2025 INSC 800 Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 1 of 25

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1643 OF 2012

VAIBHAV …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

1. This is a tale of two friends, Vaibhav and Mangesh, who

were studying at Bagla Homeopathy Medical College, Arvat

Chandrapur, Maharashtra. They were students of first year and

often used to commute together on their two-wheelers. On the

fateful day of 16.09.2010, both friends left the college together

on the scooter belonging to Mangesh, had tea at the tea stall of

PW-3 and arrived at Vaibhav’s house in the afternoon. When

Mangesh’s father/PW-1 discovered late in the evening that his

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 2 of 25

son had not reached home, he tried to find out and eventually

lodged a missing report. The next day, on 17.09.2010, the dead

body of Mangesh was found and accordingly, the present

criminal case came to be registered against unknown persons.

2. Investigation commenced and a supplementary statement

of PW-1 was recorded wherein he raised suspicion against

Vaibhav, Mangesh’s friend, classmate, scooter partner and

appellant before us in the present appeal. Upon investigation, the

police prepared the chargesheet wherein the appellant was

alleged to have caused death of deceased Mangesh by shooting

him by the gun belonging to the appellant’s father/PW-12.

3. Upon trial, the Trial Court found that the appellant had

killed Mangesh using the service gun belonging to his father

when he came to drop him after college. Thereafter, the appellant

called his friends Vishal and Akash (juvenile at the time of

incident) for helping him in the disposal of the dead body. The

appellant was found guilty for the commission of the offences

under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as “IPC” for brevity) and

Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act, 1959. His friend Vishal

was also found guilty for the commission of the offence under

Section 201 read with Section 34 of IPC. Both the convicts had

preferred separate appeals before the Bombay High Court and

both the appeals came to be disposed of by the impugned

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 3 of 25

judgment, wherein the conviction of the appellant was upheld

and Vishal was acquitted for want of evidence. The present

appeal assails the said impugned judgment dated 13.06.2012

passed in Criminal Appeal No. 57/2012.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

4. While upholding the conviction of the appellant, the High

Court appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

and acknowledged that the case is based on circumstantial

evidence as no direct evidence of the alleged act could be found.

After examining the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the

High Court observed that the material against the accused could

be summed up as follows:

“17. The material evidence adduced by the

prosecution an admitted by the defence which are

necessary for the decision of this appeal are

enumerated thus:-

(a) PW12 Khushal Tijare, father of the deceased, is

a Police Officer to whom the 9mm pistol was

entrusted along with 30 rounds.

(b) The accused and the deceased were known to

each other.

(c) On 16.9.2010, PW12 Khushalrao had kept the

pistol under the mattress in his bedroom.

(d) A1 and the deceased had been to the house of

A1. On 16.9.2010 after 3 p.m. nobody was at home.

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 4 of 25

(e) A1 called upon his father telephonically and

demanded the keys of the rear door which leads to

the abandoned quarter.

(f) PW12 informed A1 that the keys were behind the

wall.

(g) On 16.9.2010, the deceased was lastly seen in

the company of the accused as admitted by him.

(h) On 16.9.2010 after 8 p.m., PW1 was searching

for his son and in the course of searching visited the

house of A1 to inquire about Mangesh and that A1

informed PW1 that he had lastly seen Mangesh at 4

p.m.

(i) A1 visited the house of PW1 at 10 p.m. on

16.9.2010 and inquired about Mangesh. He

returned home. His parents were at home. However,

he did not disclose anything.

(j) On 17.9.2010, A1 visited the house of PW1 i.e.

father of Mangesh at 9 a.m. Thereafter he revisited

the house of PW1 with four friends and assured

PW1 that they would search for Mangesh and made

PW1 believe that Mangesh was alive.

(k) After the dead body was noticed in the courtyard

behind the residential house of A1 and was being

removed from the spot, A1 accompanied the Police

still pretending ignorance about cause of death of

Mangesh.

(l) The admission of A1 that his acquaintance with

the deceased was just one month prior to the

incident.

(m) The admission of A1 as a defence witness that

when he went to change his clothes in his room,

Mangesh was sitting on the bed in the living room,

A1 heard the noise of firearm and came in the living

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 5 of 25

room and found Mangesh lying on the ground with

the pistol in his hand and that pistol was of his

father.

(n) The admission of defence witness A1 that as

soon as he saw Mangesh lying on the ground with

the pistol, his first reaction was that he took the

pistol and kept under the mattress of the bed i.e. the

place where it was left by his father. Yet he has

stated that he had no knowledge as to where his

father had left the pistol. This contention cannot be

believed.

(o) The admission of A1 that out of fear he removed

the dead body from the living room and took it to the

courtyard on the rear side of his house, that he

cleaned the floor due to fear.

(p) The admission of A1 that when he had gone to

change his clothes, Mangesh had not left the living

room. Therefore, Mangesh had no access to the bed

room and location of the pistol from beneath the

mattress within a span of few minutes.

(q) The fact that although there was memorandum

of recovery of clothes and it was not followed by a

seizure, coupled with the statement of A1 that he

had given it to the Police but they said that it was

not required. The act of the accused disposing the

cartridge at a particular place, showing the place

to the Police, attempting to search the bullet at that

place and yet not finding it.

(r) The explanation of PW12 below Exh.83 which is

denied in the cross-examination of PW12.

(s) The sanction order issued by the District

Magistrate for prosecuting the accused showing

that the weapon of assault was used in the offence.”

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 6 of 25

5. The High Court laid great emphasis on the fact that after

the death of Mangesh, the appellant had tried to stifle the

investigation by removing evidence. It observed thus:

“20. The fact that the accused attempted to stifle the

investigation is relevant under Section 8 of the

Indian Evidence Act. The fact of fear as deposed by

A1, accepted by the accused is relevant.”

6. On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment, it could be

seen that the High Court has heavily relied upon Section 8 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred as “Evidence

Act”) to draw inferences from the subsequent conduct of the

appellant, especially removal of the dead body, concealment of

clothes, visits by the accused to the residence of PW-1 pretending

to enquire about the deceased etc. As regards the causal link

between the appellant and the alleged act, the High Court

observed that the link was established as the 9 mm pistol

belonging to the father of the appellant had caused the death of

the appellant. The following para is indicative of the same:

“23. …In the present case, the accused has himself

admitted the weapon to be the service pistol of his

father and that it was in the hand of deceased when

he first saw him. The prosecution has led cogent and

convincing evidence to prove that Mangesh had

sustained the bullet injury with the same 9mm

pistol. There is no ambiguity of the identity or

description of weapon. The link evidence between

the crime and the accused is established beyond

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 7 of 25

reasonable doubt and by the admission of the

accused himself and his father.”

7. The appellant had taken two primary defenses before the

High Court – impossibility of homicidal death in light of the

trajectory of the bullet and report of PW-9 which pointed towards

accidental death. Both the contentions were turned down in the

impugned judgment assigning different reasons. While rejecting

the former contention, the High Court again adverted to the

subsequent conduct of the appellant and observed thus:

“22. The learned counsel for the accused also

pleaded that it appears from the evidence that the

bullet was fired from a close range of 15cm would

show that it is accidental. He has argued that there

was no blackening around the eye. The direction in

which the bullet had travelled through the eye to the

occipital region would show that it is a case of

accidental firing. The counsel has further argued

that falsity of defence or giving a false explanation

does not provide an additional link and cannot be

made a ground for conviction. In the present case,

it is not the falsity of defence which is being

considered and, therefore, we have referred to

Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. The accused

had prepared a good ground and given false

explanation or rather made up a new story at the

threshold i.e. even prior to investigation, at the time

of investigation and, therefore, his conduct

indicates the act of guilty mind.”

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 8 of 25

8. On the second aspect, the High Court observed that it was

not obligatory for PW-9 to have given her opinion regarding the

cause of death, as the cause of death was well known and was

“admitted by the accused on oath”. The relevant part of the

impugned judgment reads thus:

“28. The learned counsel has heavily relied upon

the deposition of PW9 wherein it is stated that she

cannot say as to whether the death is accidental or

homicidal. We have already discussed that it is not

obligatory on the part of the Doctor to give the

cause of death when the cause is known and is

established by the cogent and convincing evidence

and moreover admitted by the accused on oath.”

THE CHALLENGE

9. Taking exception to the impugned judgment, Ld. Counsel

on behalf of the appellant submits that the High Court did not

examine the grounds taken by the appellant. It is submitted that

as per the evidence of PW-9, the trajectory of the bullet was such

that it had exited from the downward portion of the skull of the

deceased and then hit the ventilator above the door. It is

submitted that such a trajectory was only possible in case of a

suicidal death and not homicidal. It is further submitted that the

courts below have erred in not appreciating the testimony of

PW-9, who had clearly deposed that she could not ascertain the

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 9 of 25

cause of death and could not tell with certainty whether the death

was suicidal or homicidal.

10. Relying upon medical jurisprudence, it is further

submitted that in cases of accidental injuries by fire arm, bullet is

hit from a close distance. Further, in such cases, the injury is often

singular. It is submitted that in the present case, both the elements

of accidental death are present and the Courts below erred in not

appreciating so.

11. As regards the conduct of the appellant after the incident,

it is submitted that the appellant has categorically deposed that

the death of Mangesh was caused by his father’s pistol at his

residence. He has also deposed that as he heard the gunshot, he

came out and saw the dead body of Mangesh lying in pool of

blood. He got scared of his father and tried to clean up the scene

and in doing so, he removed the dead body of the deceased and

cleaned the blood by using phenyl. It is further submitted that

there was no motive for the appellant to have caused the death of

Mangesh and the relationship between the appellant and the

deceased was friendly. To buttress this submission, it is

submitted that in a case based on circumstantial evidence,

absence of motive is a crucial fact which renders the prosecution

case doubtful.

12. It is further submitted that the Courts below had placed

undue burden upon the appellant to offer explanation for certain

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 10 of 25

circumstances and his subsequent conduct. It is contended that it

was for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt

and mere inability of the appellant to explain certain aspects

could not be read against him to arrive at a finding of guilt.

Lastly, it is submitted that in a case based on circumstantial

evidence, if two views are possible, the Court must lean in favour

of the view favourable to the accused.

DISCUSSION

13. We have carefully considered the grounds of appeal,

respective submissions advanced at Bar and have heard both

sides at length. We may now consider the principal issue whether

the finding of the High Court regarding the conviction of the

appellant is sustainable in light of the evidence on record.

14. In the factual matrix of the present case, it could be

observed at the outset that certain facts stand duly admitted. We

may first consider such facts. The cause of death of the deceased

is undisputed, as it is admitted that the deceased was shot by the

service pistol belonging to PW-12, the father of the appellant.

Although, the investigating officer did not obtain any ballistic

report to ascertain the nexus between the bullet injury and the

service pistol of PW-12, however, it could be seen from the

record that the nexus has not been questioned by the defence. In

fact, both the appellant and PW-12 have admitted that the bullet

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 11 of 25

was shot from the pistol of PW-12 which was lying in the house.

Furthermore, PW-11 has also confirmed that when the service

pistol was re-deposited by PW-12, one bullet was missing from

the sanctioned number of bullets.

15. Going further, it is also admitted that the appellant had

indeed removed the dead body of the deceased and had cleaned

up the scene of crime. It is also a matter of record that the

discoveries made under Section 27 of Evidence Act were not

challenged by the appellant as the appellant had admitted that

various articles belonging to himself and the deceased, and

connected with the alleged incident, were discovered in

furtherance of his disclosures. All these aspects, however,

assume greater relevance for the offence under Section 201 IPC.

Insofar as the offences under Section 302 IPC and Section 25 of

Arms Act are concerned, the prosecution case leaves us wanting

for answers. No doubt, the deceased was shot by the pistol

belonging to the father of the appellant and in the house of the

appellant, but the pertinent question that craves for an answer is

– who pulled the trigger? Despite two rounds of litigation, the

question is yet to find an answer.

16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, answers to

such questions are not found on the face of the record. Rather,

the truth is found concealed in the layers of incriminating and

exonerating facts, and the Court is required to arrive at a judicial

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 12 of 25

finding on the basis of the best possible inference which could be

drawn from a comprehensive analysis of the chain of

circumstances in a case. As per the record and the analysis carried

out by the Courts below, the circumstances weighing against the

accused could briefly be summarized as:

i. The presence of deceased at the house of the appellant

prior to and at the time of incident;

ii. Admitted removal of dead body of the deceased by the

appellant;

iii. Admitted removal, concealment and subsequent

discovery of various articles as per the disclosure made

by the appellant;

iv. Fatal gunshot by the pistol lying in the house of the

appellant;

v. Subsequent conduct of the appellant in trying to show

concern to the father of the deceased despite knowing

about the death;

vi. Failure of the appellant to explain certain

circumstances such as the manner in which the pistol

fell in the hands of the deceased, how was it re-

concealed etc.

17. Having observed the incriminating circumstances, we may

now advert to the circumstances which leave missing links in the

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 13 of 25

chain of the prosecution. Such instances include the doubt

expressed by PW-9 regarding the nature of death, trajectory of

bullet, possibility of accidental injury etc. The case of the

appellant is that a proper appreciation of the exonerating

circumstances would make the version of the prosecution highly

improbable and doubtful. We may now examine the same by first

considering the version of PW-9. Notably, PW-9 has deposed

regarding the trajectory of the bullet as it entered and exited the

skull of the deceased. PW-9 had also annexed a diagram of the

trajectory, which revealed that the bullet entered through the eye

of the deceased and exited from the lower part of the skull from

the back. It would have been possible to reconcile this trajectory

with the version of homicidal death. However, questions arise

when the journey of the bullet is analyzed after it exited from the

lower part of the skull. For, after taking an exit from the lower

skull, the bullet hit against a ventilator which was installed above

the door of the living room. Admittedly, the ventilator was

installed at a height significantly higher than the height of the

deceased, thereby meaning that the bullet travelled upwards after

it left the skull of the deceased. The version of the prosecution is

simply that the appellant shot the deceased in the eye and there

has been no effort to prove the directions of entry or exit or to

explain the inward or outward journey of the bullet. The

prosecution version remains acceptable only till the point of entry

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 14 of 25

of the bullet through the eye, but it starts becoming cloudy when

the upward trajectory of the bullet is analyzed further, as

discussed above.

18. In usual course of things, such trajectory of the bullet could

have been possible only if the deceased was sitting and looking

downwards towards the barrel of the pistol from a close distance.

It was only then that the bullet could have hit the ventilator

despite exiting from the lower part of the skull. In fact, this is

precisely the defence of the appellant - that the deceased, on

finding the service pistol of PW-12, got curious, picked it up,

started looking into it with one eye from a close distance and

accidentally pressed the trigger. The probability of the version

put across by the appellant is on the higher side as compared to

the version put across by the prosecution, which simply does not

give any explanation for the trajectory of the bullet.

19. In gunshot cases wherein the nature of death – suicidal,

accidental or homicidal – is not ascertainable from direct

evidence, multiple factors are taken into account for arriving at a

conclusion. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the point

of entrance, the size of wound, direction of wound, position of

wound, possible distance of gunshot, number of wounds, position

of weapon, trajectory of bullet after entering into the human

body, position of exit wound (if bullet has exited), direction of

exit wound, direction of the bullet after exit, distance travelled by

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 15 of 25

the bullet after exit, nature of final impact on surface (if any) etc.

All such factors, to the extent of their applicability to the facts of

the case, need to be examined by the Court before arriving at a

judicial finding of fact. Undoubtedly, no such analysis could be

found in the impugned judgment. The High Court merely

brushed aside the defence of the appellant by referring to the

subsequent conduct of the appellant and by raising adverse

inference on that basis.

20. Similarly, the inconclusive opinion of PW-9 regarding the

death being homicidal or suicidal/accidental was also a relevant

fact. No doubt, PW-9 was not bound to give a conclusive opinion

as observed by the High Court, however, it ought to have been

examined whether the failure to do so had a bearing on the

judicial determination of the real cause of death. The nature of

death ought to have been examined in light of the surrounding

circumstances discussed above, which weigh against the

possibility of a homicidal death. The appellant has also placed

reliance on medical jurisprudence regarding the nature of injuries

in accidental or suicidal gunshot cases. More often than not, in

accidental gunshot cases, the injury is found to be singular and

inflicted from a close range. The present case ticks the boxes of

an accidental gunshot injury, both in theory and in fact.

Contrarily, the aforesaid discussion indicates that the possibility

of a homicidal death is very weak in the present case. It must also

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 16 of 25

be kept in mind that the imprints on the pistol have not been

matched with the appellant and therefore, no direct nexus exists

to conclude that the trigger was pulled by the appellant. On this

aspect as well, we may note with dismay that the High Court

rejected the defence of the appellant by simply observing that the

homicidal death of the deceased was ‘admitted’ by the appellant

on oath. There is no such admission qua the nature of death.

Contrarily, the appellant had deposed on oath that the death was

‘accidental’, a version that he has carried consistently up to this

Court.

21. Having said so, we may now examine what weighed with

the High Court to arrive at the finding of guilt of the appellant.

On a careful reading of the impugned judgment, one would

unmistakably note that the subsequent conduct of the appellant

in indulging in destruction of evidence weighed heavily against

him in the mind of the Court. The inability of the appellant to

explain certain aspects also weighed against him. Undoubtedly,

in a case based on circumstantial evidence, facts indicating

subsequent conduct are relevant facts under Section 8 of the

Evidence Act. Equally, the inconsistencies in the version of the

appellant are also relevant. However, the occasion to examine the

version/defence of the appellant could have arisen only if the

prosecution had succeeded in discharging its primary burden

beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal jurisprudence, it is a time-

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 17 of 25

tested proposition that the primary burden falls upon the

shoulders of the prosecution and it is only if the prosecution

succeeds in discharging its burden beyond reasonable doubt that

the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the evidence against

him or to present a defence. In the present case, the version of the

prosecution suffers from inherent inconsistencies and doubts, as

discussed above, and in such a scenario, the inability of the

appellant to explain certain circumstances could not be made the

basis to relieve the prosecution from discharging its primary

burden. The High Court fell in a grave error in doing so, as it

placed greater reliance on the loopholes in the appellant’s version

without first determining whether the chain of circumstances

sought to be proved by the prosecution was complete or not.

Pertinently, the inability of an accused to offer plausible

explanation on certain aspects would not automatically absolve

the prosecution of its evidentiary burden, which must be

discharged first and beyond doubt.

22. In law, there is a significant difference in the evidentiary

burden to be discharged by the prosecution and the accused.

Whereas, the former is expected to discharge its burden beyond

reasonable doubt, the latter is only required to prove a defence on

the anvil of preponderance of probabilities. If the accused leads

defence evidence in the course of a criminal trial, the same ought

to be tested as probable or improbable in the facts and

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 18 of 25

circumstances of the case. The present case, we are afraid, reveals

that the defence taken by the accused since the beginning of the

case was not tested by the Trial Court and the High Court.

Despite a specific defence taken by the appellant before both the

Courts, the Courts simply did not examine the same in the

manner required by law. The probability of the version put across

by the appellant ought to have been tested against the

circumstantial theory of the prosecution. In other words, it was

incumbent upon the Courts below to have examined whether the

defence taken by the appellant was a probable defence or not.

The failure to do so has certainly resulted into a failure of justice

and it is sufficient to reopen the evidence in the instant appeal, as

we have done.

23. We may now come to the next aspect of the case i.e.

absence of motive and consequence thereof. It is trite law that in

a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive is relevant.

However, it is not conclusive of the matter. There is no rule of

law that the absence of motive would ipso facto dismember the

chain of evidence and would lead to automatic acquittal of the

accused. It is so because the weight of other evidence needs to be

seen and if the remaining evidence is sufficient to prove guilt,

motive may not hold relevance. But a complete absence of

motive is certainly a circumstance which may weigh in favour of

the accused. During appreciation of evidence wherein favourable

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 19 of 25

and unfavourable circumstances are sifted and weighed against

each other, this circumstance ought to be incorporated as one

leaning in favour of the accused. In Anwar Ali & Anr. v. State of

Himachal Pradesh

1

, this Court analyzed the position of law thus:

“24. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the

accused that in the present case the prosecution has

failed to establish and prove the motive and

therefore the accused deserves acquittal is

concerned, it is true that the absence of proving the

motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosection

case. It is also true and as held by this Court Suresh

Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar

2

that if motive is

proved that would supply a link in the chain of

circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof

cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case.

However, at the same time, as observed by this

Court in Babu

3

, absence of motive in a case

depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor

that weighs in favour of the accused. In paras 25

and 26, it is observed and held as under:

“25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal

4

, this Court

examined the importance of motive in cases of

circumstantial evidence and observed : (SCC pp.

87-88, paras 38-39)

‘38. ... the motive is a thing which is primarily

known to the accused themselves and it is not

possible for the prosecution to explain what

actually promoted or ex- cited them to

commit the particular crime.

1

(2020) 10 SCC 166

2

1995 Supp (1) SCC 80

3

Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189

4

(2008) 16 SCC 73

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 20 of 25

39. The motive may be considered as a

circumstance which is relevant for assessing

the evidence but if the evidence is clear and

unambiguous and the circum- stances prove

the guilt of the accused, the same is not

weakened even if the motive is not a very

strong one. It is also settled law that the

motive loses all its importance in a case

where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is

available, because even if there may be a very

strong motive for the accused persons to

commit a particular crime, they cannot be

convicted if the evidence of eye- witnesses is

not convincing. In the same way, even if there

may not be an apparent motive but if the

evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and

reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive

cannot stand in the way of conviction.’

26. This Court has also held that the absence of

motive in a case depending on circumstantial

evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the

accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State of T.N.

5

)”

24. In the subsequent decision in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v.

State of Maharashtra

6

, this Court relied upon the decision in

Anwar Ali and observed as under:-

“27. Though in a case of direct evidence, motive

would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial

evidence, motive plays an important link to

5

(2009) 9 SCC 152

6

(2021) 5 SCC 626

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 21 of 25

complete the chain of circumstances. The

motive......”

More recently, in Nandu Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

(now Chhattisgarh)

7

, the position was reiterated by this Court in

the following words:

“10. In a case based on substantial evidence,

motive assumes great significance. It is not as if

motive alone becomes the crucial link in the case to

be established by the prosecution and in its absence

the case of Prosecution must be discarded. But, at

the same time, complete absence of motive assumes

a different complexion and such absence definitely

weighs in favour of the accused.”

25. Thus, a complete absence of motive, although not

conclusive, is a relevant factor which weighs in favour of the

accused. No doubt, the final effect of such absence on the

outcome of the case shall depend upon the quality and weight of

surrounding evidence. In the present case, the testimonies of

prosecution witnesses have invariably revealed that the appellant

and the deceased were friends and there was no ill-will between

them. Even the father of the deceased has testified to that effect.

The relevance of motive in a case of homicide has been a subject

of prolonged discussion. Ordinarily, in cases involving direct

evidence of the commission of crime, motive has little role to

7

Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 2022

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 22 of 25

play as presence or absence of motive is immaterial if the

commission of the crime stands proved through other evidence.

Even otherwise, motiveless crimes are not unknown to the

society. However, in cases purely based on circumstantial

evidence, the absence of motive could raise serious questions and

might even render the chain of evidence as doubtful. It is so

because the presence of motive does the job of explaining the

circumstantial evidence. For instance, in the facts of the present

case, any evidence of enmity between the appellant and the

deceased would have made suspicious the act of the appellant of

taking the deceased to his home prior to his death. However,

since the evidence suggests that they were friends, the fact that

the appellant brought him home could not be termed as per-se

incriminating. Therefore, motive explains the circumstances on

record and enables the Court to draw better inference in a case

based on circumstantial evidence.

26. As regards the subsequent conduct of the appellant, before

parting, we may also note that the same was consistent with the

theory of accidental death. That his act of removal of the dead

body and concealment of articles was a result of fear of his father

- is quite natural. A young boy studying in first year of college,

with no criminal background and with no motive in sight, would

certainly have become scared on seeing that his friend has

accidentally shot himself in the living room of his house with the

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 23 of 25

pistol belonging to his father and is lying in a pool of blood. The

subsequent conduct of cleaning up the scene and restoring the

living room in its original shape, although punishable in law,

does not become so unnatural that it could be made the basis to

convict him for the commission of murder without additional

evidence to that effect. More so, when such conclusion is not

consistent with the surrounding evidence on record, especially

medical evidence, as discussed above.

27. No doubt, the subsequent acts of cleaning up the crime

scene and making false enquiries amount to disappearance of

evidence and raise grave suspicion against the appellant.

However, mere suspicion, no matter how grave, cannot take the

place of proof in a criminal trial. The suspicion ought to have

been substantiated by undeniable, reliable, unequivocal,

consistent and credible circumstantial evidence, which does not

leave the probability of any other theory. In the present case, the

theory put across by the appellant is fairly probable and is

supported by medical evidence including the examination of the

bullet injury and trajectory. Contrarily, the conclusion drawn by

the Courts below is not supported by medical evidence and is not

consistent with the bullet injury and trajectory, as discussed

above. We have come far since our acknowledgement that in a

case purely based on circumstantial evidence, it must be

established that the chain of circumstances is complete. Such

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 24 of 25

chain must be consistent with the conclusion of guilt only and

must not support a contrary finding. The rigid principles

underlying an examination based on circumstantial evidence are

based on the premise that the very act of arriving at a finding of

guilt on the basis of inferences must be performed with great

caution and margin of error must be kept at a minimum. Having

said so, we may also observe that naturally, there could be some

inconsistencies in the chain of circumstances in the natural

course of things and mere presence of inconsistencies does not

automatically demolish the case of the prosecution. However, the

prosecution must be able to explain the inconsistencies to the

satisfaction of the Court. For, the ultimate test is the judicial

satisfaction of the Court. In the present case, the counter

probabilities and inconsistencies in the chain of circumstances

have not been explained.

28. Momentarily, even if it is believed that the view taken by

the Courts below is a possible view, it ought to have been

examined whether a reasonable counter view was possible in the

case. It is a time-tested proposition of law that when a Court is

faced with a situation wherein two different views appear to be

reasonably possible, the matter is to be decided in favour of the

accused. The benefit of a counter possibility goes to the accused

in such cases.

Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012 Page 25 of 25

29. In light of the foregoing discussion, we hereby conclude

that the High Court has erred in arriving at the finding of guilt

and in upholding the verdict of the Trial Court. The

circumstantial evidence on record is not consistent and leaves a

reasonable possibility of an alternate outcome i.e. of innocence

of the appellant on the charges of murder and illegal usage of fire

arm. Accordingly, the impugned order and judgment are partially

set aside to the extent of conviction of the appellant for the

offences punishable under Sections 302 IPC and Section 5 read

with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. Consequently, the appellant is

acquitted for the offences under Section 302 of IPC and Section

5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. His conviction under Section

201 IPC is sustained and he is sentenced for the period already

undergone by him, for reasons discussed above.

30. The captioned appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid

terms. Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

……………………………………J.

[B.V. NAGARATHNA]

……………………………………J.

[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]

NEW DELHI

June 04, 2025