CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 1 of 21

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 05.08.2026

Pronounced on: 25.09.2026

Uploaded on: 25.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010095152004

+ CRL.A. 297/2004

VINOD PRAJAPATI @ BHOLA PRAJAP ATI .....Appellant

Through: Mr.Sudarshan Rajan, Mr.Ashish

Kumar Das and Mr.Hitain Bajaj,

Advs.

versus

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent

Through: Mr.Aman Usman, APP with

Mr.Manvendra Yadav, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

J U D G M E N T

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

1. This appeal has been filed challenging the order dated

19.02.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in

Sessions Case No. 125/1997 arising out of FIR No. 1176/1995, Police

Station Sultan Puri under Sections 302/460/394/34 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (in short, „IPC‟), convicting the appellant herein for

offences under Sections 394 and 302 of the IPC.

2. The appeal further challenges the order dated 21.02.2004 passed

by the learned Trial Court, sentencing the appellant to 5 years of

rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and, in default of

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 2 of 21

payment of the fine, to further undergo one month of rigorous

imprisonment for the offence under Section 394 of the IPC, and

imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and, in default of

payment of the fine, to undergo one month of rigorous imprisonment

for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC; both sentences to run

concurrently.

3. At the outset, we may note that the appellant herein has filed an

affidavit dated 23.07.2026, stating that he does not wish to press the

appeal on merits as he claims that he was a juvenile on the date of the

commission of the alleged offence. This is also one of his the grounds

urged in this appeal.

4. The claim of the appellant is that, at the time of the alleged

offence, he was less than 18 years of age and therefore, entitled to

protection under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)

Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the 'JJ Act of 2000'). The

appellant, during the pendency of the present appeal, in fact, filed an

application, being Crl. Misc. Application No. 8884/2004, wherein he

relied upon the Secondary School Examination Mark-Sheet issued on

22.01.2000 by the National Open School [presently known as

„National Institute of Open Schooling, (NIOS)], showing his age on

the date of the alleged offence as 17 years 1 month and 27 days. In the

application, he further prayed that, if deemed necessary, his age be

determined by conducting an Ossification Test.

5. This Court, by its order dated 03.12.2004, while adjudicating on

the above said application filed by the appellant, recorded that the

appellant could not produce requisite documentary evidence to support

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 3 of 21

his claim and, therefore, directed for an Ossification Test of the

appellant to be conducted to determine his age as on 01.12.1995, the

date of the alleged offence.

6. Under the cover of a letter dated 18.02.2005, the

Superintendent, Central Jail No. 3, Tihar, forwarded the report of Bone

Age Estimation dated 08.02.2005 from the Senior Medical Officer,

Central Jail No. 3, which in turn stated that the appellant had been sent

to the DDU Hospital for medical examination and the Medical Board,

vide its report dated 04.02.2005, has informed that on the examination

of the appellant by a constituted Board and after conducting physical,

radiological and dental examinations on him, the Board has reached

the conclusion that the approximate age of the appellant is more than

22 years but less than 25 years at the time of examination, that is,

05.01.2005. As per this report, therefore, the age of the appellant as on

the date of the alleged offence would come to approximately 12 years

and 11 months (if we take the lower age of 22 years) and 15 years and

11 months (if we take the upper age of 25 years). Either way, the

appellant was a minor on the date of the alleged offence.

7. This Court, further, by its order dated 06.05.2026, directed the

respondent to verify the Secondary School Examination Mark-Sheet

placed on record by the appellant to claim juvenility as on the date of

the offence.

8. The respondent has filed a verification report dated 09.07.2026,

which, inter alia, annexes a communication dated 29.06.2026 from the

NIOS, confirming the said document filed by the appellant to be

correct. We must herein, however, note that as far as the documents on

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 4 of 21

the basis of which the age of the appellant had been recorded in the

said Mark-Sheet are concerned, it is stated that as per the NIOS norms,

they are to be maintained only for a period of 5 years and have

accordingly been weeded out.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

authenticity of the Mark-Sheet placed on record cannot be doubted,

inasmuch as the same was obtained when the claim of being a juvenile

was governed by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to

as the 'JJ Act, 1986'). The JJ Act, 1986 defined a 'juvenile' in Section

2(h) thereof to be a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years

or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. He submits

that, therefore, no benefit was accruing to the appellant by giving a

false age for his Secondary School Examination Certificate, as it

showed the appellant to be more than 16 years of age as on the date of

the offence. He submits that it is only with the coming into force of the

JJ Act of 2000 and the subsequent amendment and insertion of Section

7A therein by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)

Amendment Act, 2006 with effect from 22.08.2006, enabling a claim

of juvenility to be raised at any stage, that the appellant could have

gained any benefit under the said Act and claim to be a 'juvenile' or

'juvenile in conflict with law', as defined in Section 2(l) of the Act. He

submits that, therefore, no doubt can be placed on the genuineness of

the age reflected in the Secondary School Examination Certificate

referred to hereinabove.

10. He submits that even if the above said Certificate is to be

ignored, the age of the appellant on the date of the offence, in terms of

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 5 of 21

Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)

Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the '2007 Rules'), has to be

determined on the basis of the Ossification Test, which again shows

that the appellant was below the age of 18 years as on the date of the

alleged offence.

11. Placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Hari

Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2009) 13 SCC 211;

Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2010) 5 SCC 344;

and Satya Deo Alias Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 10

SCC 555, he submits that it is no longer res integra that in view of

Section 7A of the JJ Act of 2000, the benefit of juvenility must accrue

to the appellant, as he was less than 18 years of age on the date of the

alleged offence, even though the offence is claimed to have been

committed prior to the coming into force of the JJ Act of 2000.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits, that

Section 20 of the JJ Act of 2000 applies to proceedings pending at the

stage of trial as well as appeal, and even at the stage where the person

is already undergoing the sentence. He submits that the reckoning date

for determining juvenility is the date of occurrence of the alleged

offence. In support of his submission, he places reliance on

Charanjeet Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2004 SCC Online Del

783, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another, 2005 3 SCC

551 and Ravinder Kumar v. State, 2007 SCC Online Del 1318.

13. On the other hand, Mr. Usman, the learned APP, submits that

the appellant cannot rely on the School Certificate, inasmuch as it had

been obtained post his conviction by the Impugned Judgment. He

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 6 of 21

submits that this itself casts a doubt on the genuineness of the age

reflected in the said certificate. He submits that no document in

support of the age reflected in the School Certificate, has been

produced by the appellant in spite of opportunities granted by this

Court. The age reflected in the said school certificate is, therefore,

without any basis and cannot be relied upon by the appellant.

14. As far as the Ossification Test report is concerned, he submits

that this Court should not accept the same and, instead, should direct a

further inquiry to be made by the Juvenile Justice Board constituted

under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

(hereinafter referred to as the „JJ Act of 2015‟) on the appellant‟s

claim of juvenility, and in case the appellant is found to be a juvenile

on the date of the offence, further proceedings be directed to be

undertaken by the said Board.

15. The learned APP further submits that the 18-year age limit was

introduced by the JJ Act of 2000 and given retrospective effect by the

2006 amendment. He submits that this benefit cannot be extended

under the JJ Act of 2015. He further submits that although the Act is

beneficial in nature, it cannot be interpreted to confer a substantive

right which the legislature has not expressly preserved.

16. The learned APP submits that the plea of juvenility cannot, by

itself, invalidate the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court or

result in an automatic acquittal. He submits that the conviction must

still be examined on its merits, independent of the plea of juvenility. In

support of his submission, he places reliance on Hari Ram (supra)

Dharambir (supra) and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 7 of 21

U.P, (2013) 11 SCC 193.

17. He further submits that merely because the appellant is not

pressing the challenge to his conviction, this Court is not absolved of

its duty to examine the correctness of the conviction in exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction. In support, he relies upon Shyam Deo Pandey v.

State of Bihar (1971) 1 SCC 855, Bani Singh v. State of U.P. (1996)

4 SCC 720, and a judgment of Kerela High Court in Samuel Philipose

v. Koshy Thomas, 2009(4) KLT 360 (Ker.).

18. We have considered the submissions made by the learned

counsels for the parties.

19. As far as the applicability of the JJ Act of 2000 to cases where

the date of the alleged offence is prior to the coming into force of the

said Act, and even where the accused stands convicted, the law is no

longer res integra. In Hari Ram (supra), the Supreme Court, taking

note of the substitution of Section 2(l) defining the term 'juvenile in

conflict with law', the insertion of Section 7A in the JJ Act of 2000, the

introduction of Rule 12 into the 2007 Rules, and the amendment of

Section 20 of the JJ Act of 2000, held that the relevant date for

determining the applicability of the JJ Act of 2000, as far as the age of

the accused is concerned, is the date of the alleged offence and not the

date of Trial. It was further held that the JJ Act of 2000 would be

applicable even to proceedings of any Court/Authority initiated when

the JJ Act of 1986 was in force at the time of the alleged offence. It

further held that even where a person had ceased to be juvenile on or

before 01.04.2001, when the JJ Act of 2000 came into force, the

provisions of the JJ Act of 2000 would apply as if the said provisions

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 8 of 21

had been in force for all purposes and for all material times when the

alleged offence was committed. We quote from the judgment as

under:-

“59. The law as now crystallised on a conjoint

reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49

read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all

doubt that all persons who were below the age

of 18 years on the date of commission of the

offence even prior to 1-4-2001, would be treated

as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was

raised after they had attained the age of 18

years on or before the date of commencement of

the Act and were undergoing sentence upon

being convicted.

xxxx

68. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not

completed eighteen years on the date of

commission of the offence was also entitled to

the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as

if the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been

in existence even during the operation of the

1986 Act.

69. The said position was re-emphasised by

virtue of the amendments introduced in Section

20 of the 2000 Act, whereby the proviso and

Explanation were added to Section 20, which

made it even more explicit that in all pending

cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any

other criminal proceedings in respect of a

juvenile in conflict with law, the determination

of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms

of clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, and the

provisions of the Act would apply as if the said

provisions had been in force when the alleged

offence was committed.

70.In the instant case, there is no controversy

that the appellant was about sixteen years of age

on the date of commission of the alleged offence

and had not completed eighteen years of age. In

view of Sections 2(k), 2(l) and 7-A read with

Section 20 of the said Act, the provisions thereof

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 9 of 21

would apply to the appellant's case and on the

date of the alleged incident it has to be held that

he was a juvenile.”

20. In Dharambir (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the above

position in law as under:-

“14. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7-A

contemplates that a claim of juvenility can be

raised before any court and has to be

recognised at any stage even after disposal of

the case and such claim is required to be

determined in terms of the provisions contained

in the Act of 2000 and the Rules framed

thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be

so on or before the date of the commencement of

the Act of 2000. The effect of the proviso is that

a juvenile who had not completed eighteen years

of age on the date of commission of the offence

would also be entitled to the benefit of the Act of

2000 as if the provisions of Section 2(k) of the

said Act, which defines “juvenile” or “child” to

mean a person who has not completed

eighteenth year of age, had always been in

existence even during the operation of the 1986

Act.

15. It is, thus, manifest from a conjoint reading

of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 of the Act

of 2000, read with Rules 12 and 98 of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Rules, 2007 that all persons who were

below the age of eighteen years on the date of

commission of the offence even prior to 1-4-

2001 would be treated as juveniles even if the

claim of juvenility is raised after they have

attained the age of eighteen years on or before

the date of the commencement of the Act of 2000

and were undergoing sentences upon being

convicted. In the view we have taken, we are

fortified by the dictum of this Court in a recent

decision in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan.”

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 10 of 21

21. As far as the 2015 Act is concerned, the Supreme Court in Satya

Deo Alias Bhoorey (supra), took note of Section 25 thereof, which we

reproduce hereinunder:-

“25. Special provision in respect of pending

cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in

this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child

alleged or found to be in conflict with law

pending before any Board or court on the date

of commencement of this Act, shall be continued

in that Board or court as if this Act had not been

enacted.”

22. Explaining the effect of the above provision and Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897, the Supreme Court in Satya Deo Alias

Bhoorey (supra) held as under:-

“26. Consequently, in light of Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act read with Section 25 of the

2015 Act, an accused cannot be denied his right

to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than

eighteen years of age at the time of commission

of the offence, a right which he acquired and

has fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the

offence was committed prior to enforcement of

the 2000 Act on 1-4-2001. In terms of Section 25

of the 2015 Act, the 2000 Act would continue to

apply and govern the proceedings which were

pending when the 2015 Act was enforced. [In

the present case, we are not required to examine

and decide the question whether the 2000 Act or

the 2015 Act would apply when the offence was

committed before the enactment of the 2015 Act

but the charge-sheet was filed after enactment of

the 2015 Act. The answer would require

examination of clause (1) of Article 20 of the

Constitution and several other aspects as the

2015 Act provide an entirely different regime in

respect of children in conflict with law and the

procedure to be followed in such cases. These

aspects and issues have not been argued before

us.]”

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 11 of 21

23. The above judgment was followed by the Supreme Court in

Pawan Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 15 SCC 683.

24. Therefore, the JJ Act of 2000 shall continue to apply even to the

cases where the offence was committed before the enactment of the JJ

Act of 2015 and to the proceedings, including appeals, which were

pending when the JJ Act of 2015 came into force, like in the present

case.

25. From the above, it can be safely held that, in case we agree with

the appellant that his age was less than 18 years as on the date of the

alleged offence, he would be entitled to protection under the JJ Act of

2000 and the sentence imposed upon him would be liable to be set

aside.

26. We may now consider whether the appellant was below 18

years of age as on the date of alleged offence, that is, 01.12.1995.

27. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal

(2012) 10 SCC 489, the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines and

standards for evaluating the case of juvenility raised for the first time

before the appellate Court or Supreme Court. The same are reproduced

as under:-

“39. Now, we summarise the position which is

as under:

39.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at

any stage even after the final disposal of the

case. It may be raised for the first time before

this Court as well after the final disposal of the

case. The delay in raising the claim of

juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of

such claim. The claim of juvenility can be

raised in appeal even if not pressed before the

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 12 of 21

trial court and can be raised for the first time

before this Court though not pressed before

the trial court and in the appeal court.

39.2. For making a claim with regard to

juvenility after conviction, the claimant must

produce some material which may prima facie

satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim

of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to

be discharged by the person who claims

juvenility.

39.3. As to what materials would prima facie

satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for

discharging the initial burden cannot be

catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what

weight should be given to a specific piece of

evidence which may be sufficient to raise

presumption of juvenility but the documents

referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall

definitely be sufficient for prima facie

satisfaction of the court about the age of the

delinquent necessitating further enquiry under

Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section

313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by

itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject

the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or

acceptability of the documents like the school

leaving certificate or the voters' list, etc.

obtained after conviction would depend on the

facts and circumstances of each case and no

hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they

must be prima facie accepted or rejected.

In Akbar Sheikh [(2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3

SCC (Cri) 431] and Pawan [(2009) 15 SCC

259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] these

documents were not found prima facie credible

while in Jitendra Singh [(2010) 13 SCC 523 :

(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857] the documents viz.

school leaving certificate, marksheet and the

medical report were treated sufficient for

directing an inquiry and verification of the

appellant's age. If such documents prima facie

inspire confidence of the court, the court may

act upon such documents for the purposes of

Section 7-A and order an enquiry for

determination of the age of the delinquent.

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 13 of 21

39.4. An affidavit of the claimant or any of the

parents or a sibling or a relative in support of

the claim of juvenility raised for the first time

in appeal or revision or before this Court

during the pendency of the matter or after

disposal of the case shall not be sufficient

justifying an enquiry to determine the age of

such person unless the circumstances of the

case are so glaring that satisfy the judicial

conscience of the court to order an enquiry

into determination of the age of the delinquent.

39.5. The court where the plea of juvenility is

raised for the first time should always be

guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and

be alive to the position that the beneficent and

salutary provisions contained in the 2000 Act

are not defeated by the hypertechnical

approach and the persons who are entitled to

get benefits of the 2000 Act get such benefits.

The courts should not be unnecessarily

influenced by any general impression that in

schools the parents/guardians understate the

age of their wards by one or two years for

future benefits or that age determination by

medical examination is not very precise. The

matter should be considered prima facie on

the touchstone of preponderance of

probability.

39.6. Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility

or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently

absurd or inherently improbable claim of

juvenility must be rejected by the court at the

threshold whenever raised.”

28. To determine the age of the appellant, we need to take note of

Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, which prescribes the manner in which age

is to be determined. The same is reproduced as under: -

“12. Procedure to be followed in

determination of Age.—(1) In every case

concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with

law, the court or the Board or as the case may

be, the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 14 of 21

rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or

child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a

period of thirty days from the date of making of

the application for that purpose.

(2) The court or the Board, or as the case

may be, the Committee shall decide the

juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the

child or, as the case may be, the juvenile in

conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of

physical appearance or documents, if available,

and send him to the observation home or in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child or

juvenile in conflict with law, the age

determination inquiry shall be conducted by the

court or the Board or, as the case may be, the

Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining—

(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if

available; and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school

(other than a play school) first attended; and in

the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a

municipal authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii)

of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be

sought from a duly constituted Medical Board,

which will declare the age of the juvenile or

child. In case exact assessment of the age

cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as

the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons

to be recorded by them, may, if considered

necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile

by considering his/her age on lower side within

the margin of one year, and, while passing

orders in such case shall, after taking into

consideration such evidence as may be

available, or the medical opinion, as the case

may be, record a finding in respect of his age

and either of the evidence specified in any of the

clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence

whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 15 of 21

of the age as regards such child or the juvenile

in conflict with law.

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the

juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below

18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of

any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule

(3), the court or the Board or, as the case may

be, the Committee shall in writing pass an order

stating the age and declaring the status of

juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the

Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall

be given to such juvenile or the person

concerned.

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry

or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of

Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these

rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by

the court or the Board after examining and

obtaining the certificate or any other

documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of

this rule.

(6) The provisions contained in this rule

shall also apply to those disposed of cases,

where the status of juvenility has not been

determined in accordance with the provisions

contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring

dispensation of the sentence under the Act for

passing appropriate order in the interest of the

juvenile in conflict with law.”

29. Sub-Rule 3(a) of Rule 12 prescribes a hierarchy of documents

which may be taken as evidence for an age determination inquiry; the

first being the matriculation certificate or equivalent certificate, if

available; the second being the date of birth certificate from the school

(other than a play school) first attended; the third being the birth

certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a

panchayat; and if any of these three are not available, then, in terms of

Sub-Rule 3(b) of Rule 12, the medical opinion of a duly constituted

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 16 of 21

Medical Board be obtained. Reference in this regard may be placed to

the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC 210 wherein the said hierarchy has been duly

recognized, with the matriculation or equivalent certificate being

accorded the highest priority.

30. In the present case, we have the Matriculation/Secondary

School Examination Certificate of the appellant issued by the NIOS,

reflecting his date of birth as 04.10.1978. The said date of birth would

make him 17 years,1 month and 27 days old on the date of alleged

offence and therefore, clearly shows that the appellant had not attained

the age of 18 years as on the said date. The said certificate has also

been verified by the respondent/State and found to be correct.

31. However, the learned APP strongly urges that as the said

document was obtained by the appellant after his conviction and is not

supported by any other documents that he could produce, we should

not rely upon the same. We are not inclined to accept this submission

of the respondent. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the

appellant, no benefit would have accrued to the appellant by giving a

wrong date of birth for obtaining the above certificate as, on the date

of the said certificate, his claim of juvenility would have been

governed by the 1986 Act, which defined a „juvenile‟ to be a boy who

had not attained the age of 16 years. The certificate shows that the

appellant had already attained the age of 16 years on the date of the

alleged offence. If he were to give a wrong date of birth, he would

have ensured that the same would have reflected an age below 16

years and not just above 16 years on the date of the offence.

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 17 of 21

32. Be that as it may, even if we were to ignore the said certificate,

pursuant to an order dated 03.12.2004 passed by this Court, the

appellant underwent a medical examination by a Medical Board

constituted at DDU Hospital. The said hospital had given a report

which would show the age of the appellant to be 12 years and 11

months, in case we take his lower age as on the date of the offence,

and 15 years and 11 months, if we take the upper age on the date of

the alleged offence. Either way, he was less than 18 years on the date

of the alleged offence.

33. It is also settled law that the standard of proof for the

determination of age is the degree of probability and not proof beyond

reasonable doubt. In a case involving a claim of juvenility where two

views are possible, the Court has to take a liberal approach. Reference

in this regard may be had to the judgments in Vinod Katara (supra)

and Pawan Kumar (supra).

34. The submission of the learned APP that we should now remand

the matter to the Board to conduct an inquiry for determining the age

of the appellant as on the date of the offence, also does not impress us.

The said report has been given way back on 18.02.2005. For all this

period, no dispute has been raised on the same by the respondent and

moreover, the said Ossification Test was conducted by the Jail

Authorities only.

35. Given the above circumstances, we have no doubt that the

appellant was a juvenile as on the date of the alleged offence.

36. This now brings us to the further course of action to be adopted

by this Court.

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 18 of 21

37. In Karan Alias Fatiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 5

SCC 504, the issue of what relief the appellant can be granted in view

of the fact that he has been held to be a juvenile on the date of the

offence by the Appellate Court, was considered in detail. The Supreme

Court, taking note of its earlier judgments in Jitendra Singh @

Babboo Singh (supra) and Ashok Kumar Mehra & Anr. v. The State

of Punjab etc., (2019) 6 SCC 132, held that only on the finding of

such juvenility, the conviction of the appellant cannot be set aside and

it is only the sentence awarded by the Court that would become

ineffective. The Court, however, further taking note of the fact that the

appellant therein was more than 20 years of age and had undergone

more than 5 years of incarceration, held that there will be no

requirement of sending him to the Juvenile Justice Board and instead

ordered his release.

38. Keeping in view the above, and even though the appellant has

filed an affidavit that he does not press his appeal on merits, we have

considered the case of the prosecution against him on merits as well.

39. The case of the prosecution against the appellant is that on

01.12.1995, the husband and the children of the deceased-Lado Devi

had gone to attend a marriage in Punjabi Bagh, leaving Smt. Lado

Devi at the house along with the appellant, who was working as a

domestic servant. At about 11:15 P.M., PW-1/Narinder Singh (son of

the deceased) and his family returned to the house and found the

entrance door of the house open and the appellant missing. The dead

body of the deceased was found in the bedroom and blood-stained

clothes of the appellant were found lying in the bathroom. A

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 19 of 21

motorcycle, clothes, silver coins, jewellery and cash upto amount of

Rs.1,50,000/- were also found to be missing. As there was no eye

witness to the occurrence, the case of the prosecution rested upon

circumstantial evidence.

40. The learned Trial Court, on the basis of testimonies of PW-

1/Narinder Singh, PW-9/Bhagat Raj (other son of the deceased), PW-

11/Ram Chander Solanki (another domestic servant working in the

house of the deceased) and PW-13/Randhir Singh (husband of the

deceased), held that the prosecution had been able to prove that the

appellant was working as a domestic servant in the house of the

deceased and was present on the fateful day of the alleged offence.

41. The learned Trial Court also found that though the appellant had

tried to set up a case in the cross-examination of witnesses that his

employment had been terminated prior to the date of the incident and

he was working somewhere in Malviya Nagar, the appellant led no

evidence in support of such case.

42. The learned Trial Court further relied upon the circumstance

that the appellant was subsequently found working under the name of

“Bhola Prajapati”. This circumstance is supported by the testimony of

PW-7/V.K. Mittal and PW-8/Ved Khurana.

43. The learned Trial Court further found that the prosecution had

been able to prove that blood-stained clothes of the appellant and a

pair of chappal belonging to the appellant were found in the bathroom.

44. The above circumstances clearly showed the complete chain of

circumstances against the appellant. The learned Trial Court thus

summarized such circumstantial evidence in its order, which we

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 20 of 21

reproduce hereinunder:

“147. The following circumstances have been

proved by the prosecution against the accused

Vinod Prajapati beyond reasonable doubt:

(a) Accused Vinod Prajapati was in the

employment of the complainant on the fateful

day i.e. 1-12-95.

(b) Vinod Prajapati and deceased Lado Devi

were left behind in the house when other family

members went to attend the marriage.

(c) When Narender Singh son of the deceased

came to the house at about 11:15 P.M. after

attending the marriage he found the door of the

house open, accused Vinod Prajapati missing

and Smt. Lado Devi dead in the bed room.

(d) Gold jewelery, silver coins and cash of

Rs. 1,50,000/- was found missing.

(e) The blood stained clothes of accused

Vinod Prajapati were found lying in the bath

room.

(f) Accused-Vinod Prajapati was working at

different places under the assumed name of

Bhola.”

45. We see no reason to disagree with the above findings of the

learned Trial Court. The conviction of the appellant is accordingly

sustained and upheld.

46. On the issue of whether the appellant is to be now remanded to

the Board, as noted hereinabove, the alleged offence was committed

on 01.12.1995. The appellant stood convicted on 19.02.2004 and, as

per the Nominal Roll dated 20.07.2004, had undergone an

imprisonment of 7 years, 8 months, and 15 days and earned a

remission of 20 days as on 19.07.2004. His sentence was suspended by

this Court vide its order dated 15.04.2005. Given the said facts and for

the reason that the appellant was a juvenile as on the date of the

alleged offence; taking note of the present age of the appellant; the fact

CRL.A. 297/2004 Page 21 of 21

that the appellant has also filed an affidavit stating that he does not

intend to challenge his conviction; and in view of Section 15(1) of the

JJ Act of 2000, whereunder the maximum period for which a juvenile

can be detained is three years; as also the course followed by the

Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar (supra) and Karan Alias Fatiya

(supra), we are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be served

by sustaining the conviction of the appellant, however, quashing the

sentence awarded to him and directing his release, if not required in

any other case.

47. The appeal partially succeeds in the above terms.

48. The bail bonds and the surety furnished by the appellant are

hereby discharged.

49. A copy of this Judgment be communicated to the learned Trial

Court as also the concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary

compliance.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J

SEPTMBER 25, 2026/rv/sg/pb