LPA 336/2026 Page 1 of 34

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on: 15.05.2026

% Judgment delivered on: 26.05.2026

+ LPA 336/2026 & CM APPLs. 30157-59/2026

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR ....Appellants

Through: Mr.Chetan Sharma, ASG with

Mr.Ashish K. Dixit, CGSC, Mr.Umar

Hashmi, Mr.R.V.Prabhat,

Mr.Shubham Sharma, Mr.Yash

Wardhan Sharma, Mr.Naman, Ms.Iqra

Sheikh, Mr.Gaurav, Advs, Mr.Bipin

Bhatt, S.O.

versus

DELHI RACE CLUB (1940) LTD .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Sr. Adv. with

Mr.Azhar Alam, Mr. Sankalp

Goswami, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

J U D G M E N T

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, C.J.

CHALLENGE

1. This intra-court appeal assails the order dated 24.04.2026 passed by

learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 5608/2026 instituted by the respondent

whereby a direction has been issued by learned Single Judge that the

LPA 336/2026 Page 2 of 34

appellant no.2 shall not proceed further with the show cause notice dated

17.04.2026 till the next date of hearing.

2. The respondent, by instituting the writ petition before the learned

Single Judge, sought a writ of certiorari quashing, setting aside and

cancelling the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 issued by appellant no.2

under Section 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises (Eviction of

Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as the „P.P.

Act’]. A further prayer has also been made in the writ petition to quash, set

aside and cancel the proceedings initiated by issuing the said notice dated

17.04.2026.

FACTS

3. The show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 has been issued by the

appellant no.2 to the respondent in terms of the provisions contained in

Section 4 of the P.P. Act, calling upon it as to why the order of eviction

should not be made. The notice further requires the respondent to appear in

person or through an authorised representative along with evidence, which

the respondent intends to provide in support of the show cause and also for a

personal hearing. It further stipulates that if the respondent fails to appear on

the date fixed, the matter shall be proceeded ex-parte.

4. The show cause notice has been issued in respect of a lease granted by

the appellant no.1 in favour of the respondent on 08.03.1926, pertaining to a

plot of land admeasuring 84.484 acres, which is more explicitly described in

the schedule appended to the Lease Deed dated 08.03.1926. The lease was

granted for the use of the land as “Race Course” for a period of 25 years.

Clause 6 of the lease provides that the term of the lease can be extended for a

LPA 336/2026 Page 3 of 34

further period of 25 years from the expiration of the term of the lease. The

lease was extended from time to time and stood determined, as per the show

cause notice on 31.12.1994 by afflux on time on expiry of the last extension.

It is also to be noticed that on 25.06.1985, a substantial area of the land in

question was resumed by the appellant and allotted for certain public

purposes, including allotment to the Ministry of Defence. However, the

respondent has continued to be in occupation of the remaining portion of the

land.

5. On 25.10.1999, treating the occupation of the respondent as

unauthorised on expiry of the last extension of the term of lease on

31.12.1994, a show cause notice was issued to the respondent under Section

4 of the P.P. Act, calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why an

order of eviction and recovery of dues, including damages for unauthorised

occupation, may not be passed.

6. The said show cause notice dated 25.10.1999 was, however,

challenged by the respondent by instituting the proceeding of W.P.(C)

7822/1999 before this Court and in these proceedings initially this Court had

granted a stay on further proceedings before the Estate Officer. During the

pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent is said to have submitted a

representation dated 19.12.2011 seeking extension/renewal of the lease in

respect of the land in question.

7. W.P.(C) 7822/1999 was finally disposed of by a learned Single Judge

of this Court vide his order dated 09.07.2012, whereby the show cause notice

dated 25.10.1999 was quashed and a liberty was given to the appellant to

decide the representation dated 19.12.2011 preferred by the respondent. It

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was also provided that in the event of rejection of the representation dated

19.12.2011, the appellant would be free to determine the lease and re-enter

the subject premises as the respondent was said to be in arrears of ground

rent, etc. Pursuant to the order dated 09.07.2012 passed by this Court in

W.P.(C) 7822/1999, the representation of the respondent, dated 19.12.2011

was processed and a letter of demand dated 22.07.2013 was issued to the

respondent in respect of the outstanding dues whereby total amount

recoverable from the respondent was shown to be Rs.3,48,82,723/-. The

respondent deposited the said amount of Rs.3,48,82,723/- on 23.08.2013 and

26.08.2013, which was received by the appellant towards dues as mentioned

in the letter of demand dated 22.07.2013.

8. As per the appellant, the request of the respondent for

extension/renewal of the lease was examined; however, it was not acceded to

in view of the requirement of the subject land for government/public

purposes, including defence and security considerations, and accordingly, no

further extension/renewal of the lease was granted in favour of the

respondent. It is also stated on behalf of the appellant that a notice was

issued on 13.11.2017 to the respondent calling upon it to show cause as to

why proceedings for eviction should not be initiated in accordance with law.

Another notice is said to have been issued by the appellant to the respondent

on 09.03.2022 for alleged breaches of terms and conditions governing the

subject premises, including misuse of the land and alleged unauthorised

construction.

9. On 12.03.2026, an eviction/vacation notice was issued to the

respondent by the appellant to vacate the land in question and handover its

peaceful possession to the appellant. The said notice clearly stated that

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failure to comply would entail initiation of appropriate proceedings for

eviction and recovery of dues in accordance with law. A civil suit, being CS

(OS) 253/2026 was instituted by the respondent before this Court,

challenging the validity and legality of the notice dated 12.03.2026 and

seeking certain other reliefs in respect of the proposed action of eviction.

The said suit was disposed of by this Court on 09.04.2026. This Court, in its

order dated 09.04.2026, while disposing of the suit, has clearly recorded that

any action for dispossession of the respondent from the subject premises

would be taken only in accordance with due process of law. It is thereafter

that the notice impugned in the writ petition, dated 17.04.2026 has been

issued by the appellant no.2 to the respondent under Section 4(1) and

4(2)(b)(ii) of the P.P. Act. The notice dated 17.04.2026 has been challenged

by the respondent, as stated above, by instituting the W.P.(C) 5608/2026

before the learned Single Judge and it is in the proceeding of this writ petition

that the impugned order has been passed on 24.04.2026, whereby it has been

directed that proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026

shall stand deferred. It is this order passed by learned Single Judge, which

has been assailed by the appellants by instituting the proceedings of the

instant intra-court appeal.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

10. Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Senior Advocate and Additional Solicitor

General of India, representing the appellants, has submitted that the writ

petition against the show cause notice issued under Section 4 of the P.P. Act

ought not to have been entertained by the learned Single Judge under Article

226 of the Constitution of India. He has further argued that all opportunity is

available to the respondent to reply to the show cause notice issued by the

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Estate Officer, wherein all pleas which may be available to the respondent

can be taken, including the challenge to the issuance of the show cause notice

itself and therefore, exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge in the

writ petition while passing the impugned order, is erroneous.

11. Referring to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Escorts

Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. v. DDA & Anr., 2007 SCC OnLine

Del 1180, Sh. Sharma has argued that in view of the definition of the

expression, “unauthorised occupation” occurring in Section 2(g) of the P.P.

Act, the respondent is an unauthorised occupant of the premises in question

and therefore, the appellant has taken recourse to appropriate process of law

seeking eviction of the respondent by invoking the jurisdiction of the Estate

Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act. His submission, thus, is that the

show cause notice, which is under challenge before learned Single Judge, is

lawful and accordingly, the respondent needs to submit a reply to the said

show cause notice and participate in the proceedings.

12. Sh. Sharma has also argued that ordinarily challenge to a show cause

notice issued by the competent authority under a statute cannot be made in

writ jurisdiction and since the show cause notice has been issued in

accordance with law and jurisdiction of the Estate Officer has rightly been

invoked by the appellant no.1, interference with the proceedings pursuant to

the said show cause notice by passing the impugned order, whereby the

proceedings have been deferred, is unwarranted and uncalled for. He has

further argued that Escorts Heart Institute (supra) has considered the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s judgment in Express Newspapers Private

Limited v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 and also a Five Judges Bench

Judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing

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Limited v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 and has held that the

expression “unauthorized occupation” as used in P.P. Act includes a person,

who is found to have occupied any public premises without lawful authority

as well as those whose occupation was permissive at the inception and

subsequently ceased to be authorised.

13. Submission on behalf of the appellant no.1 is that the definition of the

term “unauthorised occupation” as occurring in Section 2(g) of the P.P. Act

covers continuance of occupation by any person of any public premises after

the grant or transfer has expired or determined for any reason whatsoever. It

is the argument of Sh. Sharma that admittedly the term of the lease has

expired on 31.12.1994 and in absence of any extension of the term of the

lease or its renewal or grant of a fresh lease, the respondent is an

unauthorised occupant in terms of Section 2(g) of the P.P. Act and therefore,

the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer has rightly been invoked under Section 4

of the P.P. Act.

14. Reference has also been made on behalf of the appellants to a

judgment of this Court in Anant Raj Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi

Development Authority, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6406. In Anant Raj

Agencies (supra), a suit was instituted before the civil court, which was

dismissed on a preliminary issue that the jurisdiction of the civil court was

barred under the provisions of the P.P. Act. In the said case, the plaintiff

claimed to have purchased the suit property under a compromise decree, and

it was pleaded that the defendant – Delhi Development Authority had

initiated the proceedings before the Estate Officer under the P.P. Act,

whereupon a show cause notice was issued calling upon the plaintiff to show

cause as to why the plaintiff should not be evicted from the suit premises. In

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these facts, the learned trial court held that the civil court does not have the

jurisdiction in view of Section 10 read with Section 15 of the P.P. Act, which

clearly stipulates that no courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or

proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised

occupation of any public premises.

15. The plaintiff in Anant Raj Agencies (supra) challenged the order of

the trial court whereby the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was not

maintainable. While dismissing the appeal, this Court inter alia observed

that the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred from entertaining any suit and

further that notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act

is an order of taking cognizance of the matter. The Court further held that

once unauthorised occupant of any public premises is issued a notice under

Section 4 of the P.P. Act for showing cause and adducing evidence before the

Estate Officer, he is required to show his cause and produce the defence to

the Estate Officer, but he cannot come to the civil court for restraining the

Estate Officer from proceeding pursuant to the notice issued under Section 4

of the P.P. Act. Sh. Chetan Sharma, placing reliance on Anant Raj Agencies

(supra), has stated that once a notice is issued under Section 4 of the P.P. Act

by the Estate Officer, the only course open to the noticee is to respond to the

notice and therefore, according to Sh. Sharma, learned Single Judge has

completely ignored all these aspects of the matter and has proceeded to pass

the order deferring the proceedings before the Estate Officer pursuant to the

show cause notice.

16. On behalf of the appellants, it has also been argued that no reason

whatsoever, even for the namesake, has been assigned by learned Single

Judge while passing the impugned order except observing therein that,

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“looking at the chequered history of the previous litigation between the

parties as noted hereinbefore, and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of

the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the matter requires

consideration”. It has further been argued that in consonance with the

principles relating to the grant of an interim order determination of the issue

of a prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience has not

been made, which itself would suffice for this Court to set aside the

impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

17. Mr. Suhail Dutt, learned senior counsel representing the respondent,

while opposing the instant appeal, has made the following submissions:-

(i) that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, being

purely interlocutory in nature, is not amenable to challenge in the

proceedings of the instant intra-court appeal for the reason that under Clause

10 of the Letters Patent, the remedy of intra-court appeal is available only

against a judgment passed by learned Single Judge and not against an

interlocutory order. In this respect, reliance has been placed by the learned

counsel for the respondent on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in

(i) Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (1981) 4 SCC 8 (ii)

Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC

399, and (iii) Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd.,

(2023) 1 SCC 634. Reference has also been made in support of this

submission to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in MCD v.

Krishan Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 316;

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(ii) It has also been argued on behalf of the respondent that there is no

absolute bar for this Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India challenging a show cause notice. In this respect, it has

been argued that ordinarily challenge to a show cause notice is not available

before this Court in writ jurisdiction, however, as laid down by Hon‟ble

Supreme Court in J. Sri Nisha v. Enforcement Directorate, 2026 SCC

OnLine SC 517, interference by this Court in proceeding under Article 226

of the Constitution of India at the stage of show cause notice is permissible in

certain circumstances such as, (i) where the notice suffers from patent lack of

jurisdiction, (ii) where it reflects non application of mind, (iii) show cause

notice is issued with a pre-determined or pre-meditated approach and (iv) in

case the show cause notice amounts to abuse of process of law or results in

violation of principles of natural justice. It has been argued that in such

situations, this Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Drawing our attention to the order passed by learned Single Judge of

this Court on 09.07.2012 in W.P.(C) 7822/1999, which was instituted by the

respondent against an earlier show cause notice under Section 10 of the P.P.

Act, dated 25.10.1999 it has been stated by learned counsel for the

respondent that once the said show cause notice was quashed being patently

illegal in law, it was not open to the appellants to have taken recourse to

issuing the impugned show cause notice for eviction on the same grounds on

which the earlier notice dated 25.10.1999 was issued.

Learned counsel for the respondent has stated that the order dated

09.07.2012, while quashing the earlier notice dated 25.10.1999, has observed

that neither the lease was determined nor was there any re-entry and since the

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notice dated 25.10.1999 was not preceded by determination of the lease as

such, the said notice was illegal. His submission is that once a similar notice

has been found by this Court in its order dated 09.07.2012 to be bad in law,

the fresh notice which is impugned in the writ petition could not have been

issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act and issuance of

such a notice is nothing but tantamount to abuse of the process of law and

also reflects pre-determined and pre-meditated approach by the appellant

no.1 in taking recourse to proceedings under Section 4 of the P.P. Act. It is

in this respect that reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on J.

Sri Nisha (supra).

(iii) Basis the law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in J. Sri Nisha

(supra), it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that since the show

cause notice, which is under challenge before the learned Single Judge, has

been issued by the Estate Officer, who patently lacks the jurisdiction to issue

such a notice in view of the order of learned Single Judge dated 09.07.2012

and issuance of the notice reflects pre-meditated mind of the appellants, as

such the writ petition before learned Single Judge is maintainable and,

therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly passed the impugned order

deferring the proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated

17.04.2026.

ISSUES

18. On the basis of the pleadings available on record and the respective

submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the following issues

emerge for our consideration and adjudication:

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(a) As to whether, the instant intra-court appeal against the impugned

order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is maintainable

and as to whether, the impugned order is a “Judgment” for the purpose of

invoking remedy of intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

(b) As to whether, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is

vitiated, as no reason has been assigned for deferring the proceedings

pursuant to the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026, and consequently, the

proceedings emanating from the show cause notice have been put to a halt by

the impugned order without any reflection in the impugned order of a prima

facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

19. For appropriately deciding issue (a) as culled out above, we need to

extract Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of

Judicature at Lahore dated 21.03.1919 which is applicable to this Court.

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent reads as under:

“10. Appeals to the High Court from Judges of the Court—

And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said

High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not

being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise

of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the

Superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order

made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a

sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power

of Superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the

Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal

jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge

of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the

Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything

hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High

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Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or

one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant of Section 108 of the

Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of

February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the

exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order

made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject

to the Superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge

who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for

appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of

Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall

be to Us, Our heirs or Successors in our or their Privy Council,

as hereinafter provided.”

20. The jurisdiction of intra-court appeal available in Clause 10 of the

Letters Patent has been saved by Section 5 of Delhi High Court Act, 1966

[hereinafter referred to as the „Act, 1966’] which provides that this Court

shall have all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law

in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable in respect of

territories by the High Court of Punjab. “Appointed Day” has been defined

under Section 2 of the Act, 1966 to mean the day appointed under Section 3.

21. Section 3 of the Act, 1966 provides that the Central Government, by

way of a notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a day and from such day

the High Court of Delhi shall come into existence. The notification under

Section 3 was issued on 31.10.1966 and, therefore, in view of the provisions

contained in Section 5 of the Act, 1966 this Court possess all such original,

appellate and other jurisdiction which was exercisable by the High Court of

Punjab; thus, this Court exercises the jurisdiction of intra-court appeal by a

Division Bench of this Court against the judgment of a learned Single Judge.

22. Section 10 of the Act, 1966 provides that where a Single Judge of this

Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, an appeal shall lie from

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the judgment of the Single Judge to a Division Bench of this Court. Section

10 of the Act, 1966, reads as under:

“10. Powers of Judges. —(1) Where a single Judge of the High

Court of Delhi exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction

conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 on that Court, an

appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single Judge to a

Division Court of that High Court.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the law in force

immediately before the appointed day relating to the powers of

the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High

Court of Punjab and with respect to all matters ancillary to the

exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary

modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Delhi.”

23. What is noticeable is that provisions contained in Clause 10 of the

Letters Patent, as also in Section 10 of the Act, 1966, provide for an intra-

court appeal which lies from the “Judgment” of the Single Judge to a

Division Bench of this Court. So far as intra-court appeal against a decision

of a learned Single Judge exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction is concerned,

the expression “Judgment” has to derive its meaning from the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as „CPC’] [see University of Delhi

and Anr. V. Hafiz Mohd. Said & Ors, AIR 1972 Delhi 102, a five-bench

judgment of this Court].

24. The expression “Judgment” occurring in Letters Patent of different

High Courts has engaged the attention of Hon‟ble Supreme Court on more

than one occasions. In Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court considered the issue, as to when a decision of a Single Judge could be

LPA 336/2026 Page 15 of 34

regarded as a “Judgment” within the meaning of the relevant Clause of

Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court.

25. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) laid

down certain principles and the first such principle laid down is that though

Letters Patent did not define the expression “Judgment”, since the Letters

Patent was a special law, it would not be appropriate to project the definition

of the expression “Judgment” occurring in Section 2(9) of the CPC into the

meaning of the said expression for the purposes of Letters Patent. The Apex

Court further held that the concept of the “Judgment” as defined in CPC is

rather narrow and while defining the expression “decree”, the limitation

which are maintained in Section 2(9) of the CPC cannot be imported into the

definition of the expression “Judgment” for the purposes of the Letters

Patent.

26. It has been held that the expression “Judgment" for the purposes of

Letters Patent would receive a wider and more liberal interpretation than the

expression “Judgment” occurring in the CPC. The Apex Court in Shah

Babulal Khimji (supra) has also held that a “Judgment” imports a concept of

finality in a broader and not in a narrower sense, and further that a

“Judgment” can be of three kinds: (i) final judgment, (ii) a preliminary

judgment and (iii) an intermediary or interlocutory judgment.

27. The relevant observations in this regard have been made in paragraph

113 of the report in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), which is extracted herein

below:

“113. Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment

consists of the reasons and grounds for a decree passed by a

court. As a judgment constitutes the reasons for the decree it

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follows as a matter of course that the judgment must be a

formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights

of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in

controversy. The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code

of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the

limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be

physically imported into the definition of the word “judgment”

as used in clause 15 of the letters patent because the letters

patent has advisedly not used the terms “order” or “decree”

anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the letters

patent was that the word “judgment” should receive a much

wider and more liberal interpretation than the word

“judgment” used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same

time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge

would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to

the number of orders which would be appealable under the

letters patent. It seems to us that the word “judgment” has

undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a

narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three

kinds:

(1) A final judgment. — A judgment which decides all the

questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial

Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided.

This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit

or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed

in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge

indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the

meaning of the letters patent and even amounts to a

decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment

to a Division Bench.

(2) A preliminary judgment. —This kind of a judgment

may take two forms—(a) where the trial Judge by an

order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of

the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the

defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the

suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally

decided one way or the other, the order passed by the

trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the

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cause so far as the Trial Judge is concerned and

therefore appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another

shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that

where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the

preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to

maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res

judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice

under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are

decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit

is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on

merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the

objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of

the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled

to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus,

such an order even though it keeps the suit alive,

undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial

which affects a vital right of the defendant and must,

therefore be construed to be a judgment so as to be

appealable to a larger Bench.

(3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment. — Most of

the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of

finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order

43 Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be

judgments within the meaning of the letters patent and,

therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory

orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but

which also possess the characteristics and trappings of

finality in that the orders may adversely affect a valuable

right of the party or decide an important aspect of the

trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order

can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party

concerned must be direct and immediate rather than

indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial Judge in

a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure

refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order

directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable

right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to

contest the plaintiff's case on his own evidence without

being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such an

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order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it

will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the

meaning of the letters patent so as to be appealable to a

larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit

where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the

suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely

affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not

direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather

too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full

right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the

suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial Judge would

not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause

15 of the letters patent but will be purely an interlocutory

order. Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes an order

setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant,

which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Order

43 Rule 1 though an order rejecting an application to set

aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43

Rule 1 clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question

that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a

judgment within the meaning of letters patent. The fact,

however, remains that the order setting aside the ex parte

decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works

serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence

of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and

is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour.

In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the

trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects

the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to

an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to

a larger Bench.”

28. What is relevant to note here is that the orders listed in Clauses (a) to

(w) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC contain the attributes of finality and

would hence be judgments even for the purposes of the Letters Patent. We

may also observe that there may be interlocutory orders which are not listed

in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC, but may still have an attribute of finality.

LPA 336/2026 Page 19 of 34

It is in this background that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shah Babulal

Khimji (supra), in paragraph 113 has held that there may be interlocutory

orders not listed in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC but still may have

trappings of finality, in the sense that such interlocutory orders may adversely

impact available rights of the parties or decide an important aspect of the trial

in an ancillary proceeding.

29. The Apex Court has further proceeded to observe that such an order

can be treated as a “Judgment” wherein the adverse impact on the party

concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. In

Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) it has also been held that during course of

proceedings of a case, the learned Single Judge may pass various orders

which are procedural or routine in nature and further, even if such orders

cause some inconvenience to a party, the same would probably be

interlocutory and would not be regarded as “Judgment”, so as to make such

orders passed by learned Single Judge amenable to challenge in an intra-

court appeal.

30. In paragraph 115 of the report in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the

Apex Court has further held that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded

as a judgment; only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of

moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and cause serious

injustice to the parties concerned. Such observations in Shah Babulal Khimji

(supra) have been made in paragraph 115 of the report, which reads as under:

“115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be

regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be

judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and

valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice

to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial

LPA 336/2026 Page 20 of 34

Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a

document also cannot be treated as judgments because the

grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court

in appeal against the final judgment.”

31. Accordingly, based on the principle laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji

(supra), what we can safely observe is that an interlocutory order to be a

“Judgment” should contain trappings of finality, either when it decides the

questions in controversy in ancillary proceedings, main proceedings or in the

part of a proceeding.

32. As laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Central Mine Planning

and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 588 to determine

the question if an interlocutory order falls within the meaning of “Judgment”

for the purposes of Letters Patent, the test which needs to be applied is as to

whether, the order is a final determination, affecting vital and valuable rights

and obligations of the parties concerned. The Court further proceeds to

observe that this needs to be ascertained on the facts of each case.

33. In Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra), the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court was examining Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to

Patna High Court and has extensively referred to the judgment in Shah

Babulal Khimji (supra), and has also mentioned that relevant Clauses of

Letters Patent of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras are in iisdem terminis (in the

exact same words) with Clause 10 of Letters Patent of Allahabad, Patna,

Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts.

34. Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra) concludes that

to determine as to whether, an interlocutory order passed by learned Single

Judge can be regarded as a “Judgment” for the purposes of Letters Parent, the

LPA 336/2026 Page 21 of 34

test to be applied will be as to whether, the order is a final determination

affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned

and this has to be ascertained from the facts of each case. Paragraph 14 of the

Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra) is extracted herein

below:

“14. In the instant case, we are concerned with the last

mentioned category. From the above discussion, it follows that

to determine the question whether an interlocutory order

passed by one Judge of a High Court falls within the meaning

of “judgment” for purposes of Letters Patent the test is:

Whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and

valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned. This

has to be ascertained on the facts of each case.”

35. Reference may also be had to the law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Midnapore (supra), where paragraph 15 of the report reads as

under:

“15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the

pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following

categories:

(i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in

controversy in the main case.

(ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and

directly affects the final decision in the main case.

(iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question

which is not the subject-matter of the main case.

(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress

of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.

(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some

prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the

rights and obligations of the parties.

LPA 336/2026 Page 22 of 34

36. For appropriately ascertaining the correct meaning of the expression

“Judgment” occurring in the Letters Patent, we may also refer to the

observations made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of

Midnapore (supra), which is extracted here in below:

“16. The term “judgment” occurring in clause 15 of the Letters

Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined

in Section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1

CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and

conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all

or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to

some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable

rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which

fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore,

“judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters

Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv)

and (v) are not “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals

provided under the Letters Patent.

37. Midnapore (supra) has reiterated what was already laid down in Shah

Babulal Khimji (supra) that the expression “Judgment” occurring in Letters

Patent will cover not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) of the

CPC and orders enlisted in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC but also other

interlocutory orders which though, may not finally and conclusively

determine the rights of the parties but may have finality in regard to some co-

lateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations

of the parties.

38. It has been held that the order which finally decides a question or issue

in the main case, orders which finally decide an issue which materially and

directly affects the final decision in the main case and orders which finally

decide a co-lateral issue or question, which is not the subject matter of the

main case will be “Judgments” for the purposes of filing appeals under the

LPA 336/2026 Page 23 of 34

Letters Patent, however, the routine orders passed to facilitate the progress of

the case and orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice

but do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties will not

be “Judgment” for the purposes of Letters Patent.

39. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. (supra) has

summed up as to which decision of a learned Single Judge will amount to

“Judgment” so as to invoke the jurisdiction of intra-court appeal by a

Division Bench. Referring to Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the Shyam Sel

& Power Ltd. (supra) arrives at the same conclusion that there may be

interlocutory orders, which are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC but if

such orders possess the characteristics and trappings of finality inasmuch as

such orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an

important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding, such decision will be

“Judgment” for the purpose of letters patent. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Shyam

Sel & Power Ltd. (supra) are extracted hereinbelow:-

“18. It could thus be seen that though this Court in Shah

Babulal Khimji [Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania,

(1981) 4 SCC 8] has held that the term “judgment” used in

letters patent could not be given a narrower meaning as is

given to the term “judgment” used in CPC and that it should

receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation, however,

at the same time, each and every order passed by the trial

Judge could not be construed to be a “judgment” inasmuch as

there will be no end to the number of orders which would be

appealable under the letters patent. It has been held that the

word “judgment” has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a

broader and not in a narrower sense. It has been held that

where an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendants,

it will undoubtedly be treated as a “judgment” within the

meaning of letters patent so as to be appealable to a larger

Bench.

LPA 336/2026 Page 24 of 34

19. It has been held in Shah Babulal Khimji [Shah Babulal

Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] that most of the

interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are

clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1CPC

and would be “judgments” within the meaning of the letters

patent and, therefore, appealable. However, there may be

interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule

1CPC but which also possess the characteristics and trappings

of finality inasmuch as such orders may adversely affect a

valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the

trial in an ancillary proceeding. It has further been held that

however, for such an order to be a “judgment”, an adverse

effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate

rather than indirect or remote. Various illustrations of

interlocutory orders have been given by this Court in Shah

Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania [Shah Babulal

Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] , para 120, which

could be held to be appealable. This Court in Shah Babulal

Khimji [Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4

SCC 8] held that though any discretion exercised or routine

orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit may

cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice to one

party or the other, they cannot be treated as a “judgment”

unless they contain the traits and trappings of finality. This

Court has expressed in para 122 of Shah Babulal Khimji [Shah

Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] that

though it had, by way of sample, laid down various illustrative

examples of an order which may amount to a judgment, it would

not be possible to give such an exhaustive list as may cover all

possible areas. This Court, in the facts of the said case, held

that an order of the Single Judge refusing appointment of a

Receiver and grant of an ad interim injunction was undoubtedly

a “judgment” within the meaning of letters patent, both because

Order 43 Rule 1CPC applies to internal appeals in the High

Court and that such an order even on merits contains the

quality of finality and would therefore be a “judgment” within

the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.”

LPA 336/2026 Page 25 of 34

40. In view of the principle of law in respect of a decision passed by

learned Single Judge being “Judgment” for the purpose of Letters Patent, as

discussed above, we now need to examine as to whether the impugned order

dated 24.04.2026 has to be regarded as “Judgment” so as to maintain this

intra-court appeal.

41. Learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has discussed

in nutshell the case of the appellant as also that of the respondent, and has

simply observed that “looking to the chequered history of the previous

litigation and in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the matter

requires consideration and after calling upon the parties to complete their

pleadings, has further directed that Estate Officer shall not proceed any

further with the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026. The question for our

determination, thus, is as to whether the impugned order directing the Estate

Officer not to proceed with the impugned show-cause notice causes prejudice

and effects any valuable rights of the appellant, though it is an order, which is

interlocutory in nature.

42. As already discussed above, the law as laid down by the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court is that the expression “Judgment” occurring in letters patent

has to be given a wider meaning, and it should not be limited to the meaning

of the said expression within the confines of the CPC. It is also noted that

such orders to be a “Judgment” for the purpose of Letters Patent, should not

be confined to the orders enlisted in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The

law, thus, is that an intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent would be

maintainable even against an interlocutory order if it impacts valuable rights

of the parties even in ancillary proceedings.

LPA 336/2026 Page 26 of 34

43. The impugned order in the instant case as has been passed by learned

Single Judge while calling upon the parties to complete their pleadings. So

far as the direction issued for completion of pleadings is concerned, such an

order cannot be regarded to be a “Judgment” for the purpose of invoking

appellate jurisdiction under Letters Patent for the reason that such an order is

not only interlocutory but is generally passed to facilitate progression of the

proceedings before learned Single Judge.

44. However, as far as the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in

the impugned order directing the Estate Officer not to proceed with the

proceedings emanating from the show-cause notice, we may note that on

account of the term of the lease having come to an end way back in the year

1994, the term of the lease stood determined and, therefore, it is a statutory

right of the appellant no.1 to invoke the provision of Section 4 of the PP Act.

We may also note that as laid down by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in

Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra), the expression

“unauthorised occupation” occurring in Section 2(g) has not to be confined to

only a person who is found to have occupied any public premises without

lawful authority, but it needs to be extended to those occupants whose

occupation was initially permissible at the inception, but subsequently ceased

to be authorised. Thus, on the basis of the lease, the respondent was validly in

occupation and possession of the subject land; however, once the term of the

lease had expired way back in the year 1994, such occupation ceased to be

authorised in terms of the provisions of the PP Act.

45. Section 4 of the PP Act vests a statutory right which provides that if

the Estate Officer has information that any person is in unauthorised

occupation of any public premises and that such a person should be evicted,

LPA 336/2026 Page 27 of 34

he shall issue a notice in writing regarding unauthorised occupation calling

upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not

be made. Thus, remedy of Section 4 seeking eviction of any unauthorised

occupant from public premises is a statutory vested right available to the

appellant no.1 and if such a course of action is resorted by the appellant

taking recourse to the provision of Section 4, any order, may be interlocutory

in nature, passed by learned Single Judge restraining the Estate Officer from

proceedings any further in the matter, in our opinion, impacts the available

statutory right of the appellant and, therefore, for this reason alone the

impugned order, as per our opinion, would be a “Judgment” for the limited

purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Division Bench of this Court under

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

46. We are also unable to subscribe to the argument made by learned

counsel for the respondent that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

notice dated 17.04.2026 is pre-meditated or amounts to an abuse of the

process of law. Section 4 vests a right to seek eviction of an unauthorised

occupant, which has statutorily been provided in respect of public premises

and if any authority resorts to such statutory recourse, it cannot be said that

such recourse would amount to misuse or abuse of the process of law or it is

pre-meditated.

47. So far as reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the

order passed by learned Single Judge dated 09.07.2012 passed in W.P.(C)

7822/1999 which was instituted by the respondent against an earlier show-

cause notice dated 25.10.1999, is concerned, we may note that said Writ

Petition was finally disposed of by the Court quashing the notice and

directing the appellant to decide the representation said to have been

LPA 336/2026 Page 28 of 34

preferred by the respondent on 19.12.2011, where a prayer was made for

extension/renewal of the lease. Pursuant to the said representation dated

19.12.2011, the prayer is said to have been processed by the appellant,

however the same was not acceded to, and therefore, a fresh notice under

Section 4 of the PP Act has now been issued. It is also noticeable that in the

proceedings instituted under Section 4 of the PP Act, the respondent will

have the amplest opportunity to explain as to why an eviction order may not

be passed. All the grounds and pleas available to the respondent under the

law will be permissible to be taken by it, including the ground that the notice

is not lawful.

48. We may also note that prior to institution of the underlying Writ

Petition namely W.P.(C) 5608/2026, the respondent had instituted a suit

being CS (OS) 253/2026, which has been disposed of by a learned Single

Judge of this Court on 09.04.2026, where it has clearly been recorded that

any action for dispossession of the respondent from the subject premises

would be taken in accordance with due process of law. Prima facie, the

subject premises is a public premises and the respondent is unauthorised

occupant within the meaning of the said expression occurring in PP Act,

however in view of the observations made while disposing of the aforesaid

suit vide order dated 09.04.2026, if for dispossession of the respondent

recourse under Section 4 of the PP Act has been taken by the appellant, it

cannot be said that such process is not in accordance with due process of law.

49. Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the appellants on

Express Newspapers Private Limited (supra), however the Division Bench

of this Court in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra)

referring to the Express Newspapers Private Limited (supra), has

LPA 336/2026 Page 29 of 34

unambiguously held that the expression “unauthorised occupation” occurring

in PP Act would include a person, who is found to have occupied any public

premises without lawful authority as well as those whose occupation was

initially permissible at the inception but subsequently ceased to be

authorised. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in

Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra), even if initially the

respondent was in permissible occupation/possession of the subject land, on

expiry of the term of the lease way back in the year 1994 he would cease to

be an authorised occupant.

50. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in Anant Raj

Agencies (supra), where it has clearly been held that once a notice was

issued under Section 4 of the PP Act by the Estate Officer, the only course

open to the noticee is to respond to the notice.

51. Accordingly, in view of the discussions made above, we opine that the

impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is to be

regarded as a “Judgment” for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction of intra-

court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the instant

appeal is maintainable.

52. As regards issue “b” set out hereinabove, what we notice is that

learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, after discussing the

respective cases of the parties, has only observed that looking at the

chequered history of the previous litigation and in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case, the matter requires consideration and, thereafter

without giving any reason, even for the namesake, has directed that the Estate

Officer shall not proceed further with the show-cause notice dated

LPA 336/2026 Page 30 of 34

17.04.2026. Such a course, in our opinion, was not available to the learned

Single Judge for passing the interim order, which has impacted the valuable

right of the appellants to invoke the statutory right under Section 4 of the PP

Act, without giving reasons and without giving a finding on the issue relating

to prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience.

53. It is settled law that this Court, while passing the interim orders even

while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, is under an obligation to conform to the legal principle

governing the grant of an interim order, which requires adjudication to be

made regarding a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable

loss. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust,

(2000) 5 SCC 57, has observed that it may be that Order XXXIX of the CPC

may not be applicable at the stage of granting interim relief in a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but at the same time various

principles laid down under Order XXXIX for granting ad-interim relief are

required to be taken into consideration. Paragraph 6 of the judgment in Era

Educational Trust (supra) is quoted below:-

“6. It may be that Order XXXIX CPC would not be applicable at

the stage of granting interim relief in a petition under Article 226

or 227 of the Constitution, but at the same time various principles

laid down under Order XXXIX for granting ad interim or interim

reliefs are required to be taken into consideration. In the case of

Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das [(1994) 4 SCC 225]

after considering the various authorities this Court laid down the

guiding principles in relation to grant of an ad interim injunction

which are as under: (SCC pp. 241-42, para 36)

“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only

under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should

weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are—

LPA 336/2026 Page 31 of 34

(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the

plaintiff;

(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve

greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff

first had notice of the act complained so that the making of

improper order against a party in his absence is prevented;

(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had

acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not

grant ex parte injunction;

(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte

injunction to show utmost good faith in making the

application;

(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a

limited period of time;

(g) general principles like prima facie case, balance of

convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered

by the court.”

54. We may also refer in this regard an order dated 07.08.2025 passed by a

Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P(C) 11876/2025, Mohmmed Javed v.

Union of India & Ors., wherein by placing reliance on Era Educational

Trust (supra), it has been held that “it is trite law that although the

provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are, ipso facto, not applicable to the

proceedings of a Writ Petition before the High Court, however, principles

laid down for granting interim relief under Order XXXIX of the CPC should

be kept in mind by the High Court”.

55. When we analyse the impugned order passed by the learned Single

Judge on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle, what we find is that

nothing has been considered by the learned Single Judge in respect of a prima

LPA 336/2026 Page 32 of 34

facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience while passing the

impugned order.

56. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4

SCC 697 (supra), has observed that in cases where withholding of an interim

relief would tantamount to disposal of the main petition itself; for by the time

the main matter comes up for hearing, there would be nothing left to be

allowed as relief to the petitioner, the availability of a very strong prima facie

case, which has to be of a standard much higher than just prima facie case,

consideration of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully

tilting the balance of case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the

Court to grant interim relief. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has further

observed that such would be rare and exceptional cases and also that such an

interim relief can be granted only if the Court is satisfied that withholding of

it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of

justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated and at the end the Court

would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. The Apex Court further

observed that such would be a rare case accompanied by compelling

circumstances where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and

would cause extreme hardship. Paragraph 12 of the judgment in Deoraj

(supra) is extracted herein below:-

“12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief

would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there

may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would

tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time

the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to

be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be

in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima

facie case — of a standard much higher than just prima facie case,

LPA 336/2026 Page 33 of 34

the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury

forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the

applicant may persuade the court to grant an interim relief though

it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would

be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an

interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the

conscience of the court and do violence to the sense of justice,

resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and

at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of

justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by

compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is

immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The

conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the court may

put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.”

57. Thus, what we need to examine is as to what would be the impact on

the proceedings of the main Writ Petition if the proceedings before the Estate

Officer pursuant to the show-cause notice had not been stayed by passing the

interim order. Even if it is presumed that the case of the respondent is that by

non-interference in the show-cause notice would render the Writ Petition

itself infructuous, the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into

consideration the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable

injury and further that such injury would tilt the balance of case and only on

recording finding on these aspects the interim relief of the nature which has

been granted vide the impugned order, could have been granted.

58. We may also notice that in such cases, the availability of a “very

strong prima facie case”, of a standard much higher than just a “prima facie

case”, is one of the requisite considerations for passing an order of interim

relief.

59. Accordingly, since the impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the

learned Single Judge does not reflect upon any of the aforesaid aspects of the

LPA 336/2026 Page 34 of 34

matter in as much as it does not even record any discussion, much less any

finding, on the aspects of a strong prima facie case, irreparable loss and

balance of convenience, in our opinion, such an order is not sustainable. The

issue “b” thus stands decided in these terms.

60. For the discussions made and reasons given above, the instant appeal is

allowed and the order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge,

so far as it directs the Estate Officer to not proceed further with the show-

cause notice dated 17.04.2026 is hereby set aside.

61. The pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

62. The appeal along with pending applications stands disposed of.

63. There shall be no orders as to costs.

(DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA)

CHIEF JUSTICE

(TEJAS KARIA)

JUDGE

MAY 26, 2026

“shailndra”/MJ/S.Rawat