As per case facts, High Courts dismissed first appeals by appellant(s) under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
2026 INSC 138
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 1 of 136
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(arising out of (@SLP (C) No(s). 215-216 of 2023
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S S.V. GLOBAL MILL LIMITED … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 23949-23951/2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 28469/2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3435/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 31094/2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 30633/2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 1202/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 19/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2752/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 2 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 342/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2483/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 31152/2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 310/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 249/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2769/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2647/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2924/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 1574/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 1884/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2214/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2085/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2129/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 1667/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2966/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3048/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2958/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 3 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2572/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3046/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3159/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2776/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2649/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2645/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2482/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2507/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2105/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2576/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2941/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2513/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2517/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3070/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2520/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 685/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3071/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 4 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3441/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3439/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3069/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4216/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2489/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3053/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2521/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4217/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2136/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2132/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4857/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3005/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2370/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5887/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3784/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2348/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2499/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 5 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4377/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3754/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3977/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4264/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3080/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3450/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3158/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3815/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4114/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3743/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 2721/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3722/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6259/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6258/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5547/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4115/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3835/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 6 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3112/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3734/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5648/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5657/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4859/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4265/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5570/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7054/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4574/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4218/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4513/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7129/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5886/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6535/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5266/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6687/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5652/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 7 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 3927/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4860/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4858/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5646/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5888/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6229/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9877/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5642/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4861/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5647/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6683/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6682/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8667/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6689/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7501/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7522/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5650/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 8 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5658/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5643/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5649/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7531/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7509/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7668/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5644/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6681/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5655/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 4827/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5656/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8659/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7660/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9858/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9859/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9869/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7533/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 9 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5654/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7648/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5364/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7506/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9868/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7662/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8660/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9865/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8663/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6686/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8662/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7725/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7508/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7670/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7529/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6684/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7504/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 10 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8655/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6688/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8668/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6252/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8661/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8656/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 5939/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8658/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7657/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8664/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7659/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7733/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7527/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8641/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10617/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 6528/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9871/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 11 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8657/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7732/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7530/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7526/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7663/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7528/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7511/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 7523/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8670/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8671/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10618/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8665/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8666/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9866/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 12007/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9862/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10619/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 12 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10620/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10621/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10622/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9860/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10631/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9876/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8672/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10623/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9874/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10624/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9863/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9857/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 8669/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9878/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9870/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10611/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10632/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 13 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10625/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9875/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9873/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9879/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10610/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10626/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9872/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9864/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9861/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9867/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10615/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10630/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10614/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10612/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10613/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10627/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10629/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 14 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10628/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10633/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15168/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16867/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15142/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14782/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14781/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14764/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16861/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 346/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16860/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16873/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16027/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16871/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16026/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16862/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16872/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 15 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16865/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13147/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15166/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16045/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15122/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13150/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16030/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16054/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13149/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16043/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11025/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13152/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13151/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14775/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15126/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14754/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11942/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 16 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13174/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10609/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10048/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16041/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11689/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10616/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15143/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13171/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14749/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11021/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 9856/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14751/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15146/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11019/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15137/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13179/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11798/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 17 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11023/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11024/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11030/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13178/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13170/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11020/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11022/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13173/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15144/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14767/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11701/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13176/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13175/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11026/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13177/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11032/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13172/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 18 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11702/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11700/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 10634/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11018/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11027/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11031/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14759/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14744/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15141/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14742/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15134/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13230/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15133/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15139/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14769/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15138/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15140/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 19 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15121/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13238/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13234/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11941/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11703/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15120/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13231/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13239/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15119/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13240/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14757/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15136/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15124/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13233/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15128/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13235/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15131/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 20 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15127/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13236/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15135/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15129/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 13232/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14763/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14779/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16031/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15130/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15125/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14743/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15132/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14745/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14750/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14756/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14753/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14773/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 21 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14761/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15163/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15145/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15165/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14771/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14776/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15164/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14777/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14780/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14766/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15161/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15160/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16033/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14774/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16856/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14772/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14768/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 22 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14770/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 14765/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 24840/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16029/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16877/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 25189/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 25192/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 25197/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15169/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16879/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 15167/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16868/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30777/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30781/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30814/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30819/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30826/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 23 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30831/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30837/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30841/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30844/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30848/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30850/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30860/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30873/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30876/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30881/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31734/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31966/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32068/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18940/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16859/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 1124/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16869/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 24 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18933/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17865/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17864/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17492/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 7532/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18934/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 8796/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17477/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17515/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 11029/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 21876/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 23572/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17533/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 24818/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16878/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17513/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 24850/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 25 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17518/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17507/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 25198/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 26085/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 26088/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30787/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17497/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30854/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30864/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30868/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 16423/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31949/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31950/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31956/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17519/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31964/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31965/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 26 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31971/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18939/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32046/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32048/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32049/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17482/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32051/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32052/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32053/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17487/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32062/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32064/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32066/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32067/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32069/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32070/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32385/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 27 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32386/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32395/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32400/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32403/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32406/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32407/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32409/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18968/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32420/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026@Diary No(s). 32421/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32423/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32426/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17886/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18958/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17887/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17486/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18957/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 28 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17870/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33044/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33045/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33046/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17512/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18935/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17496/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17485/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17534/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17888/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) NO.________OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33164/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18964/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17520/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17511/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17521/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17494/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17491/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 29 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17858/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17508/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18960/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18956/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17522/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18945/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17490/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17833/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17525/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17489/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17526/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17510/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17493/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17509/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17488/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17527/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18943/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 30 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17867/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17506/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17495/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17871/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17872/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17529/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17514/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17873/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18944/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18947/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17856/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17861/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17869/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17530/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17531/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17532/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17868/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 31 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18948/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18941/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17863/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18936/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17862/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17880/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18967/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17881/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18953/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17884/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17885/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17889/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 17890/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18950/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18959/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18965/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18942/2025)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 32 of 136
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18966/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18949/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18955/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18954/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18951/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18961/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18946/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18952/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18962/2025)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(C) No. 18963/2025)
J U D G M E N T
M. M. Sundresh, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel and the learned counsel appearing for
the parties. Additionally, we have had the pleasure of listening to Mr. R.
Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India, who made his
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 33 of 136
submissions at our request. Documents filed, judgments relied upon, and
the written submissions have been perused and duly taken on record.
3. We are dealing with a batch of matters wherein the High Courts, vide the
impugned judgments, have dismissed the first appeals filed by the
appellant(s) under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”) as being barred by
limitation.
4. The primary issue before us is on the interplay of Section 74 read with
Section 103 of the 2013 Act, on the one hand, and Sections 5 and 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1963 Act”) on the
other. The incidental issue is on the application of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1894 Act”) as against the 2013
Act in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the
1894 Act, but the award has been passed after the commencement of the
2013 Act.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 34 of 136
LAND RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
“Land is the foundation of all wealth and progress.” — Mahatma Gandhi
5. Land has always occupied a unique and enduring position in the lives of
human beings. It is not merely a means of livelihood, but the very
foundation of social, economic, cultural, and political existence. It
represents power, independence, and a sense of belonging. A piece of land
is not just soil under one’s feet. It is where families are born, crops are
grown, and collective memories of generations are embedded. Thus, to
own land means dignity, security, and a voice in society.
6. Conscious of the deep-rooted significance of land, the framers of the
Constitution placed the Right to Property amongst the cherished
fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”), drawing lessons from the
Government of India Act, 1935, and inspired by the promise of human
dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. In fact, the
Right to Property has been one of the most contested rights in Indian
constitutional history, resulting in several constitutional amendments. It
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 35 of 136
has also formed the foundation of several landmark judicial decisions that
have shaped India’s constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, one can say that no
other right has been debated, reshaped, and rewritten as much as this one.
7. However, new challenges emerged in independent India, where a few
owned vast tracts of land while many remained landless. This imbalance
led to agrarian and land reform measures, creating a conflict between
private property rights and the State’s obligation to promote social justice.
To enable these reforms, the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978,
removed the Right to Property from the list of fundamental rights and
repositioned it as a constitutional right under Article 300A of the
Constitution, which mandates that “no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law.”
8. Article 300A of the Constitution reflects the constitutional commitment to
the rule of law by ensuring that deprivation of property cannot occur
arbitrarily and must be backed by valid law. It seeks to strike a delicate
balance between societal needs and the rights of individuals, particularly
in matters of land acquisition. While the State may acquire land for a public
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 36 of 136
purpose, such power is not to be exercised arbitrarily or unjustly, but
within the statutory umbrella. American jurist Joseph Story beautifully
captures the essence of the aforesaid in the following words- “That
government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the rights of property
are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body without any
restraint.”
9. In this context, land acquisition laws assume critical importance. The
history of land acquisition in India predates the Constitution and can be
traced back to the Bengal Regulation I of 1824, when the British initiated
land acquisition for the purpose of public welfare only in certain provinces.
In Bombay, land acquisition was governed by the Building Act XVIII of
1839, while the Madras Act XX of 1852 governed acquisition in the
Madras Presidency. The scope of what constituted ‘public welfare’ was
expanded over the years in response to the developmental needs of the
time. Thereafter, significant changes were brought in through enactments
in the years 1857 and 1870. The 1870 enactment was subsequently
replaced by the 1894 Act, which governed land acquisition for over a
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 37 of 136
century, undergoing several amendments from time to time. However, its
inadequacies, particularly its failure to adequately protect landowners and
displaced persons, became evident, and after more than a century, it was
repealed and replaced by the 2013 Act, marking a shift towards a more
welfare-oriented approach.
10. We may note that even while acquisitions continue under the 2013 Act in
response to rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, and commercialisation,
Article 300A of the Constitution stands quietly but firmly as a watchful
guardian, reassuring the people that their bond with land is not forgotten
by the law.
FRAMEWORK UNDER THE 2013 ACT
11. At present, acquisition of land in the country is governed by the 2013 Act,
which continues the unique mechanism found in the erstwhile 1894 Act
with some necessary modifications, facilitating more relief to the
landowners by way of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements. The
Preamble to the 2013 Act makes this abundantly clear.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 38 of 136
“Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
[Act 30 of 2013] [26th September, 2013]
An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government
and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative,
informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation,
development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the
least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and
provide just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been
acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and
make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and
resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory
acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development
leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”
12. Therefore, the 2013 Act is not only an improved version of the 1894 Act,
but also meant to provide more benefits while ensuring a robust
mechanism for awarding just and fair compensation to the landowners. The
2013 Act takes into consideration various social factors and extends its
benefits to affected persons of different categories, including farmers and
weaker sections of society. It also provides for different parameters to be
considered by the Collector in the determination of compensation. By
strengthening the safeguards in favour of landowners, the scheme of the
2013 Act ensures that the State does not acquire land as a matter of routine
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 39 of 136
and can do so only in strict adherence to the procedure contemplated
thereunder.
13. When dealing with a beneficial legislation such as the 2013 Act, Courts
must make a conscious endeavour to give effect to its avowed objectives.
This Court has reiterated the said principle on several occasions.
Union of India vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Ors (2008) 9 SCC 527
“12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare
statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in
consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for
whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial
or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict
interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1961
SC 647 (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (1984) 4 SCC 356
: 1984 SCC (L&S) 753 : AIR 1984 SC 1842] (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa
v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. [(1981) 2 SCC 238 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 316
: AIR 1981 SC 852] (AIR para 13), S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager
(2003) 4 SCC 27 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 380 (SCC para 12).
13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate [(1995) 6 SCC 326 : 1995
SCC (L&S) 1385] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42)
“41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this
Court in Workmen v. American Express International Banking
Corpn. [(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] wherein Chinnappa
Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the following observations:
(SCC p. 76)
‘4. The principles of statutory construction are well
settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such
as social welfare legislation and human rights’ legislation
are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to
Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 40 of 136
imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the
prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and
reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the
“colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes
(we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's
opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds (1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3
All ER 237 (HL). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce
pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of
literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language,
unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the
law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic
considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is,
Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16
we had occasion to say: (SCC p. 447, para 6)
“6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation
of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of
necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation
is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief,
the court is not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions.”
42. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has
dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book.
The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659
thus:
‘A purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by—
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where
that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose
(in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction),
or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning
is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the
Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).’…”
(emphasis supplied)
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 41 of 136
Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri, (2020) 15 SCC 328
“19. We must not forget that we are dealing with a beneficial legislation.
The Preamble which has been referred to casts light on the object sought
to be subserved by the 2013 Act in general, as well as by Section 24. We
have already seen that land acquisition is to take place in a humane
fashion, with the least disturbance to the owners of the land, as also, to
provide just and fair compensation to affected persons. Viewed in the light
of the Preamble, this legislation, being a beneficial legislation, must be
construed in a way which furthers its purpose [see Eera v. State (NCT of
Delhi) (2017) 15 SCC 133, para 115: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 588] at paras 106,
128, 129 and 131]. On the assumption, therefore, that two views are
possible, the view which accords with the beneficial object sought to be
achieved by the legislation, is obviously the preferred view.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Before we proceed to analyse the unique regime governing acquisition
under the 2013 Act, we deem it appropriate to consider the incidental issue
raised before us, which hinges on the interpretation of Section 24(1)(a) of
the 2013 Act.
Section 24 of the 2013 Act
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed
to have lapsed in certain cases.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),—
(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has
been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination
of compensation shall apply; or
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 42 of 136
(b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land
Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of
1894), where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or
more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the
land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government,
if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in
accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect
of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition
under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Section 24 of the 2013 Act operates as a savings clause to preserve the land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in certain cases. On a
reading of the said provision, it is clear that the Legislature has consciously
crafted this provision bearing in mind the beneficial object behind the
legislation to ensure that the interests of both the landowners and the
beneficiary are adequately protected.
16. Sub-section (1) of Section 24 starts with a non-obstante clause. Clause (a)
of sub-section (1) ensures that the benefits conferred under the 2013 Act
are statutorily extended to the determination of compensation in cases
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 43 of 136
where the land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act,
but no award was passed under Section 11 of the said Act. In other words,
Section 24(1)(a) facilitates the continuation of the acquisition proceedings
under the 2013 Act by taking off from the proceedings initiated under the
1894 Act, qua compensation, when no award has been passed under
Section 11 of the 1894 Act.
17. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 leaves no room for any doubt
by stating that all the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to the
determination of compensation shall apply. Therefore, each and every
provision of the 2013 Act dealing with the determination of compensation,
in any manner whatsoever, be it procedural or substantive, would ipso
facto apply to a case where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has
been passed. We clarify that there is no question of rehabilitation and
resettlement under the 1894 Act and, hence, there is neither any duty to
award it nor a right to claim it under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. A
totally new benefit cannot be extended retrospectively in the absence of a
statutory prescription. What is important to note is the expression ‘relating
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 44 of 136
to the determination of compensation.’ The aforesaid expression will have
to be given maximum leverage as the benefits, except rehabilitation and
resettlement entitlements, in any case, are to be extended under the 2013
Act as against the 1894 Act. The following decisions of this Court are
apposite in this context:
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129
“191. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no award is made in a pending
acquisition proceeding; in such event all provisions of the new Act relating to
determination of compensation would apply. Section 24(1)(b) logically
continues with the second situation i.e. where the award has been passed, and
states that in such event, proceedings would continue under the 1894 Act.
Section 24(2) — by way of an exception, states that where an award is
made but requisite steps have not been taken for five years or more to take
possession nor compensation has been paid then there is lapse of
acquisition. If one of the steps has been taken, then the proviso can
operate. Time is the essence. It is on the basis of time-lag that the lapse is
provided and in default of payment for five years as provided on failure to
deposit higher compensation is to be paid. It is based on that time-lag
higher compensation has to follow. It is not the mere use of colon under
Section 24(2) but the placement of the proviso next to Section 24(2) and
not below Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is not permissible to alter a placement
of the proviso more so when it is fully in consonance with the provisions of
Section 24(2). Section 24(2) completely obliterates the old regime to the
effect of its field of operation. Under Section 24(1)(a), there is a partial
lapse of the old regime because all proceedings, till the stage of award are
preserved. The award, in such proceedings, made after coming into force
of the 2013 Act has to take into account its provisions, for determination
of compensation. Thus, proceedings up to the stage of the award are
deemed final under the old Act. In the case under Section 24(1)(b), the old
regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to Section 24(2) and in part
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 45 of 136
the new regime for payment of higher compensation in case of default for
5 years or more after award.
xxx xxx xxx
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not
made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is
no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the
provisions of the 2013 Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
Haryana State Industrial and Infraastructure Development Corporation
Limited v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 512
“34. In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the legislative
intention we have no hesitation to hold that the point of initiation of land
acquisition proceedings under the LA Act for the purpose of Section 24(1) of
the 2013 Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1) Notification in the
Official Gazette of the appropriate Government.
xxx xxx xxx
39. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved in the
captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4
notification issued under the LA Act prior to 1-1-2014 (date of
commencement of the 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 1-1-2014
and, as to whether Section 6 Notification under the LA Act could be issued
after 1-1-2014.
40. We think that while considering those questions we will have to bear in
mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the
intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now
exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. One crucial aspect
discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this
context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that
if land acquisition proceeding under the LA Act was initiated prior to 1-
1-2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not
culminated in an award under Section 11 of the LA Act, then all the
provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation
should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in
case of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the LA Act where
the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 1-1-2014, all
provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 46 of 136
compensation alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other
words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition
proceedings should continue, but all the provisions relating to the
determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable
to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play
only at that stage.
41. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the
initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice
under Section 4(1) of the LA Act and the stage at which compensation for the
acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed
to make the acquisition in accordance with the law.
42. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with
necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings
initiated under the LA Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures
are to be regulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reach the
stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on
that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are
to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the
manner provided under the LA Act or in the manner provided under the 2013
Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the
determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in
other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013
Act in relation to such proceedings.
43. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the
various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of
determination of compensation are those prescribed under the LA Act.
We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under
Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application
of the 2013 Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act clearly deals
with a different category of cases where an award has been passed under
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 47 of 136
the 1894 Act. It states that proceedings under the 1894 Act would continue
unabated, as though the same had not been repealed. The idea is to give
finality to the awards already passed under the 1894 Act, as the passing of
an award leads to the determination of the compensation, concluding the
rights and liabilities of the parties. After such a determination, there is no
question of extending the benefits under the 2013 Act. Any challenge
thereto would be under the 1894 Act.
19. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act states that the proceedings
initiated under the 1894 Act would stand lapsed in cases where an award
had been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013
Act, but the possession of the land has not been taken, and the
compensation has not been paid. When dealing with a case where the
award has already been passed under the 1894 Act, the proceedings would
continue under the erstwhile Act, unless the same falls under this sub-
section. Therefore, this provision operates as an exception to sub-section
(1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act introduced by way of a non-obstante
clause.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 48 of 136
20. Keeping this in mind, we shall now proceed to analyse the unique aspects
of the 2013 Act.
21. Whenever the land in any area is required for a public purpose, the
appropriate Government shall publish a preliminary notification to that
effect under Section 11 of the 2013 Act, followed by the publication of the
declaration under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. Thereafter, an award is
passed by the Collector under Section 23 of the 2013 Act.
Sections 23, 25 and 26 of the 2013 Act
“23. Enquiry and land acquisition award by Collector.—On the day so
fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the
Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person
interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 21, to the
measurements made under section 20, and into the value of the land at the date
of the publication of the notification, and into the respective interests of the
persons claiming the compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement, shall
make an award under his hand of—
(a) the true area of the land;
(b) the compensation as determined under section 27 along with
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award as determined under Section
31 and which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and
(c) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons
known or believed to be interested in the land, or whom, or of whose
claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively
appeared before him.
“25. Period within which an award shall be made.—The Collector shall
make an award within a period of twelve months from the date of
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 49 of 136
publication of the declaration under section 19 and if no award is made
within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land
shall lapse:
Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the power to
extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion, circumstances exist
justifying the same:
Provided further that any such decision to extend the period shall be
recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the
website of the authority concerned.”
(emphasis supplied)
“26. Determination of market value of land by Collector.—(1) The
Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the
market value of the land, namely:—
(a) the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of
1899) for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case
may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or
(b) the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest
village or nearest vicinity area; or
(c) consented amount of compensation as agreed upon under sub-section
(2) of Section 2 in case of acquisition of lands for private companies or
for public private partnership projects,
whichever is higher:
Provided that the date for determination of market value shall be the
date on which the notification has been issued under Section 11.
Explanation 1.—The average sale price referred to in clause (b) shall be
determined taking into account the sale deeds or the agreements to sell
registered for similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity area during
immediately preceding three years of the year in which such acquisition of land
is proposed to be made.
Explanation 2.—For determining the average sale price referred to in
Explanation 1, one-half of the total number of sale deeds or the agreements to
sell in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into
account.
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Explanation 3.—While determining the market value under this section and
the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price
paid as compensation for land acquired under the provisions of this Act on an
earlier occasion in the district shall not be taken into consideration.
Explanation 4.—While determining the market value under this section and
the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price
paid, which in the opinion of the Collector is not indicative of actual prevailing
market value may be discounted for the purposes of calculating market value.
(2) The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied
by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule.
(3) Where the market value under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) cannot
be determined for the reason that—
(a) the land is situated in such area where the transactions in land are
restricted by or under any other law for the time being in force in
that area; or
(b) the registered sale deeds or agreements to sell as mentioned in
clause (a) of sub-section (1) for similar land are not available for
the immediately preceding three years; or
(c) the market value has not been specified under the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) by the appropriate authority,
the State Government concerned shall specify the floor price or minimum price
per unit area of the said land based on the price calculated in the manner
specified in sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land situated in the
immediate adjoining areas:
Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers its shares to the
owners of the lands (whose lands have been acquired) as a part compensation,
for acquisition of land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per cent
of the value so calculated under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3) as the case may be:
Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case compel any
owner of the land (whose land has been acquired) to take its shares, the value
of which is deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-section (1):
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Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of any land
acquisition proceedings in any area, take all necessary steps to revise and
update the market value of the land on the basis of the prevalent market rate in
that area:
Provided also that the appropriate Government shall ensure that the market
value determined for acquisition of any land or property of an educational
institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority
shall be such as would not restrict or abrogate the right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Section 23 of the 2013 Act makes it clear that the Collector is required to
determine the compensation along with rehabilitation and resettlement
entitlements and, accordingly, pass an award, after duly considering the
objections raised by the landowners under Section 15 of the 2013 Act.
While doing so, the Collector performs a quasi-judicial role, as the
aforesaid determination directly concerns the rights of the parties before
him. He is duty bound to make the award within the period prescribed
under Section 25 of the 2013 Act, being a period of 12 months from the
date of publication of the declaration under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.
The consequence of non-compliance is also clearly spelt out thereunder.
The proviso to Section 25 of the 2013 Act is only an exception, conferring
the power to extend the period prescribed, only to the appropriate
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Government, upon being satisfied of the existence of circumstances
justifying any delay. Suffice it is to state that this being a mandate on the
Collector in the exercise of his statutory function, the question of applying
the law of limitation does not arise.
23. Being an exhaustive provision, Section 26 of the 2013 Act leaves no room
for ambiguity. The proviso to Section 26(1) explicitly states that the date
to be reckoned for determination of the market value is the date of
publication of the preliminary notification under Section 11 of the 2013
Act. Thus, it logically follows that when an award is passed as per Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the relevant date for the aforesaid determination
is the date of publication of the preliminary notification under Section 4 of
the 1894 Act.
24. The proceedings until this stage constitute the first phase of the acquisition
with the Collector playing a quasi-judicial role in determining the
compensation. Upon such determination and passing of the award under
Section 23 of the 2013 Act, the Collector becomes functus officio and does
not have the power to revisit or modify the award passed by him. Thus, his
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quasi-judicial role stands extinguished, and the substantive rights of the
parties stand concluded qua him. The next phase of the proceedings lies
before the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority
established under Section 51 of the 2013 Act (hereinafter referred to as
“Authority”) as dealt with hereinbelow.
Sections 51, 52, 53, 60, 61 and 63 of the 2013 Act
“51. Establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Authority.—(1) The appropriate Government shall, for the
purpose of providing speedy disposal of disputes relating to land
acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement, establish, by
notification, one or more Authorities to be known as “the Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority” to exercise
jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on it by or under this Act.
(2) The appropriate Government shall also specify in the notification
referred to in sub-section (1) the areas within which the Authority may exercise
jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the references made to it under
section 64 or applications made by the applicant under second proviso to sub-
section (1) of section 64.”
(emphasis supplied)
“52. Composition of Authority.—(1) The Authority shall consist of one
person only (hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer) to be
appointed, by notification, by the appropriate Government.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the appropriate
Government may authorise the Presiding Officer of one Authority to discharge
also the functions of the Presiding Officer of another Authority.”
(emphasis supplied)
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“53. Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.—(1) A
person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of an
Authority unless,—
(a) he is or has been a District Judge; or
(b) he is a qualified legal practitioner for not less than seven years.
(2) A Presiding Officer shall be appointed by the appropriate
Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of a High Court in
whose jurisdiction the Authority is proposed to be established.”
(emphasis supplied)
“60. Powers of Authority and procedure before it.—(1) The Authority
shall, for the purposes of its functions under this Act, shall have the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;
(b) discovery and production of any document or other material object
producible as evidence;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning of any public record;
(e) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses;
(f) reviewing its decisions, directions and orders;
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(2) The Authority shall have original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
every reference made to it under Section 64.
(3) The Authority shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the
principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act
and of any rules made thereunder, the Authority shall have the power to
regulate its own procedure.
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(4) The Authority shall, after receiving reference under Section 64 and after
giving notice of such reference to all the parties concerned and after affording
opportunity of hearing to all parties, dispose of such reference within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of such reference and make an award
accordingly.
(5) The Authority shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties
concerned within a period of fifteen days from the date of such award.”
(emphasis supplied)
“61. Proceedings before Authority to be judicial proceedings.—All
proceedings before the Authority shall be deemed to be judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Authority shall be deemed to be a civil
court for the purposes of sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).”
(emphasis supplied)
“63. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.—No civil court (other than
High Court under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution or the
Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating
to land acquisition in respect of which the Collector or the Authority is
empowered by or under this Act, and no injunction shall be granted by
any court in respect of any such matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Chapter VIII of the 2013 Act provides for the establishment of the
Authority which is entrusted with the function of disposal of disputes
relating to land acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement
and is the first judicial forum in the scheme of the 2013 Act.
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26. The Authority comprises only one person who is qualified to be appointed
to the said post if he has either been a District Judge in the past or is
currently serving as one. Alternatively, a legal practitioner of 7 years’
standing or more is qualified to hold the said post. Though the appointment
is made by the Government, the same must be done in consultation with
the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court as per Section 53 of the 2013
Act. The term ‘consultation’, employed in the said provision, indicates the
primary role required to be played by the Chief Justice of the High Court
in the appointment process. The said procedure of appointment shows the
nature of the duties assigned to the Authority. None other than a legally
trained person having one of the aforementioned qualifications would be
eligible to be appointed as the Authority. Sections 60 and 61 of the 2013
Act throw more light on the nature of the Authority as a judicial entity.
27. The Authority has been vested with the same powers as those of a Civil
Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the CPC’) in respect of the matters enumerated under Section 60 of the
2013 Act. In other words, he exercises the power of an original forum. It
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further goes on to state that the Authority is not bound by the procedure
laid down in the CPC and has the power to regulate its own procedure,
subject to the provisions of the 2013 Act and the Rules thereunder, while
being guided by the principles of natural justice. This shows that the
Authority exercises wider and distinct powers than those of the Collector
and, thus, the role of the Collector is not comparable to that of the
Authority.
28. The proceedings before the Authority are deemed to be judicial
proceedings and the Authority is deemed to be a Civil Court under Section
61 of the 2013 Act. Having treated the Authority as a Civil Court, armed
with further powers under the 2013 Act and the Rules thereunder, Section
63 of the 2013 Act rightly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as regards
disputes in respect of which the Collector or the Authority are empowered
under the 2013 Act.
Section 64 of the 2013 Act
“64. Reference to Authority.—(1) Any person interested who has not
accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that
the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority,
as the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land,
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the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the rights
of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested:
Provided that the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from
the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate
Authority:
Provided further that where the Collector fails to make such reference
within the period so specified, the applicant may apply to the Authority, as
the case may be, requesting it to direct the Collector to make the reference
to it within a period of thirty days.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award
is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made—
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the
Collector at the time when he made his award, within six
weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from
the Collector under Section 21, or within six months from the
date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first
expire:
Provided further that the Collector may entertain an application after
the expiry of the said period, within a further period of one year, if he is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the period
specified in the first proviso.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. Section 64 of the 2013 Act permits persons aggrieved by the award passed
under Section 23 to file an application before the Collector requiring him
to refer the matter to the Authority for his determination. The Collector is
then required to make the reference to the Authority within a period of 30
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days. The aforesaid application for reference must be filed by the
landowners within the period stipulated under Section 64(2). However, the
proviso permits the Collector to extend the said period by up to one year
in a given situation, if he is satisfied of the existence of sufficient cause for
the delay. It is pertinent to note that this power to extend the period is not
a quasi-judicial function of the Collector. In other words, the Collector
wears two hats under the scheme of the 2013 Act. While on the one hand,
he passes an award under Section 23 which is in the nature of a quasi-
judicial function, on the other hand, he is required to make a reference to
the Authority under Section 64, which is in the nature of an executive
function, though involving civil consequences.
30. Upon expiry of the one-year period, as provided under the proviso to
Section 64 of the 2013 Act, there is no recourse available to the landowners
since the statute does not empower the Collector to exercise the power
conferred under Section 5 of the 1963 Act for condonation of delay. The
question of exercising that power does not arise even otherwise as at best,
the Collector’s action can be termed as an executive one. We further note
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that the statute does not provide any right of appeal if the landowner has
failed to seek a reference within the stipulated time period. It also does not
supply any power to the Court to grant an extension in seeking a reference.
Accordingly, the right of a landowner to seek a reference is extinguished
under the statute on the expiry of the stipulated time period.
31. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that when the power to condone delay
by invoking Section 5 of the 1963 Act is not even available to a Tribunal
in the ordinary course, certainly, the Collector, not being a Court, cannot
exercise the same.
Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590
“V.B. Eradi, J.— In this appeal filed by special leave granted by this Court
against the judgment dated April 12, 1978 of a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for
condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under
Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1950 — Act 21 of 1950 (hereinafter called “the Act”).
xxx xxx xxx
3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the
conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken
by the Division Bench in Venkaiah case [AIR 1978 AP 166 : (1977) 2 APLJ
(HC) 382] is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions
of this Court in Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court
[(1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51], Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India [(1969) 2 SCC 199 : (1970) 1 SCR 396] and
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 61 of 136
Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad [(1976) 1 SCC 361 : (1976) 2 SCR 845]
that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings
in “courts” and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than
courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities,
notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested
with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil
or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was
preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a
court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings
before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may
contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such
as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation
on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings.
Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such
provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal. The only
provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is Section 93 of the Act
which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms:
93. Limitations.—Every appeal and every application for revision under
this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against
which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the
said period.
On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only
to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions
of the Limitation Act relating to “computation of the period of limitation”.
The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are
contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act,
1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with “computation of the period
of limitation”. It is only after the process of computation is completed and
it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of
the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under
Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view
expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah case [AIR
1978 AP 166 : (1977) 2 APLJ (HC) 382] that Section 93 of the Act did not
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have the effect of rendering the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector.
4. Our attention was drawn to the fact that subsequent to the decision of the
High Court, the State Legislature has enacted the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 — Act 2 of 1979, whereby Section 93 of the
Act has been amended and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 have now been expressly made applicable to appeals and revisions
preferred under Sections 90 and 91 of the Act. We see no force in the contention
advanced on behalf of the appellant that the said amendment is clarificatory in
nature. The provisions of Section 93 as they stood prior to this amendment
were free from any ambiguity and called for no clarification. The legislature
has also not given any indication of any intention to clarify but, on the other
hand, what has been done by it is to amend the section with only prospective
effect. The amended provisions of Section 93 are, therefore, of no assistance to
the appellant in this case which is governed by the section as it was originally
enacted.”
(emphasis supplied)
Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal,
(1996) 9 SCC 414
“K. Ramaswamy, J.— Leave granted.
2. A short but an important question of law arises for decision in these
appeals. By a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(1 of 1894) (for short “the Act”) published in the State Gazette on 20-2-1984,
the Government acquired the land for public purpose. The Land Acquisition
Officer (for short “the LAO”) made his award under Section 11 on 28-2-1989.
The respondents were present at the time when the award was announced. On
10-6-1989 they applied for reference under Section 18. After giving an
opportunity of hearing, by order dated 9-1-1990, the LAO rejected the
application for reference on the ground that it was barred by limitation,
i.e., beyond six weeks from the date of the award. In writ petitions the High
Court of Gujarat in the impugned order dated 13-3-1992 in Special Civil
Application No. 2296 of 1990 and batch held that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act applies to the proceedings before the Collector and that,
therefore, reasons given to condone the delay for filing the application
were valid. The reasons were that they had applied for certified copy of
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the award and after its supply and in consultation with the counsel, the
reference application came to be filed. Accordingly, the High Court
condoned the delay and directed the LAO to make the reference. These
appeals thus are filed against the said order.
3. Section 18(1) envisages that any interested person who has not accepted
the award may, by application in writing to the Collector, require him to refer
the dispute raised in the application for the determination of the court. Under
sub-section (2), the grounds on which objection to the award is taken have to
be stated in the application. However, under the proviso to sub-section (2)
every such application shall be made: (a) if the person making it was present
or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within
six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six
weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-
section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award,
whichever period shall first expire. It would thus be clear that if the interested
person was present at the time the Collector made the award, he should make
the application within six weeks from the date of the award of the Collector. In
other cases, it should be made within six weeks after the receipt of the notice
from the Collector/LAO under Section 12(2) or within six months from the
date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. Admittedly,
the application for reference is beyond six weeks under clause (a) of proviso to
sub-section (2) of Section 18.
4. The question, therefore, is: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would
apply? The High Court relied upon sub-section (3) of Section 18 which was
made by way of a local amendment, i.e., the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra
Extension and Amendment) Act 38 of 1964 which reads thus:
“Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall
be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court
subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
5. It would appear that the High Court of Gujarat has taken a consistent
view that, by operation of sub-section (3), as the Collector was designated
to be a court subordinate to the High Court under Section 115, Civil
Procedure Code (for short “CPC”), Section 5 of the Limitation Act (26 of
1963) stands attracted. Though sub-section (3) of Section 18, by virtue of
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local amendments, treated the Collector as court for a limited purpose of
exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC to correct errors
of orders passed by the Collector under Section 18, he cannot be
considered to be a court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands attracted only when LAO acts as a
court.
xxx xxx xxx
9. It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make a valid
reference to the court is that the application under Section 18(1) shall be in
writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award when the
applicant was present either in person or through counsel, at the time of making
of the award by the Collector under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2).
The Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a statutory authority.
xxx xxx xxx
11. The question emerges: whether the LAO/Collector acts as a court?
Section 3(d) defines ‘Court’ to mean the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction or a principal judicial officer within any special local limits
appointed thereunder to perform the functions of the court under the Act.
‘Collector’ has been defined in clause 3(c) to mean the Collector of district and
includes a Deputy Commissioner etc. appointed by the appropriate
Government to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act. He is
variously called the Collector/LAO. It would thus be clear that the Act made a
distinction between the Collector and the court. The Collector/LAO performs
the statutory functions under the Act including the one making the award under
Section 11 and referring a written application made under Section 18(1) of the
Act to the court and complies with Sections 19 and 20 of the Act. The
dichotomy of the Collector and the court cannot be lost sight of.
12. In Nityananda, M. Joshi v. LIC [(1969) 2 SCC 199], a Bench of three
Judges of this Court was to consider whether the Industrial Tribunal is a court
within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act when it entertains application
under Section 33-C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held
that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to an application
referable under the CPC and it contemplates an application to the court as
provided in the Third Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 4 of the
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Limitation Act also refers to the closure of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation
Act applies only to a court which is to entertain an application or an appeal
after the prescribed period has expired on its satisfying that the applicant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application. The labour
court was held not a court within the Limitation Act when it exercises the
power under Section 33-C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
13. In Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad [(1976) 1 SCC 361], the question
arose whether the Collector to whom application under Section 3 of the Kosi
Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act 30 of 1951 is made, is a court under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act? The said Act by operation of Section 15 of
that Act makes certain provisions of the CPC applicable when it conducts
certain proceedings before it. This Court had held that Collector is not a court
when he conducts the proceedings under the Act. Therefore, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not apply. In Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal [(1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR 1976 SC 2161], under Section 58 of the
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939) and under sub-section (2) proviso and sub-
section (3), application for renewal of the permit would be made and power is
given to the RTA to condone the delay if the application is made after the
expiry but within 15 days of the period. The question arose: whether Section 5
of the Limitation Act would apply by operation of sub-section (2) of Section
29 of the Limitation Act? This Court had held that since the limitation of 15
days was prescribed, if the application is not made within that limitation, the
RTA is not a court under Section 5 and it has no power to condone the delay.
14. In Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [AIR 1964 SC 260 : (1964) 4 SCR 982
: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 152], the question arose: whether Section 417(4) of Criminal
Procedure Code is a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply? It
was held that Section 417(4) is a special law and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act does not apply in view of the specific limitation provided under that Act
for filing of an appeal by a private complainant. In Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi
Development Authority [(1988) 2 SCC 338], Article 137 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an application filed in a civil court. When
application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was filed, the question arose
as to when the limitation began to run. This Court had held that the cause of
action arose on 28-2-1983 when the final bill was not prepared and the
application under Section 20 was filed within three years from that date. It is
seen that in that case the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is
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to an established civil court. Therefore, the ratio therein has no application to
the facts presently before us.
15. In Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil v. P.Y. Deshpande [AIR 1983 Bom 342 :
1982 Mah LJ 76], the question similar to the one presently under consideration
had directly arisen. Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applied for condonation
of the delay in seeking to make a reference under Section 18. It was contended
that by operation of sub-section (3) as also applicable to States of Maharashtra
and Gujarat, the Collector is a court which is amenable to revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115, CPC and that, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act
would apply. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held that the
Collector is not a court under CPC attracting the provisions of the Limitation
Act. The contra view taken by that court was held to be not a good law and
accordingly the same was overruled. The same question had arisen in Kerala
where there is no specific local provision like Section 18(3), locally amended
by Maharashtra and Gujarat. Contention was raised that by operation of sub-
section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 stands attracted since
there is no express exclusion of the limitation under the Act. Therefore, the
delay was condonable. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held
that the Collector is not a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Sub-
section (2) of Section 29 did not apply. Same is the view of the A.P. High Court
in Special Dy. Collector Land Acquisition v. K. Kodandaramacharlu [AIR
1965 AP 25 : (1964) 2 An WR 225].
16. In Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma [1973 Ker LT 138], a Full
Bench of that Court per majority had held that sub-section (2) of Section 29
and Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not apply to the proceedings under the
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and that, therefore, the Tribunal
is not a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In CIT (Agricultural) v.
Thalayar Rubber Industries Ltd. [1981 Ker LT 398 (FB)], the Court was
concerned with the question whether the Appellate Tribunal under the
Agricultural Income Tax Act is a court under Section 5 read with Section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act in respect of an application for reference. The Full Bench
had held that the appellate authority is not a court under Section 5. The delay
therefore, could not be condoned.
17. It is to be remembered that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68
of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under
Sections 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted
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by the courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-
section (2) of Section 18, the provisions of the Limitation Act were not
expressly extended. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available,
and the limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 may be treated to
be special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), the Act specifically maintains distinction
between the Collector and the court and the Collector/LAO performs only
statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under
Section 18. It is difficult to construe that the Collector/LAO while making
reference under Section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a court for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
18. Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided
under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view
that sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-
section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a court when
he acts as a statutory authority under Section 18(1). Therefore, Section 5
of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of
limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The
High Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the Collector is a
court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC
58
“Whether the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals?
11. A perusal of the Limitation Act, 1963 would show that the bar of
limitation contained in the Schedule to the Act applies to suits, appeals, and
applications. “Suit” is defined in Section 2(l) as not including an appeal or an
application. The word “court” is not defined under the Act. However, it appears
in a number of its provisions [see Sections 4, 5, 13, 17(2), 21]. A perusal of the
Schedule would show that it is divided into three divisions. The First Division
concerns itself with suits. Articles 1 to 113, all deal with “suits”.
xxx xxx xxx
14. A perusal of Section 3(2) shows that “suits” are understood as actions
begun in courts of law established under the Constitution of India.
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15. In the Schedule, the Second Division concerns itself with appeals. These
appeals under Articles 114 to 117, are either under the Civil Procedure Code,
the Criminal Procedure Code, or intra-court appeals so far as the High Courts
are concerned. These appeals again are only to “courts” established under the
Constitution.
16. Equally, in the Third Division, all applications that are referred to are
under Articles 118 to 137 only to “courts”, either under the Civil Procedure
Code or under other enactments.
17. Sections 13, 21 and Articles 124, 130 and 131 of the Limitation Act are
again important in understanding what is meant by the expression “court”....
xxx xxx xxx
21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant. —…
xxx xxx xxx
It will be seen that suits and appeals that are covered by the Limitation Act are
so covered provided court fees prescribed for such suits or appeals are paid.
Under Section 13, set out hereinabove, this becomes clear. That is why time is
excluded in cases where leave to file a suit or an appeal as a pauper is granted
in the circumstances mentioned in the section. “Courts” that are mentioned in
this section are therefore courts as understood in the strict sense of being part
of the Judicial Branch of the State.
18. Section 21 also makes it clear that the suit that the Limitation Act speaks
of is instituted only by a plaintiff against a defendant. Both plaintiff and
defendant have been defined as including persons through whom they derive
their right to sue and include persons whose estate is represented by persons
such as executors, administrators or other representatives. This again refers
only to suits filed in courts as is understood by the Code of Civil Procedure….
19. When it comes to applications, again Articles 124, 130 and 131 throw a
great deal of light. Only review of judgments by a “court” is contemplated in
the Third Division in the Schedule. Further, leave to appeal as a pauper again
can be made either to the High Court or only to any other court vide Article
130. And by Article 131, a revision petition filed only before courts under the
Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure are referred to. On
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a plain reading of the provisions of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that
suits, appeals and applications are only to be considered (from the limitation
point of view) if they are filed in courts and not in quasi-judicial bodies.
20. Now to the case law. A number of decisions have established that the
Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals. The distinction
between courts and quasi-judicial decisions is succinctly brought out in Bharat
Bank Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCR 459 : 1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188] .
This root authority has been followed in a catena of judgments. This judgment
refers to a decision of the King's Bench in Cooper v. Wilson [(1937) 2 KB 309
: (1937) 2 All ER 726 (CA)] . The relevant quotation from the said judgment
is as follows : (Bharat Bank Ltd. case [1950 SCR 459 : 1950 SCC 470 : AIR
1950 SC 188] , SCR p. 477 : AIR p. 195, para 24)
“ ‘A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two
or more parties, and then involves four requisites : (1) The presentation (not
necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the
dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by
means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the
assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if
the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal
argument by the parties, and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole
matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law
of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any
disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an
existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but
does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is
in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined
by the Minister's free choice.’ (Cooper case [(1937) 2 KB 309 : (1937) 2
All ER 726 (CA)] , KB pp. 340-41)”
21. Under our constitutional scheme of things, the judiciary is dealt
with in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI. Chapter IV of
Part V deals with the Supreme Court and Chapter V of Part VI deals with
the High Courts and courts subordinate thereto. When the Constitution
uses the expression “court”, it refers to this court system. As opposed to
this court system is a system of quasi-judicial bodies called tribunals.
Thus, Articles 136 and 227 refer to “courts” as distinct from “tribunals”.
The question in this case is whether the Limitation Act extends beyond the
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court system mentioned above and embraces within its scope quasi-
judicial bodies as well?
xxx xxx xxx
30. While discussing CST v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22 :
1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743 , this Court held : (Consolidated
Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169 , SCC pp. 183-84,
paras 25-26)
25. “… In appeal, this Court held that (1) if the legislature in a special
statute prescribes a certain period of limitation, then the Tribunal
concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application, by
excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith, on the analogy of
Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, and (2) the appellate authority and the
revisional authority were not ‘courts’ but were merely administrative
tribunals and, therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act did not, in terms,
apply to the proceedings before such tribunals….”
(emphasis supplied)
31. In a separate concurring judgment Raveendran, J. specifically held :
(Consolidated Engg. Enterprises case v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169 ,
SCC p. 190, para 44)
44. “It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the
Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in
courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial
authority. Consequently Sections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not
apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the Limitation
Act will not apply to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless
expressly provided.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil
Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 does not square with the observations of the three-
Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7
SCC 169. In the latter case, this Court has unequivocally held that CST v.
Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3
SCR 743 is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not
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apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan v.
Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 is in conflict with the
judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises case v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7
SCC 169, it is no longer good law.
33. The sheet anchor in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil
Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5] was Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.…
xxx xxx xxx
A bare reading of this section would show that the special or local law
described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period
of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule. This would
necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the
suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or
application of the nature described in the Schedule. We have already held that
such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the Schedule are only to
courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that
only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule is to
be filed in a court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted.
This is made even clearer by a reading of Section 29(3).....
When it comes to the law of marriage and divorce, the section speaks not only
of suits but other proceedings as well. Such proceedings may be proceedings
which are neither appeals nor applications thus making it clear that the laws
relating to marriage and divorce, unlike the law of limitation, may contain
proceedings other than suits, appeals or applications filed in courts. This again
is an important pointer to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation Act
including Section 29(2) would apply only to the three kinds of proceedings
mentioned all of which are to be filed in courts.”
(emphasis supplied)
Sections 69 and 70 of the 2013 Act
“69. Determination of award by Authority.—(1) In determining the
amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired including the
Rehabilitation and Resettlement entitlements, the Authority shall take into
consideration whether the Collector has followed the parameters set out
under section 26 to section 30 and the provisions under Chapter V of this
Act.
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(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the
Authority shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve
per cent per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and
from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under Section
11 in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date
of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.—In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any
period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land
were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court
shall be excluded.
(3) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the
Authority shall in every case award a solatium of one hundred per cent over
the total compensation amount.”
(emphasis supplied)
“70. Form of award.—(1) Every award under this Chapter shall be in
writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Authority, and shall specify the
amount awarded under clause first of section 28, and also the amounts (if any)
respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section,
together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.
(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement
of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of
clause (2), and clause (9) of respectively, of section 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Once the reference is made by the Collector under Section 64 of the 2013
Act and notice has been issued to the necessary parties under Section 66,
Section 69 kicks into operation, empowering the Authority to award just
and fair compensation to the landowners. Such an award to be passed
includes not only monetary compensation, but also rehabilitation and
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resettlement entitlements. While doing so, the Authority is bound by the
provisions of the 2013 Act and the Rules thereunder.
33. An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 of the 2013 Act
partakes the character of a decree, qua the operative part, while in its
entirety, it becomes a judgment. Thus, a clear distinction is drawn between
the award of the Collector and that of the Authority. An award passed by
the Collector cannot be called a decree even though it accrues a right to the
claimant and the Collector is bound by it. Thus, an award passed by the
Authority becomes a decree, whereas the one passed by the Collector does
not. In other words, the proceedings before the Authority mark the
initiation of judicial proceedings for the very first time under the scheme
of the 2013 Act, making them original proceedings. This is also one of the
reasons why the Collector does not have discretion to invoke Section 5 of
the 1963 Act in entertaining a reference application beyond the one-year
period provided for in the proviso to Section 64(2).
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Section 74 of the 2013 Act
“74. Appeal to High Court.—(1) The Requiring Body or any person
aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file
an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period,
allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
(2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such
appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the
High Court.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means the
High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to
be acquired is situated.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. Section 74 of the 2013 Act provides for a statutory right to appeal against
the award passed by the Authority under Section 69. The existence of such
an appellate remedy reinforces that the proceedings before the Authority
are original in nature and the award passed by it is a judgment and a decree.
Further, Section 74 explicitly permits the requiring body or any person
aggrieved by the award of the Authority to approach the High Court. Thus,
one cannot presume that appeals under the said provision are only filed by
one set of parties.
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35. However, Section 74 provides a period of 60 days from the date of the
award for filing an appeal before the High Court. The computation of the
said 60 days would be from the date of the receipt of the said award by the
aggrieved person. The proviso to Section 74 allows for an appeal to be
filed within a further period of 60 days. It does not extend the period of
limitation provided for filing the appeal, but brings a delayed filing within
the ambit of Section 74(1). This being a mere proviso, cannot be
interpreted to mean otherwise. A proviso can only be understood in the
context of the main provision and not vice versa. On the issue of
interpretation of a proviso, the following decisions would be apposite:
The Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union and The
Metropolitan Life Assurance Society & Ors. 1897 AC 647 (House of
Lords)
“Now that being so, what is the meaning of the proviso? I have not been
able to satisfy my own mind that it can be read or ought to be read in the sense
suggested by Rigby L.J., which has met with the approval of my noble and
learned friend the Lord Chancellor; but I am perfectly clear that if the
language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions
which are said to occur in it, you cannot derive these provisions by
implication from a proviso…
Consequently, my Lords, so far from seeing any reason for departing from
the language of the Act if it were capable of one or other of the two
constructions, my inclination certainly would be to put upon it the construction
that would make it permissive, rather than the construction that would make it
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compulsory. But the truth is there is nothing to be found in the enacting part of
the provision, as I have said, which can reasonably have the effect contended
for: it is said to be found in the proviso. The argument is this: The proviso
shews that the Legislature contemplated that the loan could be paid off but for
the proviso against the will of the person who had lent the money, and has in
the proviso protected only those who had lent the money previous to the
passing of the Act. My Lords, I am not satisfied that the proviso has that
meaning and operation only. I am not going to repeat the reasons which have
been given for thinking that it may be a perfectly sensible proviso to guard
against the particular evil suggested; but I do not care to rest upon that, and I
desire not to rest upon it. If I thought the proviso as senseless as has been
suggested, supposing the construction I put upon the Act is adopted, I
should come to the same conclusion, and I think any other conclusion
would be in the highest degree dangerous. I decline to read into any
enactment words which are not to be found there, and which would alter
its operative effect because of provisions to be found in any proviso. Of
course a proviso may be used to guide you in the selection of one or other
of two possible constructions of the words to be found in the enactment,
and shew when there is doubt about its scope, when it may reasonably
admit of doubt as to its having this scope or that, which is the proper view
to take of it; but to find in it an enacting provision which enables
something to be done which is not to be found in the enactment itself on
any reasonable construction of it, simply because otherwise the proviso
would be meaningless and senseless, would, as I have said, be in the highest
degree dangerous. And for this reason: one knows perfectly well that it not
unfrequently happens that persons are unreasonably apprehensive as to the
effect of an enactment when there is really no question of its application to their
case; they nevertheless think that some Court may possibly hold that it will
apply to their case, and they suggest if it is not intended to be applicable no
harm would be done by inserting a proviso to protect them; and, accordingly, a
proviso is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular
person was apprehensive, although the enactment was never intended to apply
to his case, or to any other similar cases at all. If the construction contended for
were adopted the result would be this: Having put in a proviso which was
thought to be needless in order to satisfy certain persons, or a particular class
of persons, and allay their fears, you would have the enactment so construed
against the intention of the Legislature as to impose a liability upon a number
of people who were not so apprehensive, or perhaps were not present, and
therefore either did not think it necessary or were not in a position to protect
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 77 of 136
their own interests by a proviso. My Lords, I am satisfied that many instances
might be given where provisoes could be found in legislation that are
meaningless because they have been put in to allay fears when those fears were
absolutely unfounded, and when no proviso at all was necessary to protect the
persons at whose instance they were inserted…
LORD SHAND. My Lords, I am also of opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed, and I agree in all that has been said as to
what may be called the enacting part of this clause. Without going again into
the reasons for this opinion, I think it is clear that the first part — the enacting
part — of the clause merely provides for an authority or sanction being given,
as a protection to the ratepayers, against those who are managing the poor funds
for them. I can see nothing from beginning to end of that clause which I should
hold, if there were no proviso there, to confer a power to interfere with the
securities given, so as to compel the person who had lent the money to accept
the repayment of it at any time, notwithstanding the fact that the document
upon which he lent it provided for its being paid by instalments over a series
of years.
My Lords, when one comes to the proviso, I agree with your
Lordships that it cannot be held to control the substantive enactment. I
agree with what has been said by my noble and learned friend opposite (Lord
Herschell) on that subject. I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment
appealed from ought to be affirmed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Dwarka Prasad v Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128
“18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the following, among
other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes:
CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256,
266 : (1959) 36 ITR 1; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST, AIR 1955 SC 765
: (1955) 2 SCR 483, 493 : (1955) 6 STC 627 ; Thompson v. Dibdin (1912) AC
533, 541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR 49] ; Rex v. Dibdin 1910 Pro Div 57, 119,
125] and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Supp (2)
SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231 . The law is trite. A proviso must be limited
to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of
construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in
relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 78 of 136
or independent enactment. ‘Words are dependent on the principal
enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read
as divorced from their context’ (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If the
rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its
operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have
taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins
against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be
considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a
proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is
to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they
mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious
construction.
“The proper course is to apply the broad general Rule of
construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as
a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.
The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and
meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause,
and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail. (Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 162)”
(emphasis supplied)
36. There is not much difference between the main provision contained in
Section 74(1) and its proviso. Thus, Section 74 provides only one period
of limitation, meaning thereby that the other one mentioned under the
proviso gets subsumed within the period provided under Section 74(1).
Section 103 of the 2013 Act
“103. Provisions to be in addition to existing laws.—The provisions of this
Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time
being in force.”
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37. Section 103 actually throws more light on the peculiar structure of the
legislation. There is no difficulty in holding that the 2013 Act is a special
Act. It may also be called a complete code to an extent, especially when an
award passed by the Authority becomes a decree, and the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court is barred. However, Section 103 also facilitates adequate
borrowing from other enactments. In fact, the completeness of the 2013
Act comes from such borrowing. We have absolute clarity in our
understanding of Section 103, as it explicitly states that the provisions of
the 2013 Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law
in force. Thus, this provision is self-explanatory.
38. The language of the provision is both positive and negative as it states that
the provisions of the 2013 Act are in addition to the existing laws, while
further clarifying that it is not in derogation of the same. Once we
understand Section 103 as it is, it defines the nature of the entire enactment.
The following decisions of this Court clarify the meaning of the
expression, “in addition to and not in derogation of”:
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KSL and Industries Ltd v Arihant Threads Ltd & Ors - (2015) 1 SCC 166
“36 [Ed. : Para 36 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./61/2014 dated 25-11-2014.] . Sub-section (2) was added to Section
34 of the RDDB Act w.e.f. 17-1-2000 by Act 1 of 2000. There is no doubt
that when an Act provides, as here, that its provisions shall be in addition
to and not in derogation of another law or laws, it means that the
legislature intends that such an enactment shall coexist along with the
other Acts. It is clearly not the intention of the legislature, in such a case,
to annul or detract from the provisions of other laws. The term “in
derogation of” means “in abrogation or repeal of”. The Black's Law
Dictionary sets forth the following meaning for “derogation”:
“derogation.—The partial repeal or abrogation of a law by a later Act
that limits its scope or impairs its utility and force.”
It is clear that sub-section (1) contains a non obstante clause, which gives the
overriding effect to the RDDB Act. Sub-section (2) acts in the nature of an
exception to such an overriding effect. It states that this overriding effect is in
relation to certain laws and that the RDDB Act shall be in addition to and not
in abrogation of, such laws. SICA is undoubtedly one such law.
37. The effect of sub-section (2) must necessarily be to preserve the powers
of the authorities under SICA and save the proceedings from being overridden
by the later Act i.e. the RDDB Act.
38. We, thus, find a harmonious scheme in relation to the proceedings for
reconstruction of the company under SICA, which includes the reconstruction
of debts and even the sale or lease of the sick company's properties for the
purpose, which may or may not be a part of the security executed by the sick
company in favour of a bank or a financial institution on the one hand, and the
provisions of the RDDB Act, which deal with recovery of debts due to banks
or financial institutions, if necessary by enforcing the security charged with the
bank or financial institution, on the other.
xxx xxx xxx
49. The term “not in derogation” clearly expresses the intention of
Parliament not to detract from or abrogate the provisions of SICA in any way.
This, in effect must mean that Parliament intended the proceedings under SICA
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for reconstruction of a sick company to go on and for that purpose further
intended that all the other proceedings against the company and its properties
should be stayed pending the process of reconstruction. While the term
“proceedings” under Section 22 of SICA did not originally include the RDDB
Act, which was not there in existence. Section 22 covers proceedings under the
RDDB Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v Union of India &
Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 416
“25. It is significant to note that there is no provision similar to that of
Section 88 of RERA in the Code, which is meant to be a complete and
exhaustive statement of the law insofar as its subject-matter is concerned. Also,
the non obstante clause of RERA came into force on 1-5-2016, as opposed to
the non obstante clause of the Code which came into force on 1-12-2016.
Further, the amendment with which we are concerned has come into force only
on 6-6-2018. Given these circumstances, it is a little difficult to accede to
arguments made on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners,
that RERA is a special enactment which deals with real estate development
projects and must, therefore, be given precedence over the Code, which is only
a general enactment dealing with insolvency generally. From the introduction
of the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of the Code, it is clear that Parliament
was aware of RERA, and applied some of its definition provisions so that
they could apply when the Code is to be interpreted. The fact that RERA
is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for
the time being in force, also makes it clear that the remedies under RERA
to allottees were intended to be additional and not exclusive remedies.
Also, it is important to remember that as the authorities under RERA were to
be set up within one year from 1-5-2016, remedies before those authorities
would come into effect only on and from 1-5-2017 making it clear that the
provisions of the Code, which came into force on 1-12-2016, would apply in
addition to RERA.”
(emphasis supplied)
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Section 105 of the 2013 Act
“105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with
certain modifications.—(1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this
Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in
the Fourth Schedule.
(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106 the Central Government may,
by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth
Schedule.
(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from
the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this
Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First
Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third
Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of
land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall
apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the
compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or
rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the
case may be.
(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section
(3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session,
for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in
two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session
immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both
Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree
in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be
issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as
may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.”
Clause 22 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2013 Act
“22. Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition have been
enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in addition to and not in
derogation of these Acts. The provisions of this Act can be applied to these
existing enactments by a notification of the Central Government.”
(emphasis supplied)
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39. Section 105 of the 2013 Act makes the provisions of the Act inapplicable
to certain other enactments in the Fourth Schedule, subject to sub-section
(3) which states that by way of a notification, the Central Government can
direct certain provisions of the said Act to apply to such enactments. This
is in consonance with Clause 22 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the 2013 Act which clearly indicates that the provisions of the 2013 Act
are in addition to and not in derogation of certain Central Acts dealing with
land acquisition. Though the said provision specifically deals with the
enactments relating to land acquisition, one can understand the scheme of
the said Act through this provision, as no specific embargo with respect to
the application of other Acts has been provided under the 2013 Act.
Therefore, this provision, when read with Section 103, would only reiterate
our view expressed earlier.
Section 114 of the 2013 Act
“114. Repeal and saving.—(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of
1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1)
shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of
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the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of
repeals.”
40. Under Section 114, the repeal of the 1894 Act is made subject to the
application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Though this
provision is not of much relevance, it does help us to understand the reason
behind the inclusion of Section 24(1)(a) in the 2013 Act.
41. To sum up:-
From the above analysis, we hold that the 2013 Act is a special law and a
complete code to a large extent, but does not bar any assistance from the
other enactments to give effect to its avowed object. After all, we must not
lose sight of the fact that the right to get fair compensation is enshrined
under Article 300A of the Constitution and when the statute itself provides
so, it must be given effect to by the Court, notwithstanding any other
possible technical interpretation. In other words, the provisions of the 2013
Act are meant to give effect to its object and, therefore, any contra
interpretation would result in its destruction, and must be avoided by the
Court.
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THE LAW OF LIMITATION
42. Conceptually, the modern law of limitation did not exist in ancient India
in a codified or structured form. Instead, only the law of prescription was
applied primarily to matters relating to land, as the society was largely
agrarian in nature. Over the years, the need for a more systematic approach
to limitation became apparent. The Indian legal system, as it exists today,
is largely based on the English legal system, which itself drew heavily from
Roman law. Consequently, the modern law of limitation in India is the
result of historical development and the assimilation of English and Roman
legal principles.
43. A comprehensive statute of limitation was introduced in the Roman
Empire by Emperor Theodosius, way back in 424 AD, prescribing a
uniform time limit for actions. Such actions were classified into two broad
categories, namely actiones perpetuae, which could be brought at any
time, and actiones temporales, which were subject to fixed time limits. In
other words, for the first category, the period of limitation was, in fact, put
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on hold till such action was taken, while for the other, it was so fixed,
extinguishing any such right thereafter.
44. In England, during the reign of Henry VIII, fixed periods of limitation were
introduced, operating as a bar against initiating real actions thereafter. This
principle was extended to personal actions through the James Statute and
was further developed with greater rigour after 1834.
45. In British India, Provincial Courts were governed by Regulations on the
law of limitation. For the first time, the Limitation Act of 1845 was
introduced, by which the then existing Regulations were replaced. After
another attempt in the year 1848, the Limitation Act of 1859, for the first
time, brought in a uniform law of limitation applicable to both Chartered
and non-Chartered Courts.
46. The Limitation Act of 1859 was repealed by the enactment of the
Limitation Act of 1871. The concept of ‘sufficient cause’ saw its genesis
therein. Under Section 5(b), courts were empowered to admit appeals after
the period of limitation upon satisfaction of a sufficient cause. Section 6
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excluded the application of the Limitation Act, 1871 if any other law
prescribed a different period of limitation.
“Limitation Act, 1871
[Act 9 of 1871] [ 24th March, 1871]
Repealed by Act 15 of 1877
PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.
(Received the assent of the Governor General on the 24th of March 1871.)
An Act for the Limitation of Suits and for other Purposes.
PREAMBLE
Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the
limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts; And whereas it
is also expedient to provide rules for acquiring ownership by possession; It is
hereby enacted as follows:—
4. Dismissal of suits &c. instituted, &c., after period of limitation.—
Subject to the provisions contained in sections five to twenty-six (inclusive),
every suit instituted, appeal presented, and application made after the period of
limitation prescribed therefor by the second schedule hereto annexed, shall he
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
Explanation.—A suit is instituted in ordinary cases when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer: in the case of a pauper, when his application
for leave to sue as a pauper is filed; and in the case of a claim against a company
which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first sends in his
claim to the official liquidator.
Illustrations.
(a).—A suit is instituted after the prescribed period of limitation. Limitation
is not set up as a defence and judgment is given for the plaintiff. The
defendant appeals. The appellate court must dismiss the suit.
(b).—An appeal presented after the prescribed period is admitted and
registered. The appeal shall, nevertheless, be dismissed.
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5. a. Proviso where court is closed when period expires.— If the period,
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day
when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted,
presented or made on the day that the Court re-opens:
b.Proviso as to appeals and applications for review.— Any appeal or
application for a review of judgment may be admitted after the period of
limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the
Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making the
application within such period.
6. Different periods of limitation prescribed by local laws.— When,
by any law not mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed and now or hereafter
to be in force in any part of British India, a period of limitation differing from
that prescribed by this Act is specially, prescribed for any suits, appeals or
applications, nothing herein contained shall affect such law.
Appeals from decree of High Court on original side.— And nothing
herein contained shall affect the periods of limitation prescribed for appeals
from, or applications to review, any decree, order or judgment of a High Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.”
47. The Limitation Act of 1871 was repealed by the enactment of the
Limitation Act of 1877. While Section 5 of the erstwhile Act, referred
supra, was incorporated without any modification, Section 6 barred the
application of the Limitation Act, 1877 to a special law when a period of
limitation is specifically prescribed by such special law.
“5. Proviso where Court is closed when period expires.—If the period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application expires on a day
when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted,
presented, or made on the day that the Court re-opens:
Proviso as to appeals and applications for review. —Any appeal or
application for a review of judgment may be admitted after the period of
limitation prescribed therefore, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the
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Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making
the application within such period.
6. Special and local laws of limitation.—When, by any special or local
law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is
specifically prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein
contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed.”
The Limitation Act, 1908
48. Notably, the provision under Section 6 of the earlier legislations no longer
retained its original form and was consciously changed by the Legislature.
For the first time, the expression ‘expressly excluded’ was introduced
under Section 29 in respect of the application of the Limitation Act, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as the “1908 Act”) to special or local laws. Section
29 makes it clear that unless an express exclusion is made in the special or
local law, Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 of the 1908 Act would apply to the
same. On the contrary, the Limitation Act of 1871 and the Limitation Act
of 1877 simply excluded the application of the said Acts if a period of
limitation was provided under the special or local law.
PART V
Savings And Repeals
“29. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
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(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed
therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if
such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law—
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section
22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Indian Divorce Act (4
of 1869).
(4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of “easement” in section 2 shall
not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882
(5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.”
(emphasis supplied)
3
rd
Report of the Law Commission of India
49. The Law Commission of India took up the task of revising the Limitation
Act of 1908, and the recommendations made by it in its 3
rd
Report of 1956
which led to the enactment of the 1963 Act. The Committee entrusted with
the said task comprised men of erudition and eminence such as M. C.
Setalvad, (Chairman), K. Srinivasan, Durga Das Basu, M. C. Chagla, K.
N. Wanchoо, G. N. Das, P. Satyanarayana Rao, N. C. Sen Guptа, V. K. T.
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Chari, D. Narsa Raju, G. S. Pathak, and G. N. Joshi. The following are the
relevant excerpts from the Report:
“3rd Report of the Law Commission of India on Limitation Act, 1908
[M. C. SETALVAD, (Chairman), K. SRINIVASAN, DURGA DAS BASU,
M. C. CHAGLA, K. N. WANCHOО, G. N. DAS, P. SATYANARAYANA
RAO, N. C. SEN GUPTА, V. K. T. CHARI, D. NARSA RAJU, G. S.
PATHAK, G. N. JOSHI]
PART I - PRELIMINARY
Chapter I - Introduction:
The utility of a statute of limitation has never been a matter of serious doubt or
dispute. It has been said that the statute of limitation is a statute of repose, peace
and justice. It is one of repose because it extinguishes stale demands and quiets
title; in the words of John Voet, controversies are restricted to a fixed period of
time lest they should become immortal while men are mortal. It secures peace
as it ensures security of rights; and it secures justice, as by lapse of time
evidence in support of rights may have been destroyed. There can thus be no
doubt that it rests on sound policy. The operation of the law of prescription has
been explained by Lord Plunket in a striking metaphor. He stated that Time
holds in one hand a scythe and in the other, an hour-glass. The scythe mows
down the evidence of our rights, while the hour-glass measures the period
which renders that evidence superfluous. Commenting on this, a learned author
observes that the metaphor could have been completed by adding, so far as
India is concerned, that the frame-work of the hour-glass would certainly
decay, the glass be broken, and the sand escape.
xxx xxx xxx
9. We recommend that a new definition of the word "application" so as to
include any petition, original or otherwise, should be added. The object is to
provide a period of limitation for original petitions and applications under
special laws as there is no such provision now. Consequential alterations in the
definition of the word 'applicant' should also be made.
xxx xxx xxx
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22. The expression "period prescribed" occurring in Section 4 has been
construed differently by different courts. Some courts take the view that
it means only the periods of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the
Act and does not attract the extensions of the periods of limitation under
the Sections, which is obviously not correct. As. the expression occurs in
other sections also, it would be better if a new definition clause for "period
prescribed" is inserted to the effect that it means the period of limitation
computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We recommend
accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5.
26. We are of opinion that instead of leaving it to the different States or the
High Courts to extend the application of section 5 to applications other than
those enumerated in the section, a uniform rule should be adopted applying it
to all applications except those arising under order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to execution. In the case of special or local laws, it would
be open to such laws to provide that section 5 will not be applicable.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 29
58. Section 29(1) provides that Section 25 of the Contract Act which permits
a barred debt to be regarded as valid consideration for a contract, is not affected
by the Limitation Act. This may be retained.
59. The combined operation of sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section 2
is that so far as special and local laws are concerned, only sections 4, 9 to
18 and 22 of the Act apply and that too subject to such modifications as
may be prescribed. We consider that there is no need for this restriction
and that the principles contained in sections 4 to 25 should be made
applicable to all special and local laws, leaving it open to the legislature to
exclude the application of any or all of these sections, in any given case.”
(emphasis supplied)
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50. The Report succinctly highlighted the need for a comprehensive change to
the 1908 Act. The ambiguity surrounding the expression ‘period
prescribed’ was clarified by providing a new definition for the same.
Furthermore, while dealing with Section 29, the Committee was of the
opinion that the restriction contained under the 1908 Act was no longer
required. Thus, it recommended that Sections 4 to 24 should be made
applicable to all special and local laws while keeping the window open for
the Legislature to exclude their application in a given case. Accordingly,
the 1963 Act came to be enacted.
51. With the above-stated understanding of the history of the law of limitation,
we shall now venture into the relevant provisions of the 1963 Act.
The Limitation Act, 1963
52. The 1963 Act is an endeavour to consolidate various laws on limitation. It
is meant to create a uniform framework for the exercise of certain rights.
If the period of limitation expires, so does the right. Therefore, specific
periods of limitation have been provided under the Schedule for different
categories of actions, namely— suits, appeals and applications.
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Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(j) “period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period”
means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions
of this Act;”
(emphasis supplied)
53. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines ‘period of limitation’ and ‘prescribed
period’. It clarifies that the period of limitation means the period as
mentioned in the Schedule qua filing of any suit, appeal or application. For
example, a period of three years has been fixed for suits relating to
accounts, contract, declaration, decrees and instruments. This period
cannot be altered. On the other hand, prescribed period would mean the
period of limitation as computed in accordance with the provisions of the
1963 Act. Therefore, in effect, there is not much of a difference between
the period of limitation and prescribed period. Rather, prescribed period is
the period of limitation after computation. Courts are not expected to deal
with the period of limitation qua a suit, but shall certainly go into the
manner in which the same is computed with due assistance from the other
provisions. However, the situation is different while applying the period of
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limitation to an appeal or an application which may be filed during the
pendency of a suit or an appeal. With the aforesaid understanding, we shall
consider the other provisions.
Section 5 of the 1963 Act
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or
any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of
Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be
admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
or making the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by
any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing
the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this
section.”
(emphasis supplied)
54. Before analysing Section 5 of the 1963 Act, we would like to take note of
the 89
th
Report of the Law Commission of India.
89
th
Report of the Law Commission of India
55. In 1983, the Law Commission of India took up a suo motu revision of the
1963 Act. Section 5 of the said Act has been discussed elaborately in
Chapter 5 of its Report. A clear view has been expressed that Section 5
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does not apply to the initiation of a suit. Relevant excerpts are extracted
hereunder.
“CHAPTER 5
SECTION 5: EXTENSION OF THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD FOR
SUFFICIENT CAUSE
5.1. Section 5 empowers the court, for “sufficient cause”, to entertain an
appeal or application (except an application for execution) filed after expiry of
the prescribed period. A number of points require to be considered with
reference to this section. The section does not apply to suits.
I. Suits
5.2. Section 5, as stated above, does not apply to suits. We have
considered the question whether the section should be amended so as to
include within its ambit suits filed after the prescribed period. Delving into
the old records relating to the drafting of the Indian Limitation Bill, 1908,
we discovered that this question was considered at that distance of time
also. When the draft of the Indian Limitation Bill 1908 was circulated for
comments, Dr. Hari Singh Gaur commented as under:
“I am not sure if a suit may not be also included in the clause; if the
intending plaintiff is wrongfully confined by the defendant, why he
should lose his suit? Section 18 ‘fraud’ does not cover such a case.”
However, the Divisional Judge, Nagpur, was apprehensive that if the
ambit of the clause was enlarged, it would lead to unsavoury practices;
false grounds were often invented when the litigant found that he was out
of time. In most cases they were, accordingly to him, based on purely
personal incidents or conditions which his adversary was not expected to
refute.
5.3. Though there is some merit in Dr. Hari Singh Gour’s suggestion,
we think that enlarging the scope of section 5 to cover suits would do more
harm than good to the administration of justice. The rapport between the
lawyer and his rural client is generally so well established that a visit to
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the family lawyer on the weekly market day is always on the agenda of a
villager. Such being the style of functioning of village folks, it is
improbable that the munshi to the lawyer would allow his client’s case to
go by default by asking him to wait till the last day of limitation. If, as
contemplated by Dr. Hari Singh Gour, a plaintiff may be prevented from
reaching his lawyers on the last day of limitation by scheming defendants,
he could as well as prevented by other causes like breakdown of the bus
service, floods, illness, etc the authorship of which cannot be imputed to
the defendants.
In view of the above, we do not recommend extention of the principle of
section 5 to suits.”
(emphasis supplied)
56. The Report makes it clear that Section 5 of the 1963 Act does not apply to
a suit. Rather, it applies only to an appeal or an application. Section 5 of
the 1963 Act must be construed with respect to an appeal or an application
during its pendency or an application pending the suit, or any other
petition. In other words, it does not apply to original proceedings. This
view is fortified by the very heading of the provision itself, which provides
for the extension of the prescribed period in “certain cases”.
57. The provision gives adequate discretion to the Court to condone the delay
while facilitating and aiding justice to the parties. It provides only for an
extension of the prescribed period. Therefore, the prescribed period which
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is the period of limitation arrived at after computation, can be extended by
the Court on satisfaction of sufficient cause.
Computation of Period of Limitation
58. Part III of the 1963 Act speaks of the computation of the period of
limitation. An extension under Section 5 is distinct and different from
exclusion as provided under this Part. For computation of the period of
limitation, what is relevant is only the exclusion of certain time periods as
provided under Sections 12 to 24. Therefore, once the Court is satisfied
that a case is made out for exclusion of time, the resultant period becomes
the period of limitation. However, this is not so in the case of the
application of Section 5. In other words, the application of Section 5 results
in the extension of the period of limitation and cannot bring the delay
within the fold of the period of limitation, whereas the application of Part
III results in exclusion, which brings the same within the fold of the period
of limitation. Therefore, Section 5, on the one hand and Sections 12 to 24,
on the other, operate in different fields.
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Section 29 of the 1963 Act
“29. Savings.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by
the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with
respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or
other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in Section 2 shall
not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act,
1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.”
(emphasis supplied)
59. Much has been said and argued on this provision. This provision throws
light on the interplay between the 1963 Act and special or local laws. It
comes into play when the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or
local law. This provision applies to a suit, an appeal, or an application. The
first part of this provision speaks of the application of Section 3 over which
there is no quibble. It gives due recognition to the period of limitation
provided under the special or local law and imports it into the Schedule. In
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fact, it provides for an automatic change in the Schedule by the invocation
of Section 3. However, for determination of the period of limitation,
Sections 4 to 24, pertaining to extension and exclusion, shall apply. Thus,
Section 29(2) is the provision that triggers the activation of Sections 4 to
24. This applies ordinarily to every special or local law, unless such law
contains an express exclusion of the 1963 Act. To put it differently, the
intention to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear,
apparent and manifest. Therefore, the language of Section 29(2), indicates
the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to
24 to all special or local laws. A specific exclusion alone would take away
its application. The application of Sections 4 to 24 can be excluded by such
laws either individually or in totality. The provisions pertaining to the
exclusion of time can also be applied at different stages. Suffice it is to
state that Sections 4 to 24 will not apply only when their exclusion is
expressly provided by such special or local law. In other words, there is a
debarment of the exercise of any implied exclusion as a matter of rule.
However, it can be done by the Court only in exceptional situations and
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that too, when the person claiming so discharges the burden of proving the
same through the scheme of the legislation. Mere incorporation of a
specific period of limitation under the special or local law does not amount
to express exclusion of the 1963 Act. Rather, it must indicate that Sections
4 to 24 of the 1963 Act are excluded. As a matter of rule, the said words
must be present in the special or local law. Otherwise, it would amount to
nullifying Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.
60. When the Legislature has consciously incorporated Section 29(2) in the
1963 Act, its application cannot be ousted in an indirect manner. Applying
this provision only for the purpose of extension while ignoring exclusion
cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Also, one part of this provision alone
cannot be followed while failing to adhere to the other part. When one can
say that, the first part of this provision, which imports the period of
limitation of the special or local law into the Schedule, can be accepted,
the other carved part cannot be ignored. Hence, a piecemeal application of
this provision shall not be permitted.
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61. Section 29(2) is not limited to the current laws but also covers laws that
may be enacted in the future while they are in force and therefore must be
interpreted harmoniously with other provisions rather than in isolation.
When two enactments are to be interpreted, a court must construe them
together, ensuring that both can co-exist and be given effect. Both must
operate as a helping hand to each other and therefore, an approach that may
lead to a conflict must be avoided. Reading a special or local law by
ignoring Section 29(2) would be contrary to the object of the 1963 Act,
making it seem as though the said provision does not exist in the statute.
62. To sum up:-
From the aforesaid analysis of the provision, we hold that the compliance
of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising
only by way of an express exclusion. Therefore, in the absence of the same,
Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law.
This, we say so, notwithstanding the principle governing harmonious
construction as Section 29(2) is a very unique provision which seeks to be
taken note of in the interpretation of other statutes.
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA
63. The Learned Attorney General for India submitted that Section 29(2) of
the 1963 Act requires that necessary attention be given by the Legislature
while legislating with respect to periods of limitation in special
legislations. Sections 4 to 24 cannot be ordinarily excluded. Such
exclusion must be express, indicating that the Parliament really intended
to exclude the provisions of the 1963 Act, after due deliberation. He further
submitted that in many special or local legislations, there is a primary
limitation period and a secondary limitation period, with the latter being
set out in a proviso. Such proviso must guardingly say that Section 5 is
expressly excluded in order to curtail its application. When a law has
serious economic and financial implications affecting public interest at
large, the rigor of a provision with a limited period to seek relief may
warrant a relaxation.
64. He further submits that on a proper reading of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013
Act and in consonance with the view taken in the case of Deepak Agarwal
(supra), Section 74 is not applicable to the present batch of matters, as
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except for provisions relating to the determination of compensation, no
other part of the 2013 Act applies. Thus, matters will have to be relegated
under the 1894 Act.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS
65. For the sake of brevity, we shall summarise the submissions advanced by
the learned Senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, rather than dealing with them separately.
66. On the incidental issue, it is submitted that only the provisions relating to
determination of compensation would apply to cases where acquisition
proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act, but the award was passed
after the commencement of the 2013 Act, and not the provisions relating
to rehabilitation and resettlement. This was the intention of the Legislature,
as is evident from the fact that the Rajya Sabha consciously removed the
words ‘rehabilitation and resettlement’ from one of the initial drafts which
had used the words ‘determination of compensation, rehabilitation and
resettlement’.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 105 of 136
67. On the main issue, it is contended that Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not
contain any express exclusion of the application of the provisions of the
1963 Act. In particular, it does not exclude the applicability of Section 5
thereof. A mere prescription of a period of limitation, howsoever
peremptory or imperative the language may be, is not sufficient to displace
the applicability of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
68. Much has been argued on Section 103 of the 2013 Act. It is submitted that
Section 103 indicates that the 2013 Act is not a complete Code in itself
and, in fact, facilitates borrowing from the 1963 Act. The decisions relied
upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the interplay
of Section 29(2) with Section 5 of the 1963 Act, on the one hand, and
provisions of special enactments with specified periods of limitation, on
the other, pertain to entirely different subjects. Furthermore, a pari materia
provision contained in one statute cannot automatically be read into
another. Except for the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, there is no statute
containing a pari materia provision to Section 103 of the 2013 Act. Even
in the decision of this Court in New India Assurance v. Hilli Multi
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Purpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, (2020) 5 SCC 757 which dealt with the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, though a pari materia provision to
Section 103 of the 2013 Act exists, this Court has not specifically
examined its interplay with Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act. Thus, the
decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents must be
examined in their proper context. The object of the 2013 Act must be
accorded primacy and being a beneficial legislation, must be interpreted
liberally. Where two interpretations are possible, the one that advances the
legislative intent must be preferred. Moreover, Section 74 of the 2013 Act
must not be construed only from the standpoint of the State or the
beneficiary, but also from the standpoint of the landowners as well.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
69. The learned Senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents submitted that the contention of the appellants that an appeal
against an award passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act would
be governed by the 1894 Act and not the 2013 Act as the land acquisition
proceedings in the present batch of matters have been initiated under the
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1894 Act, is negated by the view expressed in the cases of Indore
Development Authority (supra) and Deepak Agarwal (supra), which
have clarified that in the event the award is passed after the commencement
of the 2013 Act, then there would be continuity of the acquisition
proceedings under the 2013 Act.
70. It is further submitted that the 2013 Act is a comprehensive and self-
contained Code. Time is of the essence and forms the schematic basis of
this legislation, which aims to give quick and speedy relief to the
concerned parties. Strict timelines have been provided for every stage of
the land acquisition process, including appeals. The separate and distinct
adjudicatory mechanism, the bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, and
the absence of an appeal to the Supreme Court in consonance with the
provisions of the CPC, satisfy the test for a self-contained Code laid down
under Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1. The
2013 Act being a self-contained Code, Section 5 of the 1963 Act certainly
stands excluded qua Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
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71. Furthermore, Section 74 of the 2013 Act satisfies the two necessary
conditions to attract Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act. Firstly, the 2013 Act is
a special law, and secondly, Section 74 prescribes a period of limitation
different from the Schedule of the 1963 Act. Thus, the unfettered power to
condone delay, subject to the demonstration of sufficient cause, available
under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, is consciously and deliberately excluded.
This Court, while considering pari materia provisions in other enactments,
has given a purposive interpretation to the expression, ‘expressly
excluded’, occurring in Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, and held that the
express exclusion can be inferred either from the explicit language of the
special law or can be necessarily implied from the scheme and object of
the special law. There is no question of distinguishing the said decisions
on the basis of the objectives behind and the nature of relief available under
the enactments dealt with therein, as what is relevant is the interpretation
given by the Court. Thus, the High Courts have rightly held in the
impugned judgments that on a conjoint reading of Section 74 of the 2013
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Act with Sections 5 and 29(2) of the 1963 Act, Section 5 of the 1963 Act
is excluded by implication.
72. Even assuming that the appellant could seek refuge under Section 5 of the
1963 Act, the law does not permit a different yardstick to be applied for
government instrumentalities and, thus, delay due to interdepartmental
correspondence is an insufficient cause for condonation of delay. The
extent of impact is also irrelevant, as one has to see the law as available
under the statute.
73. Finally, it is submitted that the award passed by the Authority under
Section 69 of the 2013 Act is in accordance with law and no additional or
excess compensation has been awarded. Accordingly, the impugned
judgments require no interference.
DISCUSSION
74. We have dealt with the provisions contained in both the enactments in
extenso already. We have also dealt with the principles of law. Upon such
analysis, we reiterate that the 2013 Act is a unique piece of legislation. The
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Collector is given two different and distinct roles up to a certain stage of
the acquisition process. The first role is to facilitate the acquisition on
behalf of the Government, and the other is with respect to the
determination of the compensation. For both these roles, there is no
question of application of any provisions of the 1963 Act, as the Collector
either acts as a statutory authority on the executive side or as a quasi-
judicial authority while determining the compensation or as an authority
dealing with rights having civil consequences while making a reference.
In all these three acts, there is no role that is exclusively judicial. As we
have already discussed, only when the issue of compensation is decided by
the Authority, who is a legally trained person entitled to exercise the
powers of a Civil Court, followed by the declaration of an award deemed
to be a decree, does an out-and-out judicial forum enter the picture. The
proceedings before him are original in nature, with two parties appearing
before him, of which even the Collector is a party, since it is his award that
is under challenge. There is a reason why the Authority is expected to
exercise an element of fair play by following the principles of natural
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justice which would otherwise inhere in a party before it. It is only the
Court that is given the inherent power of formulating its own procedure
when it is not provided under the statute. Thus, the reference made by the
Collector to the Authority, which is akin to the institution of a suit before
a Civil Court, does not attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
However, an application filed during the pendency of the reference, being
akin to an application filed during the pendency of a suit, would attract the
application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. For example, when a party to a
reference dies, and an application for bringing the legal representatives on
record is filed belatedly, Section 5 of the 1963 Act would have to be
pressed into service. Such a situation might also arise in appellate
proceedings. To that extent, there is no bar.
75. Section 74 of the 2013 Act provides for a first appeal, both, on facts and
on law. This appellate proceeding before the High Court is nothing but a
continuation of the original proceedings before the Authority. As already
discussed earlier, Section 74 provides a period of 60 days for filing an
appeal before the High Court, with an additional period of 60 days as per
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the proviso. The proviso does not extend the period of limitation, but
merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of the main provision.
Being a mere proviso, it cannot be interpreted to mean an extension of the
period of limitation.
76. Thus, Section 74, along with its proviso, deals with only one period of
limitation, which is 60 days. The proviso merely facilitates an appellant to
file the appeal within a further period of 60 days which, in effect, brings
the same within the fold of the initial 60 days. This provision, as a whole,
does not involve an exercise of the power conferred to the Court under
Section 5 of the 1963 Act. However, we must note that the 2013 Act does
not take away from its purview the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the
1963 Act. We do not find any express exclusion contained in Section 74
of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious
that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of
Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview.
77. As Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections
4 to 24 of the 1963 Act, a limited interpretation of Section 5 of the 1963
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Act alone cannot be given. What applies to exclusion shall apply to
extension as well. In our considered view, the High Court, while exercising
the power under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, is certainly entitled to draw
its power from the sources available under the 1963 Act. We cannot
introduce words that are not available in Section 74 through an imaginary
interpretation in holding the existence of an express exclusion. It is a
conscious decision made by the Legislature, and its knowledge must be
inferred and implied. Thus, we are inclined to hold that there is not much
difference between the main provision contained in Section 74(1) and its
proviso. There is only one period mentioned for filing the appeal, meaning
thereby that the other one mentioned under the proviso gets subsumed
within the period provided under Section 74(1).
78. Furthermore, the intention of Section 103 of the 2013 Act is also to be
seen, which clarifies that it is in addition to and not in derogation of the
existing laws. It facilitates adequate borrowing from other enactments. In
fact, the completeness of the 2013 Act comes from such borrowing,
including from the 1963 Act. Any interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013
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Act, barring the application of other enactments which would include the
1963 Act, would make Section 103 of the 2013 Act redundant and otiose.
When the Legislature introduces a provision, there can be no interpretation
in ignorance of it. Such an ignorant interpretation would also be dangerous,
as it would amount to striking down the very provision itself even without
a challenge.
79. Thus, we hold that the 1963 Act applies to the 2013 Act. Any interpretation
to the contrary would result in a situation as if both Section 29(2) of the
1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act have vanished from the
respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible in law. We must also
remain conscious that any interpretation having the impact of destroying a
right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should be eschewed unless it
appears so on the very face of it. Even when two interpretations are
possible, the one that facilitates the filing of an appeal must be approved.
80. Having understood Section 74 of the 2013 Act, we are inclined to hold that
the issue being determination of just, fair and adequate compensation by
the First Appellate Court having the trappings of the original one and
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keeping in mind the object and the intent of the enactment which Courts
are duty-bound to give effect to rather than indulging in its destruction, a
liberal approach has to be adopted, both, when dealing with a case coming
under the proviso or on an application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.
81. Thus, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgments
rendered by the High Courts which have held that Section 5 of the 1963
Act has no application to Section 74 of the 2013 Act, particularly in view
of the fact that the period of limitation provided under Section 74 must be
read into the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3 of the 1963 Act.
82. We may note that, except in a few cases before us, the delay in filing the
first appeals is not substantial. We do not wish to remit the matters to the
High Courts for deciding the applications for condonation of delay, as such
an exercise might further prolong the litigation. Therefore, in the interest
of justice, all the applications seeking condonation of delay are to be
allowed, particularly when the High Courts have not substantially gone
into the merits of the appeals and in light of the law governing limitation.
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Hence, we are inclined to allow these appeals by condoning the delay in
filing the respective appeals before the High Courts.
83. Accordingly, the impugned judgments are set aside, and the applications
for condonation of delay in filing the first appeals under Section 74 of the
2013 Act are allowed. The High Courts are expected to adjudicate on
merits, except to the extent of observations made pertaining to the
incidental issue.
84. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to flag certain concerns as to how
collusion takes place with the active connivance of the officials. The very
appeals before us, approximately 530 in number, are classic examples of
such official connivance. As a matter of fact, we find that in most of these
cases, even copy applications had not been filed within the time prescribed,
pursuant to the judgments delivered by the Reference Court. Even after
this judgment was reserved, numerous matters similar to the present ones
have come and continue to come before us, from across the country. This
clearly indicates the lackadaisical approach in filing appeals before the
High Courts under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and the pan-India impact of
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the same. Incidentally, we also find a delay in the filing of most of the
present appeals reiterating the callousness and casual approach of the
acquiring bodies. We are also conscious of the fact that an alleged
collusion might involve different persons, including the office of the
acquiring body and that of their counsel. The delay also exhibits a clear
lack of coordination between the two offices.
85. Accountability is an important facet in a constitutional democracy
governed by the rule of law. When an instrumentality of the State and its
officials act with such connivance and collusion, it not only undermines
the administration of justice but also erodes public confidence in the legal
system. The repeated failure to pursue remedies within time cannot be
brushed aside as mere negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the
erring officials. Even assuming that all the cases may not involve an act of
collusion, there is certainly abject carelessness and indifference, especially
when disputes involve substantial amounts of money. In most of these
cases, it has not been brought to our notice whether any action has been
initiated and, thereafter, taken against the officers concerned. Certainly,
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the malice must be addressed by creating a better management and
monitoring system. Accordingly, the appellant(s) are directed to undertake
appropriate measures to avoid any delay in the filing of appeals before the
High Court or Special Leave Petitions before this Court in the future.
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531
“35. We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following
reasons in support of its order:
xxx xxx xxx
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate
unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first
respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on
part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record
before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to
suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt
inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not
border on callousness.
xxx xxx xxx
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel
that the High Court's decision [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine
Del 5511] to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to
present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer
from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have
shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and
justice-oriented approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be
provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an
appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of
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limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality
and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains,
can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme
of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view
on balancing of the competing interests.”
(emphasis supplied)
JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES
86. Numerous judgments have been relied upon by the Bar. While we are
conscious of the fact that most of these judgments deal with different
enactments, though containing pari materia provisions as the one under
Section 74 of the 2013 Act, with little modification, we would like to
discuss the same. Some of the heavily relied upon judgments, along with
the provisions that the Court was concerned with therein, are listed in the
table below.
Sl. Judgment Provision
1. Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh
1963 SCCOnline SC 41
Section 417 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898
2. Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand
Baghel 1963 SCC OnLine SC 122
Section 116-A of The Representation
of People Act, 1951
3. Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs Lalit
Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133
Section 81, 82 and 86 of The
Representation of People Act, 1951
4. Mangu Ram v. Municipal
Corporation Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC
392
Section 417 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023 & Connected matters Page 120 of 136
5. Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat
Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995)
5 SCC 5
Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Control
Act, 1965
6. Union of India v. Popular
Construction Company 2001 (8)
SCC 470
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996
7. Commissioner of Customs,
Central Excise, Noida v. Punjab
Fibres Ltd Noida (2008) 3 SCC 73
Section 35-H of the Central Excise
Act, 1944
8. Consolidated Engineering
Enterprises v. Principal Secretary
Irrigation Department (2008) 7
SCC 169
Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996
9. Chhattisgarh State Electricity
Board v. Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission and Ors
(2010) 5 SCC 23
Section 125 of the Electricity Act,
2003
10. Ketan V. Parekh v. Special
Director, Directorate of
Enforcement (2011) 15 SCC 30
Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999
11. Bengal Chemists & Druggists
Association v. Kalyan Choudhary
(2018) 3 SCC 41
Section 421 of the Companies Act,
2013
12. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Hilli Multi Purpose Cold Storage
Pvt. Ltd, (2020) 5 SCC 757
Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986
13. Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak
Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021)
10 SCC 401
Section 61 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016
14. National Spot Exchange Ltd. v.
Dunar Foods Ltd. (Resolution
Professional), (2022) 11 SCC 761
Section 61 of the I&B Code, 2016
15. Mohd. Abaad Ali & Anr. vs.
Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence, (2024) 7
SCC 91
Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973
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87. At the outset, we have no hesitation in holding that any pari materia
provision contained in any other legislation, similar to the one under the
2013 Act, may not have the same meaning and, therefore, a word of caution
is required for the Court while dealing with the interpretation of such
provisions. The reason is rather simple. Such an approach might destroy
the very object enshrined under the 2013 Act, being a welfare legislation.
In other words, interpretation of a word or a provision must be made
contextually with respect to each statute and, therefore, importing any
understanding to a different statute would be fraught with dangerous
consequences. Our view is fortified by the following decisions:
D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 : (1952) 2 SCC 619
“(12) These remarks are necessary for a proper understanding of the meaning
of the terms employed by the statute. It is no doubt true that the meaning should
be ascertained only from the words employed in the definitions, but the set-up
and context are also relevant for ascertaining what exactly was meant to be
conveyed by the terminology employed. As observed by Lord Atkinson in -
‘Keates v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd.’ [(1911) A. C. 641]:
(AC p. 642) In the construction of a statute it is, of course, at all times and
under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things
existing at the time the statute was passed, and to the evils which, as
appears from its provisions, it was designed to remedy.” If the words are
capable of one meaning alone, then it must be adopted, but if they are
susceptible of wider import, we have to pay regard to what the statute or
the particular piece of legislation had in view. Though the definition may
be more or less the same in two different statutes, still the objects to be
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achieved not only as set out in the preamble but also as gatherable from
the antecedent history of the legislation may be widely different. The same
words may mean one thing in one context and another in a different
context. This is the reason why decisions on the meaning of particular
words or collection of words found in other statutes are scarcely of much
value when we have to deal with a specific statute of our own; they may be
helpful, but cannot be taken as guides or precedents.”
(emphasis supplied)
M/s MSCO. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 51
“4. The expression ‘industry’ has many meanings. It means ‘skill’,
‘ingenuity’, ‘dexterity’, ‘diligence’, ‘systematic work or labour’, ‘habitual
employment in the productive arts’, ‘manufacturing establishment’ etc. But
while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory
instrument in the absence of any definition in that very document it must
be given the same meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or
understood in the sense in which people conversant with the subject-
matter of the statute or statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous
to interpret a word in accordance with its definition in another statute or
statutory instrument and more so when such statute or statutory
instrument is not dealing with any cognate subject. Craies on Statute Law,
Sixth Edn.) says thus at page 164 :
“In construing a word in an Act caution is necessary in adopting the
meaning ascribed to the word in other Acts. “It would be a new terror
in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a
word to an unnatural sense because in some Act which is not
incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the
purposes of that Act alone.” (Macbeth & Co. v. Chislett [1910 AC 220,
223 : 79 LJKB 376 : 102 LT 82 (HL)] )”
(emphasis supplied)
State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360
“30. The counsel for the respondent has contended that the term
“university” needs to be read in accordance with Sections 2(f), 3 and 23 of the
UGC Act, wherein a “deemed university” is different from a “university”,
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stricto sensu. However, we do not subscribe to such contention for the reasons
provided below.
31. The contention of the respondent is that the term “university” needs to
be read in accordance with the UGC Act, wherein only those universities
covered under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act are covered under the PC Act. Such
an interpretation by importing the technical definition under a different
Act may not be feasible herein. It is a settled law that technical definitions
under one statute should not be imported to another statute which is not
in pari materia with the first. The UGC Act and the PC Act are enactments
which are completely distinct in their purpose, operation and object. The
Preamble of the UGC Act states that it is
“An Act to make provision for the coordination and determination of
standards in universities, and for that purpose, to establish a
University Grants Commission”.
On the other hand, the PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of
corruption in the country. As such, the extension of technical definitions
used under one Act to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Acts
are not in pari materia with one another.
32. The above principle of law was recently applied by a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. [(2014) 9 SCC 657 :
(2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 1], where an argument was advanced by the counsel that
the interpretation of the term “shop” under the ESI Act should be determined
in light of the definition of the same under the relevant Shops and Commercial
Establishments Act. Negativing this contention of the counsel, the Court went
on to hold that: (SCC pp. 685-86, paras 52-53 & 58-59)
“52. An argument raised by the appellants herein is the issue
relating to the “doctrine of pari materia”. It is contended that since the
ESI Act does not define the term “shop”, the said definition may be
ascertained in the light of the definitions under the relevant Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act as enacted by the respective State
Legislatures, since the purpose and object of both the enactments are
one and the same.
53. For the above purpose, it would be necessary to look into the
concept of “doctrine of pari materia” and further ascertain
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whether the given statutes are in fact pari materia with the ESI
Act. It is settled law that two statutes are said to be in pari materia
with each other when they deal with the same subject-matter. The
rationale behind this rule is based on the interpretative
assumption that words employed in legislations are used in an
identical sense. However, this assumption is rebuttable by the
context of the statutes. According to Sutherland in Statutes and
Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edn.:
‘Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertain to the
same subject-matter when they relate to the same person or
things, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the
same purpose or object.’
xxx xxx xxx
58. It can be concluded that though the ESI Act, the 1948 Act and
the 1961 Act deal with labour and workmen, in essence and spirit they
have a different scope and application. The Acts do not appear to have
any overlap in their fields of operation and have mutually exclusive
schemes. Therefore, the argument that the Acts are pari materia with
each other, must fail.
59. This Court must also address the issue that arose in the course
of the arguments that the word “shop” has been used in the impugned
notifications as well as the 1948 Act and the 1961 Act and therefore
assistance may be taken from the latter statutes to interpret the
notification. This argument, in light of the above discussion, does not
appeal to us.”
It is for the same reasoning that we are of the opinion that the High Court’s
reliance on the judgment of this Court in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v.
Rabi Sankar Patro [(2018) 1 SCC 468], was not appropriate, as the same was
with reference to enactments relating to administration/regulation of
universities, and is unconnected with the Objects of the PC Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
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Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209
“55. A textual comparison of the provisions of Section 60(5) of IBC with
Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 would reveal some similarities of
expression, with textual variations. For the purposes of the present
proceedings, it suffices to note that clause (c) of Section 60(5) confers
jurisdiction on NCLT to entertain or dispose of “any question of priorities or
any question of law or facts arising out of or in relation to the insolvency
resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate
person under the Code”. Section 446(2)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 and
Section 280(d) of the Companies Act, 2013 use the expression any question of
priorities or any other question whatsoever whether of law or fact. These words
bear a striking resemblance to the provisions of Section 60(5)(c) of IBC. But
textually similar language in different enactments has to be construed in
the context and scheme of the statute in which the words appear. The
meaning and content attributed to statutory language in one enactment
cannot in all circumstances be transplanted into a distinct, if not, alien soil.
For, it is trite law that the words of a statute have to be construed in a
manner which would give them a sensible meaning which accords with the
overall scheme of the statute, the context in which the words are used and
the purpose of the underlying provision. Therefore, while construing of
Section 60(5), a starting point for the analysis must be to decipher
parliamentary intent based on the object underlying the enactment of IBC. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons leading up to the enactment to IBC conveys
a strong sense of the intent of the legislature…..”
(emphasis supplied)
C. Bright v. District Collector, (2021) 2 SCC 392
“8. A well-settled rule of interpretation of the statutes is that the use of
the word “shall” in a statute, does not necessarily mean that in every case
it is mandatory that unless the words of the statute are literally followed,
the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. It is
not always correct to say that if the word “may” has been used, the statute
is only permissive or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those
provisions will not render the proceeding invalid [State of U.P. v.
Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912] and that when a statute
uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may
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ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the
whole scope of the statute [State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961
SC 751] . The principle of literal construction of the statute alone in all
circumstances without examining the context and scheme of the statute
may not serve the purpose of the statute [RBI v. Peerless General Finance
& Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424].”
(emphasis supplied)
88. We refrain from dealing with each and every relied upon judgment as
broadly two different views have been taken by this Court. While the first
set of judgments is in favour of the respondents, starting with Hukumdev
(supra), the other view in favour of the appellants emanates from Mangu
Ram (supra) which distinguishes Kaushalya Rani (supra) since it was a
case that dealt with the 1908 Act. We also take note of the fact that in
Hukumdev (supra), this Court has distinguished Vidyacharan (supra)
since it also dealt with the 1908 Act.
89. We shall first deal with the law as laid down by Hukum Dev (supra),
followed in the subsequent decisions of this Court.
“17. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has been made applicable
to appeals both under the Act as well as under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
no case has been brought to our notice where Section 29(2) has been made
applicable to an election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act by virtue of
which either Sections 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been attracted. Even
assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election
petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from that fixed
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under Section 81 of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly
excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before us that the
words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express
reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the
meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have
to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act,
and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the
Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should
govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the
relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called
in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case
where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of
the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open
to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special
law exclude their operation. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation
Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the
Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss
an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections
81, 82 or 117….
18. It was sought to be contended that only those provisions of the
Limitation Act which are applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the
Act, unless expressly excluded, would be attracted. But this is not what Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act says, because it provides that Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded,
all of them would become applicable. Whether those Sections are applicable is
not determined by the terms of those Sections, but by their applicability or
inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. A person who
is a minor or is insane or is an idiot cannot file an election petition to challenge
an election, nor is there any provision in the Act for legal representation of an
election petitioner or respondent in that petition who dies, in order to make
Section 16 of the Limitation Act applicable. The applicability of these
provisions has, therefore, to be Judged not from the terms of the
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Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Act relating to the filing of
election petitions and their trial to ascertain whether it is a complete code
in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of
the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of that Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
90. On a reading of the aforementioned judgment, we find that express
exclusion is the general rule and implied exclusion is only an exception
that comes into play depending on the nature and scheme of the concerned
legislation. Therefore, the onus lies heavily on the party claiming an
implied exclusion to show the same. We have no qualms in holding that a
case of implied exclusion has not been made out insofar as the 2013 Act is
concerned, owing to its unique scheme. However, on facts, we find that in
Hukumdev (supra), this Court was concerned with a unique legislation
being the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which contains an
express provision in the form of Section 86 which states that if one misses
the bus of limitation, then any election petition filed thereafter shall be
dismissed summarily. Therefore, the legislation itself clearly mentions the
consequences of a belated filing. Hence, the said judgment is clearly
distinguishable insofar as its facts are concerned.
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91. In the other judgments relied upon by the parties, this Court was dealing
with different enactments such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Customs Act, 1962, the Electricity
Act, 2003, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999, the Special Courts (Trial of Offences
relating to transaction in Securities) Act, 1992, the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and even the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
92. These enactments travel on totally different fields involving different
parties, different mechanisms and different authorities. In some cases, the
appeals were preferred before the statutory authorities for distinct reliefs
under the respective enactments. In many of them, this Court was
concerned with statutory rights, and the respective statutes being dealt with
did not contain any provision as contained in Section 103 of the 2013 Act.
A statute involving financial implications and, in some cases, a penalty,
also stands on a totally different footing. There, the issue would be one of
action taken, while we are concerned with the entitlement of a party.
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93. In Popular Construction (supra), as distinguished in Consolidating
Engineering Enterprises (supra) and taken note of in Kalpraj (supra),
the issue was with respect to the application of the law of limitation to a
proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
which is purely a commercial dispute between two individuals.
94. In New India Assurance Company (supra), the facts are totally different.
This Court was dealing with a complaint given for the first time before the
consumer forum. Therefore, the said proceedings were original in nature.
On the contrary, we are dealing with the application of Section 5 of the
1963 Act to an appeal against a deemed decree. Furthermore, neither the
scope of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act nor that of Section 3 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which is a pari materia provision to
Section 103 of the 2013 Act, was considered and discussed in the said
decision. Thus, we are inclined to state that the said decision, not having
considered the issues dealt with by us, cannot be termed as a binding
precedent. Reference can be made to the following decisions:
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Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra &
Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 494
“14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v.
Leathem [1901 AC 495 : (1900-1903) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] : (All ER p. 7 G-I)
“Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1 : (1895-1899) All ER Rep
52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a
general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have
very often said before—that every judgment must be read as applicable
to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions which may be found there are not
intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and
qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are
to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition
that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning
assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer
must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
(emphasis supplied)
We entirely agree with the above observations.
15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] (vide
SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:
“18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background
of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only
an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows
from it.”
16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC
111] (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:
“59. … It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”
(emphasis supplied)
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17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8
SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without
disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed:
(SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)
“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the
decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither
to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too
taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts
are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and
provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark
into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not
to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments.
They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted
as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 :
(1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All
ER p. 14 C-D)
‘The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the
ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of
Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.
This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language
actually used by that most distinguished Judge, …’
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2
WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said,
‘Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory
definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.’ (All ER p.
297g)
Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR
1062 : (1971) 2 All ER 1267], observed: (All ER p. 1274d)
‘One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even
Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;’
And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972 AC 877 : (1972) 2
WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)
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‘There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a
judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and
it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the
setting of the facts of a particular case.’
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make
a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases
by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying
precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962
SC 680] , AIR p. 688, para 19)
‘Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between
one case and another is not enough because even a single significant
detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should
avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by
matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To
decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.’
* * *
‘Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of
justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches
else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to
keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede
it.’ ”
(emphasis supplied)
18. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down
therein, because often decisions are cited for a proposition without reading the
entire decision and the reasoning contained therein. In our opinion, the decision
of this Court in Sarguja Transport case [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19
: AIR 1987 SC 88] cannot be treated as a Euclid's formula.”
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95. In Mohd. Abaad Ali (supra) which has followed Mangu Ram (supra)
while distinguishing Hukum Dev (supra), this Court was dealing with the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is a general law applicable to
criminal proceedings only.
96. As repeatedly mentioned in our judgment, we are concerned with a special
law which provides for just and fair compensation, along with the relief of
rehabilitation or resettlement. Therefore, without discussing the decisions
relied upon by the parties any further, we only say that one must see the
exclusive mechanism provided under a statute to be used for achieving the
goal. Suffice it is to state that after the exhaustive and threadbare analysis
of the provisions available under both the 2013 Act and the 1963 Act, we
find that the decisions cited by the Bar do not have any application to the
present batch of matters and therefore, deserve to be discarded.
CONCLUSION
97. We conclude as follows:
(i) Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applicable to all those cases
where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act.
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(ii) For passing the award under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the
2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation
and resettlement entitlements.
(iii) The first appeals before the High Courts should be treated as ones
under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the
1894 Act.
(iv) Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5
of the 1963 Act.
(v) Consequently, all the applications seeking condonation of delay in
preferring the first appeals before the High Courts under Section 74
of the 2013 Act stand allowed.
(vi) All the impugned judgments are set aside insofar as the issue of
application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act is concerned.
(vii) The respective State Governments will have to take necessary
measures and issue appropriate directions to the officers dealing
with the appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act against the awards
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passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act to ensure that the
appeals are filed as provided under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
(viii) High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic
one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.
98. Accordingly, the appeals stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
99. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………. .J.
(M. M. SUNDRESH)
.................………………………..J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA )
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 09, 2026
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