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Serial No. 01

Supplementary List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA

AT SHILLONG

Date of Hearing : 01.06.2026

Crl.A. No.1 of 2023 Date of Decision: 26.08.2026

Wanteilang Khongkhniang,

S/o- Alos K. Khhnian

R/O- H/No-22, Mawthang Sohkhyllung

Vill-Mawthang Sohkhyllung-793108,

East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya

…..Accused/Appellant

-VERSUS-

The State of Meghalaya through,

Secretary Home (Police) Department,

Shillong, Meghalaya.

…..Respondent

Coram:

Hon ’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge

Hon ’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge

Appearance:

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. A.K. Bhuyan, Adv.

Mr. P.P. Medhi, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with

Mr. E.R. Chyne, GA.

Judgment and Order

Per. B. Bhattacharjee, Judge:

1. The present appeal by the appellant has been preferred against the

Judgment and Order dated 11.10.2022 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO),

East Khasi Hills in POCSO Case No. 21 of 2015 convicting the appellant u/s 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 2 of 22

3(a)/5(l)/6/7/9(l)/10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

(POCSO) Act, 2012 and u/s 354/354A/354B/375(a) falling under

375(sixthly)/376/(2)(j)(n)/450/506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 and

sentencing him to (i) rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of

Rs.1,00,000 u/s 376 (2) IPC, (ii) imprisonment for 7 years and fine of Rs.

50,000 u/s 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, (iii) imprisonment for 10 years and

fine of Rs. 50,000 u/s 450 IPC and (iv) imprisonment for 7 years and fine of

Rs. 10,000 u/s 506 IPC.

2. The brief fact of the case is that an FIR dated 23.11.2014 was lodged

by the survivor alleging that on 20.11.2014 at around 02:30 P.M. the appellant

had committed forcible rape on her while she was alone at her residence. On

the basis of the FIR, a case was registered as Laban P.S. Case No. 114 (11)

2014 u/s 3/4 POCSO Act, 2012 and the matter was investigated into. After

completion of the investigation, a charge sheet bearing Charge Sheet No.

14/2015 dated 20.03.2015 was filed against the appellant u/s 3(a)/4 POCSO

Act, 2012 and u/s 450/506 IPC.

3. At the trial, charges were framed against the appellant u/s 3(a)/4

POCSO Act r/w Section 450/506 IPC on 03.05.2016. The appellant pleaded

not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 11(eleven) witnesses

and exhibited 5 (five) documents in support of its case. On 20.06.2022,

charges were altered/added to include Sections 3(a)/5(l)/6/7/8 POCSO Act,

2012 and Sections 354/354A/354B/375(a) falling under 375 (sixthly) /376/

(2)(j)(n) IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the newly added charges. No

witness was recalled or re-examined after alteration/addition of the new

charges. An enquiry was conducted by the Trial Court u/s 34(2) of POCSO

Act, 2012 to determine the age of the survivor and for that purpose, both the

parents of the survivor, who were previously examined as prosecution

witnesses, were recalled and examined as CW1 and CW2. After the closure

of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant was recorded u/s

313 Cr.P.C. on 09.09.2022. The appellant declined to adduce any defence 2026:MLHC:938-DB

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witness. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties by the impugned

Judgment and Order convicted the appellant. Hence, this appeal.

4. Mr. A.K. Bhuyan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits

that the prosecution case is full of contradiction as the FIR refers to only one

incidence whereas the charge sheet speaks about two incidences. He submits

that the FIR was lodged after 3 days of the alleged incident but the prosecution

failed to offer any explanation for the delay making the entire case doubtful.

He submits that the learned Trial Court failed to consider contradictory

statements of the survivor with regard to the date of incident as the statement

recorded by the doctor showed that the survivor stated the date of first incident

to be on 16.11.2014. The learned Trial Court, he submits, also erred in not

appreciating the evidence of PW6 who stated that no rape had taken place.

Even the evidence of medical expert (PW8), according to the learned counsel,

does not support the prosecution version of the case as there was no indication

of any recent tear of hymen in the medical report. It is further submitted by

the learned counsel that the learned Trial Court erred in determining the date

of birth of the survivor on the basis of a birth certificate dated 06.04.2015

issued after the occurrence of the incidence. He also submits that no

prosecution witness was recalled after alteration/addition of charges by the

Trial Court depriving the appellant to further cross-examine the witnesses

which caused serious prejudice to him.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant next submits that the survivor in

her evidence as well as statement u/s 164 disclosed that she informed about

the occurrence of the incident to few persons and named them, but none of the

named persons was examined as a witness by the prosecution in the case. In

addition, he submits that despite seizure of the clothes by seizure list (exhibit-

3) and saliva swab, vaginal swab and blood sample by seizure list (exhibit-5)

of the survivor, the seized items were not sent for forensic examination by the

investigating authority. Non-examination of the persons named by the

survivor and absence of forensic examination of the seized articles, according 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 4 of 22

to him, raises serious doubt about the prosecution case and calls for drawing

of an adverse inference.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the Trial Court

has committed a gross error in framing charges and proceeding with the trial

against the appellant without determining his age as the appellant was a minor

at the time of the incident. He further contends that the learned Trial Court has

failed to appreciate the provision of Section 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act,

2012 in its proper perspective and convicted the appellant without there being

any cogent and trustworthy evidence. He submits that the learned Trial Court

believed the narration of the survivor with regard to the incident of

20.11.2014, but disbelieved the incident of 09.11.2014 and 16.11.2014 and,

in such a situation, could not have convicted the appellant. He submits that

the quantum of punishment awarded by the Trial Court is far beyond any

reasonable justification as the appellant is a young man and has no previous

criminal record. He, thus, submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in

law and facts in failing to appreciate the materials on record and came to a

perverse finding and prays that the conviction and sentence of the appellant

be set aside and quashed.

7. The following decisions are relied on by the learned counsel for the

appellant in support of his submission: -

i. Tomaso Bruno and Another V. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7

SCC 178 (para 21,42)

ii. Govindaraju @ Govinda V. State by Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr.,

Criminal Appeal No. 984 of 2007 (para 39,45), (Supreme Court

of India).

iii. The State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi V. Tufail, CRL. L.P. 303/2019

(para 7,8) (High Court of Delhi)

iv. State of Rajasthan V. Bhanwar Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 147 (para

6)

v. Raju V. State of M.P., (2008)15 SCC 133 (para 21)

vi. Kuna Alias Sanjaya Behera V. State of Odisha, (2018) 1 SCC 296

(para 19)

vii. Thulia Kali V. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 (para

12,13,14)

viii. Manirul Islam V. State of Assam, (2021) 6 GLR 55 (para 51,53) 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 5 of 22

ix. State of Rajasthan V. Ghewar Singh and Ors., DB Criminal

Death Reference Nos. 1, 167 and 201/2018 (para 17-19),

(Rajasthan High Court)

x. Ramanand V. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2022 SC 5273(para

117)

xi. Biju Saikia V. The Stat of Assam, Crl. Appl (J)/2/2021 (para 38-

44), (Gauhati High Court)

xii. Reena Hazarika V. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289 (para

19,20)

8. Conversely, Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG appearing for the State-

respondent supports the conviction and sentence of the appellant and submits

that the decision of the Trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity or

illegality. He submits that there was no delay in lodging the FIR as it was

lodged within 3 days of the occurrence of the incident. The question of delay,

according to him, in an offence involving sexual assault against a minor is not

very vital as per the settled propositions of law. He submits that the evidence

of the survivor (PW1) clearly indicates that she was raped by the appellant

and there was no rebuttal of the same by the appellant in cross-examination of

the survivor. The evidence of the survivor, he submits, is well supported by

PW4 who stated that the mother of the appellant came to seek forgiveness

from the survivor’s parents as the appellant had committed a mistake. He

submits that the evidence of PW6 that on 20.11.2014 while the survivor came

for tuition, she was crying and informed that the appellant did bad thing to her

corroborates the testimony of the survivor. In addition, he submits that PW8,

the doctor who conducted medical examination of the survivor, opined that

the survivor was sexually assaulted.

9. The learned AAG further submits that there is no contradiction between

the statements of the survivor recorded during the course of the investigation

and her evidence before the Trial Court. He submits that the survivor was all

along consistent in narrating the facts of the incident and she was not

confronted with her previous statements u/s 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. by the

appellant at the time of the cross-examination. He submits that absence of 2026:MLHC:938-DB

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forensic report of the seized articles in the present case is of no consequence

as the testimony of the survivor is sufficient to sustain conviction of the

appellant. He submits that non-examination of the persons named by the

survivor does not weaken the prosecution case as the evidence of PW5, PW6

and PW9 is sufficient to prove that the survivor had informed them about the

wrongdoings of the appellant after the incident. He submits that no particular

number of witnesses is required to prove a fact and it is the quality of the

evidence and not the quantity that is material.

10. In support of his argument, the learned AAG has placed reliance on the

following decisions: -

i. Marbet Nongsiej V. State of Meghalaya, Crl. A. No. 2 of 2019

(para 52, 57, 67, 68, 70)

ii. State of Himachal Pradesh V. Prem Singh, (2009) 1 SCC 420

(para 6)

iii. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai V. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3

SCC 217 (para 9,10,11)

iv. Rajan V. State of Harayana, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1952 (para

32 IV, VI, VII, XI, XII, XIII)

v. Vijay V. State, (2019) SCC OnLine Del 10485 (para 20)

vi. Paramjeet Singh V. State of Uttarakhand, (2010) 10 SCC 439

(para 21 to 30)

vii. Arjun Sonar V. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (2025) SCC

OnLine SC 2065 (para 6)

viii. State of Himachal Pradesh V. Raghubir Singh, (2024) SCC

OnLine SC 940 (para 10)

ix. Deepak Kumar Sahu V. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) SCC

OnLine SC 1610 (para 5.5.5, 5.5.6, 5.5.7, 5.6, 5.8)

x. Ganesan V. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 (para 10)

xi. Sanjay Darjee V. State of Sikkim, (2025) SCC OnLine Sikk 95

{para 7 (iii), 7 (iv)}

xii. Imran Islam Bora V. State of Assam, (2023) SCC OnLine Gau

5365 (para 12, 13, 15,16)

xiii. Sushil Kumar Tiwari V. Ram Sah, Criminal Appeal No. 3813 of

2025 arising out SLP (Crl) No. 18377 of 2024 (para 26, 27),

(Supreme Court of India)

11. Analysis of the prosecution evidence reveals that PW1, the survivor, in

her deposition stated that on 20.11.2014 when she was busy in her household

work, the appellant, who was staying in an adjacent house, came to her house 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 7 of 22

and enquired about the whereabouts of her mother and brother. While she was

taking cloth from the bed, the appellant entered the house again and told her

to give him a kiss, which she rejected. The appellant pulled her hands and

forcibly kissed her. He also tried to pull her skirt down and in the process the

skirt was torn. He pulled down his pant half way and pulled her to bed. She

tried to resist him and pushed him but was not successful and he was raping

her in standing position and also inappropriately touched upper body parts.

She was shocked and when she came out of shocking stage, realised that her

skirt was wet and the appellant after committing the rape left the house. She

went to her mother’s bedroom and cleaned herself. After sometimes she went

for tuition where she narrated the incident to her friend. On the next day in

school, she narrated the incident to her best friend. She also informed the

matter to her tuition teacher and the appellant’s girlfriend. Her tuition teacher

advised her to report the matter at home. When she reached home after tuition,

her elder sister saw her crying and came to know about the incident from her

upon enquiry. Later, her sister called her father, mother, the house owner and

also the appellant. The appellant denied the allegation and there was a huge

argument, scolding at the appellant. The matter was informed to her

grandmother who advised to report the incident to the police. She was taken

to Ganesh Das Hospital for medical examination. She exhibited the FIR as

Exhibit-1 and her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. as Exhibit-2.

12. The survivor in her deposition further stated that the incident narrated

in the FIR was not the first incident as the appellant had earlier raped her in

the same month of November, 2014 in his house and threatened her not to

reveal the incident to anybody or else he would spoil her name by saying that

she had willingly gone to him.

In her cross-examination, the survivor stated that both she and the

appellant were tenants in the house of PW7. She stated that in the year 2014

she was studying in Class VIII. She and the appellant were very close friends

and she used to ask for help from him for project work. Her mother also loved 2026:MLHC:938-DB

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the appellant. The appellant used to give her lift while going to school. She

denied that the appellant came to her house asking for fire matches on

20.11.2014. While confirming the statements made in her chief, she stated that

she narrated the incident to her tuition teacher and her family members and

later on 23.11.2014 she went to file the FIR before the police. She stated that

she did not shout for help when the appellant committed rape on her as she

was in a state of shock. While the police took her for medical examination,

she had changed her clothes.

There was no attempt by the appellant to rebut the narrative of the

survivor with regard to the incident of 20.11.2014. The appellant did not even

try to establish that he did not visit the resident of the survivor on that

particular date. In fact, the suggestion put forward to the survivor in her cross-

examination that the appellant went to her place on 20.11.2014 asking for fire

matches confirms the presence of the appellant in the house of the survivor at

the time of the incident. Furthermore, despite the fact that there was no

mention of occurrence of any other incident other than that of 20.11.2014 in

the FIR, the appellant did not cross-examine the survivor to disprove her

assertion in the evidence with regard to occurrence of the former incident.

In her re-examination, the survivor stated that she informed about the

incident to the girlfriend of the appellant i.e. PW9. She also stated that she

told PW5, the cousin of PW9, that the appellant raped her. The appellant

declined to cross-examine the survivor on the re-examination.

13. PW2, the mother of the survivor, in her deposition stated that after 2 to

3 days of the incident, the survivor told her that the appellant came to their

house when she was in her in-law’s place and after making an enquiry about

her and her eldest son’s whereabouts, raped the survivor. On the day when the

survivor stated her about the incident, the appellant was present in her house.

She scolded him why he committed such a heinous crime against the survivor

though she treated him as her own son, the appellant did not reply and kept

quiet. Later, she called her house owner and narrated the incident and they 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 9 of 22

advised her to report to the police. She along with her relative went to file a

complaint to the PS and the appellant at that time fled away. She stated that

the survivor did not inform the matter on the day of the incident as she was

scared of the appellant.

In her cross-examination, PW2 admitted that she had not witnessed the

incident but came to know from her daughter after three days. The appellant

while cross-examining PW2 did not try to contradict the fact that he was

present at the time when the survivor disclosed the incident to PW2 and that

he was scolded by PW2. The appellant also did not dispute the fact that he

fled away when PW2 went to file the complaint.

PW2 was again recalled and examined as CW2 for determination of age

of the survivor where she stated that the survivor was born on 23.04.2000 at

Ganesh Das Hospital, Shillong. She exhibited Exhibit-C2 as the birth

certificate of the survivor issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death, Shillong

Municipal Board and stated that the birth was registered on 07.09.2000 and

the certificate was issued on 06.04.2015. The appellant declined to cross-

examine CW2 to dispute the date of birth of the survivor.

14. PW3, the father of the survivor, in his deposition stated that he was

informed by his son that the survivor was raped by the appellant. On getting

the information, he went to the appellant’s house and gave him 2/3 slaps and

thereafter their landlord came and stopped him. He also stated about going to

the Laban PS and reporting the matter to the police.

In his cross-examination, PW 3 stated that he did not see the occurrence

but heard it from his son. He did not know that the survivor was having a love

affair with the appellant. The statement that he went to the house of the

appellant and slapped him 2/3 times after coming to know of the incident, was

not sought to be disturbed in his cross-examination by the appellant.

PW3 was again examined as CW1 on the issue of determination of age

of the survivor where he stated that the survivor was born on 23.04.2000 and

exhibited the Secondary School Leaving Certificate of the survivor dated 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 10 of 22

23.05.2017 as Exhibit-C1 showing the date of birth of the survivor on

23.04.2000. In his cross-examination, he answered in affirmative the question

as to whether the same date of birth was given at the time of admission of the

survivor in school.

15. PW4 in her deposition stated that she went to the house of the survivor

after being informed of the incident by PW3. On reaching the house of the

survivor she saw one lady, who, she later came to know was the mother of the

appellant. The mother and father of the survivor told PW4 that the mother of

the appellant came to seek forgiveness as her son, the appellant, had

committed a mistake and proposed to allow the appellant to marry the

survivor. PW4 stated that the parents of the survivor wanted to report the

matter to the police, but they did know how to go about as they are illiterate.

She enquired about the incident from the survivor and the survivor narrated

the incident to her. Before going to the police station PW4 was told that the

survivor still had the clothes which she was wearing at the time of the incident.

PW4 stated that the FIR was written by her and exhibited her signature on the

FIR as Exhibit- 1/2. She also exhibited Exhibit- 3, the seizure list, and Exhibit-

3/1 as her signature.

In her cross-examination, PW4 stated that the FIR was read over to the

survivor before being lodged with the police. She admitted that the mother of

the appellant did not tell her that she asked for forgiveness and proposed to

make the appellant marry the survivor, but was informed of the same by the

parents of the survivor. She remembered that the police seized one skirt and

one black cycling short.

16. PW5 in his deposition stated that he did not know anything about the

case, but one day the survivor told him that the appellant had done bad thing

to her without telling what bad thing was done. He told the survivor to report

the matter to her parents.

In his cross-examination, PW5 confirmed that the survivor told him one

day after the incident, but he could not remember the exact date. He stated that 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 11 of 22

he and survivor were friends since childhood and he knew the appellant who

was his neighbour. He did not know whether the survivor and the appellant

were having a love affair.

17. PW6 in her deposition stated that she was taking private tuition at her

residence and the survivor was her student. On 20.11.2014, the survivor came

for tuition at about 5 P.M. and started crying. On repeated enquiry, the

survivor informed that her neighbour, the appellant, did bad thing to her. PW6

enquired what bad thing was done, the survivor said that the appellant touched

her body. PW6 advised the survivor to inform her parents.

In her cross-examination, PW6 stated that on the day of the incident

when the survivor came for tuition, she looked sad and was crying. PW6 stated

that the survivor narrated the incident privately in absence of other students.

She could not say if the survivor was in a relationship with the appellant.

18. PW7 in her deposition stated that the appellant was a tenant in her

house. The survivor was also a tenant in her house. She stated that the father

of the survivor had a brawl with the appellant and from there she learnt that

the appellant had committed rape on the survivor.

In her cross-examination, PW7 stated that the appellant was a tenant in

her house for one year. He did not create any trouble when he was staying as

a tenant and there was no complaint against him. She admitted that she had

not seen the incident but heard about it. She did not know if the appellant was

in a relationship with the survivor.

19. PW8, the Medical Officer, in her deposition stated that on 23.11.2014

she conducted medical examination of the survivor. She had also recorded the

history of the case narrated by the survivor. The survivor narrated that on

20.11.2014 while she was washing utensils in her house, her neighbour came

and sexually assaulted her. The survivor resisted. The survivor also stated that

she was sexually assaulted on 16.11.2014 in the house of the appellant. PW8

medically examined the survivor and on general examination she found

everything was normal, but on examination of survivor’s genital part, she 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 12 of 22

found that her hymen was torn with 8 O’ clock position. It was an old tear.

PW8 collected the biological sample of the survivor and handed over to the

police. After examining the survivor, PW8 prepared a report and exhibited the

same as Exhibit-4. She opined that the survivor was sexually assaulted. She

also exhibited Exhibit-5.

In her cross-examination, PW8 admitted that she did not find any

medical evidence of recent sexual intercourse.

20. PW9 in her deposition stated that she knew the survivor who is her

relative. The survivor disclosed to her that she was raped by the appellant. The

survivor was 14/15 years old and studying in Class VIII at the time of the

incident. PW9 stated that she did not know the appellant and had not seen him

also.

In her cross-examination, she stated that she knew the survivor right

from her childhood. She could not say if the survivor had a liking for the

appellant. She stated that the survivor narrated the incident to her near her

house.

21. PW10, the investigating officer, in her deposition stated that on

23.11.2014 an FIR was lodged by the survivor alleging that she was raped by

the appellant. The FIR was registered and the case was endorsed to her for

investigation. She took the survivor to Ganesh Das Hospital for medical

examination and seized the biological sample of the survivor collected by the

doctor vide Exhibit-5. She examined the survivor and thereafter the survivor’s

statement was recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C. The mother of the survivor produced

the wearing apparels of the survivor which were seized vide Exhibit-3. She

visited the place of occurrence and examined four witnesses. On 10.12.2014,

she handed over the case diary to the O/C Laban PS as she availed maternity

leave.

In her cross-examination, PW10 admitted that the FIR was filed three

days after the incident. She stated that her investigation commenced from

23.11.2014. She admitted that the survivor had taken bath and changed her 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 13 of 22

clothes after the incident. She also admitted that the seized articles were not

sent for forensic analysis by her and she did not find any witness to the

incident. She denied the suggestion that the survivor and the appellant were

having an affair and the FIR was filed because of misunderstanding between

them.

22. PW11, a police officer, in her deposition stated that she could not

recollect the date when the case was endorsed to her for submission of charge

sheet as all the formalities observed in conducting the investigation in the case

was carried out by PW10 who later proceeded for maternity leave. After she

received the C/D she observed that the formalities in the investigation had

been completed by the previous I/O and the matter was discussed with O/C

Laban PS for further steps. The O/C went to meet the S.P. for approval and

accordingly she was directed to file charge sheet against the appellant. Before

filing the C/S she had gone through the C/D including the statements of

witnesses u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and the statement of the survivor u/s 164 Cr.P.C.

She stated that it was evident from record that a prima facie case was found

well established against the appellant. She had never seen the appellant.

In her cross-examination, she admitted that she did not take part in the

investigation of the case. She also could not remember charge sheet was filed

after how many days of handing over of the case to her.

23. The appellant’s statement was recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. by the Trial

Court where he denied all the accusations against him. However, he admitted

that he went to the house of the survivor on 20.11.2014 to take matchsticks

but did not enquire about her mother and brother. He also admitted that the

father of the survivor slapped him after two or three days but not on

20.11.2014.

24. The statement of the survivor was recorded u/s 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.

during the course of the investigation of the case. The survivor was not

confronted with her previous statement at the time of her cross-examination 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 14 of 22

by the appellant. With regard to the incident of 20.11.2014, the survivor in her

statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C stated: -

“….........On 20

th

November, 2014 while I was washing

utensils at home at around 2:30 in the day time,

………(appellant) entered our house. He asked about the

whereabouts of my mother and elder brother.

I told him that my mother had taken my younger brother for a

walk and that my elder brother had gone to the toilet outside.

In fact my elder brother was not home but I lied as I was scared

of ……..(appellant). ……..(appellant) went outside. I

remembered that I had to wash some clothes as told by mother

so I went to the bedroom to take the clothes.

………(appellant) suddenly entered and asked me to kiss him

and I said “NO”. He however pulled me and kissed me on my

lips.

He started touching my body and tried to take off my skirt. He

covered my mouth and he managed to pull my skirt till it got

torn.

He pulled down his zip and he tried to pull me to the bed but I

fought back. He made me stand near one chair and he held me

tight.

He took out his penis and I lost consciousness and I could not

understand.

When I regained consciousness I found my panty and skirt

pulled down to my knees and they were wet with some white

discharge. It was disgusting.

I changed my clothes and I had a wash.

I told about this incident to my friend …………..in the tuition.

The following day I told about the incident to three of my

classmates ……….., ………. &………. They told me that I

should tell my family.

I did not dare tell my family as I was scared.

In the tuition I just cried & my tuition teacher asked me the

reason why. I told her and she advised me to tell my family. I

then told my family after this ………(appellant) however made

accusations against me.”

25. Comparison of the aforementioned statement of the survivor

with her evidence before the Trial Court does not show any notable

contradiction in so far as her narrative in relation to the incident of

20.11.2014 is concerned. The only difference appears to be in relation 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 15 of 22

to the date of the alleged first occurrence which finds no mention in the

FIR. The survivor in her statement disclosed the date of first occurrence

to be on 09.11.2014, whereas, in her evidence she did not mention any

specific date and only stated in the same month of November 2014.

However, the above discrepancy does not go to the root of the accusation

made in the FIR and no way has the effect of dislodging the credibility

of the evidence of the survivor in the case. Thus, the contention of the

appellant that the discrepancy in the date of first occurrence casts a doubt

in the entire prosecution case deserves no acceptance, more particularly,

when the appellant had chosen not to confront the survivor with the

above fact in her cross-examination to relate it with the incident

mentioned in the FIR to attach element of falsity in the version of the

survivor.

26. With regard to the contention of the appellant that the learned

Trial Court erred in proceeding with the trial of the case without first

determining the age of the appellant who was a minor at the time of the

incident, it is seen that the appellant did not take any such plea before

the Trial Court during the course of the trial. Although, the plea of

juvenility can be raised at any point of time, the same has to be supported

by some material. The appellant has neither made any assertion with

regard to his date of birth in the present appeal nor placed any document

before this Court in support of his plea of being a minor. Hence, the

contention deserves no consideration.

27. The contention of the appellant that the birth certificate

(Exhibit-C2) should not have been accepted by the Trial Court for

determining the age of the survivor as it was issued only on 06.04.2015,

after the occurrence of the incident, has no merit as the evidence of CW2

and the Exhibit-C2 clearly project that the birth of the survivor was

registered on 07.09.2000, i.e. just after few months of her birth. Simply

because the birth certificate of the survivor was obtained on a later date, 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 16 of 22

it cannot be termed suspicious to disprove the prosecution case.

Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that the appellant had

disputed the date of birth of the survivor in the cross-examination of

CW1 and CW2.

28. The plea of the appellant that the denial of opportunity to cross-

examine the witnesses after the alteration/addition of charges by the

Trial Court has highly prejudiced the appellant finds no support from

the materials on record. The record of the Trial Court reveals that on

20.06.2022 charges were altered/added to include Section 3(a)/5(l)/6/7/8

POCSO Act, 2012 and Sections 354/354A/354B/375(a) falling under

375 (sixthly) /376/ (2)(j)(n) IPC. Thereafter, on 23.06.2022, the parties

were heard by the Trial Court on whether proceeding immediately with

the trial would prejudice the appellant in his defence or the prosecution

in conducting the case. Both the parties agreed and preferred to proceed

with the trial and did not express any desire to recall any witness for the

purpose of examination or cross-examination. The plea of the appellant,

as such, has no leg to stand and is hereby rejected.

29. As pointed by the learned counsel for the appellant, the police

in the present case did not send the seized material for FSL examination

highlighting a flaw in the investigation. However, the survivor should

not suffer or lose justice due to omission or lapses by the investigating

agency. The absence of FSL report is not a ground for drawing an

adverse inference against the prosecution or for discarding a case of

penetrative sexual offence against a minor survivor provided the

testimony of the survivor is consistent, credible and unblemished by

major contradiction. An FSL report is only a corroborative piece of

evidence. It is not substantive proof on its own and its absence does not

automatically nullify a reliable first-hand account. The absence of

physical injuries, an intact hymen or missing forensic traces does not

disprove penetration or sexual assault, as physical tearing or wounds do 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 17 of 22

not occur in every instance. In the instant case, in absence of any

contradiction, the evidence of the survivor is found to be consistent,

trustworthy and reliable. Thus, the question of drawing adverse

inference on account of failure on the part of the investigating agency to

send the seized article for FSL examination does not arise.

30. Coming to the issue of non-examination of the persons who

were informed of the incident by the survivor, the statement u/s 164 and

the evidence of the survivor reveals that a number of persons were

informed of the incident by the survivor. It is true that all the persons

named by the survivor have not been examined as witnesses, but some

of them i.e. PW5, PW6 and PW9 were examined as witnesses and their

evidence before the Trial Court confirmed that the survivor had

informed them of the bad thing done to her by the appellant after the

incident. The law values the quality of evidence over the number of

witnesses examined. Although, the survivor did not disclose that she

was raped and only stated that the appellant had done bad thing to her

without disclosing the actual offence in details to PW5, PW6 and PW9,

such non-disclosure or partial disclosure cannot be termed as a

contradiction to the prosecution version of the case and the testimony of

the survivor. After all, a victim of sexual offence of the age of the

survivor cannot be expected to share every detail of the incident to

everyone by overcoming the severe shock and trauma and fear of social

stigma.

31. The decisions of Tomaso Bruno and Another (supra) and

Govindaraju @ Govinda (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the

appellant in support of his contention of drawing adverse inference are

not applicable in the present case as it is not a case where the prosecution

has failed to produce the best evidence. The absence of FSL report with

regard to the seized article and non-examination of all the witnesses 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 18 of 22

named by the survivor, in the facts and situation of the present case, are

not fatal to the prosecution case.

32. The decisions of Tufail (supra) and Bhanwar Singh (supra) also

have no application in the present matter as the version of the survivor

does not suffer from any contradiction insofar as the allegation against

the appellant is concerned. Similarly, the case of Raju (supra) is also not

applicable in the present case as the facts and situation of the said case

is not identical to the present case in hand.

33. Paragraph 19 of the case of Kuna Alias Sanjaya Behera (supra)

lays down proposition of law with regard to appreciation and

acceptability of evidence in criminal trial. The paragraph reads as

under:-

“That conviction can be based on a testimony of a single

eyewitness if he or she passes the test of reliability and that it

is not the number of witnesses but the quality of evidence that

is important, have been propounded consistently in Anil

Phukan, Ramji Surjya, Patnam Anandam and Gulam Sarbar

with the apparent emphasis that evidence must be weighed and

not counted, decisive test being whether it has a ring of truth

and it is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise.”

The above proposition, in fact, goes against the contention of

the appellant that since all the persons named by the survivor in her

statement was not examined, the prosecution is not been able to prove its

case beyond reasonable doubt.

34. The law laid down in the case of Thulia Kali (supra) with

regard to delay in lodging FIR was in the context of an offence u/s

302/379 IPC. However, the case of Prem Singh (supra), referred by the

learned AAG, was delivered in the context of sexual offence wherein

the Apex Court held: -

“6. So far as the delay in lodging the FIR is concerned, the delay

in a case of sexual assault, cannot be equated with the case

involving other offences. There are several factors which weigh

in the mind of the prosecutrix and her family members before 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 19 of 22

coming to the police station to lodge a complaint. In a tradition-

bound society prevalent in India, more particularly rural areas,

it would be quite unsafe to throw out the prosecution case

merely on the ground that there is some delay in lodging the

FIR. In that score, learned counsel for the appellant is right that

the High Court has lost sight of this vital distinction.”

In the present case there is nothing on record to suggest that the

delay of 3 (three) days in lodging the FIR has resulted in introduction of

coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of

deliberation and consultation. The plea of delay, as such, deserves no

consideration.

35. The decision of Manirul Islam (supra) was rendered in a case

where the testimony of the prosecutrix was found to be full of

contradiction and unreliable. The case of Biju Saikia (supra) was

decided by noticing material contradictions/omissions /improvement in

the version of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, the above decisions

have no application in the present case. The case of Ghewar Singh and

Ors. (supra) concerns offence of gang rape and as such is not relatable

to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

36. The plea raised on behalf of the appellant basing on the decision

of the case of Ramanand (supra) is also not tenable in view of the fact

that the appellant was not represented by a Legal Aid counsel before the

Trial Court. The case record reveals that the appellant was all along

represented by a counsel of his choice at the trial. Merely because the

trial has not ended in the expected line of the appellant, he cannot come

up with a plea that the counsel representing him was not

experienced/competent.

37. The case of Reena Hazarika (supra) does not apply in the

present case as the statement of the appellant recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

does not show that any specific defence was taken by him. The learned

counsel for the appellant has also not pointed out to any specific defence 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 20 of 22

taken by the appellant after conclusion of the prosecution evidence.

Thus, the question of non-consideration of defence taken u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

does not arise.

38. The Apex Court in the case of Ganesan (supra) observed as

under: -

“10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment,

molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence

of the prosecutrix, in Vijay v. State of M.P., it is observed in

paras 9 to 14 as under : (SCC pp.195-98)

“9………………………….

10……………..

11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in

cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court

is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity.

Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the

statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing

out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the

victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does

not require any corroboration unless there are compelling

reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for

some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial

conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable

than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice.

The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual

offence may not be even properly explained, but if found

natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The

Court observed as under…….

8……….

21…. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities

of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or

insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix,

which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise

reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix

inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking

corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for

some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit

reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may

lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration

required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the

prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the

entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 21 of 22

and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual

molestation.’

12……….

13.In State of H.P v. Raghubir Singh this Court held that

there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to

corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording

an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not

counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of

the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there

is absence of circumstances which militate against her

veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in

Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an earlier

judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan.

14……..”

39. The position which emerges from above is that in cases

involving sexual offence, minor contradictions or insignificant

discrepancies in the statement of a victim should not be a ground for

throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the

victim of sexual offence is enough for conviction and it does not require

any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking

corroboration. The Court should examine the broader probability of a

case and not get swayed away by minor contradiction or insignificant

discrepancies to throw out and otherwise reliable prosecution case.

Furthermore, the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence cannot be

equated with the case involving other offences. The delay in case of

sexual assault may not be even properly explained, but if found natural,

the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof.

40. The present case is not a case where the prosecution has failed

to establish the foundational facts. The prosecution case is firmly

established by the evidence of PW1(survivor) and well supported by

other prosecution witnesses in so far as the post incident events with

regard to scolding and slapping of the of the appellant are concerned.

The appellant has not made any allegation of hostility or vindictiveness 2026:MLHC:938-DB

Page 22 of 22

on the part of the survivor in making of the accusation against him in

order to render the statement and the evidence of the survivor doubtful.

The totality of the circumstances appearing in the case does not disclose

that the survivor had a strong motive to falsely involve the appellant and,

therefore, there should not be any hesitation on the part of this Court in

accepting her evidence adduced during the course of the trial.

41. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the appellant in his statement u/s

313 Cr.P.C. admitted that he went to the house of the survivor to take

matchstick on 20.11.2014. However, he did not say anything as to what

happened thereafter, whether he collected matchstick from the house of

the survivor or not. The appellant further stated that the father of the

survivor (PW3) slapped him two or three days after 20.11.2014 without

telling the reason for which he was slapped. The failure on the part of

the appellant to offer any explanation or defence further strengthens the

prosecution version of the case.

42. For what has been discussed above, there is no merit in the

present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.

43. The Trial Court record be returned forthwith.

44. Let an authenticated copy of this Judgement and Order be

furnished to the parties immediately.

(B. Bhattacharjee) (W. Diengdoh)

JUDGE JUDGE

Meghalaya

26.08.2026

“Abhinandan,PS” 2026:MLHC:938-DB