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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

BEFORE:

THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

CRR 4734 of 2023

Sushobhan Sarkar & Ors.

Vs.

State of West Bengal & Anr.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Sabir Ahmed, Adv.

Mr. Swagata Biswas, Adv.

For the State : Mr. Pawan Kumar Gupta, Adv.

Mr. Deepak Khetowat, Adv.

For the Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Sanway Banerjee, Adv.

Judgment reserved on : 11.08.2026

Judgment delivered on : 02.09.2026

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:-

1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of

the proceeding in G.R. Case no. 767 of 2023 arising out of Electronics

Complex Police Station Case no. 126 of 2023 dated 25.07.2023 under

Sections 420/406/120B of the Indian Penal Code 1860, pending before

the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at

Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas.

2. The petitioners case is that the petitioners no.1 and 2 herein are the

Directors of C-Quel Management Services Private Limited and the

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petitioner nos.3 and 4 herein are the employees of the said company.

The petitioners state that to enrich the organizational action, the

company required assistance of legal expert for which the said company

floated an advertisement seeking applications from the intending

eligible persons for the post of Legal Manager. In response to such

advertisement, the opposite party no.2 herein applied for the said post

with his resume and disclosed that he has working experience of 15

years, out of which more that 10 years as a business entrepreneur after

his B.Tech, and more than 5 years in the Law field.

3. On receiving the resume of the opposite party no.2, the opposite party

no.2 was called for an interview and after the interview, the opposite

party no.2 disclosed that, being an Advocate, he will have to surrender

his enrolment with the Bar Association, if he is appointed in the said

post of Legal Manager. Instead of that he himself has offered that he will

be a Legal Retainer with the company and assist the company in his

capacity and guide the company in all legal issues and research for the

empowerment project of the company.

4. On negotiation, it was decided that there will be a six months

provisional clause and the complainant will have to undergo induction

after joining and will raise bill for monthly retainership and the

retention fees was decided at Rs.35,000/- and statutory tax will be

applicable. The date of joining was fixed on 02.01.2023 and the opposite

party no.2 was offered the position of Legal Retainer with the company

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and an offer letter was issued to him and sent through e-mail of the

said company.

5. On receipt of such offer letter, the opposite party no.2 instantly replied

and expressed his acceptance of the said offer and, thereafter, started

acting as a Legal Retainer of the said company.

6. The petitioners further states that after appraisal of the trainee when a

dispute arose with regard to scope and necessity of the legal work, the

opposite party no.2 himself intended to tender his resignation on

16.02.2023 and previously also there has been counseling for

performance improvement of the opposite party no.2. Accordingly, the

opposite party no.2 stopped visiting the office of the company. The

petitioners state that finding no other alternative, the petitioner-

company through a mail dated 18.02.2023 informed the opposite party

no.2 that legal retainership contract has been ceased with effect from

16.02.2023.

7. The petitioners further state that since the opposite party no.2 had

worked in the office of the company till 16.02.2023, phone calls were

made to the opposite party no.2 for submission of his invoice for the

month of February, 2023 as the petitioner-company intended to pay the

remuneration of the Legal Retainer.

8. On 20.02.2023, the opposite party no.2 sent an e-mail indicating that

the company does not have any lawful right to revoke an executed legal

retainership agreement, without obtaining the consent of the other

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party and to consider the email as a legal notice for recovery of

compensation for loss or damages caused due to the breach of contract

and also raised a bill to the tune of Rs.20,712.

9. Subsequently the opposite party no.2 registered the present case.

10. The allegation of the de facto complainant in the written complaint is

lengthy along with points of law. The de facto complainant being

appointed as a legal retainer to the accused company is admitted. The

relevant part of the complaint is as follows:-

“That after providing service as a 'Legal Retainer' for 18 days

in the month of February, 2023, suddenly and surprisingly,

at 18:04hrs on date 18/02/2023, the de facto complainant

received an arbitrary email from cqadmin@cquel.com, with

sushobhan@cquel.com and nandini@cquel.com kept in cc.

The said arbitrary email contained an one-sided statement

intending to cease the retainership-agreement with effect

from 16/02/2023, which was anterior to the date of

communication of the instant arbitrary email, without

assignment of any valid reason /ground, and without any

express intention of payment of fees of Rs. 20,712 Only

(Rupees Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred and Twelve Only)

for the services provided for the 18 days in the said month of

February, 2023, along with any compensation for termination

of retainership-agreement at the will of one party.

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That on 20/02/2023, at 16:04hrs, the de facto complainant

sent to the Director / Managing Director of the accused

person no. 1 company an email containing legal notice for

"unfair intention of breach of contract, without

assigning any reason and without having any lawful

right to rescind the previously executed 'Legal

Retainership' agreement, dated 28 December 2022,

one-sidedly and without obtaining the consent of the

other party.".

That within 3 (three) days, from the date of the said email

dated 20/02/2023, no response was received at the end of

the de facto complainant from the side of the accused person.

Hence, the de facto complainant kept on keeping himself

available for providing the legal retainer's services to the

accused person and raised consecutive 2 (two) nos of

Invoices bearing respective nos SB/2/2023, dated

01/03/2023, and SB/3/2023, dated 01/04/2023, which

jointly valued Rs. 70,000 Only (Rupees Seventy Thousand

Only). The Invoices were sent by emails, respectively sent on

01/03/2023 at 12:20hrs and on 01/04/2023 at 14:33hrs.

That the intentional and deliberate ignorance and non -

payment by the accused persons of the Invoiced amounts left

the de facto complainant with no other option than to initiate

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termination of the 'Legal Retainership' agreement by serving

a 15 (fifteen) days notice.”

11. The de facto complainant further specified the conduct of the accused

persons to prima facie make out the case for offences punishable under

Sections 406/418/420/34 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code,

1860, as follows:-

“Since the month of March, 2023, the accused person/s,

having converted the Intellectual property of the de

facto complainant to its/their own use, intentionally

and deliberately, despite repeated notices and reminders,

failed to discharge such trust and to perform their part of

promises by disbursing the claimed amount as per legal-

rainership agreement.

Hence, the accused person/s committed offence punishable

under Section 406 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. From the

series of acts and omissions of the accused person/s and

the afore-said facts it can be seen that the accused

person/s dishonestly, by deceiving the de facto complainant

under the guise of the 'Legal Retainership' agreement,

induced the de facto complainant to deliver monthly

his intellectual property, which the de facto

complainant would not do if he was not so deceived,

to the accused person/s. The acts of the accused

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person/s substantially damaged the mind and reputation of

the de facto complainant.

The accused person/s thereby caused wrongful loss to the

de facto complainant by not disbursing the total outstanding

retainership fees of Rs. 1,05,000/-, which was a binding

upon the accused person by the legal -retainership

agreement, enforceable by Law.

Hence, the accused person/s committed offences

punishable under Section 418 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The intellectual properties, the de facto complainant

entrusted / put forward to the accused person/s, were

converted into valuable security, which, in turn, caused

the accused person no. 1 to earn business profit by selling

those to different clients of the accused person no. 1. The

accused person/s never performed their part of promises by

disbursing the total invoiced amount of Rs. 1,05,000/- to

the de facto complainant.

Hence, the accused person/s committed offences

punishable under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Common intentions of all the accused persons were same

and in furtherance to the common intentions the accused

persons committed above offences of criminal breach of

trust, cheating.

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Hence, each of the accused persons is liable for the offences

under Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Two or more accused persons conjointly agreed to commit

the above-mentioned Illegal acts and the criminal acts were

already committed.

Hence, such accused persons are parties to such criminal

conspiracy punishable under Section 120B of Indian Penal

Code, 1860.”

12. Heard the learned counsels for the parties perused the materials in the

case diary placed by the State.

13. The petitioners argue that the dispute is purely civil in nature

considering that at best it is a case of breach of contract.

14. The petitioners have relied upon the following judgments:-

i. Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs State of Bihar, (2000) 4

SCC 168.

ii. Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati vs CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257.

iii. Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. vs State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293.

iv. Indian Oil Corporation vs NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736.

v. Trisuns Chemical Industry vs Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC

686.

15. It is further stated by the petitioner, that the termination of the

retainership arose out of performance-related concerns following a

training/review session conducted with the Opposite Party No. 2 a

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matter squarely within the domain of a service -provider/service-

recipient relationship, and not an act of criminal dishonesty.

The conduct of the Opposite Party No. 2 in issuing successive invoices

and "legal notices" threatening criminal prosecution unless payment

was made within stipulated timeframes, is itself indicative of the true

nature of the exercise namely, the use of the threat of criminal

proceedings as a tool of coercive recovery of a disputed civil claim.

16. The opposite party/ de facto complainant in his written notes relied

upon the judgment in Rajeev Kourav vs Baisahab and Ors., reported

in (2020) 3 SCC 317, wherein the Court held:-

“……….It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark

upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the

petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal

proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court

that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the

ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the

Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding……”

17. The complainant has reiterated his case as made out in his written

complaint.

18. The following judgment is also relied upon by the respondent:-

i. Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Ors. vs State of Punjab &

Ors., decided on 5

th

May, 2009, in Criminal Appeal No. 908

of 2009.

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19. The Supreme Court in several precedents has discouraged such

proceedings initiated by the complainant only to harass the

other party. Some of the rulings are as follows:-

a) M/s. Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/s NEPC India Ltd. &

Ors., Appeal (crl.) 834 of 2002 decided on 20.07.2006

(Para 8, 9, 10).

b) Birla Corporation Ltd. vs Adventz Investments and

holdings, (Criminal Appeal No. 877 of 2019) (Para 86).

c) Mitesh Kumar J. Sha vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal no. 1285 of 2021) (Para 37, 41, 42).

d) R. Nagender Yadav vs The State of Telangana, Criminal

Appeal No. 2290 of 2022, on 15 December, 2022 (Para

17).

e) Deepak Gaba and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesh and

Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, on January

02, 2023 (Para 21, 24).

20. The petitioner also relies upon the judgment in Delhi Race Club (1940)

Limited and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesb & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC

690, wherein the Supreme Court held:-

“38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails

to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above.

We may only say, with a view to clear a serious

misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as

the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant

that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under

Section 405IPC, punishable under Section 406IPC, is

committed by the accused, then in the same breath it

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cannot be said that the accused has also committed the

offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section

415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC.”

21. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). ……… of 2022

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the Supreme Court

held:-

“15. This Court has an occasion to consider the ambit

and scope of the power of the High Court under Section

482 CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings in Vineet

Kumar and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March,

2017. It may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of

the above judgment where the following was stated:

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it

is necessary to consider the ambit and scope of

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC vested in the High

Court. Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the

High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to

give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and

laid down several principles which govern the exercise of

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A

three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v.

L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that the High Court

is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the

conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would

be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends

of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated :

„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High

Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the

conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would

be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of

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justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in

civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a

salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding

ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of

harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled

object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the

material on which the structure of the prosecution rests

and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the

proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice

are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has

got to be administered according to laws made by the

legislature. The compelling necessity for making these

observations is that without a proper realisation of the

object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save

the inherent powers of the High Court to do ju stice,

between the State and its subjects, it would be

impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that

salient jurisdiction.‟

41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section

482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement

of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be

abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court

has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court

cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in

one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this

Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1)

SCC 335. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which

cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of

operation or harassment. When there are materials to

indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fides and proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

which is to the following effect :

„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him

due to private and personal grudge.‟ Above Category 7 is

clearly attracted in the facts of the present case.

Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State

of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did

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not advert to the relevant facts of the present case,

materials on which final report was submitted by the IO.

We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case

where the High Court ought to have exercised its

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the

criminal proceedings.”

16. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the

exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of

the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482

CrPC are well settled and to the possible extent, this

Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to

give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein

such power should be exercised. This Court has held in

para 102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan

Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation

by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

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same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of

which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion

that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any

of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there

is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him

due to private and personal grudge.”

17. The principles culled out by this Court have

consistently been followed in the recent judgment of this

Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State

of Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC

315.”

22. The present case falls under category 1 and 3 of Para 102 of Bhajan

Lal (Supra).

23. The Supreme Court in Randheer Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

& Ors., (2021) 14 SCC 626, held:-

“18. The only question is whether there is any criminal

offence disclosed in the FIR so far as the Appellant is

concerned. When the High Court passed its order dated

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5th October, 2017, Rajan Kumar (since deceased), the

executant of the sale deed and the Power of Attorney

holder was also an applicant before the Court. Today,

there has been a change in situation, in that, criminal

proceedings against Rajan Kumar have abated since

Rajan Kumar is no longer alive. It is the case of the

private respondent that the private respondent purchased

property. In the meantime, Rajan Kumar, who is no

longer alive, on the basis of a false Power of Attorney of

Bela Rani, executed a sale deed in favour of Randheer

Singh, i.e., the Appellant herein. There is only a vague

averment “by connivance”. The next part of the sentence

reads “Bela Rani had no right to sell the aforesaid plot.”

23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an

offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case

of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title.

Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in favour of

Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively, the Power of

Attorney, in itself, was a forged document.

24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a

deed which was not actually executed, but a deed which

had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the

signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to

say that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a Power of

Attorney authorising the sale of property knowing that

she had no title to convey the property. It is another thing

to say that the Power of Attorney itself was a forged,

fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning

thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani.

Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom

how the investigating authorities could even have been

prima facie satisfied that the deed had been forged or

fabricated or was fraudulent without even examining the

apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been

cited as a witness.”

On noting several precedents the Court finally held:-

“33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are

being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment

against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of

repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so

far as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of

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how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved in

any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant

part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely

vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for

the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a

complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on

the nature of the allegation and whether the essential

ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to

be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that

a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a

criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see

whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given

colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High

Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal

proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra

(supra) extracted above.

34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as

also a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is

available may not be a ground to quash criminal

proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no

criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with

the Charge-Sheet so far as this Appellant is concerned.

The other accused Rajan Kumar has died.”

24. From the materials in the case diary nothing transpires to make out the

offences as alleged by the complainant.

25. The dispute in this case arose, when the petitioners’ being dissatisfied

with the work of the complainant decided to discontinue him. The

dispute thus relates to termination of service for which he was engaged.

26. The said dispute in no manner even prima facie constitute the offences

alleged.

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27. The contents in the written complaint also show a dispute only as to

termination of services, which the complainant was connected with for

less than two months.

28. Thus, there being no prima facie materials on record against the

petitioners in respect of the offences alleged, the proceedings in G.R.

Case no. 767 of 2023 arising out of Electronics Complex Police Station

Case no. 126 of 2023 dated 25.07.2023 under Sections 420/406/120B

of the Indian Penal Code 1860, pending before the Court of learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas

are liable to be quashed.

29. The revisional application being CRR 4734 of 2023 is allowed.

30. The proceeding in G.R. Case no. 767 of 2023 arising out of

Electronics Complex Police Station Case no. 126 of 2023 dated

25.07.2023 under Sections 420/406/120B of the Indian Penal Code

1860, pending before the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate at Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas, is hereby quashed in

respect of the petitioners namely Sushobhan Sarkar, Nandini

Sarkar, Abhijit Bhattacharya and Poulomi Kumari .

31. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.

32. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

33. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary

compliance.

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34. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal

formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)