2025 INSC 565 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. /2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.6289/2019 ]

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & OTHERS … APPELLANT S

VS.

S. LALITHA & OTHERS … RESPONDENT S

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The challenge in this appeal is to a short order of the High Court of

Karnataka at Bengaluru

1

dated 8

th

March, 2018

2

dismissing a writ petition

3

that

the appellants had presented before it. The appellants felt aggrieved by a

judgment and order dated 1

st

August, 2017 of the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Bengaluru

4

whereby it allowed an original application

5

of the

respondent.

1

High Court

2

impugned order

3

W.P. No. 9171 of 2018

4

Tribunal

5

O.A. No. 2 of 2017

2

3. Undisputed facts, giving rise to this appeal, in a nutshell are these:

a. The respondent joined as TV News and Film Librarian (Library &

Information Assistant) at Doordarshan Kendra, Bangalore on 11

th

March, 1985.

b. On 31

st

May, 2002, the appellant received benefit of financial

upgradation under the Assured Career Progression

6

Scheme, 1999 for

the first time w.e.f. 9

th

August, 1999.

c. Since the ACP Scheme envisaged benefits of financial upgradation in

the hierarchical scale after 12 and 24 years of service, the respondent

became entitled to receive benefit of financial upgradation under the

ACP Scheme for the second time w.e.f. 11

th

March, 2009.

d. The Modified Assured Career Progression

7

Scheme, 2009 was brought

into force superseding the ACP Scheme, w.e.f. 19

th

May, 2009.

e. The MACP Scheme envisaged placement in the immediate next higher

grade pay on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years of service. It also

provided that upgradation granted under the ACP Scheme in the past

to those grades which now carry the same Grade Pay due to the

merger of pay scale/upgradation of pay recommended by the 6

th

Pay

Commission shall be ignored for the purpose of granting upgradation

under the MACP Scheme.

f. The basic difference between the ACP Scheme and the MACP Scheme

appears to be that while under the former scheme the financial

upgradation was to the pay scale of the next higher promotional post

6

ACP Scheme

7

MACP Scheme

3

in the service, under the latter scheme, financial upgradation was with

reference to the next higher grade pay in the scale of pay as notified

upon implementation of the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay)

Rules, 2018.

g. Since the respondent had not been promoted to a higher post till 1

st

September, 2008, she was granted the second benefit envisaged in

the MACP Scheme [Pay Band 2 with Grade Pay of Rs.4,800/ -] vide an

order dated 10

th

August, 2010, w.e.f. 1

st

September, 2008.

h. In due course of time, w.e.f. 11

th

July, 2015, the respondent was

granted the benefit of third financial upgradation under the MACP

Scheme [Grade Pay of Rs.5,400/ -] vide an order dated 18

th

November, 2015.

i. The respondent, indubitably, received the benefits of second and third

financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme without raising any

demur.

j. On 4

th

October, 2016, the respondent submitted a representation to

the Director General, Doordarshan, 3

rd

appellant (5

th

respondent in

the original application), to grant her benefit of second financial

upgradation under ACP Scheme with Grade Pay of Rs.6,600/- w.e.f.

11

th

March, 2009 and the benefit of the third financial upgradation

under the MACP Scheme with Grade Pay of Rs.7,600/-, w.e.f. 11

th

March, 2015.

k. Such representation was rejected on 5

th

November, 2016 by the Dy.

Director (S.II).

4

l. Challenging rejection of her representation, the respondent

approached the Tribunal which, as noted above, allowed her original

application

8

vide the judgment and order dated 1

st

August, 2017

9

,

which later came to be affirmed by the High Court vide the impugned

order.

4. The Tribunal proceeded to allow the O.A. of the respondent relying on a

judgment and order of the High Court dated 5

th

June, 2017 in B. D. Kadam &

ors. v. Union of India & ors.

10

.

5. The impugned order recorded its concurrence with the decision in B. D.

Kadam (supra) and, thus, held that the Tribunal was not in error in upholding

the respondent’s challenge to the order dated 5

th

November, 2016 rejecting

her representation. The High Court also noticed that the decision in B.D.

Kadam (supra) had been challenged before this Court by the Union of India

in SLP (Civil) D No. 29605 of 2017 but no order had been passed. Accordingly,

the challenge in the writ petition was spurned. Submission advanced on behalf

of the respondent that the Tribunal’s order had been complied with was ,

however, recorded.

6. Incidentally, SLP (Civil) D. No. 29605 of 2017 stands dismissed vide an

order of this Court dated 27

th

January, 2020.

7. Up to this stage, it would seem to be an open and shut case. The Tribunal

having proceeded to allow the O.A. on the basis of B. D. Kadam (supra), which

it was bound to follow, the Tribunal’s order having been complied with by the

8

O.A.

9

Tribunal’s order

10

2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4772

5

appellants by granting to the respondent the benefit she had claimed, and the

SLP (Civil) D. No. 29605 of 2017 against the decision in B. D. Kadam (supra)

having been rejected, nothing further would survive for consideration.

However, certain subsequent developments including decisions of this Court

have been drawn to our notice by the appellants and it has been urged that

this Court may examine the issue of the respondent’s entitlement in the light

of such developments and notwithstanding that compliance with the Tribunal’s

order has been secured.

8. After SLP (Civil) D. No. 29605 of 2017 came to be dismissed by this

Court on 27

th

January, 2020, a review petition

11

was filed before the High

Court. Vide its order dated 7

th

March, 2023, the High Court rejected the review

petition. Challenging such rejection, SLP (Civil) D. No. 45401 of 2023 has been

filed, whereupon a coordinate Bench of this Court on 8

th

December, 2023 has

issued notice in view of the decisions in Union of India & ors. v. S. Ranjit

Samuel & ors.

12

and Vice Chairman, DDA v. Narendra Kumar & ors.

13

.

9. The appellants, therefore, contend that the issue is still at large as to

whether the respondent was entitled to succeed in her claim before the

Tribunal and the High Court.

10. Since SLP (Civil) D. No. 45401 of 2023 is pending, the same has to be

decided on its own merits. However, for reasons more than one (which we

need not express here, lest it has any effect on the pending lis), we are really

11

R.P. No.345 of 2022

12

2022 INSC 340 = 2022 SCC OnLine SC 368

13

2022 INSC 276 = (2022) 11 SCC 641

6

not impressed by the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants based

on the fact of issuance of notice referred to above.

11. Though not cited by the appellants, we have looked into a decision of

recent origin of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Union of India v. N.M.

Raut

14

, wherein, upon thorough consideration of the MACP scheme and the

decisions referred to therein, financial upgradations granted in favour of the

respondents-employees were interdicted and the appeals were allowed.

However, we have noticed a factual dissimilarity which is of some significance.

The respondents-employees were granted financial upgradations under the

MACP Scheme despite grant of non-functional upgradation after two or four

years of service while functioning as Pharmacist and Superintendent,

respectively, and thus had not stagnated. This Court in N.M. Raut (supra) held

that such grant of non -functional upgradation and thereafter financial

upgradation under the MACP Scheme would be contrary to the intent and

purpose of the MACP scheme. This position is evident from what was observed

in paragraph 20, reading as follows:

“20. In view of the aforesaid position of the MACPS, we fail to understand how

we can ignore the financial upgradation, which was granted upon completion

of two or four years of service in the posts of Pharmacist or Superintendent,

as the case may be, for the purpose of deciding as to whether or not the

Government employee would be entitled to the next financial benefit under

the MACPS. To ignore the financial upgradation granted on completion of two

or four years of service as Pharmacists or Superintendents, would be contrary

to the intent and purpose of the scheme, the language employed as well as

the examples/illustrations which have been given. …”

12. It is, therefore, apparent that financial upgradations granted under the

MACP Scheme despite grant of non-functional upgradation to the respondents-

14

2024 INSC 1042 = 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3873

7

employees upon completion of two or four years of service, as the case may

be, was not found by this Court to be in accord with the MACP scheme and

while, however, not ordering recovery from those who had retired and those

who were due to retire within a year of pronouncement of such judgment, the

Court clarified that their pension and pay scale be redetermined w.e.f. 1

st

January, 2025. The respondent before us had claimed benefits of financial

upgradation on completion of 24 years of service with effect from the date of

grant of financial upgradation to her was due in terms of the ACP Scheme,

which got delayed and, in the interregnum, the MACP Scheme intervened. The

reason why this Court held against the respondents-employees in N.M. Raut

(supra) is, therefore, quite distinct, whereas this appeal calls for a different

perspective.

13. Be that as it may, non-interference with the order impugned is the logical

conclusion based on our understanding that issuance of notice on SLP (Civil)

D. No. 45401 of 2023 is of no relevance and that the decision in N.M. Raut

(supra) does not operate to the detriment of the respondent; however, the

reason why we propose not to end our judgment here but to say a few more

words is because of an objection that the appellants had raised in their counter

statement as regards maintainability of the O.A. According to the appellants,

the O.A. was time-barred and ought to have been dismissed as such.

14. The respondent had pleaded in paragraph 3 of the O.A. as follows:

“3. LIMITATION:

The Applicant further declares that the application is within the limitation period

prescribed in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 as the

Applicant is challenging the orders passed by the 5

th

Respondent at Annexure

A-11 dated 5.11.2016 against the claim of the Applicant.”

8

15. Since the O.A. was verified on 21

st

December, 2016, the respondent was

confident and, accordingly, declared that it was within the period of limitation

prescribed in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

15

.

16. Both the Tribunal as well as the High Court did not rule on the objection

of maintainability though, for the reasons and the observations that follow,

such objection appears to us to be fairly sound.

17. C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining

16

, Union of India v.

M.K. Sarkar

17

, State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari

18

and

Union of India v. Chaman Rana

19

are decisions of this Court on belated

approaches with stale grievances in service related disputes having a material

bearing on this appeal.

18. In C. Jacob (supra), this Court observed that the case before it was a

typical example of “representation and relief”. The employee kept quiet for 18

years after termination of service. A stage was reached of no record being

available regarding his previous service. In the representation which the

employee made in 2000, he claimed that he should be taken back in service.

On rejection of the said representation by an order dated 9

th

April, 2002, he

filed a writ petition before the jurisdictional high court claiming service

benefits, by referring the said order of rejection as the cause of action. The

learned Judge examined the claim, as if it was a live claim made in time, found

fault with the employer for not producing material to show that termination

15

1985 Act

16

2008 INSC 1133 = (2008) 10 SCC 115

17

2009 INSC 1288 = (2010) 2 SCC 59

18

2013 INSC 560 = (2013) 12 SCC 179

19

2018 INSC 230 = (2018) 5 SCC 798

9

was preceded by due enquiry and declared the termination as illegal. But as

the employee already reached the age of superannuation, the learned Judge

granted the employee the relief of pension with effect from 18

th

July, 1982, by

deeming that he retired from service on that day. This Court expressed its

inability to understand how the learned Judge could declare a termination in

1982 as illegal in a writ petition filed in 2005 as well as how fault could be

found with the Department of Mines and Geology, for failing to prove that a

termination made in 1982, was preceded by an enquiry in proceedings initiated

after 22 years, when the department in which the employee had worked was

wound up long back in 1983 itself and the new department had no records of

his service.

19. The facts in M.K. Sarkar (supra) would reveal that more than 22 years

after his retirement, and after receiving his dues under the Provident Fund

Scheme, the retiree-respondent had made a representation requesting that he

may be extended the benefit of the Pension Scheme while, at the same time,

expressing willingness to refund the amount received under the Provident Fund

Scheme (by way of adjustment against the arrears of pension that would

become payable to him on acceptance of his request for switch over to the

Pension Scheme). The said request was not accepted. The retiree-respondent

therefore approached the Central Administrative Tribunal

20

by filing an

application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act seeking a direction to the Railway

Administration to permit him to exercise an option to switch over to the Pension

Scheme. The application was disposed of by the CAT by directing a decision to

20

CAT

10

be taken on the representation of the retiree-respondent by passing a

reasoned order, making it clear that it did not examine the claim on merits.

The claim of the retiree-respondent was rejected by the Chairman, Railway

Board whereupon a second original application was filed before the CAT. CAT

allowed this second application and directed the Railways to permit the retiree-

respondent to opt for the pension scheme and also inform him the amount

that was required to be refunded in case he exercised the option. The relevant

high court having jurisdiction was unsuccessfully approached by the Railways,

whereafter this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution was

invoked. It is in the aforenoted facts and circumstances that this Court had the

occasion to observe in paragraphs 15 and 16 as follows:

15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead”

issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the

court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as

furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred

dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with

reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on

which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s

direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor

a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation,

or erase the delay and laches.

16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or

representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with

reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale”

issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or dispute, the

court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct

consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct

“consideration” without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that

such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to

limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that

would be the legal position and effect.

20. Shiva Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) and Chaman Rana (supra)

arose out of belated claims for grant of promotion. In Chaman Rana (supra),

it was held that a subsequent pronouncement of a judgment by this Court

11

could not enthuse a fresh lease of life or furnish a fresh cause of action to what

was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim. The following passage from Shiv

Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) was quoted:

“29. … Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but

not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any

provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion

cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.”

This was followed by the observation that caution has to be exercised by the

Court with regard to the modus operandi of the representation syndrome to

revive what are clearly dead and stale claims , as discussed in C. Jacob

(supra).

21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench in State

of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das

21

, had the occasion to consider the effect

that unexplained delay and laches would have in availing remedies. The Court

in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of

rights. Taking note of multiple precedents in the field on the subject of delay

or laches disentitling a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46

(forty-six) years after final publication was grossly belated and that no relief

could have been made available to the respondents/writ petitioners.

22. Although in C. Jacob (supra) and M. K. Sarkar (supra) the law was

declared keeping in mind that there were directions for consideration of the

“stale” or “dead” claims by the orders of the high court and the CAT,

respectively, and thereafter, rejection of the claims gave rise to the second

21

2023 INSC 619 = (2023) 15 SCC 273

12

round of litigation, here no such order of the Tribunal admittedly intervened.

There is, thus, a factual dissimilarity; yet, nothing much turns on it.

23. In the facts of the present appeal, we find that the respondent had

received the second benefit of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme

in August, 2010 and even the third benefit thereunder sometime in November,

2015. She claimed grant of the second benefit of financial upgradation under

the ACP Scheme, due to her in March, 2009, as late as in October, 2016 by

making a representation. Fortuitously for the respondent, she did not have to

approach the Tribunal for getting her representation decided, because within

32 days of receipt thereof, the Dy. Director (S.II) rejected such representation

on 5

th

November, 2016. The due diligence exercised by a conscientious officer,

[who thought it to be his duty to decide the representation but otherwise could

well have elected not to examine the same because (i) a “stale” or “dead”

claim had been raised and (ii) the respondent, while in service, had accepted

the benefits of financial upgradation without raising any demur] cannot be

taken undue advantage by the respondent by urging that the law declared in

the aforesaid decisions would not be applicable in her case because of factual

dissimilarities.

24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of

this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay or

laches is considered one of the factors which could assume significance in

denying relief when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate

case, a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the

13

applicant’s negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue

delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal.

25. However, although limitation laws do not apply to writ jurisdiction, in

relation to service disputes triable under the 1985 Act the laws of limitation

traceable in Section 21 read with Section 20 thereof do apply. Sections 20 and

21 (to the extent relevant) read as follows:

“20. Application not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted .—

(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that

the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the

relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have

availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules

as to redressal of grievances,—

(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority

or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules,

rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person

in connection with the grievance; or

(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other

authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with

regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person,

if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was

preferred or representation was made has expired.

(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an

applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or the Governor

of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the

remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such

memorial.”

(emphasis supplied)

“21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,—

(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of

sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance

unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such

final order has been made;

(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in

clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six

months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made,

within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

… ”.

14

26. A Constitution Bench of this Court in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya

Pradesh

22

, upon noting Section 20, had the occasion to observe as follows:

15. In several States the Conduct Rules for government servants require the

administrative remedies to be exhausted before the disciplinary orders can be

challenged in court. …

16. The Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings do provide for an appeal

against the orders of punishment imposed on public servants. Some Rules

provide even a second appeal or a revision. The purport of Section 20 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act is to give effect to the Disciplinary Rules and the

exhaustion of the remedies available thereunder is a condition precedent to

maintaining of claims under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Administrative

Tribunals have been set up for government servants of the Centre and several

States have already set up such Tribunals under the Act for the employees of

the respective States. The law is soon going to get crystallised on the line laid

down under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

(emphasis supplied)

27. As noted in S.S. Rathore (supra) and as is still the present position,

service rules (rules relating to conduct, discipline and appeal, leave, pension,

etc.) governing public servants do have provisions providing for first appeals,

second appeals (not ordinarily), revisions against original/appellate orders, or

memorials (not ordinarily). In rare cases, such rules may also provide for

representations against actions which affect the public servants and are

perceived by them to be not in accordance with law. In any event, even though

service rules may not provide for a representation, there could be cases (to be

discussed hereafter) where omission or failure to consider and dispose of a

representation could give rise to a claim to move the CAT.

28. We may, at this juncture, clear the position that the CAT does have, in

exceptional cases, the power to entertain an original application under Section

19 of the 1985 Act even if the applicant before it has not exhausted the

remedies available to him under the service rules applicable to him as to

22

1989 INSC 268 = (1989) 4 SCC 582

15

redressal of grievances. If any authority on the point is required, one may

profitably refer to the decision in D.B. Gohil v. Union of India

23

.

29. Coming back to Section 20, the purport of the opening words of sub-

section (2) read with sub-section (1) thereof, which we have highlighted

above, leaves no manner of doubt that the word “remedies” referred to

therein, used as a noun, mean the “remedies” that are statutorily available as

to redressal of grievances under the relevant service rules. However, in a case

where the service rules do not provide any scope for representation to be

made, the aggrieved public servant without making an unprovided for

representation, i.e., a non-statutory representation, and without waiting for its

disposal, may approach the CAT directly challenging the order/action that has

prejudicially affected his right and left him aggrieved; and, if any objection as

to non-exhaustion of remedy before the departmental authorities is raised

before the CAT by the authorities, the same can well be countered by urging

that the service rules do not provide any statutory remedy by way of a

representation to the departmental authorities against the order/action under

challenge.

30. There could, however, be innumerable cases where formal orders may

not exist affecting the rights of public servants covered by the 1985 Act but

affectation of their rights could arise out of silence or inaction of the employer

to confer an otherwise legitimate benefit. What is the recourse available in

such a case? In such cases, it is eminently desirable that steps be first taken

by the public servant to invite the attention of the employer to such affectation

23

(2010) 12 SCC 301

16

of rights for the same to be addressed by the employer. Suppose, a public

servant is due for promotion or is due for a pay raise or claims entitlement to

any service benefit which, according to him, is due but the employer has

remained silent or inactive in not giving the public servant what is due to him.

In such cases, the only way of espousing one’s grievance is through a

representation bringing to the notice of the employer that grant of the service

benefit, though due, has not been considered and that the grievance be

redressed. If the grievance is not redressed despite receiving the

representation and despite expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (2)

of Section 20 of the 1985 Act, in such cases, the CAT cannot throw out an

original application by holding that the remedy by way of a representation is

not provided in the service rules. However, the public servant has to be

cautious and take care not to wait indefinitely for espousing his grievance from

the date affectation of his right begins. If he does wait indefinitely, he does so

at his own peril.

31. Or, take a case where there is no employer-employee relationship yet,

viz., the case of an aspirant for public employment who participates in the

selection process but turns out to be unsuccessful. Should he have any

grievance in relation to the process and seeks to challenge the same, he may

do so immediately before accrual of third party rights ; or, he may first

represent and if there be no response or any response which does not address

his grievance, he may apply before the CAT under Section 19 of the 1985 Act

within the prescribed period of limitation. However, if there is delay and third

party rights accrue, the delay has to be explained and condonation sought.

17

32. Reading Section 20 as we have interpreted it above with the guiding light

provided by S.S. Rathore (supra) and M.K. Sarkar (supra), we need to

consider whether the O.A. filed by the respondent before the Tribunal was

within time or not.

33. The respondent did not in the O.A. plead and indicate the specific

provision in the service rules in terms whereof she sought relief from the 3

rd

appellant by filing the representation dated 4

th

October, 2016. In the absence

of such pleading, one has to proceed on the premise that she had made the

representation on her own without the same being provided under any service

rules applicable to her and, in that sense, it was a non-statutory

representation. The period of limitation could not have been stretched by the

respondent by asserting that rejection of her non-statutory representation

resulted in accrual of the cause of action for moving the Tribunal.

34. To summarise the legal position, what assumes cruciality in cases, such

as these, is whether the representation that has been made and rejected,

whereafter the jurisdiction of the CAT is invoked, is statutorily provided in the

service rules governing the applicant-public servant. Bare reading of the

opening words of Section 20 of the 1985 Act with sub-section (1), which

requires exhaustion of other available remedies as a general precondition for

entertaining original applications under Section 19, refers to remedies that are

available under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances against

final orders. If the relevant service rules do not provide for making of a

representation against final orders, by reason of absence of such a provision,

the remedy of the aggrieved applicant-public servant would lie directly before

18

the CAT in challenging the order/action of the authorities adverse or prejudicial

to his interest; and, in such a case, an original application ought not to be

rejected mechanically on the ground that all “remedies” have not been

exhausted. However, it cannot be gainsaid that if the relevant service rules do

provide for making of a representation, the remedy made available has to be

exhausted unless an exceptional case is set up. Provision made in the service

rules, if at all, for making of a statutory representation, timing of such

representation and whether the representation raises a “stale” or “dead” claim

– all these are relevant for deciding the question of limitation under the 1985

Act. The opening words of Section 20 read with sub-section (2) thereof would,

however, call for a nuanced approach. As observed earlier, a representation

though not provided in the relevant rules governing ser vice could yet be

necessary and imperative when a legitimate service benefit is not conferred on

the aggrieved applicant-public servant by the employer on his own either due

to inaction or otherwise. In such a case, the representation inviting attention

to what the aggrieved applicant-public servant perceives is deprivation of a

legitimate benefit has to be made expeditiously and before accrual of third-

party rights, if any. Such a representation could be made even after accrual of

third-party rights, but within a reasonable time of the same coming to the

notice of the aggrieved applicant-public servant. What would constitute

reasonable time would necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case

and decided accordingly.

35. We hold that except in cases where final orders are passed on

appeals/revisions/memorials/representations which are statutorily provided,

19

limitation for the purpose of filing an original application under Section 19 of

the 1985 Act, in view of the above-referred decisions and Sections 21 and 20

thereof, has to be reckoned keeping in mind the date of accrual of the cause

of action and the proximity of the date of the representation, and the period

of one year for filing an original application has to be counted from the date of

expiry of six months from date of such a representation if no order were passed

thereon. Needless to observe, the cause of action cannot be deferred by

making a highly belated representation and awaiting its outcome. We also

make it clear that different considerations would arise in a case of a continuous

wrong, which has to be decided in the light of the decision of this Court in

Union of India v. Tarsem Singh

24

.

36. On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have, if she

felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of

financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme ,

availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately after her rights were

affected. She ought not to have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance

through a belated representation. Filing of such belated representation, which

was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of

action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed

within time.

37. Both fora, i.e., the Tribunal as well as the High Court, did not rule on the

objection of maintainability of the O.A. despite such objection being sound.

The reasons that we have assigned would lead to the irresistible conclusion

24

2008 INSC 930 = (2008) 8 SCC 648

20

that the O.A. was time-barred and should not have been entertained by the

Tribunal. The High Court too erred in law by failing to entertain the challenge

to the Tribunal’s order on the specious ground that the decision in B.D. Kadam

(supra) covered the issue without, however, examining whether the O.A. was

maintainable.

38. Having ruled thus, we cannot ignore a vital fact. The respondent has

retired in 2018. The Tribunal’s order has been implemented and she has

received certain financial benefits. During the winter years of her life, financial

support will become essential to ensure that she can live a life of dignity and

purpose, exercising her right to a fulfilling existence. Regard being had to the

same and bearing in mind the provision contained in Article 15(3) of the

Constitution enabling the State to make special provisions inter alia for women

and that Article 41 thereof provides guidance for the policy of the State to be

aimed at providing assistance in cases of inter alia old age, we, in due exercise

of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and considering this

case as a very special case, refrain from directing the respondent to refund

any surplus amount received by her over and above her entitlement.

39. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of without interfering with the

impugned order.

………………………………J

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

………………………………J

(RAJESH BINDAL )

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 24, 2025.