W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 1 of 22

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 05

th

January, 2026

Pronounced on: 11

th

February, 2026

+ W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025

VIKAS YADAV .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Sr. Adv. with

Mr. Hemendra, Mr. Prabhav

Ralli, Mr. Shivam Tyagi, Ms.

Shreya Chauhan, Advs.

versus

THE STATE NCT OF DELHI THROUGH SECRETARY &

ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, SPP for

State with Ms. Jyoti Babbar,

Mr. Ranjeeb Kamal Bora,

Advocates for R-1 and R-2.

Ms. Vrinda Bhandari, Ms.

Pragya Barsaiyan, Advs. for R-

3

Mr. Sanchar Anand, Mr. Rajat

Rathee, Mr. Aman Kumar

Thakur, Mr. Pratimesh, Advs.

for R-4.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

JUDGMENT

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.

1.This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India read with Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 2 of 22

2023 [“BNSS”] seeking grant of first spell of furlough for a period of

21 days to the petitioner and for quashing of the rejection order dated

29

th

October, 2025 passed by the Jail Authority.

Brief facts of the case:

2.The petitioner was convicted by the trial Court vide judgment

dated 28

th

March, 2008 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for

life under Section 302/34 of Indian Penal Code [“IPC”], Rigorous

Imprisonment [“RI”] for 10 years under Section 364/34 IPC and RI

for 5 years under Section 201/34 IPC with fine. The substantive

sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

3.The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the

Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 02

nd

April, 2014.

The State and the first informant/complainant (respondent No.3)

preferred petitions seeking enhancement of sentence before this Court.

Vide judgment dated 06

th

February, 2015, the Division Bench of this

Court enhanced the sentence awarded to the petitioner and directed

that the petitioner shall undergo life imprisonment for offence under

Section 302/34 IPC, which shall be 25 years of actual imprisonment

without consideration of remission and fine of Rs. 15,00,000/-, RI for

10 years with fine for offence under Section 364/34 IPC and RI for 5

years with fine for offence under Section 201/34 IPC. It was further

directed that the sentence for conviction of offences under Section

302/34 IPC and Section 364/34 IPC shall run concurrently, however,

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 3 of 22

the sentence under Section 201/34 IPC was directed to run

consecutively to the other sentences.

4.The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the

petitioner vide judgment dated 17

th

August, 2015 and subsequently,

vide order dated 03

rd

October, 2016, the sentences and other directions

passed by the High Court were upheld with only modification that the

sentence imposed under Section 201/34 IPC shall run concurrently

with sentences under Section 302/34 IPC and not consecutively, as

earlier directed by this Court.

5.The petitioner had earlier sought 21 days furlough vide LPA

516/2018, which was dismissed by the Division bench of this Court on

07

th

September, 2018 on the ground that good conduct remission is a

prerequisite for furlough. As the petitioner, being sentenced to life

imprisonment, is barred from consideration for remission for 25 years,

he is not entitled to any remission, including annual good conduct

remission required for furlough.

6.As per the nominal roll, the petitioner has undergone about 23

years of actual custody, and is presently working as a Ward Sahayak,

but his application seeking the first spell of furlough was considered

and rejected by the competent authority vide order dated 29

th

October,

2025. The relevant order of the competent authority is reproduced

hereunder;

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 4 of 22

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 5 of 22

7.On 01

st

December, 2025, the Office of the Director General of

Prisons issued a corrigendum vide F.10(3467481)/ CJ/ Legal/ PHQ/

2025/8402, partially modifying its order dated 29

th

October, 2025 by

substituting para 4(l)(i) to read that the convict must have earned

rewards in the last three Annual Good Conduct Remissions and

continue to maintain good conduct, while the rest of the order

remained unchanged. The corrigendum F.10(3467481)/ CJ/ Legal/

PHQ/ 2025/8402, is reproduced as under;

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 6 of 22

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner:

8.Mr. Vikas Pahwa, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner

submitted that the impugned order dated 29

th

October, 2025 rejecting

the Petitioner’s prayer by the Director General (Prisons) for furlough

is manifestly arbitrary and suffers from non-application of mind. It

was submitted that the rejection is founded solely on unsubstantiated

apprehensions and an erroneous assumption that a sentence without

remission disentitles a convict from furlough. It was emphasized that,

the Petitioner has already undergone more than 23 years and 4 months

of actual incarceration out of a sentence of 25 years, and his conduct

in prison for over the last 12 years has been consistently satisfactory,

as indicated in the Nominal Roll. Furthermore, during the period of

interim bail granted by the Supreme Court from 24

th

April, 2025 to

08

th

September, 2025, there was no misuse of liberty or any adverse

incident, thereby demolishing the basis of the apprehensions relied

upon by the authorities.

9.Mr. Pahwa learned senior counsel, further submitted that the

subsequent corrigendum dated 01

st

December, 2025 is legally

unsustainable and amounts to a colourable exercise of power. Once

the competent authority passed the rejection order, it became functus

officio and could not have sought to supplement or cure the defects in

the original decision. It was further submitted that the corrigendum

was admittedly issued without placing the file before the competent

authority and without affording any notice or opportunity of hearing to

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 7 of 22

the Petitioner, rendering it void ab initio. Such post decisional

corrigendum, it was submitted, is impermissible in law and violative

of the principles of natural justice, and therefore liable to be rejected.

10.Learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Atbir v. State (NCT of Delhi)(2022) 13 SCC

96, in support of his submission, that furlough is an incentive for good

conduct and is distinct from remission. It is submitted that the

Supreme Court has authoritatively held that denial or ineligibility for

remission does not operate as a bar to the grant of furlough, even in

cases where the convict is required to remain in prison for the

remainder of natural life. It was submitted that, this settled law was

reiterated in Sanjay Kumar Valmiki v. State (NCT of Delhi)2023

SCC OnLine Del 7335 by this Court while granting furlough to

the petitioner therein. The said judgment, being binding under

Article 141 of the Constitution, squarely governs the present case.

Subsequent decisions of this Court, including Jeet Dahiya v. State

(NCT of Delhi)W.P.(Crl.) 2941/2023, and Jitender v. State

(NCT of Delhi)2025 SCC OnLine Del 4854, have consistently

applied the ratio of Atbir(supra), even after the amendment to the

Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 [DPR, 2018], thereby reaffirming that the

reformative object of furlough cannot be defeated by reliance on the

nature of sentence or gravity of offence alone.

11.Furthermore, it was submitted that the security and threat

perception has already been duly considered and addressed by the

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 8 of 22

Supreme Court while granting interim bail to the Petitioner and

furlough to the co-accused Sukhdev Yadav on 25

th

June, 2025. During

the extended period of interim bail of the petitioner, no untoward

incident occurred, and the respondents continue to enjoy extensive

security cover, which adequately mitigates any residual concerns. On

the aforesaid grounds, it was prayed that the impugned order dated

29

th

October, 2025 and the subsequent corrigendum dated 01

st

December, 2025 be quashed, and the Petitioner be granted the first

spell of furlough in accordance with law, as denial thereof infringes

his fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent nos. 1 and 2:

12.Mr. Mahajan, learned SPP for the respondent nos. 1 and 2

vehemently opposed the grant of furlough to the petitioner while

submitting that the petitioner is not even eligible for grant of furlough

under the DPR, in view of the sentence imposed upon him under

Sections 302/34 IPC, which expressly mandates 25 years of actual

imprisonment without consideration of remission. It was submitted

that Rule 1223(I) DPR, as amended on 16

th

June, 2020, clearly

requires that a prisoner must have earned rewards in the last

three “Annual Good Conduct Remissions”as a pre-condition for

furlough. Since the petitioner is ineligible for ordinary remission by

virtue of the sentencing order, he cannot earn Annual Good Conduct

Remission under Rule 1178. Further, it was clarified that Rule 1171,

where remission is denied by a court without specifying the kind, all

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 9 of 22

kinds of remissions stand denied. Consequently, the petitioner fails to

cross the statutory eligibility threshold under Rule 1223, rendering the

petition liable to be dismissed at the outset.

13.It was further submitted that the corrigendum note dated 01

st

December, 2025 issued to the impugned order dated 29

th

October,

2025 is legally valid and merely corrects an apparent error by

reproducing the amended and applicable rule correctly. The

corrigendum does not amount to a review but only rectifies a

typographical mistake whereby the word “Report” was replaced with

“Remission.”. Reliance is placed on Sakiri Vasu v. State of

U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409, wherein the Supreme Court held that when a

statute confers a power or jurisdiction upon an authority, it impliedly

includes all incidental and ancillary powers necessary to effectively

exercise that jurisdiction. In rebuttal to the contention of the petitioner

that the authority had become functus officio is submitted to be

misconceived, and further it was submitted that no principles of

natural justice were violated since the Delhi Prison Rules do not

contemplate any hearing prior to passing an order on furlough or a

corrigendum thereto. The petitioner cannot claim any vested right

based on an incorrect or unamended version of the rule.

14.Learned SPP submitted that reliance placed by the petitioner

on Atbir (supra) is wholly misplaced, as the said judgment was

rendered under a materially different rule position. At the relevant

time in Atbir (supra), Rule 1223(I) referred to “Annual Good Conduct

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 10 of 22

Report” and not “Annual Good Conduct Remission.” The Supreme

Court itself noted the distinction between the two expressions and held

that they could not be equated. The present case is governed by the

amended rule, and therefore the ratio of Atbir (supra) is not applicable.

The present case is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment

in Vikas Yadav v. State LPA 516/2018, wherein an identical eligibility

condition requiring three Annual Good Conduct Remissions was

interpreted, and furlough was denied to the petitioner on account of

the bar on remission, a decision binding on the Single Bench.

15.It was lastly submitted, that even eligibility does not confer an

absolute right to furlough, which remains discretionary in nature. The

use of the word “may” in Rule 1221 DPR, read with Rules 1224 and

1235, makes it clear that furlough can be denied in the interest of

society, security, and public order, particularly where the prisoner is

considered dangerous or untrustworthy. The grant of furlough to the

co-convict Sukhdev Yadav by the Supreme Court is distinguishable,

having been passed in the light of pre-amended Rule 1223(I), and

therefore cannot operate as a precedent.

Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 3/Mrs. Neelam Katara:

16.Ms. Bhandari learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 opposed

the furlough application, submitting that the impugned order dated 29

th

October, 2025 is well-reasoned and has been passed strictly in

accordance with the DPR, 2018, and therefore does not warrant

interference. It was submitted that the petitioner is ineligible for

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 11 of 22

furlough under Rule 1223 of the DPR, 2018, which mandates three

annual good conduct remissions as a pre-condition. The petitioner,

having been sentenced by judgment dated 06

th

February, 2015 to life

imprisonment with a stipulation of 25 years actual imprisonment

without consideration of remission, has admittedly completed only

about 23 years of incarceration and is thus disentitled from earning

any form of remission, including annual good conduct remission.

Reliance is placed on the order dated 07

th

September, 2018 passed in

LPA No. 516/2018 and the note appended to Rule 1171 of the DPR,

2018, clarifying that denial of remission without specification amounts

to denial of remission of all kinds.

17.It is further submitted that the petitioner’s ineligibility for

furlough has been consistently affirmed by this Court, as evidenced by

the fact that he has never been granted furlough during his long period

of incarceration. It was emphasized that the reliance placed by the

petitioner on the precedent of the Supreme Court in Atbir(supra) is

misconceived, as the said judgment interpreted an earlier version of

Rule 1223 which required three annual good conduct reports, whereas

the amended rule, pursuant to notification dated 16

th

March, 2020,

requires three annual good conduct remissions. It was further

submitted that even if the petitioner were held eligible, furlough

remains discretionary, and as held in Atbir (supra) itself, the

competent authority must assess the parameters under the DPR, 2018

before granting furlough. It was furthermore submitted that the case of

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 12 of 22

the co-convict Sukhdev @ Pehalwan is clearly distinguishable, as he

had completed the stipulated 20 years actual imprisonment without

remission before being granted furlough by the Supreme Court.

18.Lastly, it was submitted that furlough is not an absolute right

but a reward based on good conduct and reformation, and the

petitioner’s misconduct disentitles him from such relief. The

petitioner’s alleged misconduct includes breach of interim bail

conditions, making false statements under oath, producing fabricated

documents, attempting to mislead the Court, interfering with the

administration of justice, and posing a threat to Respondent Nos. 3 and

4, who continue to be provided security till date. In view of the

petitioner’s conduct and the potential adverse repercussions of his

release, it has been submitted that the denial of furlough is justified

and calls for no interference.

Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 4

19.The learned counsel for Respondent No. 4 submits that furlough

is not an absolute right but a discretionary relief, governed by the

DPR. Reliance is placed on Rules 2(17), 1199, 1220, 1223, 1224(ii)

and 1235 of the DPR to contend that furlough is a reward for

unblemished conduct and may be denied where the prisoner’s

presence in society is considered dangerous or prejudicial to public

peace. The discretionary nature of furlough has been consistently

affirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v.

Suresh Pandurang Darvakar AIR 2006 SC 2471 and Asfaq v. State

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 13 of 22

of Rajasthan & Ors.(2017) 15 SCC 55, as well as in Atbir (supra),

wherein it was clarified that the said judgment confers only a right of

consideration and does not dilute the discretion of the competent

authorities.

20.It was further submitted that Respondent No. 4 is the sole

independent prosecution witness in the Nitish Katara murder case,

whose truthful testimony led to the conviction of the petitioner and his

co-accused. The learned counsel highlighted the consistent findings of

this Court and the Supreme Court regarding the intimidation, pressure,

and traumatisation suffered by Respondent No. 4 at the hands of the

petitioner, his family members, and associates, including repeated

attempts at witness intimidation, filing of false and frivolous cases,

and threats to life necessitating continuous security cover. Reliance

was placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in Bhagwan Singh v.

State of U.P. & Ors.2024 SCC OnLine SC 2599,in support of his

submissions about the threat perception.

21.Lastly, it was submitted that the petitioner’s conduct, both

during trial and thereafter, clearly disentitles him from any

discretionary relief such as furlough. The petitioner and his family are

alleged to have misused their influence to obstruct the justice delivery

system, tamper with evidence, threaten witnesses, and mislead courts,

including by breaching bail conditions and making false statements on

oath, which are the subject matter of pending proceedings.

Analysis and conclusion:

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 14 of 22

22.The Court has considered the rival submissions and the material

placed on record. Furlough is neither an absolute right nor a matter of

course, it is a conditional, discretionary relief governed strictly by the

Delhi Prison Rules, 2018. While furlough serves a reformative

purpose, its grant is subject to statutory eligibility conditions and an

overarching assessment of public safety, security, and the conduct of

the convict. Judicial review under Article 226 is therefore limited to

examining arbitrariness, perversity, or patent illegality in the decision-

making process, and not to substitute the Court’s view for that of the

competent authority.

23.In the present case, the petitioner stands convicted for grave

offences under Sections 302/34, 364/34 and 201/34 IPC, with his

sentence under Section 302/34 IPC enhanced by this Court to life

imprisonment meaning 25 years of actual incarceration without

consideration of remission, a sentence upheld by the Supreme Court.

The statutory consequence of such a sentence, read with Rule 1171 of

the DPR, 2018, is that all forms of remission stand excluded during

the stipulated period. The rule 1171 of the DPR 2018 reads as under;

“1171. Remission should be granted on the basis of an

inmate’s overall good behavior during the stay in the

Jail, willingness to take work while in custody,

cooperation and help to the prison administration in

prison management and general response to various

institutional activities.

Note:- If any statute or the court in its order of

sentence has denied the remission to the prisoner and

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 15 of 22

thereby not specified the kind of remission to be denied

then all kinds of remission will be denied.”

24.The meaning of Remission and the concession of “Annual Good

Conduct Remission” has been explained in the DPR 2018, as follows;

“1170. Remission is a concession, which can be

granted by the Authorities as provided in these rules.

The appropriate Government reserves the right to

debar/ withdraw any prisoner, or category of

prisoners from the concession of remission. The

remissions may be withdrawn or forfeited if the

prisoner commits specified Jail offences or conditions

prescribed in the relevant order of remitting the

sentence.

Kinds of Remission

1173. Remission will be of the following types:

A) Ordinary Remission

B) Annual Good Conduct Remission

C) Special Remission

D) Remission by Government

Ordinary Remission

1174. Authority to grant ordinary remission: The

Superintendent of Prison or officer nominated by the

Superintendent on his behalf, who shall not be below

the rank of Additional Superintendent/Deputy

Superintendent-I, is authorized to grant ordinary

remission.

1175. Eligibility: The following types of convicted

prisoners shall be eligible for ordinary remission:

I. Prisoners having substantive sentences of two

months and more,

II. Prisoners, sentenced to simple imprisonment for

two months or more, who volunteer to work,

III. Prisoners employed on prison maintenance

services. requiring them to work on Sundays and

Holidays, e.g. sweeping, cooking etc, irrespective of

the length & nature of their sentence i.e., simple or

rigorous imprisonment

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 16 of 22

IV. Prisoners undergoing imprisonment in lieu of fine

which immediately follows and is in continuation of

the substantive sentence of not less than three months.

Note: It will be the responsibility of the prison

administration to provide work to all eligible

prisoners. If for any reason the prison administration

fails to do so the prisoners, who are otherwise eligible

for remission for work, should be granted it as per

their normal entitlement under the orders of the

Inspector General of Prisons.

1176. Non-Eligibility: The following types of prisoners

will not be eligible

for ordinary remission:

I. Prisoners having substantive sentence of less than

two months,

II. Prisoners sentenced in default of payment of fine

only,

III. Prisoners whose sentence is reduced to less than

two months (in such cases remission already earned, if

any, should stand forfeited),

IV. Prisoners, who are convicted of an offence

committed after admission to the prison under

Sections: 147/148/152/224/302/304/304A/306/307/

308/ 323/ 324/ 325/ 326/ 332/

333/ 352/ 353/ 376 or 377 of IPC or of an assault

committed after admission to the prison on a warder

or other officer or under any other law for misusing

the concession of parole/furlough granted under that

law.

V. Prisoners debarred from remission as punishment

for committing prescribed prison offences,

VI. Prisoners specifically debarred from remission by

the Government or the Inspector General of Prisons or

under any law or rule;

VII. Prisoners undergoing sentence in the Narcotics,

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS)

cases, provided they are convicted after the 29th May,

1989;

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 17 of 22

VIII. During out-periods which are not reckoned as

part of sentence (being periods during bail, escape

and other periods, which are treated as out-periods

and not reckoned as part of sentence under specific

orders of the Government issued in that behalf).

Annual Good Conduct Remission

1178. Any prisoner, eligible for ordinary remission,

who for a period of one year from the date of his

sentence, or the date on which he was last punished

(except by way of warning) for a prison offence, has

not committed any prison offence, should be awarded

30 days annual good conduct remission by the

Superintendent of the Prison in addition to any other

remission.

Explanation: - For the purposes of this rule, prison

offences punished only with a warning, shall not be

taken into account.”

25.In contrast to the present petitioner who has to undergo 25 years

of uninterrupted sentence without remission, the co-convict, Sukhdev

Yadav, was sentenced to 20 years of actual imprisonment without

remission with a nominal fine of Rs.10,000/- and was granted furlough

by the Supreme Court on 25

th

June, 2025 (Annexure P-6) only after

completion of his entire stipulated sentence of uninterrupted

incarceration. The Supreme Court, while granting furlough to the co-

convict, specifically took note of the fact that he had completed the

full period of incarceration as directed by this Court, which stood

affirmed by the Supreme Court. The relevant extract makes it clear

that the grant of furlough was premised on the completion of the

sentence In these circumstances, the principle of parity cannot be

invoked by the present petitioner, as his mandatory requirement of 25

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 18 of 22

years of actual imprisonment remains unfulfilled, the relevant

paragraphs of the order dated 25

th

June, 2025 read as under;

“ After hearing learned counsel for the parties and

taking an overall view of the matter, more particularly the

factum that petitioner has completed 20 years of

uninterrupted incarceration without remission, as ordered

by the High Court which was affirmed by the Supreme

Court, we are of the view that it is a fit case where petitioner

deserves to be released on furlough at least for a limited

duration. Of course, necessary conditions would have to be

imposed on the petitioner so that liberty of furlough is not

misused. That apart, safety and security of respondent Nos. 2

and 3 are also required to be protected.

That being the position, we grant furlough to the

petitioner for a period of three months from the date of

release. Petitioner shall be produced before the learned Trial

Court within a maximum period of seven days from today,

whereafter the learned Trial Court shall release the petitioner

on furlough on appropriate terms and conditions including

concerning safety and security of respondent Nos.2 and 3.”

26.It is pertinent to note that the petitioner’s reliance placed

upon Atbir (supra) is misconceived. In Atbir (supra), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court was interpreting the pre-amendment Rule 1223(I),

which stipulated eligibility for furlough on the basis of “Annual Good

Conduct Reports,” and the Hon’ble Court consciously distinguished

the same from “Annual Good Conduct Remission.” The present case,

however, is to be governed by the amended Rule 1223(I), which

substitutes the earlier criterion by mandating the earning of “Annual

Good Conduct Remission,” thereby altering the statutory threshold for

eligibility. Consequently, the ratio of Atbir (supra) cannot be

mechanically applied so as to dilute or override the clear and

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 19 of 22

unambiguous mandate of the amended rule. Moreover, the Division

Bench judgment of this Court in Vikas Yadav(supra), rendered in the

petitioner’s own case, squarely covers the field and continues to bind

this Court, particularly in the context of furlough eligibility where the

sentence expressly excludes remission.

27.In Atbir (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with an

order dated 21

st

October, 2019 passed by the Director General of

Prisons rejecting the furlough application on the ground that the

petitioner therein was barred from parole and remission pursuant to

the decision of the Hon’ble President on a mercy petition. The

adjudication in that case was thus rooted in the pre-2020 rule position,

which required three “Annual Good Conduct Reports” for

consideration of furlough. By contrast, the 2020 amendment

consciously replaced the word “report” with “remission,” thereby

introducing a substantive change in the eligibility condition. In the

present case, the Director General of Prisons, while issuing the

corrigendum, rightly modified the order dated 29

th

October, 2025 by

clarifying that paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (i), shall read as requiring

“good conduct in the prison and that the prisoner should have earned

rewards in the last three Annual Good Conduct Remissions and

continues to maintain good conduct.” The said clarification is in strict

conformity with the amended statutory rule and leaves no scope for

extending the benefit of Atbir (supra) to the petitioner.

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 20 of 22

28.Rule 1223(I), as amended with effect from 16

th

June, 2020,

unequivocally prescribes earning rewards in the last three Annual

Good Conduct Remissions as a condition precedent for consideration

of furlough. The amended notification reads as under;

29.The petitioner admittedly cannot earn such remissions till his

stipulated 25 years of actual imprisonment is undergone and therefore

fails to satisfy the threshold eligibility under the applicable rule

framework.

30.The challenge to the corrigendum dated 01

st

December, 2025 is

equally untenable. The corrigendum merely corrects and aligns the

impugned order with the amended and applicable rule position and

does not amount to a substantive review or fresh adjudication. The

doctrine of functus officio has no application where the authority

merely rectifies an apparent error to reflect the correct statutory

provision. No prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioner,

nor do the Delhi Prison Rules contemplate a prior hearing before

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 21 of 22

issuance of such a corrigendum. Post-decisional clarification to bring

an order in conformity with law cannot be characterised as arbitrary or

violative of natural justice.

31.In Ashfaq v. State of Rajasthan (2017) 15 SCC 55, the

Supreme Court held that furlough is a brief and conditional release

granted to prisoners undergoing long-term imprisonment. It is to be

noted that, it was further observed that furlough operates as a good

conduct remission, and unlike parole, the period spent on furlough is

not required to be undergone as part of the sentence. The relevant

paragraph reads as under;

“14. Furlough, on the other hand, is a brief release from the

prison. It is conditional and is given in case of long-term

imprisonment. The period of sentence spent on furlough by the

prisoners need not be undergone by him as is done in the case of

parole. Furlough is granted as a good conduct remission.”

32.Even otherwise, eligibility for furlough does not translate into

an enforceable right. The petitioner’s antecedents, including the

commission of the present offence while being on bail in another high-

profile murder case, and threat perception, are relevant considerations

under Rules 1224 and 1235 of the DPR, 2018. The discretion vested in

the authorities to deny furlough in the interest of public order and

safety has been exercised on germane considerations and cannot be

termed perverse or irrational.

33.It is well settled that the objective of furlough is reformative and

humanitarian in nature, intended to enable prisoners to maintain social

and familial ties and to alleviate the rigours and monotony of

W.P.(CRL) 3628/2025 Page 22 of 22

prolonged incarceration. However, such benevolent considerations

cannot be invoked to dilute or bypass the explicit statutory

requirements prescribed under the Delhi Prison Rules, which are

binding and must be strictly complied with while considering any

claim for furlough.

34.In view of the above facts and circumstances, this Court finds

no arbitrariness, illegality, or violation of constitutional rights in the

impugned order dated 29

th

October, 2025 or the corrigendum dated

01

st

December, 2025. The petitioner is statutorily ineligible for

furlough under the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, as amended in the year

2020 and, in any event, does not merit discretionary relief in the facts

and circumstances of the case.

35.The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.

11

th

FEBRUARY, 2026/na