with respect of

the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the

District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily

resides or to a District Court having jurisdiction in the place where he has

property.

43. Sub-section (3) provides that if an application with respect to the

guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a District Court other

than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides,

the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would

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21

be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other District Court

having jurisdiction.

44. It is, thus, evident that Section 9 speaks with respect to the

guardianship of the person of the minor and the condition to maintain such

petition in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.

45. Sub-section (2) provides that if the application is with respect

to the guardianship of the property of the minor, such petition can be

entertained to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the

minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having jurisdiction in a place

where he has property, meaning thereby, guardianship with respect to the

property of the minor, the concurrent jurisdiction of the District Court has

been given, such litigation can be filed in either to the District Court having

jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or a District

court having jurisdiction where he has property. But, in any stretch of

imagination so far as the issue of guardianship of person of minor is

concerned, sub-section (2) of Section 9 is having no nexus, rather, sub-

section 2 deals with the guardianship of the property of the minor.

46. Sub-section (3) further clarifies which has got bearing in the present

facts and circumstances of the case that if an application with respect to the

guardianship of the property of a minor is made to the District Court other

than having jurisdiction in the place where the minor resides, the Court may

return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of

more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdiction.

47. Thus, Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 lays down

the rules of jurisdiction for filing applications regarding guardianship. In

essence, it specifies which District Court has authority depending on

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22

whether the matter concerns the minor’s person or property deals with

where to file guardianship applications. For guardianship of a child's

personal care (where they live and who looks after them), the application

must go to the District Court where the child usually lives. For

guardianship of a child's property (like land or money), the application can

be made either where the child lives or where the property is located. If

someone files about property in a Court where the child doesn't live, the

Court can send the case to another Court if it believes justice would be

better served there.

48. It is pertinent to mention herein that the consideration has been

given by the Hon’ble Apex Court so far as the issue of jurisdiction as per

the provision of Section 9(1) of the Act, 1890 is concerned in the case of

Ruchi Majoo vs. Sanjeev Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 that any challenge to

the jurisdiction of the Court will have to be seen in the context of the

averments made in the pleadings of the parties and the requirement of

Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

49. The fact of the said case as would be evident from the reference

made at paragraph-9 thereof that the appellant mother had in her petition

filed under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 invoked the jurisdiction of

the Court at Delhi, on the assertion that the minor was, on the date of the

presentation of the petition for custody was ordinarily residing at New

Delhi.

The respondent had raised the issue of jurisdiction by pleading that

the appellant along with the respondent and their minor son had stayed

with the parents of the appellant at Delhi till 05.07.2008. Thereafter, they

were supposed to visit Udaipur but since the appellant insisted that she

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23

would stay at Delhi and assured to send the minor son after sometime to

Udaipur, the respondent left for Udaipur where he received a legal notice

on behalf of the appellant making false and imaginary allegations.

The ground, therefore, was taken that neither the appellant nor Kush,

the minor son could be ordinarily resident of Delhi so as to confer

jurisdiction upon the Delhi Court.

50. The Hon’ble Apex Court has taken into consideration the

provision as contained under Section 9(1) of the Act, 1890 which has been

considered at paragraph-24 that the solitary test for determining the

jurisdiction of the Court under Section 9 of the Act is the “ordinary

residence” of the minor. The expression used is “where the minor

ordinarily resides”. Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given

place is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact.

It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the

jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never be a pure question of law,

capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of

the controversy.

51. The Hon’ble Apex Court has considered at paragraph-26 the

expression “ordinarily resident” appearing in Section 9(1). The word

“ordinary” has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows:

“Ordinary (adj.).—Regular; usual; normal; common; often recurring;

according to established order; settled; customary; reasonable; not

characterised by peculiar or unusual circumstances; belonging to,

exercised by, or characteristic of, the normal or average individual.”

The word “reside” has been explained similarly as under: “Reside.—

Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. (WesternKnapp Engg.

Co. v. Gilbank [129 F 2d 135 (CCA 9th Cir 1942)] , F 2d at p. 136.) To

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

24

settle oneself or a thing in a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to

dwell permanently or continuously, to have a settled abode for a time,

to have one's residence or domicile; specifically, to be in residence, to

have an abiding place, to be present as an element, to inhere as a

quality, to be vested as a right. (Bowden v. Jensen [359 SW 2d 343 (Mo

Banc 1962)] , SW 2d at p. 349.)”

52. In Webster's Dictionary also the word “reside” finds a similar

meaning, which may be gainfully extracted:

“1. To dwell for a considerable time; to make one's home; live. 2. To

exist as an attribute or quality with in. 3. To be vested: with in.”

53. For ready reference, paragraphs 24 to 31 of the said judgment are

being referred as under:

“24. It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test

for determining the jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 of the

Act is the “ordinary residence” of the minor. The expression used is

“where the minor ordinarily resides”. Now whether the minor is

ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of intention

which in turn is a question of fact. It may at best be a mixed question

of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted it can

never be a pure question of law, capable of being answered without

an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy.

25. The factual aspects relevant to the question of jurisdiction are not

admitted in the instant case. There are serious disputes on those aspects

to which we shall presently refer.

26. We may before doing so examine the true purpose of the expression

“ordinarily resident” appearing in Section 9(1). This expression has

been used in different contexts and statutes and has often come up for

interpretation. Since liberal interpretation is the first and the foremost

rule of interpretation it would be useful to understand the literal

meaning of the two words that comprise the expression. The word

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25

“ordinary” has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows:

“Ordinary (adj.).—Regular; usual; normal; common; often recurring;

according to established order; settled; customary; reasonable; not

characterised by peculiar or unusual circumstances; belonging to,

exercised by, or characteristic of, the normal or average individual.”

The word “reside” has been explained similarly as under:

“Reside.—Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge.

(WesternKnapp Engg. Co. v. Gilbank [129 F 2d 135 (CCA 9th Cir

1942)] , F 2d at p. 136.) To settle oneself or a thing in a place, to be

stationed, to remain or stay, to dwell permanently or continuously, to

have a settled abode for a time, to have one's residence or domicile;

specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding place, to be present

as an element, to inhere as a quality, to be vested as a right. (Bowden

v. Jensen [359 SW 2d 343 (Mo Banc 1962)] , SW 2d at p. 349.)”

27. In Webster's Dictionary also the word “reside” finds a similar

meaning, which may be gainfully extracted:

“1. To dwell for a considerable time; to make one's home; live. 2. To

exist as an attribute or quality with in. 3. To be vested: with in.”

28. In Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah [(1913-14) 41 IA 314 : AIR 1914

PC 41] the infants had been residing in the district of Chingleput in the

Madras Presidency. They were given in custody of Mrs Annie Besant

for the purpose of education and were getting their education in

England at the University of Oxford. A case was, however, filed in the

District Court of Chingleput for the custody where according to the

plaintiff the minors had permanently resided. Repeating the plea that

the Chingleput Court was competent to entertain the application Their

Lordships of the Privy Council observed: (IA p. 322)

“… The District Court in which the suit was instituted had no

jurisdiction over the infants except such jurisdiction as was conferred

by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. By the 9th section of that Act

the jurisdiction of the court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in

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26

the district. It is in Their Lordships' opinion impossible to hold that

infants who had months previously left India with a view to being

educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were

ordinarily resident in the district of Chingleput.

29. In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh [AIR 1963 SC 1521 : (1963) 2 Cri

LJ 413] this Court was dealing with a case under Section 488 CrPC

and the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a petition for

maintenance.

The Court noticed a near unanimity of opinion as to what is meant by

the use of the word “resides” appearing in the provision and held that

“resides” implied something more than a flying visit to, or casual stay

at a particular place. The legal position was summed up in the following

words: (AIR p. 1524, para 8)

“8. … Having regard to the object sought to be achieved, the meaning

implicit in the words used, and the construction placed by decided cases

thereon, we would define the word ‘resides’ thus: a person resides in a

place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even

temporarily; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place

his abode depends upon the facts of each case.”

30. In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India [(2006) 7 SCC 1] the expression

“ordinary residence” as used in the Representation of the People Act,

1950 fell for interpretation. This Court observed: (SCC p. 96, paras

243- 46)

“243. Lexicon refers to Cicutti v. Suffolk County Council [(1981) 1

WLR 558 : (1980) 3 All ER 689 (DC)] to denote that the word

‘ordinarily’ is primarily directed not to duration but to purpose. In this

sense the question is not so much where the person is to be found

‘ordinarily’, in the sense of usually or habitually and with some degree

of continuity, but whether the quality of residence is ‘ordinary’ and

general, rather than merely for some special or limited purpose.

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27

244. The words ‘ordinarily’ and ‘resident’ have been used together in

other statutory provisions as well and as per Law Lexicon they have

been construed as not to require that the person should be one who is

always resident or carries on business in the particular place.

245. The expression coined by joining the two words has to be

interpreted with reference to the point of time requisite for the purposes

of the provision, in the case of Section 20 of the RP Act, 1950 it being

the date on which a person seeks to be registered as an elector in a

particular constituency.

246. Thus, residence is a concept that may also be transitory. Even

when qualified by the word ‘ordinarily’ the word ‘resident’ would not

result in a construction having the effect of a requirement of the person

using a particular place for dwelling always or on permanent

uninterrupted basis. Thus understood, even the requirement of a person

being ‘ordinarily resident’ at a particular place is incapable of

ensuring nexus between him and the place in question.

31. Reference may be made to Bhagyalakshmi v. K. Narayana Rao [AIR

1983 Mad 9] , Aparna Banerjee v. Tapan Banerjee [AIR 1986 P&H

113] , Ram Sarup v. Chimman Lal [AIR 1952 All 79] , Vimla Devi v.

Maya Devi [AIR 1981 Raj 211] and Giovanni Marco Muzzu (Dr.), In

re [AIR 1983 Bom 242] , in which the High Courts have dealt with the

meaning and purport of the expressions like “ordinary resident” and

“ordinarily resides” and taken the view that the question whether one

is ordinarily residing at a given place depends so much on the intention

to make that place one's ordinary abode.”

54. The Hon’ble Apex Court, based upon the facts of the aforesaid

case, has considered as would be evident from paragraph-36 that the

question whether the decision to allow the appellant and Kush, the minor

son, to stay back in Delhi instead of returning to America was a voluntary

decision as claimed by the appellant or a decision taken by the respondent

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28

under duress as alleged by him was a seriously disputed question of facts,

a satisfactory answer to which could be given either by the District Court

where the custody case was filed or by the High Court only after the parties

had been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their

respective versions.

55. It is, thus, evident from the proposition so laid by the Hon’ble

Apex Court that the meaning and purport of the expression “ordinary

resident” and “ordinarily resides” and taken the view that the question

whether one is ordinarily residing at a given place depends so much on the

intention to make that place one's ordinary abode.

56. The issue of residence, in order to have the jurisdiction to the

concerned Court, has also been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Jeewanti Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey,

((1981) 4 SCC 517, wherein it has been held at paragraph-12 that in order

to give jurisdiction on the ground of ‘residence’, something more than a

temporary stay is required. It must be more or less of a permanent

character, and of such a nature that the Court in which the respondent is

sued, is his natural forum. The word ‘reside’ is by no means free from all

ambiguity and is capable of a variety of meanings according to the

circumstances to which it is made applicable and the context in which it is

found. It is capable of being understood in its ordinary sense of having

one's own dwelling permanently, as well as in its extended sense. In its

ordinary sense ‘residence’ is more or less of a permanent character. The

expression ‘resides’ means to make an abode for a considerable time; to

dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a

time. It is the place where a person has a fixed home or abode. In Webster's

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

29

Dictionary, ‘to reside’ has been defined as meaning ‘to dwell permanently

or for any length of time’, and words like ‘dwelling place’ or ‘abode’ are

held to be synonymous. Where there is such fixed home or such abode at

one place the person cannot be said to reside at any other place where he

had gone on a casual or temporary visit, e.g. for health or business or for a

change. If a person lives with his wife and children, in an established

home, his legal and actual place of residence is the same. If a person has

no established home and is compelled to live in hotels, boarding houses or

houses of others, his actual and physical habitation is the place where he

actually or personally resides.

57. Thus, as per ratio rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Ruchi Majoo vs. Sanjeev Majoo (supra) it has been observed in

paragraph-24 that whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place

is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact. It

may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the

jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never be a pure question of law,

capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of

the controversy.

58. This Court, having regard to the principles enunciated by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned authorities, now proceeds

to revert to the factual matrix of the present case, as duly considered by

the learned Court below, for the purpose of returning findings upon the

issues framed in the preceding paragraphs.

59. The Original Suit No. 105 of 2024 before the Family Court at

Deoghar seeking custody of the minor child under the Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 1956. The said suit was admitted and notices were

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30

issued to the respondent. After appearing and participating in proceedings

including mediation, thereafter the respondent filed an application under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground of territorial jurisdiction under

Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. By the impugned

judgment dated 06.11.2025, the learned Additional Principal Judge,

Family Court, Deoghar allowed the said application and rejected the suit

on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal

challenges the said impugned judgment.

60. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs that the power to reject

a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is an extreme and drastic power

which must be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the defect

is patent and apparent on the face of the plaint itself, without requiring any

inquiry into facts. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of Order

VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to read the plaint as a whole and

assume all pleaded facts to be true. If even one of the pleaded facts

discloses a cause of action or establishes the jurisdiction of the Court, the

application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be dismissed.

61. From perusal of impugned judgment, it is evident that the learned

Court below going beyond the pleadings and making a finding on facts

that the child was ordinarily residing at Bengaluru, which finding could

only have been arrived at after recording evidence. From perusal of

impugned judgment, it is evident that the learned Family Court, Deoghar

has allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejecting

the suit at the threshold, which is contrary to settled position of law.

62. Further, the respondent appeared before the learned Family

Court pursuant to notice, participated in the proceedings and was referred

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

31

to mediation. At no point during the admission stage or during the

mediation proceedings did the respondent raise any objection regarding

territorial jurisdiction. The application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was

filed by the respondent belatedly, only after the mediation proceedings

failed, solely with the intent to stall and obstruct the custody proceedings.

Having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Family Court at

Deoghar by appearance and participation in proceedings, the respondent is

estopped from raising a belated jurisdictional objection.

63. In the present case, the appellant has specifically pleaded that the

respondent has been shifting the child from place to place, keeping her at

undisclosed locations, that the child was removed from school without

notice and that the respondent has now shifted to Patna.

64. In view of these pleadings and the disputed nature of the factual

position, the question of ordinary residence of the minor could only have

been adjudicated after recording evidence. It is considered view of this

Court that the learned Family Court has committed a serious error of law

in deciding this mixed question of fact and law at the threshold stage of

Order VII Rule 11 CPC without recording any evidence.

65. Further, a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

unless the defect is patent and apparent on the face of the plaint itself and

the Court must assume all pleaded facts to be true.

66. Further, the question of ordinary residence of a minor under

Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is a mixed question of

law and fact and must be decided after evidence, not at the threshold stage

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

32

of Order VII Rule 11 CPC as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ruchi

Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo (supra).

67. Thus, upon a comprehensive appraisal of the discussion

hereinabove, this Court is constrained to hold that the learned Family

Court, in rejecting the suit at the very threshold, has failed to adhere to the

settled position of law as adverted to and referred in the preceding

paragraphs. The order so passed, being vitiated by perversity, necessarily

warrants interference by this Court.

68. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the interpretation of

the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court

which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the

evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State

[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206

while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt,

true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant

material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding

so outrageously defies logic as so to suffer from the vice of irrationality

incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm

in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said

judgment reads as under:

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of

cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court

observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the

subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on

record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of

procedural irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd.

[AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

33

a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is

altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics

v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court

observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of

the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse

that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the

Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of

pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett

v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse

verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the

weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v.

Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the

wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating

from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various

dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that

most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International

Edn.

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the

direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language

(Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or

opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

“Perverse. —A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that

is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the

evidence.”

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34

69. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any order made in

conscious violation of pleading and law, then it will come under the

purview of perverse order. Further “perverse verdict" may probably be

defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is

altogether against the evidence.

70. Thus, “perversity” refers to a finding or decision so unreasonable

or irrational that no reasonable person acting judicially could have reached

it. It signifies a gross and unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by

a Court.

71. Further Perversity is a high threshold for intervention,

distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or law. The safest approach on

perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the

facts but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not

perversity, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016)

14 SCC 197.

72. This Court, upon due consideration of the legal import of the

expression ‘perversity’ and in the light of the foregoing discussion, is of

the considered view that the impugned judgment/order, having been

rendered at the threshold without appreciating the fact that the issue of

jurisdiction is not a pure question of law and that evidence is indispensable

for arriving at a final conclusion, therefore, impugned order/judgment

squarely falls within the ambit of perversity.

73. Consequently, such a decree cannot be permitted to stand, and in

exercise of appellate jurisdiction, this Court finds sufficient cause to

interfere with the same.

2026:JHHC:25963-DB

35

74. Accordingly, the order/judgment dated 06.11.2025 and the

decree signed on 14.11.2025 passed in Original Suit No.105 of 2024 by

the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Deoghar are hereby

quashed and set-aside.

75. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the learned Addl. Principal

Judge, Addl. Family Court, Deoghar by revival of Original Suit No. 105

of 2024 to its original file, so that the suit may be adjudicated afresh on its

own merits in accordance with law.

76. Both parties are directed to cause their appearance before the

learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Deoghar within a

period of four weeks from today.

77. The learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court, Deoghar

shall thereafter adjudicate the suit on its merits by duly framing the issue

of jurisdiction as one of the points for determination, and shall proceed in

accordance with law upon a comprehensive consideration of all evidence

available on record or adduced by the parties.

78. With aforesaid direction and observation, the instant appeal stand

disposed of.

79. Pending I. As, if any, stand disposed of.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

I Agree.

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)

Sudhir

Dated:27/08/2026

Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi

AFR

Uploaded on 28/08/2026.