2025 INSC 146 1 | P a g e

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Miscellaneous Application No. 1773/2021 in Civil Appeal No.

7064/2019

Union of India and another ….Appellants

versus

Tarsem Singh and others ….Respondents

IN THE MATTER OF

Project Director, National Highways Authority of India ….Applicant

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. ……..…./2025 @ Diary No.37767/2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9919/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15538/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15581/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15653/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15747/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. ……..…./2025 @ Diary No.38417/2023)

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. ……..…./2025 @ Diary No. 52538/2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14942/2019)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. ……..…./2025 @ Diary No. 21226/2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……..…. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. ……..…./2025 @ Diary No. 38093/2024)

ORDER

SURYA KANT, J.

1. The instant Miscellaneous Application, filed by the National

Highways Authority of India (NHAI) through its Project Director,

seeks clarification regarding the judgment dated 19.09.2019,

passed in Civil Appeal No. 7064 of 2019, titled Union of India &

Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors ,

1 to the extent that the

aforementioned judgment is to be applied prospectively, thereby

precluding the reopening of cases where land acquisition

proceedings have already been completed and the determination of

compensation had also attained finality.

1

Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304.

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2. This Miscellaneous Application is tagged with several appeals filed

by the NHAI challenging the decisions of various High Courts at the

instance of private parties, wherein relief has been granted relying

on the judgment dated 19.09.2019. The High Court s vide these

decisions have either (i) awarded ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ to the

expropriated landowners; or (ii) directed the Competent Authority

(Land Acquisition, National Highways) to consider and decide

representations made by the landowners for the grant of ‘solatium’

and ‘interest’ in light of the aforementioned judgment of this Court.

This also includes SLP (C) No. 14942/2019 titled ‘K. Raju and

others v. The Project Director, National Highways Authority of India

and others’, which has been preferred by a private party assailing

the decision of the Madras High Court dated 01.04.2019, whereby

the relief of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ was directed to be raised before

the Competent Authority.

3. Additionally, SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023 titled ‘Raj Kumar and

another v. Union of India and others’, has been preferred by a private

party whose lands were acquired by NHAI. In this instance, the

Punjab and Haryana High Court has rejected their claim for the

award of ‘Additional Market Value’ relying upon its decision in

National Highway Authority of India v. Resham Singh ,

2

2

National Highway Authority of India v. Resham Singh, 2023:PHHC:053158 -DB.

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whereby the landowners were held entitled to ‘solatium’ and

‘interest’, but their claim for the grant of ‘Additional Market Value’

was declined. These benefits were granted / partly declined in

terms of Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(1894 Act), which were read into the provisions of the National

Highways Act, 1956 (NHAI Act).

A. BRIEF LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

4. At this juncture, it is pertinent to briefly delve into the legislative

background of Section 3J of the NHAI Act vis-à-vis the 1894 Act

and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act).

5. The erstwhile 1894 Act facilitated the acquisition of land by the

Government for public purposes, outlining a process that included

the identification of land, issuance of a notification announcing the

intent to acquire, followed by inquiries and hearings to determine

the compensation payable to landowners. Additionally, the 1894

Act provided for the grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ under Sections

23 and 28. For a considerable period, the NHAI Act operated

alongside the 1894 Act, with its provisions being pari materia to

those of the latter.

6. Be that as it may, Section 3J of the NHAI Act has been fraught with

controversy from its very inception. Section 3J, along with several

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other provisions, were inserted into the NHAI Act vide the National

Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (1997 Amendment ), with

the objective of ‘creating an environment to promote private

investment in National Highways, to speed up construction of

highways and to remove bottlenecks in their proper management’. In

this regard, one of the impediments to the speedy implementation

of highway projects was recognised to be the inordinate delay in the

acquisition of land.

7. Accordingly, the NHAI Act was amended , with a number of

measures undertaken to accelerate the procedure of acquisition,

whereby a determination of compensation would be made by the

Competent Authority, and if not accepted by either party, it would

then be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Central

Government. In addition, this newly introduced process did not

envisage either ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’ and rather declared through

Section 3J that ‘nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall

apply to an acquisition under this Act’.

8. Upon its incorporation and coming into force, several High Courts

began to strike down Section 3J of the NHAI as unconstitutional in

the light of its effect of treating similarly situated individuals

differently. It was first struck down by the Karnataka High Court

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on 11.10.2002 in the case of Lalita v. Union of India

3 and then

subsequently on 28.03.2008 by the Punjab and Haryana High

Court in Golden Iron and Steel (supra). This trend continued to

be followed by the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani v. Union

of India.

4

9. Meanwhile, the 2013 Act came into force with effect from

01.01.2014 and by the promulgation of Amendment Ordinance 9

of 2014, the 2013 Act was amended from 01.01.2015, thereby

making its provisions applicable to numerous enactments ,

including the NHAI Act. Subsequently, upon the lapsing of the

Ordinance, a notification dated 28.08.2015 was issued under

Section 105, read with Section 113, wherein it was specified that

the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply to acquisitions carried

out under the NHAI Act.

10. Thereafter, a batch of appeals challenging the decision in T.

Chakrapani (supra) were disposed of by this Court on 21.07.2016,

following a statement made by the then Solicitor General of India

that ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ would be paid on acquisitions made

under the NHAI Act.

5 However, the batch of appeals challenging the

decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron

3

Lalita v. Union of India, 2002 SCC Online Kar 569.

4

T. Chakrapani v. Union of India, 2011 SCC Online Mad 2881.

5

Civil Appeal Nos. 129-159/2014.

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and Steel (supra) remained pending. In two other appeals,

challenging the decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Punjab

and Haryana High Court, this Court disposed them off, holding that

‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ would be awardable to cases pending as on

the date of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Golden Iron and Steel (supra) i.e. 28.03.2008.

6

11. This prompted NHAI to withdraw the appeals challenging the

decision in Golden Iron and Steel (supra). In similar cases, the

Madras High Court also awarded payment of ‘solatium’ and

‘interest’.

7 Thereafter, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) was

delivered by this Court, making clear the legal position on the grant

of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ vis-à-vis the NHAI Act.

12. As already iterated, this triggered a chain reaction of writ petitions

being filed across various High Courts by aggrieved landowners

whose lands had been acquired by the NHAI in the period between

1997 and 2015 and who had not been granted the benefit of

‘solatium’ or ‘interest’, seeking parity with those who were found

entitled to these statutory benefits prior to 1997 and post-2015.

Since the High Courts have restored parity in these cases, NHAI

6

Sunita Mehra v. Union of India, (2019) 17 SCC 672.

7

Union of India v. M. Pachamuthu, WA Nos. 62-81/2019.

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has sought clarification of our judgement in Tarsem Singh

(supra).

B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES

13. Mr. Tushar Mehta, Learned Solicitor General of India, appearing on

behalf of the Applicant, NHAI, made the following submissions:

a) The judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) is applicable

prospectively from the date of its pronouncement, i.e.,

19.09.2019, and not retrospectively from the date of

enforcement of the 1997 Amendment. Granting relief in cases

that have already been concluded is inconsistent with the

principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Gurpreet

Singh v. Union of India.

8

b) If the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) is applied

retrospectively, it would necessitate reopening all acquisitions

made by the NHAI between 1997 and 2015. Consequently, the

Government would be obligated to compensate every claimant

whose land was acquired by the NHAI during this period.

c) Permitting the decision to operate retrospectively would lead to

an influx of mass litigation, requiring the reopening of closed

cases. This would have significant economic ramifications,

8

Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457.

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placing an additional burden of approximately Rupees 92.18

crores on the Public Exchequer for the payment of ‘interest’

and ‘solatium’ for the delayed period.

d) Reopening such cases would directly contravene the doctrine

of immutability, a fundamental principle which holds that a

judgment, once attaining finality, becomes unalterable and

cannot be modified. Furthermore, any claims now raised by

private parties would be barred by the principles of delay and

laches.

14. Per contra, the counsel(s) representing the landowners refuted the

claims made by the NHAI and contended as follows:

a) Declaring the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) as

prospective would render redundant the entire exercise of

ensuring parity, given that the 2013 Act now governs the field,

making the grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ a requisite.

Tarsem Singh (supra) was delivered specifically with a view

to address the grievances of landowners who were denied the

statutory benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ owing to the

operation of Section 3J of the NHAI Act.

b) Limiting the judgment to prospective application would result

in hostile discrimination, as landowners in Chakrapani

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(supra), Tarsem Singh (supra) , and similar cases have

benefited from the declaration of Section 3J of the NHAI Act as

unconstitutional. Conversely, other similarly situated

landowners would be deprived of the same relief, leading to

inequality that undermines the essence of Article 14 of the

Constitution.

c) The instant Application seeking clarification represents a

second attempt to evade impending liability. This Court, in

Tarsem Singh (supra), has already addressed the precedent

set in Sunita Mehra (supra), unequivocally holding that the

benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ must be extended to all cases

arising between 1997 and 2015, based on the categorical

admission by the Union of India itself.

d) The clarification sought through this Application, if

entertained, would effectively amount to a review of the

decision in Tarsem Singh (supra). It would also enable the

Government to withdraw from its previously stated position,

wherein it had agreed to extend the benefit of ‘solatium’ and

‘interest’.

C. ISSUES

15. As previously elaborated, the singular issue prompting filing of the

instant Application is to determine definitively whether the

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judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) is applicable prospectively or

extends retrospectively.

D. ANALYSIS

16. At the outset, it is essential to briefly refer to the ratio espoused in

Tarsem Singh (supra), which, after considering the relevant facts,

applicable laws, and precedents, held that Section 3J of the NHAI

Act, by excluding the applicability of the 1894 Act and thereby

denying ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ for lands acquired under the NHAI

Act, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. To this end, the

decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) took notice of the eleven

grounds raised on behalf of the NHAI and the Union of India, and

dealt with those grounds by segregating the appeals therein into

eleven groups and outlining them in seriatim.

17. Regardless, the prayer in the instant Application expressly seeks

clarification that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) should be

deemed to operate prospectively only. However, in our considered

view, granting such a clarification would effectively nullify the very

relief that Tarsem Singh (supra) intended to provide, as the

prospective operation of it would restore the state of affairs to the

same position as it was before the decision was rendered.

18. We say so for the reason that the broader purpose behind Tarsem

Singh (supra) was to resolve and put quietus upon the quagmire

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created by Section 3J of the NHAI Act, which led to the unequal

treatment of similarly situated individuals. The impact of Section

3J was short-lived, owing to the applicability of the 2013 Act upon

the NHAI Act from the date of 01.01.2015. As a result, two classes

of landowners emerged, devoid of any intelligible differentia: those

whose lands were acquired by the NHAI between 1997 and 2015 ,

and those whose lands were acquired otherwise.

19. This must be viewed in the light of the principle that when a

provision is declared unconstitutional, any continued disparity

strikes at the core of Article 14 and must be rectified, particularly

when such disparity affects only a select group. To illustrate,

rendering the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) as prospective

would create a situation where a landowner whose land was

acquired on 31.12.2014 would be denied the benefit of ‘solatium’

and ‘interest’, whereas a landowner whose land was acquired the

very next day, 01.01.2015—the date on which the Ordinance was

promulgated, to read the 2013 Act into the NHAI Act, would be

entitled to these statutory benefits.

20. Be that as it may, even if we were to assume that the decision in

Tarsem Singh (supra) suffers from the vice of vagueness, the

absence of a judicial directive or an explicit legislative mandate

should not result in the creation of an artificial classification among

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a homogeneous group by the same State exercising powers under

the same Statute. In this specific instance, the landowners have no

discretion or choice regarding the date of land acquisition or the

surrender of possession. Thus, both equity and equality demand

that no such discrimination be permitted, as allowing it would be

unjust.

21. That being so, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) also cannot

be assailed on the grounds that it opens a Pandora’s Box or

contravenes the doctrine of immutability, as it merely allows for the

grant of ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’, which are inherently embedded as

compensatory benefits under an expropriating legislation. This

exercise cannot be equated to reopening of cases or revisiting the

decisions that have already attained finality. Similarly, the

restoration of these twin benefits does not invite reconsideration of

the merits of a decided case, re-evaluation of the compensation

amount, or potentially declaring the acquisition process itself to be

unlawful. Instead, the ultimate outcome of Tarsem Singh (supra)

is limited to granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ to aggrieved

landowners whose lands were acquired by NHAI between 1997 and

2015. It does not, in any manner, direct the reopening of cases that

have already attained finality.

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22. On the contrary, modifying or clarifying the judgment in Tarsem

Singh (supra) would lend itself to violating the doctrine of

immutability, undermining the finality of the decision. In fact, what

the Applicant seeks to achieve, indirectly, is to evade responsibility

and further delay the resolution of a settled issue where the

directions given are unequivocal—Quando aliquid prohibetur ex

directo, prohibetur et per obliquum i.e. ‘what cannot be done directly

should also not be done indirectly’. This Court has, on several

occasions, disapproved of the practice of filing Miscellaneous

Applications as a strategic litigation tactic aimed at neutralising

judicial decisions and seeking a second opportunity for relief.

23. In all fairness, the only defense that may perhaps seem appealing

is the claim of a financial burden amounting to Rupees 100 crores.

However, this argument does not persuade us for several reasons:

First, if this burden has been borne by the NHAI in the case of

thousands of other landowners, it stands to reason that it should

also be shared by the NHAI in this instance, in order to eliminate

discrimination. Second, the financial burden of acquiring land

cannot be justified in the light of the Constitutional mandate of

Article 300A. Third, since most National Highways are being

developed under the Public Private Partnership model, the financial

burden will ultimately be passed on to the relevant Project

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Proponent. Fourth, even the Project Proponent would not have to

bear the compensation costs out of pocket, as it is the commuters

who will bear the actual brunt of this cost. Ultimately, the burden

is likely to be saddled onto the middle or upper-middle-class

segment of society, particularly those who can afford private

vehicles or operate commercial ventures. We are thus not inclined

to entertain the plea for prospectivity on this limited tenet.

24. Lastly, as regards the decision in Sunita Mehra (supra), which is

claimed to have prohibited the grant of ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’ in

concluded cases, we find that this position has already been

addressed and clarified in Tarsem Singh (supra). Given that the

Government, through the then Solicitor General, had conceded this

issue at that time, it cannot now retract its stance and seek to

reargue the same bone of contention. Hence, this assertion too,

stands rejected.

E. CONCLUSION

25. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no merit in the contentions

raised by the Applicant, NHAI. We reaffirm the principles

established in Tarsem Singh (supra) regarding the beneficial

nature of granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ while emphasising the

need to avoid creating unjust classifications lacking intelligible

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differentia. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the

present Miscellaneous Application.

26. Leave is granted in the other connected matters, and all the appeals

are disposed of with a direction to the Competent Authority to

calculate the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ in accordance with

the directions issued in Tarsem Singh (supra). In this context, the

appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023 is dismissed,

as the challenge therein pertains to the High Court’s refusal to

award Additional Market Value as another component of the

compensation, while ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ have already been

granted.

27. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of in the above terms.

Ordered accordingly.

…….……………….J.

(SURYA KANT)

..…....……………..J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI

DATED: 04.02.2025