REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO…1927…...OF 2023

(arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)

No.2139 of 2021)

THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. …...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KAMLESH RANI BHATLA ……RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Leave granted.

2.The appellants question the legality of a judgment of a

Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which in substance

sustains an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal allowing

the respondent to withdraw her resignation and permit her to re-

join duty. At the material point of time, the respondent was

working as an Assistant Teacher in a school under the Directorate

of Education, Delhi Government, who are the appellants before us.

She had tendered her resignation on 22

nd

March 2012 as she

desired to participate in the elections for the post of a Counsellor of

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Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Her request for resignation was

accepted by the authorities on 29

th

March itself, with effect from

22

nd

March 2012. She, however, lost the election, which was held

in the month of April the same year. On 21

st

April 2012, she

applied for withdrawing her resignation and re-join duty for the

post in question. This application, however, was kept pending in

spite of several reminders in the years 2013 and 2014.

3.The respondent then filed a writ petition before the Delhi High

Court. This was registered as W.P. (C) No. 1522 of 2014 and the

said petition was disposed of on 20

th

March 2014 with the following

directions and order:-

“6. The petitioner, is aggrieved by the fact that, there has

been no decision on her request, as yet. The petitioner,

apparently, has also taken recourse to the Right to

Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act). In respect of the

application made under the RTI Act, the petitioner though

has received a response dated 18.01.2013 from

respondent nos. I and 2, which only indicates that the

decision regarding her request for withdrawal of

resignation is ? under process.

7. In view of the aforesaid facts, in my opinion, the

respondents cannot, not take a decision in the matter.

Therefore, the writ petition is disposed of with a direction

to the respondents to deliberate upon and thereafter

dispose of the request of the petitioner qua withdrawal of

her resignation; albeit by a speaking order. The needful

will be done expeditiously, though not later than 10 weeks

from today. The copy of the order passed will be furnished

to the petitioner. The respondents, while passing the order,

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will also take note of the judgment of this court dated

18.03.2005, passed in WP(C) No. 3303/2003, titled Nirmal

Verma vs MCD and Anr.

8. The writ petition and the application are disposed of

with the aforesaid directions.”

(quoted verbatim from the paper book)

4.On 14

th

May 2015, the Deputy Director of Education, District

South East, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi had

rejected her plea and, inter-alia, ordered:-

“… AND WHEREAS, the operative part of the judgment

dated 18.03.2005 in W.P.(C) No. 3303/2003 of Hon'ble

High Court Delhi is re-produced as under;-

"… It would, thus, be seen that in the cases cited above

and as also in Durgesh Mohanpunu’s case which is the

latest case processed after the petitioner's case, the

respondents have taken a consistent position that legally it

is permissible for them to allow withdrawal of resignation

after its acceptance and have followed the practice of

restoration of service. In the petitioner's case also

accordingly there is no ground made out for adopting a

different yardstick or contrary legal submission to defeat

the petitioner's case. Petitioner had also. within a month of

the acceptance of her resignation and within a week of her

losing the election requested for being permitted to

withdraw the resignation in accordance with Rule 26(4) of

CCS Pension Rules. It is not the case of respondents that

petitioner was not having a good record or had been guilty

of any misconduct: or impropriety or it being a case of any

doubt on the integrity etc. Denial of reinstatement in

service to the petitioner and not treating the petitioner at

par with others in the absence of any distinguishing

feature, renders the respondent's action arbitrary and

tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed under

Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this

regard may be made to Sengara Singh and Ors. v. State of

Punjab and Ors. Reported at.....”.

AND WHEREAS, the case of Mrs. Kamlesh Rani Bhatia

cannot be equated .at par with Nirmal Verma case.

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NOW, THEREFORE, after considering all the aspects of

the matter, the request of Mrs. Kamlesh Rani Bhatia for

withdrawal of her resignation is considered and found no

merit, hence, rejected.

This, issues with the prior approval of competent

authority & in compliance of order of Hon'ble High Court

dated 20.03.2014, passed in W.P. (C) No 1522/2014.”

(quoted verbatim from the paper book)

5.This order was challenged by the respondent before the

Central Administrative Terminal. The Tribunal in a judgement

delivered on 20

th

March 2017, relying upon Rule 26(4) of the

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, sustained the

respondent’s case, primarily relying on judgement of the Delhi High

Court in the case of “Nirmal Verma -vs- MCD and Anr.” delivered

on 18

th

March 2005 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3303/2003.

6.We find from the order of the Tribunal that the main argument

that was advanced before it by the appellant herein was that the

case of Nirmal Verma (supra) was distinguishable in the sense that

no chargesheet was issued to the applicant in that case whereas in

the case of respondent, a chargesheet had been submitted alleging

breach of certain provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct)

Rules, 1964. The memorandum of charges was issued on 4

th

September 2011 and the two articles of charges related to her

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involvement in political activities while working. Annexure II of

Memorandum of charges stipulated: –

“ANNEXURE II

STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF

MISNDUCT/MISBEHAVIOUR IN SUPPORT OF THE

ARTICLE OF CHARGES FARAMED AGAINST SMT,

KAMLESH RANI BATLA, ASSTT. TEACHER.

ARTICLE-I

Smt. Kamlesh Rani Batla, Assistant Teacher while

working in Govt. Sarvodya Coed. Middle School, J-Block,

Sangam Vihar, New Delhi, during her duty hours, attended

the meeting held by the BSP, the National Political Party

without informing or taking permission from the

department.

ARTICLE-II

Smt. Kamlesh Rani Batla, Assistant Teacher while

working in Govt. Sarvodya Coed. Middie School, J-Block,

Sangam Vihar, New Delhi, and during the elections period

canvassing and delivering slogans for the BSP as evident

from the CDs and photo clippings.

Thus, she has violated Rule 3 of CCS Conduct Rules, 1964

which unbecoming of a government servant.”

(quoted verbatim from the paper book)

7.As we have already indicated, only argument advanced by the

appellant before the Tribunal was that a chargesheet was issued to

the respondent before her resignation. On that basis, the

authorities wanted to distinguish her case in relation to the case of

Nirmal Verma (supra). The Tribunal observed and held:-

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“5. The only argument advanced by the counsel for the

respondents that a chargesheet was issued to the

applicant before her resignation and accordingly the case

of the applicant cannot stand on the same footing as that

of Nirmal Verma, relied upon by her, does not seem to be

justified for the simple reason that if a chargesheet was

issued to the applicant then it was within the domain of

the respondents not to accept her resignation and they

could not have issued vigilance clearance. Once the

respondents have given the vigilance clearance in respect

of the applicant and allowed her to contest MCD election,

hence, in my considered opinion, the respondents are

estopped from taking the plea of pendency of chargesheet

against the applicant. I am also of the view that the

respondents were very much within their capacity not to

accept the applicant's resignation pending enquiry, if any,

rather they ought to have awaited the decision in the

enquiry. Hence, at this stage, taking the above plea of

pendency of chargesheet and distinguishing the character

of the present case with that of Nirmal Verma's case

(supra) seems to show their power vested with the

respondents to deny or reject the applicant's application for

withdrawal of her resignation. Since all the conditions set

out under Rule 26 of CCS (Pensions) Rules, 1972 are

satisfied by the applicant, the stand of the respondents to

deny the applicant to withdraw her resignation is not

reasonable in these circumstances apart from being

contrary to law.

6. Going through the judgment in Nirmal Verma's case

(supra), I find that the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a

similar manner allowed the case of petitioner therein

taking into consideration the rule position and directed the

respondents to process the request of the petitioner for

withdrawal of her resignation and also to allow her to join

back her duties. Hence, adopting the same ratio as laid

down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Nirmal

Verma's’ case (supra), I allow the instant OA with a

direction to the respondents to process the case of the

applicant for withdrawal of her resignation and allow her

to join duty as Assistant Teacher and the intervening

period be also decided as per existing rule with

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consequential benefits. However, the respondents are at

liberty to proceed with the pending chargesheet, if any, as

per rules. No costs.”

(quoted verbatim from the paper book)

8.The High Court in the order impugned, observing that no

enquiry was conducted against respondent and even vigilance

clearance was granted to her before accepting her resignation,

rejected the writ petition filed by the appellant authorities.

9.Before us, on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Divan, learned

Additional Solicitor General has cited a decision of the Delhi High

Court in the case of Directorate of Education -vs- Manisha

Sharma in W.P. (C) 8494/2015 decided on 28

th

November 2019.

The Division Bench of the High Court in this judgement, had

referred to the decision in the case of Nirmal Verma (supra) and

observed: –

“14. The Court is unable to agree with the reasoning in

Nirmal Verma v. MCD (supra) that since there was no

misconduct on the part of the candidate, she should be

permitted to withdraw her resignation. What was not

noticed in Nirmal Verma v. MCD (supra) is the fact that the

resignation had already been acted upon and that Rule

26(4), in any event, did not stand attracted.”

10.Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 stipulate:-

“26. Forfeiture of service on resignation.-

(1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is

allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the

appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service.

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(2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if

it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission,

another appointment, whether temporary or permanent,

under the Government where service qualifies.

(3) Interruption in service in a case falling under sub-rule

(2), due to the two appointments being at different

stations, not exceeding the joining time permissible under

the rules of transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of

any kind due to the Government servant on the date of

relief or by formal condonation to the extent to which the

period is not covered by leave due to him.

(4) the appointing authority may permit a person to

withdraw his resignation in the public interest on the

following conditions, namely:-

(i) That the resignation was tendered by the

Government servant for some compelling reasons

which did not involve any reflection on his

integrity, efficiency or conduct and the request

for withdrawal of the resignation has been made

as a result of a material change in the

circumstances which originally compelled him to

tender the resignation;

(ii)that during the period intervening between

the date on which the resignation became

effective and the date from which the request for

withdrawal was made, the conduct of the person

concerned was in no way improper;

(iii)that the period of absence from duty

between the date on which the resignation

became effective and the date on which the

person is allowed to resume duty as a result of

permission to withdraw the resignation is not

more than ninety days;

(iv)that the post, which was vacated by the

Government servant on the acceptance of his

resignation or any other comparable post, is

available.”

(5)    Request for withdrawal of a resignation shall not be

accepted by the Appointing Authority where a Government

servant resigns his service or post with a view to taking up

an appointment in or under a private commercial company

or in or under a corporation or company wholly or

substantially owned or controlled by the Government or in

or under a body controlled or financed by the Government.

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(6)    When an order is passed by the Appointing Authority

allowing a person to withdraw his resignation and to

resume duty, the order shall be deemed to include the

condonation of interruption in service but the period of

interruption shall not count as qualifying service.

(7)    A resignation submitted for the purpose of  Rule

37 shall not entail forfeiture of past service under the

Government.”

11.In the case of Manisha Sharma (supra), the Division Bench

opined that there was no material change in the circumstances

which originally compelled the respondent to tender her resignation

therein and the respondent voluntarily resigned because she

intended to contest the election. It was also held that once the

resignation had been accepted and acted upon, thereafter, the

incumbent could not contend that she was under any compulsion

for tendering her resignation. Once resignation had been acted

upon, there was no question of permitting a person to withdraw

such resignation. This was the view taken by this Court in the case

of State of Haryana and others -vs- Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3

SCC 321].

12.So far as the factual context of this case is concerned, as we

have narrated above, the first order of the High Court was a

direction upon the employer to take a decision. At that point of

time, the ratio laid down in the case of Nirmal Verma (supra)

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prevailed and the High Court had directed the authorities to take

decision in terms of the said ratio while considering the plea of the

respondent before us. The appellant had accepted that judgment

and the rejection decision was taken within the parameters set by

the High Court in the order passed on 20

th

March 2014. The only

reason as to why the respondent’s request for withdrawal of

resignation was rejected was that a memorandum of charges had

been issued against her. The authorities, in the order of rejection,

did not take the stand that once accepted, a resignation cannot be

withdrawn. At no stage of this case, which underwent two rounds of

litigations, the authorities had raised the point which formed the

basis of the judgment in the case of Manisha Sharma (supra). The

appellants also did not reason their rejection order with the ground

that there was no compelling reason for the respondent to tender

her resignation. In the second round of proceedings from which this

appeal arises, the Tribunal did not find justification for rejection of

the respondent’s plea for withdrawal of resignation to be

acceptable. We have reproduced earlier in this judgment the

reasoning given by the Tribunal in sustaining the respondent’s

case. Before the Tribunal, as also the High Court, the controversy

remained confined to issue of memorandum of charges against the

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respondent. Both the fora opined that the respondent’s case could

not be distinguished from the ratio of the case of Nirmal Verma

(supra) merely on the strength of issue of memorandum of charges

against her.

13.After the High Court sustained the Tribunal’s verdict which

went in favour of the respondent, on 28

th

November 2019, the

Division Bench judgment in the case of Manisha Sharma (supra)

was delivered. In this judgment, the Division Bench, on analysing

the conditions specified in Rule 26(4) found that having resigned to

contest the election, the respondent therein could not be heard to

say that she was under compulsion. It was also held that once the

resignation has been accepted and acted upon, then there is no

question of permitting a person to withdraw such a resignation. In

the facts of the present case, however, that ground was not invoked

to reject the respondent’s withdrawal request herein. Moreover, the

parameter based on which the authorities were asked to take

decision on the request for withdrawal of resignation was laid down

by the High Court itself. The boundary within which the authorities

were to examine the incumbent’s plea was not questioned by the

authorities before any forum. On the other hand, they accepted the

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said parameter and rejected the plea thereby confining their

consideration within the boundary demarcated by the High Court.

14.In our opinion, in the context of this case, the ratio of

Manisha Sharma (supra) cannot be made applicable. We accept, as

a proposition of law, the interpretation given to the Rule 26(4) by

the Division Bench in the said judgment. But in the case of the

respondent herein, her withdrawal plea was required to be

examined within a given parameter and since the employer never

challenged the direction laying down the scope within which they

were to consider the withdrawal plea of the respondent, the right of

the respondent to be considered within that parameter had

crystallised. The authorities could not, and did not, go beyond that

parameter.

15.Now the question arises as to whether we could import

additional reasoning into the decision of the employer on the basis

of interpretation given to said Rule 26(4) by the High Court

subsequent in point of time. Ultimately, what we are dealing with in

this appeal is a decision of an employer terminating the master-

servant relationship on the basis of certain grounds laid down in

the rejection order. It is a fact that Rule 26(4) operates in the case

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of the respondent and in the event we had found that the first

decision of the High Court was absolutely contrary to the provisions

of the said Rules, we might have had accepted the argument of Ms.

Divan founded on reasoning contained in the case of Manisha

Sharma (supra). But as per the said provision, we do not find there

is absolute bar on the employer in permitting withdrawal of

resignation even after the same is accepted. Said Rule 26 does not

contain any such provision. Moreover, sub-rule (4) of Rule 26

envisages certain situations wherein withdrawal of resignation

might be permitted even after the resignation becomes effective. The

situations contemplated in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of Rule 26(4)

permit withdrawal of resignation after the same becomes effective.

Resignation can become effective either by stipulation of law or by

acceptance thereof. To illustrate the former situation, some

statutory instrument may contain deeming provisions for

resignation to become effective in the event after tendering the

resignation letter, no decision is taken by the employer within a

given timeframe. That is not the case here. So far as the present

case is concerned, resignation can become effective only on

acceptance thereof and sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 lays down situations

in which there can be withdrawal even after resignation becomes

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effective. This question, however, does not arise here as what we

are examining in this judgment is legality of an order by which the

respondent’s plea for withdrawal of resignation was rejected on

grounds spelt out in the order itself. The Tribunal and the High

Court found the reasoning of the appellant unsustainable.

16.In the peculiar facts of this case, in our opinion the judgment

of the High Court sustaining the Tribunal’s decision do not warrant

any interference.

17.The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. All connected

applications are disposed of.

18.There shall be no order as to costs.

…...........................J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

…..........................J.

(KRISHNA MURARI)

NEW DELHI;

23

rd

March, 2023.

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