2026 INSC 65 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO . 1233 of 2025
X … PETITIONER
VS.
O/O SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF PEOPLE & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
INDEX
PREFACE ......................................................................................... 2
FACTS ............................................................................................. 2
PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF A JUDGE ............................................. 6
THE CONUNDRUM ........................................................................... 11
SUBMISSIONS ............................................................................... 13
ISSUES ......................................................................................... 13
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 14
Issue I : How must the first proviso be construed? ........................... 14
Issue II : Whether the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was
competent to refuse the motion? ................................................... 19
Issue III: What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman’s refusal
to admit the motion on the validity of the Speaker’s action under
Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act? ..................................................... 29
What, if the order of the Deputy Chairman, was to be held illegal? .. 29
The Prejudice Angle – need not be tested ..................................... 32
2
Effect of not challenging the decision of the Deputy Chairman ........ 35
Issue IV: Draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of the
Rajya Sabha – whether justified in law? .......................................... 39
SO FAR ......................................................................................... 44
Issue V : Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief? .................. 45
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 45
APPENDIX- I .................................................................................. 46
APPENDIX- II ................................................................................. 52
PREFACE
1. This writ petition tasks us to decide an important question relating to
proper interpretation of Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
1
,
which hitherto has never emerged. Petitioner, a High Court Judge,
contends that the procedure prescribed for the constitution of a
Committee under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act has not been followed,
thereby infringing his Fundamental Rights.
FACTS
2. Facts in brief, relevant for deciding this writ petition, are these.
The incident
2.1 While serving as a Judge of the Delhi High Court, a fire occurred at the
petitioner’s residence on 14
th
March, 2025. During the course of
dousing the fire, burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered at his
house. Following this incident, allegations of misbehaviour were
levelled against the petitioner. In accordance with the “In -House
Procedure” adopted by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting of
1
Inquiry Act
3
15
th
December, 1999, the Chief Justice of India
2
constituted a three-
member committee on 22
nd
March, 2025 to examine the allegations.
The three-member committee submitted its report to the CJI on 3
rd
May, 2025, recording that the allegations were substantiated and that
they warranted initiation of proceedings for the petitioner’s removal
from office. In terms of the procedure, the CJI then forwarded the
report to the Hon’ble President
3
and the Hon’ble Prime Minister of
India.
Precursor Litigation
2.2 Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition
4
before this Court,
challenging Paragraphs 5(b) and 7 of the In -House Procedure, the
forwarding of the report of the three-member committee by the CJI,
and the report itself. Four days after the said petition was filed, i.e., on
21
st
July, 2025, the Monsoon Session of the Parliament commenced.
During this session, Members of both Houses, desirous of initiating
proceedings for removal of the petitioner from office, gave two notices
of motion in their respective Houses on the same day (21
st
July, 2025).
In the following part of this judgment, we will discuss, inter alia, the
process of removal of a Judge from office, the notices that are required
to be given, and the consequences of such notices being given on the
same day.
2
CJI
3
President
4
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699 of 2025
4
2.3 It is, however, apposite to note that the petitioner’s writ petition was
dismissed on 7
th
August, 2025, by a two-Judge Bench of this Court of
which one of us (Dipankar Datta];’) was a member.
Notices of motion seeking removal o f the petitioner from office:
incidents of 21
st
July, 2025
2.4 Invoking the provisions of the Inquiry Act, a notice was given on 21
st
July, 2025, of a motion signed by more than 100 members in the Lok
Sabha for presenting an address to the President praying for the
petitioner’s removal. The said notice was received by the Speaker of
the Lok Sabha at 12:30 p.m., but was not admitted on the same day.
2.5 After a brief interval, between 4:07 p.m. and 4:19 p.m., a notice for
the same purpose, signed by more than 50 members, was given in the
Rajya Sabha. The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha addressed the House
regarding the said notice. In his speech, among other matters, the
Chairman noted that a similar notice may have been given in the Lok
Sabha. Referring to the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act
(which requires the constitution of a Committee by the Presiding
Officers of both Houses of the Parliament when notices of motion for
the removal of a Judge are given in both Houses on the same day),
the Chairman directed that “the Secretary-General will take necessary
steps in this direction”.
2.6 Notably, the Chairman resigned from his office of the Vice-President of
India later that day (21
st
July, 2025).
5
2.7 Pursuant to the direction of the then Chairman, the Secretariat of the
Rajya Sabha requested information from its counterpart in the Lok
Sabha as to whether such a notice had indeed been given, to which
the response was in the affirmative. Following this, the notice given in
the Rajya Sabha was sent to the Members’ Salaries & Allowances
Branch of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat for verification of the signatures
of the notice givers. Out of the 62 notice givers, the signatures of three
did not match their specimen signatures.
Consideration of the Notice by the Secretary General and non-
admission by Deputy Chairman
2.8 On 11
th
August, 2025, the notice given in the Rajya Sabha was
scrutinized by its Secretary-General, who observed various deficiencies
therein and held it to be not “in order.” The draft decision of the
Secretary-General was then placed before the Deputy Chairman,
discharging the functions of the Chairman in his absence, who
concurred with the conclusion and accordingly recorded that the notice
was “not admitted”. This decision was communicated to the Secretary-
General of the Lok Sabha on the same day.
Admission of notice by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and
constitution of Committee
2.9 On 12
th
August, 2025, having received the communication that the
notice had not been admitted by the Deputy Chairman (performing the
duties of the office of Chairman), the Speaker of the Lok Sabha
proceeded to admit the notice given in the Lok Sabha on 21
st
July,
2025. The Speaker announced this admission in the House and, in
6
accordance with Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act, constituted a three-
member Committee
5
.
2.10 The Committee subsequently served upon the petitioner the memo of
charges. There is some dispute as to whether all the materials that are
sought to be relied upon have been furnished or not. That, however, is
not a matter for our consideration.
PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF A JUDGE
3. For a clearer understanding of the arguments advanced referring to
the Constitutional and the statutory provisions relatable to removal of
a Judge from office, we consider it apposite to first outline the process
for such removal.
4. Article 124 of the Constitution of India provides for “Establishment and
constitution of Supreme Court”. Clause (4)
6
thereof provides that a
Judge of the Supreme Court can be removed from office by the order
of the President. It further lays down two conditions for removal: first,
that the Judge must be guilty of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity”;
and second, that the resolution for removal must be passed in each
House of Parliament “by a majority of the total membership of t hat
House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members
of that House present and voting”. From this, it is clear that a
5
Committee
6
(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an
order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by
a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two –
thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the
President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or
incapacity.
7
“resolution” is to be moved in each House of the Parliament and that
misbehaviour or incapacity must be “proved”. Article 124, however,
does not specify the procedure for presenting such an address, who
may move it, how it is to be moved, or for investigating allegations
against a Judge. Clause (5)
7
, however, empowers the Parliament to
regulate these procedural aspects by law. In exercise of this power, the
Parliament, in the nineteenth year of the Republic, enacted the Inquiry
Act.
5. The procedure applicable for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court
is also applicable for removal of a High Court Judge, as adopted under
sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of Article 217 of the Constitution.
6. On a reading of the relevant provisions, we find that the process of
removal of a Judge is indeed a tedious one involving various stages.
The process for removal of a Judge, as envisaged in the Constitution
and the Inquiry Act, is discussed below for completeness of
understanding.
Stage I: Introduction of Motion & Admission by Speaker/Chairman
6.1 Section 3(1) of the Inquiry Act provides that to initiate the process
for removal of a Judge, a notice must be given of a motion for
presenting an address to the President praying for removal of such
Judge. The said notice may be given in any house of the
7
(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and
for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause
(4).
8
Parliament. In the Lok Sabha, the said notice must be signed by at
least 100 of its members. A minimum of 50 signatories is required
in the case of the Rajya Sabha. Once such a notice has been given,
it is for the Speaker (if the motion is given in the Lok Sabha) or the
Chairman (if the motion is given in the Rajya Sabha) to take a call
on admission of the motion.
6.2 The Speaker or the Chairman may either admit or reject the motion
after “consulting such persons, if any, as he thinks fit and after
considering such materials, if any, as may be available to him”
[see: Section 3(1) of the Inquiry Act]. If the motion is not
admitted, it brings down the curtain; if accepted, then the
Committee [referred to in Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act] is to be
formed for taking the process ahead. User of the modal verb “may”
in Section 3(1) suggests that the Speaker or the Chairman, as the
case may be, is vested with a discretion whether or not to admit
the motion.
Stage II: Formulation of a Committee of three members for making
investigation
6.3 Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act provides that once a notice is
admitted, the motion is to be kept pending, and the Speaker or the
Chairman is required to constitute a Committee for the purpose of
investigating the grounds on which the removal of a Judge is
sought. The Committee shall consist of three members: one chosen
from among the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme
9
Court, who would preside over the meetings of the committee
8
;
one chosen from among the Chief Justices of the High Courts; and
one person who, in the opinion of the Speaker or, as the case may
be, the Chairman, is a distinguished jurist.
6.4 The second proviso to Section 3(2) provides that if notices have
been given in both Houses of the Parliament, albeit on different
dates, the notice submitted later in point of time shall stand
rejected. Consequently, in such a case, the Committee shall be
constituted by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of
the Rajya Sabha, wherever notice is given prior in point of time.
6.5 The first proviso to Section 3(2) contemplates a situation in which
notices are given in both Houses on the same day. In such a case,
“no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been
admitted in both Houses; and where such motion has been
admitted in both Houses, the Committee shall be constituted jointly
by the Speaker and the Chairman”. Thus, this situation calls for the
formation of a Joint Committee. It is this provision that forms the
fulcrum of the dispute in the present case, and we propose to
address the same a little later.
Stage III: Formulation of Charges and Investigation
6.6 The Committee is required to frame definite charges against the
Judge proceeded against; provide such Judge with a statement of
8
Rule 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969
10
the grounds on which such charges are based; afford him a
reasonable opportunity of being heard; and, where the allegation
relates to physical or mental incapacity, the Committee would have
the power to constitute a Medical Board [see: Sections 3(3), (4),
(5), (6), (7) & (8) of the Inquiry Act].
6.7 The Committee, being empowered to regulate its own procedure,
is mandated to afford the Judge a reasonable opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, adduce evidence, and be heard in his defence
[see: Section 4(1) of the Inquiry Act].
Stage IV: Report by the Committee and discussion in Parliament
6.8 After conclusion of the investigation, the Committee must submit
a report to the Speaker or the Chairman or both stating its findings
on each charge. If the committee finds the Judge not guilty, it is
the end of the matter; however, if the finding is of guilt, the motion
for removal is taken up for discussion in the Parliament. [see:
Sections 4 (2) & (3) and 6 of the Inquiry Act].
Stage V: Discussion in the Parliament
6.9 Upon receiving a report that finds the Judge guilty of any
misbehaviour or suffering from any incapacity, the motion—which
has been kept pending—shall be taken up for consideration by the
House(s) of Parliament in which it was pending, together with the
report of the Committee. Both Houses, after discussion, shall either
adopt or reject the motion in accordance with the numerical
11
requirements prescribed under Article 124(4) of the Constitution,
namely, “by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two – thirds of the members of that
House present and voting”. When the motion is adopted by both
Houses, the “misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be
deemed to have been proved”.
Stage VI : Order of the President
6.10 As is required by Article 124(4), a Judge can be removed only “by
an order of the President”. Thus, after a motion has been passed
by both houses, it is the President’s order which results in removal
of a Judge from office.
THE CONUNDRUM
7. Proviso 1 to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act reads:
“Provided that where notices of a motion referred to in sub-section (1) are
given on the same day in both Houses of Parliament, no Committee shall
be constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses and
where such motion has been admitted in both Houses, the Committee shall
be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman.”
8. Petitioner is aggrieved by the constitution of the Committee solely by
the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Since notices under Section 3(1) of the
1968 Act were given in both Houses on the same day, the petitioner
has contended that the Committee constituted by the Speaker of the
Lok Sabha violates the proviso. According to the petitioner, since
notices were given in both Houses on the same day, a Joint Committee
should have been formed by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha , subject to the motion having been
12
admitted in both the Houses; and if the motion fails in any House, the
consequence, in his submission, is that the notice given in the other
House must also fail. In essence, the petitioner’s argument is that
where notices are given in both Houses on the same day, and the
motion is not admitted in one House, the Presiding Officer of the other
House, i.e., the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, ceases
to have the authority to proceed with the motion.
9. On the other hand, the respondents have invited us to interpret the
provision in a manner that facilitates the proceedings for investigation
rather than bringing them to a grinding halt. According to their reading
of the first proviso, the decisive factor is not the mere giving of notices
of motion in both Houses on the same day, but their admission on the
same day. It was contended that even if notices are given in both the
Houses, where the motion is admitted in only one House, that House
remains competent to proceed with the constitution of a Committee
through its Presiding Officer, i.e., the Speaker or the Chairman, as the
case may be, notwithstanding that the motion might have been
rejected by the Presiding Officer of the other House. Drawing our
attention to the documents, since placed on record, the respondents
submitted that the motion was never admitted by the Chairman of the
Rajya Sabha. Consequently, it has been their argument, that the
Committee was validly constituted by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
13
SUBMISSIONS
10. The written submissions filed by the parties have been made part of
this judgment as appendices. We find reference to numerous
precedents by the parties, which were not cited in course of hearing.
For brevity’s sake, the key arguments have been referred to by us in
the judgment wherever necessary.
ISSUES
11. Based on the arguments advanced during proceedings in Court and
the written submissions filed by the parties, the following questions
arise for our consideration:
I. How should the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act be
construed? Does it require the constitution of a Joint Committee
where notices, having been given in both Houses on the same day,
is later followed by refusal to admit the motion by the Presiding
Officer of one House and admission of the motion by the Presiding
Officer of the other House?
II. Whether, in view of the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
falling vacant, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was
competent to refuse admission of the notice of motion?
III. What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to
admit the motion on the validity of the Speaker’s action under
Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act?
14
IV. Whether the draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of
the Rajya Sabha recording that the notice of motion given to the
Chairman is not “in order” justified in law?
V. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief?
ANALYSIS
ISSUE I : HOW MUST THE FIRST PROVISO BE CONSTRUED ?
12. Under the heading “Conundrum,” we have examined the differing
views presented before us on the proper construction of the first
proviso. Section 3 of the Inquiry Act, inter alia, prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the Parliament in considering a motion
and in conducting an investigation into the allegations made against a
Judge. The first proviso to Section 3(2) addresses the specific situation
where notices of motion are given in both Houses but on the same day.
There is no dispute that the object of the said proviso is to provide an
additional safeguard to the Judge by requiring the constitution of a
Joint Committee of the Speaker and the Chairman and to prevent a
situation where the Judge is made to attend proceedings before two
separate committees constituted by the Speaker and the Chairman .
The question before us, however, is: when precisely is this safeguard
triggered?
12.1. We are unable to accept the interpretation of the first proviso, as
advanced by Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
namely, that where notices of motion have been given in both Houses
on the same day, the rejection of a notice in one House would
15
automatically result in the notice in the other House failing for the
following reasons.
12.2. The first proviso does not address all possible permutations but is
confined to one specific situation, namely, where notices of motion
given in both Houses on the same day have been admitted in both
Houses. It is only in that limited situation that the statute mandates
the constitution of a Joint Committee. The said proviso does not
prescribe a condition precedent for the formation of a Committee in
cases other than the one expressly provided.
12.3. In other words, the first proviso is not exhaustive but situational in
nature. It does not contemplate a scenario where a notice of motion
is accepted in one House and rejected in the other. To interpret the
said proviso in the manner suggested by Mr. Rohatgi would require us
to read into it a disabling consequence, namely, that the motion
pending in the other House must also necessarily fail. Such an
interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, a course we are
neither empowered nor inclined to undertake.
12.4. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a proviso cannot
be read in a way which nullifies the provision to which it is a proviso
9
,
unless such an intention is manifest. The main part of Section 3(2)
9
see: A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran, 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 304; Tribhovandas Haribhai
Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Haryana State Cooperative Land
Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees
Union & Anr., (2004) 1 SCC 574; and Kerala State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P)
Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 672.
16
vests the power to constitute a Committee in the Speaker or the
Chairman, as the case may be, upon admission of the notice of
motion. The first proviso cannot be read to curtail this power except
in one clearly defined circumstance, namely, the admission of notices
in both Houses. In all other cases, the power of the Speaker or the
Chairman to constitute a Committee remains unaffected.
12.5. There is nothing in the Inquiry Act to suggest that rejection of a
motion in one House would render the other House incompetent to
proceed in accordance with law. The argument, therefore, lacks any
legal foundation. The interpretation advanced by the petitioner of
rejection of a notice in one House resulting in the notice automatically
failing in the other House would entail consequences of a most serious
nature. The members would be put to square one and the process has
to be initiated afresh in either House. Had the Parliament intended
such far-reaching consequences, it would have articulated the first
proviso in clear and unambiguous terms. The absence of any express
provision to that effect is, in our opinion, determinative.
12.6. Looked from another angle, accepting such an argument would
produce absurd results where the individual capacity of one House in
initiating a motion under Article 124(4) becomes contingent upon the
outcome in the other House, even at the stage of admission of such a
motion. Taking away the autonomy of one of the two Houses of the
Parliament could not have been the intent behind the first proviso.
17
12.7. Such an interpretation must also be rejected on the ground that it
renders the first proviso open to abuse. It would permit a situation
where, upon getting the wind of a notice of motion being given for
removal of a Judge with a real likelihood of the same being admitted
by the Presiding Officer of one House, certain members of the other
House not inclined to have the process of removal initiated against
the Judge may deliberately give a defective notice on the same day,
solely with the intention of scuttling the proceedings. Upon such
notice subsequently being found to be defective and not admitted, the
mere fact that such a notice was introduced on the same day would
lead to the first proviso being set in action mandating constitution of
a Joint Committee, as argued by the petitioner, thereby leading to
frustration of the proceedings in the first House. Furthermore, it is
also possible that upon introduction of the notice of motion in the
second House, the Speaker or the Chairman does not admit or reject
the motion. Such an act, on a literal application of the first proviso,
would be sufficient to trigger the requirement of Joint Committee. The
proviso cannot be allowed to be used as a w eapon for scuttling
proceedings or giving a veto to the Houses of Parliament.
12.8. In our opinion, the mischief which the Inquiry Act sought to remedy
was the absence of a statutory mechanism for investigating into
allegations against a Judge and for facilitating such investigation. The
Inquiry Act cannot be interpreted in a manner that frustrates this
18
objective by permitting the proviso to be employed as an instrument
of obstruction.
12.9. It has been contended, with considerable emphasis, that the
legislative intent underlying the proviso is to confer an additional layer
of protection to a Judge, by ensuring that if either House is unwilling
to admit the motion, the process of impeachment must necessarily
fail. We are unable to agree with such contention. In our view, the
protection afforded to a Judge remains fully intact as, even where a
motion is admitted and a Committee is constituted, either House
retains the absolute authority to rejec t the motion after the
Committee’s report is placed before it. Moreover, assuming arguendo,
that the proviso was intended to provide such heightened protection,
it cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders the mechanism of
removal practically unworkable. Constitutional safeguards for Judges
cannot come at the cost of paralysing the removal process itself. The
first proviso must, therefore, be construed to balance prescribed
protection with the effective functioning of the mechanism for removal
of a Judge from office triggered by the peoples’ representatives, and
not to frustrate it altogether.
13. Also, as contended by Mr. Mehta, learned Solicitor General
representing the respondents, the first proviso is intended to obviate
the risk of parallel committees being constituted by the Presiding
Officers of the both Houses of Parliament in a circumstance where the
Presiding Officers of both Houses, unaware of a notice given in the
19
other, proceeds to admit the motions and constitutes two separate
committees. Highly improbable though it seems to be (unawareness
of the Presiding Officers), we cannot rule out the possibility. Such a
situation would inevitably result in the formation of two committees,
giving rise to a serious possibility of conflicting and inconsistent
conclusions apart from requiring the Judge to face two investigations.
14. Finding ourselves in disagreement with the interpretation proposed by
the petitioner, we hold that the first proviso caters to only one
situation, that is, when notices of motion were given in both Houses
on the same day and were admitted by both Houses (irrespective of
their admission on the same or different dates). Therefore, in a case
where notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day,
the fact that a notice is not admitted in one House will not necessitate
constitution of a Joint Committee and the Speaker or the Chairman, as
the case may be, can independently proceed to constitute a
Committee.
ISSUE II : WHETHER THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE RAJYA SABHA WAS
COMPETENT TO REFUSE THE MOTION?
15. The above issue stems from the contention of the petitioner that the
Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, acting as the Chairman, was not
even empowered to consider the question of admission of the motion,
far less refusing to admit it, which has strongly been resisted by the
respondents by contending that the office of the Chairman having
20
fallen vacant, in terms of the Constitutional scheme, it is the Deputy
Chairman who has to perform the duties of the office of Chairman.
15.1. Petitioner contended that clause (a) of Section 2 of Inquiry Act defines
Chairman as the Chairman of the Council of States. The fact that the
legislature has used the word “means” and not the phrase ‘means and
includes’ suggests that the definition is exhaustive. Thus, the Deputy
Chairman could not have usurped the statutory power vested in the
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and act in his place, and consequently
could not have taken any decision whatsoever concerning the motion.
15.2. Reference was made by Mr. Rohatgi to the rules framed under the
Inquiry Act being the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969
10
. After drawing
our attention to Rules 16 and 17, it was argued that the rules
expressly but narrowly enumerate certain functions that may be
discharged by the Deputy Speaker or the Deputy Chairman in the
absence of the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be .
Emphasis was laid on the fact that these rules confer authority only
in limited and specified circumstances, and do not extend to the
exercise of powers contemplated under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act.
The legislative intent is clear that the authority conferred on the
Speaker or the Chairman under the Inquiry Act does not extend to
the Deputy Speaker or the Deputy Chairman , unless expressly
provided.
10
Inquiry Rules
21
15.3. Drawing support from this Court’s decision in Sub-Committee on
Judicial Accountability v. Union of India
11
, it was contended that
the rules of procedure of the Rajya Sabha cannot govern the
proceedings under the Inquiry Act. The Inquiry Act operates as a code
in itself. Paragraphs 91, 92, 95 and 96 of Sub-Committee on
Judicial Accountability (supra) were relied on by him.
15.4. Should in terms of Article 91 the Deputy Chairman were held
empowered to act as the Chairman and decide on the question of
admission of a motion moved by certain members of the Rajya Sabha,
Mr. Rohatgi next expressed an apprehension that a situation could
arise where the Deputy Chairman himself is a signatory to the notice
of motion in his capacity as a member of the House. In such a
circumstance, if the Deputy Chairman were to take any decision on
the motion as the Presiding Officer, it was feared that he would
effectively be acting as a judge in his own cause.
16. Per contra, Mr. Mehta invited our attention to Part V of the Constitution,
and in particular, Articles 89 and 91. Clause (1) of Article 89 provides
that the Vice-President of India shall be the ex officio Chairman of the
Council of States. Clause (2) thereof provides that the Council of States
shall, as soon as may be, choose a member of the Council to be the
Deputy Chairman.
16.1. Further, he referred to Article 91 of the Constitution. We can do no
better than reproduce it in its entirety for a better understanding:
11
(1991) 4 SCC 699
22
91. Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties
of the office of, or to act as, Chairman:
(1) While the office of Chairman is vacant, or during any period when the
Vice-President is acting as, or discharging the functions of, President, the
duties of the office shall be performed by the Deputy Chairman, or, if the
office of Deputy Chairman is also vacant, by such member of the Council
of States as the President may appoint for the purpose.
(2) During the absence of the Chairman from any sitting of the Council
of States the Deputy Chairman, or, if he is also absent, such person as
may be determined by the rules of procedure of the Council, or, if no
such person is present, such other person as may be determined by the
Council, shall act as Chairman.
16.2. We were also shown Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Rajya
Sabha, framed under Article 118 of the Constitution, which provides
that the Deputy Chairman is elected by the members of the House.
Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure further delineates the powers of the
Deputy Chairman, which reads as under:
9. The Deputy Chairman or other member competent to preside over a
sitting of the Council under the Constitution or these rules shall, when so
presiding, have the same power as the Chairman when presiding over
the Council and all references to the Chairman in these rules shall in
these circumstances be deemed to be, references to any such person so
presiding.
(emphasis by counsel)
17. After having considered the constitutional and statutory provisions and
the arguments advanced, we find ourselves in disagreement with the
contention that the Deputy Chairman could not have rejected the
motion.
17.1. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 91, envisage two distinct scenarios:
vacancy and absence, respectively. Clause (1) applies where the office
of the Chairman is vacant or the Chairman is acting as the President,
in which case the Deputy Chairman performs the duties of the office
of the Chairman. Clause (2), by contrast, applies where the office is
23
not vacant but the Chairman is merely absent from a sitting, and the
Deputy Chairman only acts as the Chairman for that sitting.
17.2. To read the statute in isolation of the Constitution would be grossly
incorrect. True it is, this Court in Sub-committee on Judicial
Accountability (supra) held that the rules framed under Article 118
12
of the Constitution would not govern the procedure under the Inquiry
Act; however, the observations were made in the specific context of
the issue which was considered. It is important to notice that neither
Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act nor its proviso was under
consideration.
17.3. We see no reason why Article 91 of the Constitution should be kept
aside when a court is tasked to make a meaningful interpretation of
any provision of the Inquiry Act or, for that matter, any other
enactment. After all, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land
and all laws validly enacted owe their origin to the Constitution. To
proceed in disregard of what the Constitution ordains would be an act
of gross impropriety on our part.
17.4. Any interpretation of a statute which has the effect of generating an
interpretation fouling the Constitution should be eschewed. A fortiori,
a narrow interpretation of the word “Chairman” appearing in Section
3 overlooking Article 91 would be incoherent. The onerous obligation,
12
Rules of Procedure
(1) Each House of Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject to the provisions
of this Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business.
…
24
nay, duty of the Deputy Chairman, to perform the duties of the office
of the Chairman is sacrosanct to the functioning of the Council of
States. The duties that the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman (in
case of a vacancy in the former office) perform under the Inquiry Act
cannot be separated from the office that they hold as the Presiding
Officer of the House.
18. As regards Mr. Rohatgi’s apprehension that the Deputy Chairman may
himself be a signatory to the notice, apart from the fact that the
situation posited is purely hypothetical and need not detain us, we are
unable to agree with Mr. Rohatgi on this proposition.
18.1. We find it profitable to refer to the following observations made by
the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Ontario v. The Hamilton
Street Railway Company And Ors.
13
as relied upon by the
Constitution Bench in Central Bank of India v. Workmen
14
:
…They would be worthless as being speculative opinions on hypothetical
questions. It would be contrary to principle, inconvenient, and
inexpedient that opinions should be given upon such questions at all.
When they arise, they must arise in concrete cases, involving private
rights; and it would be extremely unwise for any judicial tribunal to
attempt beforehand to exhaust all possible cases and facts which might
occur to qualify, cut down, and override the operation of particular words
when the concrete case is not before it.
18.2. Be that as it may, assuming that the Deputy Chairman happens to be
a signatory to the motion, he must, in his administrative prudence
recuse to act as the Deputy Chairman in that case. After all, the Rules
of Procedure of the Rajya Sabha, under Rule 8, do provide for a panel
13
[1903] A.C. 524
14
1959 SCC OnLine SC 1
25
of Vice-Chairmen to be nominated by the Chairman, who would act in
the absence of the Chairman as well as the Deputy Chairman.
18.3. That apart, if at all such a situation arises, the doctrine of necessity
could also compel the Deputy Chairman, or whosoever is the
incumbent acting in place of the Chairman, to exercise the functions
of the Chairman in his place.
18.4. Doctrine of necessity, as elaborated by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
in Election Commission of India v. Subramaniam Swamy
15
would make it clear that despite the apprehension of a possible bias,
the decision-making authority must proceed to adjudicate the issue
in the interest of necessity. The relevant portion of the decision reads
thus:
16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled
that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity
which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial
propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative
for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must
yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority
or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed
full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of
justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the
case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed
to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the
members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified
on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them,
a stalemate situation may develop. In such cases the doctrine of
necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased
person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in
favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In
the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach
a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election
Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to
be invoked.
(emphasis ours)
15
(1996) 4 SCC 104
26
19. The argument touching upon the provisions of Rule 16 and 17 of the
Inquiry Rules, howsoever appealing, is without merit and must be
rejected. The Inquiry Rules envisage a possible absence of the
Chairman whereas the Constitution provides for the Deputy Chairman
in the event of the office of Chairman being vacant. Similar is the case
for the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Hence, when the statute is
silent on a particular aspect, the Constitution and the doctrine of
silence, must be read into the statute to fill its gaps. The Constitution
is the supreme and overarching legal framework, to which all statutes
must conform. For an elaborate understanding, it would be profitable
to refer to a decision of this Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v.
Gujarat Coop. Milk Mktg. Federation Ltd
16
, which expounded the
law in the following terms:
24. No doubt, in the cases referred to above, the respective Acts
contained a provision regarding no confidence. What about a situation
where there is no express provision regarding no confidence? Once the
cooperative society is conferred a constitutional status, it should rise to
the constitutional aspirations as a democratic institution. So, it is for the
respective legislative bodies to ensure that there is democratic
functioning. When the Constitution is eloquent, the laws made
thereunder cannot be silent. If the statute is silent or imprecise on the
requirements under the Constitution, it is for the court to read the
constitutional mandate into the provisions concerned and declare it
accordingly. Article 243-ZT has given a period of one year to
frame/reframe the statutes in consonance with Part IX-B and thereafter
i.e. with effect from 12-1-2013, those provisions which are inconsistent
with Part IX-B, cease to operate.
25. Silence in the Constitution and abeyance as well has been dealt
extensively by Michael Foley in his celebrated work The Silence of
Constitutions. To quote from the Preface:
“Abeyances refer to those constitutional gaps which remain vacuous
for positive and constructive purposes. They are not, in any sense,
truces between two or more defined positions, but rather a set of
implicit agreements to collude in keeping fundamental questions of
16
(2015) 8 SCC 1
27
political authority in a state of irresolution. Abeyances are, in effect,
compulsive hedges against the possibility of that which is unresolved
being exploited and given meanings almost guaranteed to generate
profound division and disillusionment. Abeyance s are important,
therefore, because of their capacity to deter the formation of
conflicting positions in just those areas where the potential for
conflict is most acute. So central are these abeyances, together with
the social temperament required to sustain them, that when they
become the subject of heightened interest and subsequent conflict,
they are not merely accompanied by an intense constitutional crisis,
they are themselves the essence of that crisis.”
In Part II, Chapter Four, the author has also dealt with the constitutional
gaps and the arts of prerogative. To the extent relevant, it reads as
follows (p. 82):
“Gaps in a constitution should not be seen as simply empty space.
They amount to a substantial plenum of strategic content and
meaning vital to the preservation of a constitution. Such interstices
accommodate the abeyances within which the sleeping giants of
potentially acute political conflict are communally maintained in
slumber. Despite the absence of any documentary or material form,
these abeyances are real, and are an integral part of any constitution.
What remains unwritten and indeterminate can be j ust as much
responsible for the operational character and restraining quality of a
constitution as its more tangible and codified components.”
26. Where the Constitution has conceived a particular structure on
certain institutions, the legislative bodies are bound to mould the statutes
accordingly. Despite the constitutional mandate, if the legislative body
concerned does not carry out the required s tructural changes in the
statutes, then, it is the duty of the court to provide the statute with the
meaning as per the Constitution. “[T]he job of the Supreme Court is not
to expound the meaning of the Constitution but to provide it with
meaning.” [ W alter Berns, “Government by Lawyers and
Judges”, Commentary, June 1987, 18.] The reference obviously is to the
United States Supreme Court. As a general rule of interpretation, no
doubt, nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute. However, when
there are adequate grounds to justify an inference, it is the bounden duty
of the court to do so.
“… It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that
nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are
adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature
intended something which it omitted to express.” [ Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) 33.]
According to Lord Mersey in Thompson (Pauper) v. Goold and Co. [1910
AC 409 (HL)] : (AC p. 420)
“… It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament, words which
are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing
to do.”
In the case of cooperative societies, after the Ninety -seventh
Amendment, it has become a clear or strong necessity to do the strong
thing of reading into the legislation, the constitutional mandate of the
cooperative societies to be governed as democratic institutions.
28
“45. … The constitutional provisions have to be construed broadly
and liberally having regard to the changed circumstances and the
needs of time and polity.” [ The Constitutional Bench decision in State
of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, (2010) 3
SCC 571, p. 591, para 45 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 401]
20. History is replete with such instances where, in absence of the
constitutionally delineated office, the deputy or the in -charge
incumbent has performed the functions relatable to the constitutional
office. The idea behind it is that vacancy or absence, for whatever
reason, may not bring the constitutional machinery to a standstill.
Ultimately, the show must go on to ensure that institutional continuity
is maintained. We may take judicial notice of a couple of historic
events. For instance, when former President Dr. Zakir Hussain passed
away while in office on 3
rd
May, 1969, Vice President V.V. Giri was sworn
in as the Acting President. Later, when Vice President V.V. Giri resigned
to contest for the presidential election, H on’ble Mohammad
Hidayatullah, the then CJI acted as the President of India. While acting
as such, His Lordship appointed Shri Shanti Swaroop Dhavan as the
Governor of West Bengal. Similarly, when the former President
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed passed away on 11
th
February, 1977 while in
office, the then Vice President Sri B.D. Jatti acted as the President and
performed all the presidential functions, including appointment of
Judges. Pointedly, Sri B.D. Jatti, as the acting President, appointed Sri
Manoj Kumar Mukherjee in June, 1977 as an Additional Judge of the
High Court at Calcutta (who then went on to serve as the Chief Justices
of the Allahabad High Court and the Bombay High Court, and was later
29
elevated as a Judge of this Court). Obviously, such appointments could
not have been nullified on the ground that the acting President, and
not the President, had made such appointments.
21. If we were to read the law in the manner proposed by Mr. Rohatgi, we
would be left with a constitutional vacuum which, in the absence of the
Chairman of the Council of States, or the Speaker of the House of
People, as the case may be, would render the provisions of the Inquiry
Act otiose in the given circumstance.
22. Thus, Issue II framed above must be answered in the affirmative; we
unhesitatingly hold that the Deputy Chairman was competent to
consider the notice and refuse admission of the motion.
ISSUE III: WHAT IS THE EFFECT, IF ANY, OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN’S REFUSAL
TO ADMIT THE MOTION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE SPEAKER’S ACTION UNDER
SECTION 3(2) OF THE INQUIRY ACT?
WHAT, IF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, WAS TO BE HELD ILLEGAL ?
23. Although the petitioner has not, as such, mounted any challenge to
the decision of the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha in not
admitting the motion, having regard to the gamut of arguments made,
we deem it appropriate to proceed on the premise that the refusal of
the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to admit the motion is illegal
(on a ground other than competence), and to examine what, if at all,
would turn on such assumption. Prefatorily, we clarify that this exercise
is to demonstrate that even on such a hypothetical plank, the edifice
of the petitioner’s case does not materially improve.
30
24. In brief, the relief sought by the petitioner cannot follow, for the simple
reason that the validity of the Speaker’s action does not hinge upon
the correctness or otherwise of the decision taken by the Deputy
Chairman.
25. As discussed by us in the preceding segment, the first proviso would
spring into action only when notices of motion (given on the same day
in both Houses) have been admitted in both Houses.
26. The logical culmination, thus, is even if the refusal by the Deputy
Chairman (performing the duties of the office of the Chairman of the
Rajya Sabha) were to be ignored as legally unsustainable, the factual
as well as legal position would still remain as it is: that, as on the date
when the Speaker acted, there was no admitted motion pending in the
Rajya Sabha. In the absence of an admitted motion in one House, the
statutory sine qua non for the applicability of the proviso stood
unfulfilled.
27. What, then, would be the consequence of holding the refusal by the
Deputy Chairman to be bad in law?
27.1. At the highest, a declaration that the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya
Sabha had erred in the exercise of his statutory power by failing to
act in accordance with law which would entail reconsideration of the
notice by the Presiding Officer of the Rajya Sabha, in accordance with
law. However, it cannot, retrospectively invalidate a lawful exercise of
power already undertaken by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, which
was founded on an admitted motion.
31
27.2. Next, we ponder as to what is the error, if any, committed by the
Speaker in this case. Facts noticed, reveal that the Speaker proceeded
to constitute the Committee only after receiving an official
communication that the notice given in the Rajya Sabha was not
admitted by its Presiding Officer. The Speaker, in such a case, was
adequately empowered to proceed in conformity with Section 3(2)(a),
(b) and (c) of the Inquiry Act.
27.3. Viewed from the perspective of parliamentary functioning, members
of the Lok Sabha who initiated the motion were exercising
constitutional responsibility in terms of Article 124(4). Upon valid
admission of their motion by the Speaker, they acquired a statutory
entitlement to have the matter examined by a duly constituted
committee. To interpret the statute in a manner that nullifies this
entitlement due to procedural infirmities, assumed or real, in the
other House, would tantamount to curtailing the participatory rights
of elected representatives without statutory warrant. Per contra, the
members of the Rajya Sabha suffer no prejudice, by the Speaker’s
action. They did have a right in law to claim that the notice given in
the Rajya Sabha be dealt with in accordance with law by the
competent authority. If at all they felt prejudiced, the decision of the
Deputy Chairman refusing to admit the motion could have been laid
to challenge by them. We assume that they did not prefer to challenge
the decision because their purpose of having an inquiry conducted
32
under the Inquiry Act stood fructified, once the Speaker admitted the
motion of the Lok Sabha members and constituted the Committee.
28. Thus, even if the act of the Deputy Chairman were to be held illegal
and consequently set aside / or a reconsideration were ordered, the
same would never result in restoration of the status quo ante. Even
such limited declaratory relief, however, cannot be granted in the
present case in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution (discussed in detail hereafter).
THE PREJUDICE ANGLE – NEED NOT BE TESTED
29. With fervour, Mr. Mehta argued that the petitioner has not shown that
any “demonstrable, gross or real prejudice” is caused to him owing to
the Deputy Chairman’s decision not to admit the motion and that, in
fact, such a decision operated to his benefit. The mere loss of a Joint
Committee, absent mala fides or tangible disadvantage, does not
amount to legal prejudice.
30. On the other hand, Mr. Rohatgi, by referring to the celebrated decision
in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan
17
submitted that prejudice caused need
not be separately established; non-observance of principles of natural
justice is by itself sufficient proof of prejudice. He reminded us of the
oft-quoted observation of Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J. (as His
Lordship then was) that “(I)t ill comes from a person who has denied
justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced”.
17
(1980) 4 SCC 379
33
31. We have heard arguments that initiation of proceedings against the
petitioner has caused irreparable reputational and constitutional
prejudice and that the doctrine of “no prejudice” cannot apply where
mandatory safeguards are violated. This argument presu pposes
illegality in the constitution of the Committee which, for reasons
already discussed, we are unable to accept. Once the Committee is
lawfully constituted, the statute itself provides for elaborate
safeguards at the investigation stage, including framing of charges,
opportunity of defence, cross -examination of witnesses, and
adjudication by a body comprising of senior constitutional
functionaries. At this nascent stage, no civil consequences follow; the
motion itself remains pending and can succeed on ly if both Houses
ultimately adopt it by the constitutionally mandated special majority.
32. Mr. Mehta argued that constitution of a Single -House Committee
instead of a Joint-Committee, on facts and in the circumstances, does
not undermine the fairness of the procedure. We accept this
submission. Reputational injury, howsoever unfortunate, cannot be a
ground to subvert a constitutionally sanctioned statutory process,
particularly when the Parliament has consciously designed a multi -
tiered safeguard structure before any adverse consequence can ensue.
33. We also find ourselves in complete accord with Mr. Mehta’s contention
that the ultimate safeguard of Parliamentary approval under Article
124(4) also remains intact. Germane, it is, to note that even after the
Committee submits its report, the constitutional and statutory scheme
34
does not render the petitioner remediless or exposed to automatic
consequences. The report, by itself, is neither determinative nor self-
executory. Rather, it merely triggers the next stage of Parliamentary
consideration, where the motion for removal, kept pending till then, is
required to be taken up separately in each House and can culminate in
an address to the President only upon satisfaction of the rigorous
special majority stipulated under Article 124(4) of the Constitution.
Thus, in consideration of the edifice of the parties’ submissions, even
from the standpoint of the petitioner, no vested or accrued right gets
defeated.
34. Undoubtedly, the removal of a Judge of a High Court is constitutionally
anchored in Article 217 read with Article 124 of the Constitution, with
the procedural framework being provided by the Inquiry Act. That said,
a grievance raised by a Judge, who, though a constitutional functionary
by virtue of the office held, is nonetheless a public servant, questioning
the desirability, advisability or necessity of initiating proceedings, or
alleging procedural infirmities therein, partakes the character of a
service-related dispute. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
consistently held that every infraction of the rules governing discipline
and control does not, by itself, vitiate disciplinary proceedings. A plea
founded on infraction of procedure must necessarily be examined
through the prism of prejudice, having regard to the nature of the rule
alleged to have been infracted, namely, whether it is mandatory or
merely directory. Such an enquiry presupposes the existence of
35
infraction of a governing rule. In the present case, however, it is
unnecessary to undertake such an exercise, for the petitioner has
failed to establish infringement of any vested or accrued right.
EFFECT OF NOT CHALLENGING THE DECISION OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
35. The decision of the Deputy Chairman is not part of the writ petition
because despite the petitioner asking for it, the same was not
furnished to him. In fact, it is the petitioner’s claim that he derived
knowledge of such decision once the counter affidavi t to the writ
petition came to be filed by the respondents. Acting in deference to
our observation in Court on 7
th
January, 2026, the decision of the
Deputy Chairman was placed on record simultaneously with furnishing
a copy thereof to the petitioner.
36. Upon receipt of the decision of the Deputy Chairman together with the
“draft decision” of the Secretary General, Rajya Sabha, no exception
has been taken by the petitioner, in black and white, either by
amending his writ petition or by filing an affidavit obviously because
the decision does not adversely affect him. Rather, the decision is in
the petitioner’s favour in the sense that the Deputy Chairman did not,
inter alia, find sufficient material to substantiate the claim of the notice
givers that a case for removal of the petitioner from office by
proceeding under the Inquiry Act had been set up.
37. However, in course of oral hearing, the thrust of Mr. Rohatgi’s
submission has been that the decision of the Deputy Chairman, for
36
reasons urged, is non-est; therefore, the clock must be put back to
explore a meeting of minds of the Presiding Officers of the two Houses
for constitution of a Joint Committee.
38. Acceptance of Mr. Rohatgi’s argument would essentially require us to
not only examine the legality, propriety and/or correctness of the
decision of the Deputy Chairman but to quash the same.
39. The question as to whether a court can quash an order without the
same being subjected to challenge came up for consideration in
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sunita Mehra
18
. This Court
held:
3. The short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether
there being no challenge to the order of eviction passed by the Estate
Officer under the Act, in the writ petition was the High Court justified in
setting aside that order in appeal. It was urged that after the order of
eviction was passed the writ petition was not amended by challenging the
order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer. No ground as regards its
invalidity was also stated. It is not disputed that the writ petition was not
amended after the order of eviction was passed by the Estate Officer. Even
in the letters patent appeal, the order of eviction was not made to form
part of the records of the case and under such circumstances the Division
Bench of the High Court was not legally justified in setting aside the order
dated 24-2-1982 passed by the Estate Officer. Consequently, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
40. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view. If an order has been
passed to the prejudice or detriment of a suitor and such suitor seeks
to have the order declared invalid and quashed in writ proceedings, it
is imperative that he lays the order to a challenge, makes specific
averments and urges cogent legal grounds to demonstrate its invalidity
to enable him claim relief based thereon. This is required to serve as
18
(2001) 9 SCC 344
37
a notice to the opponent as to what are the grounds likely to be urged
based whereon the suitor would seek to have the order quashed.
Unless the opponent is put to notice, he cannot, perhaps, by projecting
his own imagination discover all that may be in the contemplation of
the suitor to be used and established against the opponent. Once put
to notice, the opponent is entitled to raise an effective defence in
support of the order under challenge to persuade the court not to
quash it. This is a very basic rule of essential justice, which serves twin
purposes: (i) of abortion of any attempt to spring surprises at the
hearing; and (ii) prevention of miscarriage of justice.
41. In Chandigarh Administration v. Laxman Roller Flour Mills (P)
Ltd.
19
, this Court succinctly enunciated as follows:
4. A perusal of the relief extracted above shows that the writ petitioner-
respondent never asked for any relief in the writ petition commanding
the Chandigarh Administration to issue completion certificate in its
favour. Learned counsel for the respondent frankly stated that there is no
allegation in the writ petition to the effect that Chandigarh Administration
has illegally withheld the completion certificate. It is settled law that
unless the allegations are made in the writ petition and a relief to that
effect is also prayed for in the writ petition, the High Court is not justified
in issuing any order in excess of the relief prayed for in the writ petition.
We are, therefore, satisfied that in the absence of pleading and prayer in
the writ petition, the High Court fell in error in issuing directions to the
appellant to issue completion certificate to the writ petitioner -
respondent. In such circumstances, we set aside the order of the High
Court to the extent it directs the Chandigarh Administration to issue
completion certificate to the writ petitioner-respondent. The appeal is
thus allowed. There shall not be any order as to costs.
42. What has been laid down in Sunita Mehra (supra) and Chandigarh
Administration (supra) in relation to exercise of writ power under
19
(1998) 8 SCC 326
38
Article 226 of the Constitution would equally extend to exercise of
similar powers under Article 32.
43. A profitable reference may be made in this regard to the decision of
this Court in Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala
20
as far as
exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is concerned. Relevant
paragraphs from such decision read as follows:
14. Reverting to the preliminary objections raised by the respondent
State, as already mentioned above, there is no reference to the G.O. in
the entire writ petition. This document is not even part of the writ
petition. Therefore, there are no foundational facts and/or pleadings in
the writ petition challenging this G.O. as unconstitutional. More
importantly, there is no prayer in the writ petition seeking quashing of
this G.O. Even when the learned counsel for the State had pointed out
fundamental infirmity in the writ petition, no attempt was made by the
petitioners to amend the writ petition so as to incorporate challenge to
the said G.O. as well. In the absence of any pleadings and the prayer
seeking quashing of the said G.O., it is not permissible for the petitioners
to seek a relief by making oral submissions in this behalf.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the writ petition on the ground
of maintainability only as we do not deem it necessary to go into the
issue on merits for lack of pleadings as well as requisite prayers in this
behalf. No costs.
44. Tested on this anvil, the petitioner’s grievance plainly cannot be
addressed. In the absence of any challenge to the decision of the
Deputy Chairman, we find no reason to outlaw it.
45. It is trite that writ jurisdiction is exercised to test the legality of an
existing order, and not to grant relief on the hypothesis that another
authority ought to have acted differently. The Inquiry Act does not
contemplate constitution of two committees by the Presiding Officers
of both Houses, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Mehta. Thus, if at all, two
committees are constituted, one each by one Presiding Officer of a
20
(2018) 14 SCC 193
39
House, to investigate common allegations against a Judge, any right
can accrue to the Judge to question such constitution as well as the
legality of the subsequent process or outcome. This is because the
legal framework does not allow parallel proceedings by two
committees. Such an occurrence could be rare and if the occasion
therefor arises, certainly the court may interfere. However, that
obviously is not the case here. Judicial interference, bearing in mind
the stage the proceedings have reached, would amount to travelling
beyond the pleadings and trenching upon areas where no enforceable
legal injury has yet arisen. The settled limits of writ jurisdiction do not
permit the Court to confer relief in vacuum, divorced from a direct
challenge to the order which is alleged to be the source of illegality.
ISSUE IV: DRAFT DECISION PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
RAJYA SABHA – WHETHER JUSTIFIED IN LAW ?
46. For the limited purpose of future cases of a similar nature, and for no
other purpose whatsoever, we briefly record our opinion on the
procedure leading to the decision of the Deputy Chairman. It is clarified
in unequivocal terms that this discussion is purely academic and shall
not, directly or indirectly, be relied upon or invoked to claim any
benefit, leverage, or advantage by the petitioner.
47. We were furnished with a certified copy of the decision taken by the
Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha declining to admit the motion.
The document, spanning seven pages, comprises fifteen numbered
paragraphs and one unnumbered paragraph. The fifteen numbe red
40
paragraphs set out what is described as a “draft decision of the Chair,”
concluding that the notice was not “in order,” which was thereafter
placed before the Deputy Chairman for approval. In the unnumbered
paragraph, the Deputy Chairman expressly concurred with the decision
of the Secretary General in the following terms:
“Having carefully considered the facts of the case and legal position
enunciated above, I agree with the conclusion drawn. The Notice given
by Hon’ble MPs is found to be not in order and, thus, not admitted.
Secretary-General, Lok Sabha, may be informed accordingly.”
48. Upon a reading of the document in open court, we expressed our prima
facie reservations regarding the conduct of the Secretary General in
holding the notice to be not “in order”. The same were not fully
addressed by the submissions advanced by Mr. Mehta. For the reasons
set out in the paragraphs that follow, we are unable to find a clear legal
basis for the course of action adopted by the Secretary General. To
facilitate a clearer understanding of this conclusion, we deem it
appropriate to reproduce paragraph 14 of the said document, which
sets out the reasons on the basis of which the Secretary General found
the notice to be not “in order”:
“11. Pursuant to the directions of the then Chairman, a closer scrutiny of
the said Notice of Motion was undertaken, which revealed the following
deficiencies:
(i) The said Notice of Motion is not drawn in proper terms to elicit a
decision of the House;
(ii) The said Notice of Motion has relied on certain documents and
material facts. However, no such authenticated copy of these
documents and reports has been enclosed for consideration of the
Chairman, Rajya Sabha.
(iii) The prayer in the said Notice of Motion request that “the present
Motion under section 3(1)(b) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
ought to be admitted in the House”. However, section 3 (1) (b) of
the Act provides that “the Speaker or, as the case may be, the
41
Chairman may, after consulting such persons, if any, as he thinks
fit and after considering such materials, if any, as may be
available to him, either admit the motion or refuse to admit the
same”. It may be seen that section 3 (1) (b) gives discretion to
admit or refuse to admit the Notice of Motion to the Chairman,
Rajya Sabha and not to the House. Accordingly, an incorrect
provision has been invoked in the prayer in the said Notice of
Motion invoking incorrect provision of the Act display a casual and
cavalier approach to an extremely serious matter.
(iv) The Notice of Motion also contains certain factual inaccuracies. In
the ‘Sequence of Events’, it is stated that “… on 3 March, 2025,
the three-member In-House Committee conducted a spot
inspection at the site of the incident, during which electronic
evidence was examined and statement of 55 witnesses were
record (sic. recorded). Based on the findings, a report was
finalized and submitted to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India on 5
May 2025. This 64-page report was published in the public
domain by multiple news portals on 19 June, 2025”. It needs to
be seen that the impugned fire incident at the residence of
Justice xxxx occurred on the night of 14 March, 2025. It is
highly unlikely that the spot inspection could have taken place on
3
rd
March, 2025 i.e. the day before the fire incident. Further, in
absence of any material record appended with their said Notice
of Motion, it is not possible to determine the veracity of these
facts.
(emphasis supplied in original)
49. The material placed by the Secretary General before the Deputy
Chairman raises certain concerns. First, there appears to be an
insistence on the use of ‘proper terms’ for the notice, a requirement
which does not find express recognition in law. Secondly, a
requirement seems to have been read into the law for furnishing
authenticated documents in support of the material facts, which,
particularly in view of documents already in the public domain, may
not have been necessary at that stage. In any event, the substance of
the allegations was required to be considered, as there was no
statutory obligation upon the notice-givers to produce supporting
evidence at that juncture. Thirdly, exception appears to have been
42
taken to an incorrect reference to a statutory provision, without due
appreciation of the legal position governing the subject. Fourthly, the
Secretary General appears to have examined the correctness of the
facts pleaded, including with reference to certain dates, thereby
traversing beyond the scope of his designated role. The Inquiry Act
does not contemplate a substantive assessment of the merits of the
allegations by the Secretariat of a House. The Secretary General’s role
was expected to remain confined to administrative scrutiny, such as
verification of procedural compliance, and could not extend to
assuming a quasi-adjudicatory function.
50. It is relevant to note that neither the Inquiry Act nor the Rules framed
thereunder prescribe a mandatory form for a notice of motion. In the
absence of defined parameters, it is not readily apparent on what basis
the Secretary General concluded that the Notice of Motion was not ‘in
order.’ Where no prescribed format exists, a notice containing
allegations of impropriety against a Judge could not reasonably be
treated as ineffective solely on account of perceived deficiencies in
drafting or form. The role of the Secretary General was confined to
placing the notice before the competent authority, namely, the office
of the Chairman, without expressing any conclusion as to its
admissibility.
51. That the Secretary General went beyond a purely administrative role
is apparent from the language employed in the document itself. The
concluding paragraph (paragraph 15) thereof states: “A draft
43
decision of the Chair, indicating the aforesaid Notice of Motion not
being in order and hence, non est is accordingly placed for approval.
Subject to its approval, a communication would be sent to Secretary-
General, Lok Sabha”. (emphasis ours)
52. Without venturing further into the matter, we consider it appropriate
to note that the manner in which the notice of motion was processed
at the Secretariat level does not fully align with the role contemplated
under law.
53. That said, we repeat, these observations are confined solely to the
procedural aspects noted above and are occasioned by the particular
course of action adopted at the Secretariat level. Since the decision of
the Deputy Chairman declining to admit the motion is not under
challenge, and has been taken independently in accordance with his
constitutional role, these observations do not, in any manner, impinge
upon or affect the validity of that decision.
54. We do hope that no other Judge faces proceedings for his removal from
service on allegations of misbehaviour. Should, at all, there be an
unfortunate recurrence of a Judge prima facie indulging in
misbehaviour and the representatives of the people of the nation
demand an investigation based on allegations of misbehaviour, it would
be just and proper if Secretariat exercises restraint and leaves it to the
Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, as the
case may be, to decide the question of admission of a motion instead
of concluding as to what should be the future course of action.
44
SO FAR
Issue I : Does the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act require the
constitution of a Joint Committee where notices, having been given in both
Houses on the same day, is later followed by refusal to admit the motion by
the Presiding Officer of one House and admission of the motion by the
Presiding Officer of the other House?
➢ No, it does not. The proviso applies to only one specific situation,
namely, where notices of motion given on the same day have been
admitted by both Houses. It does not restrict or negate the individual
authority of either House of Parliament.
Issue II : Whether the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was competent
to refuse admission of the notice of motion?
➢ Yes, he was.
Issue III : What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to
admit the motion on the validity of the Speaker’s action under Section 3(2)
of the Inquiry Act?
➢ There is no need to examine this issue, as the order of the Deputy
Chairman is not under challenge. Arguendo, even if it were examined,
it would have no effect, since the Speaker committed no illegality in
constituting the committee.
Issue IV: Whether the draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of
the Rajya Sabha recording that the notice of motion given to the Chairman
is not “in order” justified in law?
➢ No; does not align with the procedure contemplated under law.
45
ISSUE V : WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF ?
55. The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 is confined to enforcement
of Fundamental Rights and does not extend to issuing advisory or
corrective directions in relation to internal statutory mechanisms of the
Parliament, where no present or inevitable infraction of any
Fundamental Right is evinced. Petitioner is, thus, not entitled to any
relief.
CONCLUSION
56. For the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for. The present
writ petition stands dismissed.
………………………… …………. J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
………………………… …………..J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
New Delhi;
January 16, 2026.
46
APPENDIX- I
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
A. CHALLENGE BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT
1. The Petition challenges the unilateral constitution of the Judges Inquiry
Committee (“JIC”) by the Speaker under Section 3(2) of the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968 (the “Act”) on 12.08.2025 after admitting a motion
given in the Lok Sabha on 21.07.2025 seeking removal of the Petitioner
as a Judge, despite a motion presented in the Rajya Sabha on the same
day not having been admitted (as communicated to retitioner during the
course of hearing). The motion was stated to have been “not admitted”
in the Rajya Sabha on 11.08.2025 pursuant to a scrutiny undertaken by
the Secretary General of the Rajya Sabha and affirmed by the Deputy
Chairman, purportedly seeking to derive authority from Article 91 of the
Constitution of India.
2. Petitioner contends that the action of the Speaker is contrary to the first
proviso of Section 3(2) of the Act, thus vitiating the constitution of the
JIC and all consequential proceedings. This, since where notices of
motion are given on the same day before both Houses of Parliament, the
JIC could not have been constituted unless (a) both Houses had
admitted the motions; and (b) a JIC constituted thereafter jointly by the
Hon’ble Speaker and Hon’ble Chairman.
3. It is further submitted that the Deputy Chairman could not have
exercised the powers comprised in Section 3(2) which stands exclusively
reserved in the Hon’ble Chairman as the persona designata. Article 91
is merely a pro tem measure limited to ensuring continuity of
proceedings in the House and cannot extend to statutory powers solely
exercisable by the Hon’ble Chairman.
B. PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
4. Contrary to the counter-affidavit, during oral arguments, Respondents
did not challenge the maintainability of the Petition. In any event, it is
47
settled law that all processes relating to the removal of a Judge under
the Act [up until the point proceedings in the House(s) commence upon
submission of a Report by the JIC] are proceedings outside the House,
amenable to judicial review as these flow from Article 124(5), and not
Articles 118, 119 or 122 [Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
v. UoI [(1991) 4 SCC 699 - paras 76-79, 81-82, 86, 91 & 93-101].
C. CONSTITUTION OF JIC IS CONTRARY TO LAW
5. Indisputably, the Act is a plenary and comprehensive legislation
referable to Article 124(5) and thus liable to be strictly construed. The
scheme of the Act, broadly, conceives of four different parts to the
process of removal.
a. Introduction [Section 3(1)]: All Members of Parliament have a right
to present notices of motion seeking removal of a Judge. Where
motions are endorsed by a specific number of Members [100 in the
Lok Sabha, 50 in Rajya Sabha], it leads to the next step —
consideration of the motion by the Speaker or Chairman to decide
whether it merits admission.
b. Admission / Rejection [Sections 3(1) and (2)]: The admission or
rejection of a motion is a statutory power of immense moment and
thus vested in two high constitutional functionaries, namely, the
Speaker and Chairman who are to independently assess and evaluate
whether the notice of motion merits admission and the initiation of
further steps under the Inquiry Act.
c. Committee Formation and Report (Sections 3 -5): In the event a
motion is admitted, it is kept pending enabling the Hon’ble Speaker
or the Chairman, as the case may be, to constitute a three-member
committee for inquiring into the allegations. This committee must
conduct an inquiry as per the provisions of the Act and its Rules and
furnish its report within the specified time-frame.
d. Consideration of Report and Address (Section 6): Only if the report
of the committee recommends the removal of the Judge, would it
48
then be transmitted for discussion by Members in the Houses, which
may thereafter resolve to present a joint address to the President of
India seeking removal of the Judge in question.
6. Section 3 constitutes the fulcrum of the legislation, and covers the entire
field of presentation and consideration of motions. Since it constitutes a
constitutional safeguard, it is liable to be interpreted strictly. It exhausts
all contemplated scenarios on the giving of motions, namely: (i) motion
in one House alone; (ii) motions in both Houses on ditterent days (in
which case the second proviso applies); and (iii) motions given in both
the Houses on the same day (triggering the first proviso). Undisputedly,
in the present case motions were given on the same day in both the
Houses and the challenge thus centers upon the first proviso.
7. As per the Petitioner, the JIC could not have been constituted unless
both the Speaker and the Chairman had admitted the motions in both
Houses and only thereafter proceeded to constitute the JIC jointly. The
use of double peremptory negatives (“no” committee and “unless”) is
evidence of a manifest intent to underscore its mandatory and non -
derogable character [Fuleshwar Gope v. Uol [2024 SCC OnLine SC
2610 - para 27; Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra
(2009) 9 SCC 92 - paras 5, 10, 12, 13, 14 & 15].
8. Since the power to admit a motion stands conferred upon two co-equal
constitutional authorities, the statute mandates concurrence to avoid
conflicting decisions, separate committees coming to be constituted or
parallel inquiries being initiated. A decision not to admit if taken by one
of those authorities would undoubtedly cast a cloud of invalidity on the
other. It is these considerations which inform the mandate of concerted
action.
9. Implicit in the first proviso is the situation where one motion is rejected
and one admitted. In such a situation the motion would clearly fail and
cannot be proceeded with. Lapsing of a motion is a consequence that
follows not only from the plain and exhaustive words of the proviso but
also from the fact that both the Houses are equal and the determination
49
of the Speaker and Chairman (as the case may be) to not admit a motion
cannot be overridden or overruled by a contrary view of the other
functionary. To read the proviso as not providing for that consequence
would mean that Section 3 is incomplete.
10. It would be incorrect and inconceivable to assume that Parliament was
either not cognizant or unaware of such a possibility or conundrum even
though it chose to introduce a specific provision to deal with motions
presented on the same date and promulgated a complete and exhaustive
code. Legislative oversight cannot be readily assumed or inferred.
11. The admission of both motions is not liable to be read as a condition
precedent for the applicability of the first proviso. This condition is
indelibly linked to the expression ‘no committee shall be constituted…’.
If the Inquiry Act were to be interpreted in any other manner, it would
compel one to hold that it fails to provide for a situation where one of
the motions presented on the same day is rejected. This, despite the
Inquiry Act having been acknowledged to be a complete code, a
comprehensive legislation on the subject of removal, and Section 3
thereof constituting its center piece.
12. Respondents’ interpretation that the first proviso applies only when both
motions are “admitted” is wrong. This interpretation seeks to introduce
the phrase ‘given and admitted’ into the statute and contradicts settled
principles of statutory interpretation [G Narayanaswami v. G
Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717 – para 18-20]. This more so since
adhering to the plain text of the statute does not lead either to absurdity
or to any unworkable situations.
13. Respondents’ contention that there is no prejudice caused due to non-
compliance with the statute cannot be countenanced [S.L. Kapoor v.
Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] . The doctrine of prejudice or useless
formality has no application to mandatory statutory safeguards and
more so when we are concerned with salutary constitutional safeguards.
Petitioner is facing removal proceedings even though one of the two
similar and identical motions were found not to warrant further
50
consideration. The mere fact that an adverse report may ultimately be
placed before both Houses cannot justify a Judge being subjected to a
process which is constitutionally infirm and unwarranted. Additionally,
the mere right of addressing both Houses at a belated stage cannot
overcome the prejudice caused. Last but not the least, the reputational
damage caused as a result of the impugned proceedings is prejudice in
itself.
D. CONSIDERATION OF RAJYA SABHA MOTION IS CONTRARY TO
LAW
14. The Rajya Sabha motion was “not admitted” by the Deputy Chairman on
11.08.2025. No formal order to this effect has been communicated or
supplied to Petitioner. The file notings supplied demonstrate that the
consideration on the motion was by the Secretary General (Respondent
No. 2) and merely “affirmed” by the Deputy Chairman.
15. Petitioner submits that the Deputy Chairman lacked authority to exercise
any powers in respect of the motion given on 21.07.2025. The Act
defines “Chairman” and “Speaker” exhaustively by using the categorical
“means”, rather than the fluid or expansive “means and includes”. The
use of “means” is intended to be an explicit statement of the full
connotation of a term, thus, leaving no room for ambiguity. The
definitions (absent in the Bill) were included in the Act to “ensure and
maintain the independence of the judiciary” [Joint Committee Report
on the Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 1964] . Where any role was perceived
for the Deputies, it had been specifically carved out (See Rules 16 & 17,
Judges Inquiry Rules, 1969) and which too is plainly a limited, expressly
defined role, confined to proceedings in the House after the submission
of the JIC Report.
16. Article 91 confers only limited, pro tem authority relating to proceedings
in the House and cannot extend to statutory functions under the Act.
Parliament was conscious of Article 91 and still adopted exhaustive
definitions under the Act reserving admission powers in the
51
Speaker/Chairman alone as persona designata. The Parliament appears
to have been guided inter alia by Article 100 which gives only a casting
vote to the Speaker/Chairman (unlike a member of the House including
the Deputy Chairman who can sign the motion and vote on it if the
Report calls for removal of the Judge).
17. Further, unlike Article 65(3) which effects a complete substitution of
authority, Article 91 envisages only a pro tem role. Accepting the
Respondents’ contention would mean that any other member”
temporarily presiding over House proceedings (in the absence of the
Deputy Chairman) could also exercise powers under Section 3. This
would clearly be contrary to the import and intent of the statute.
Therefore, Petitioner submits that for all the reasons set out above. the
constitution of the JIC is liable to be declared non est, and this Hon’ble
Court ought to allow the present petition.
Filed on: 12.01.2026
Place: New Delhi.
52
APPENDIX- II
SHORT NOTE
ON BEHALF OF TUSHAR MEHTA, SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
A. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS
1. The Petitioner has assailed the action of the Hon’ble Speaker admitting
the notice of motion on 12.08.2025 and the constitution of a three-member
Inquiry Committee under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
(“Act”). It is the Petitioner’s case that since notices of motion were “given”
in both Houses on the same day, the proviso to Section 3(2) mandated that
no Committee could be constituted unless the motion was admitted in both
Houses and, if admitted, the Committee must be constituted jointly by the
Speaker and the Chairman.
2. It is respectfully submitted that the Writ Petition is misconceived and
founded on an erroneous reading of the statutory scheme. At the outset,
the Respondents’ have divided their arguments broadly on the following
four issues :
a. The proviso to Section 3(2) of the Act is attracted only where the
motions are “admitted” in both Houses, and not just being “given”
b. In any event, the Petitioner demonstrates no real, demonstrable and
gross prejudice so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Hon’ble Court under Article 32; and
c. The Rajya Sabha motion was, upon scrutiny, expressly “not admitted”
by the Deputy Chairman, who was validly acting as the Chairman
under Article 91 when the office fell vacant and was constitutionally
and statutorily permitted to exercise such a power. This order is not
and could not have been challenged.
B. INTERPRETATION OF PROVISO TO SECTION 3(2)
3. It is respectfully submitted that Articles 121 and 211 of the Constitution
prohibit any discussion in the House with regard to the conduct of any judge
of the Supreme Court or the High Court, except upon a motion for
53
presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge.
A perusal of Article 124(4) read with Article 217 and 218, makes it crystal
clear that a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court cannot be
removed from office except on the g round of proven misbehaviour or
incapacity.
4. Therefore, the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge culminating
in an order of the Hon’ble President is passed only after an address by each
House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of
that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members
present and voting, ensuring stringent thresholds that operate as a
substantive inbuilt safeguard. It ensures that such motions for removal of
Judges are not initiated in a routine manner and that the process is
insulated against proceedings founded on frivolous allegations, extraneous
considerations or patently false claims.
5. It is thus respectfully submitted that by virtue of Article 122, these
notices of motion cannot be impugned in a court of law as long as they do
not contravene any constitutional or statutory mandate.
6. The Act incorporates an important safeguard in Section 3(1) by drawing
a clear distinction between a motion being “given” and its subsequent
“admission”. A motion does not automatically set the statutory machinery
in motion merely upon being “given”. It is only upon “admission” that the
statutory consequence of constituting a three-member Committee follows.
The Legislature has, therefore, consciously used two distinct expressions,
and the language employed is the determinative factor of the legislative
intention. At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that, as per Rule 2(e) of
the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, “motion” is defined to mean the motion
admitted under Section 3(1) .
7. As per Section 3(1) of the Act, “giving” a motion is essentially a
ministerial act of presentation/filing, whereas “ admission” is a
substantive, independent decision that necessarily entails due scrutiny and
54
application of mind by the Speaker or the Chairman after consulting such
person, if any, as he thinks fit. Thus, the Speaker or the Chairman has an
option either to admit the motion or refuse to admit the motion.
8. This Hon’ble Court in P.D. Dinakaran (2) v. Judges Inquiry
Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 474 had held that the Speaker/Chairman, is
not bound to admit the motion submitted with the requisite numerical
strength as a matter of course because he had the discretion under the Act
to consult such persons as he may think fit and consider any material which
is made available to him before taking a decision on the admission of
motion. This Hon’ble Court also held that, in a given case, he may even
choose to refuse to admit the motion.
21
9. It is crucial to highlight that this Hon’ble Court in Sarojini Ramaswami
(Mrs) v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 506 has also held the following:
95. “.....The law so enacted under Article 124(5) provides that any
accusation made against a sitting judge to enable initiation of the
process of his removal from office has to be only by not less than the
minimum number of Members of Parliament specified in the Act, all
other methods being excluded. On initiation of the process in the
prescribed manner, the Speaker/Chairman is to decide
whether the accusation requires investigation. If he chooses
not to act on the accusation made in the form of motion by the
specified minimum number of Members of Parliament, the
matter ends there. On the other hand, if the
Speaker/Chairman, on a consideration of the materials
available and after consulting such persons as he thinks fit,
forms the opinion that a prima facie case for investigation into
the accusation against the Judge is made out, he constitutes
a Committee of judicial functionaries in accordance with
Section 3(2) of the Act.”
10. If this condition of an independent application of mind with an order
“admitting” the motion is not read, there is a possibility of members
gathering mere requisite numerical strength “filing” motions even on the
basis of some unpopular judgment given by a Judge resulting in the
21
Paragraphs 26 & 31 of P.D. Dinakaran (2). See also Krishna Swami v. Union of India ,
(1992) 4 SCC 605 ¶45.
55
appointment of a Committee. Such a reading of Section 3(1) would render
a mere achievement of numerical strength as the only condition precedent
for forming a Committee under Section 3(2), rendering the second part of
Section 3(1) otiose.
11. Further, it is humbly submitted that in the absence of a mandatory
requirement of independent scrutiny culminating in a formal order of
“admitting” the motion, the statutory safeguard would be rendered illusory.
Mere fulfilment of the numerical strength of the members could trigger the
process of removal by simply “giving” the notice of motion, even on the
basis of an unpopular judgment given by a Judge, thereby mechanically
leading to the constitution of a Committee without any threshold
assessment of whether the motion warrants such grave proceedings.
12. The procedure contemplated in the Act is sui generis and will have to
be interpreted in view of the constitutional scheme in general and Articles
121 and 211 in particular. Section 3(2) of the Act also specifically and
consciously uses the word “if the motion referred to in subsection (1) is
admitted”. This further highlights the significance of “admission” of the
motion, which is different from mere “giving” of the motion. It thus provides
that if a motion for removal of a Judge is admitted by the Speaker or the
Chairman, the Speaker or the Chairman shall keep the motion pending and
“constitute, as soon as may be,” a three-member Committee to investigate
the grounds for removal of a judge.
13. It is pertinent to note that the proviso to Section 3(2) stipulates that
where notices of a motion are given on the same day in both Houses of
Parliament, “no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been
admitted in both Houses” and it is only when the motion is admitted in both
Houses, that the Committee shall be constituted jointly by the Speaker and
the Chairman. Thus, when notices of motion are initiated simultaneously in
both Houses, the law envisages a joint action only if both Houses admit
the motion. The proviso is intended to avoid two committees being
56
constituted simultaneously to inquire into the same allegations, which may
result in conflicting views.
14. The logical corollary of this is that when notices of motion are given on
the same day, but only admitted by one House and rejected by the other
House, then the Speaker/Chairman, as the case may be, who admits the
motion is well within its statutory right to keep it pending and constitute a
Committee as per Section 3(2) of the Act.
15. In the facts of the present case, notices of motion were indeed
submitted on the same day, i.e., 21 July 2025, in both Houses of Parliament.
On the one hand, the notice of motion for removal given in the Lok Sabha
was received by the Hon’ble Speaker at 12:30 pm and was signed by 146
members belonging to different political parties. On the other hand, the
notice of motion given in the Rajya Sabha was signed by 62 members, and
the then Chairman made an announcement in the House between 4:07 pm
to 4:19 pm. The address of the then Chairman makes it evidently clear
that he was neither “admitting” the motion nor “refusing to admit” the
motion.
22
Moreover, the Hon’ble Law Minister had also informed the
Chairman that another motion was given in the Lok Sabha, pursuant to
which the Chairman directed the Secretary General to “ take necessary
steps in this direction”.
16. It is pertinent to note that the then Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
resigned as the Vice-President on 21 July 2025, and the Deputy Chairman
assumed charge under Article 91 of the Constitution. Upon scrutiny of the
notice, the Deputy Chairman, on 11 Augus t 2025, concluded that the
motion contained infirmities and that the notice was not in order and thus
not admitted. The Hon’ble Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, directed that
the Secretary General, Lok Sabha, may be informed accordingly. This
decision of refusal to admit the motion was communicated in writing by the
22
The then Chairman, specifically mentioned that “Then the right of the Speaker or
the Chairman to admit or reject the motion is not there ” (Pg. 47 of the Petition @
Para 1).
57
Rajya Sabha Secretariat to the Lok Sabha Secretariat on the same day, i.e.
11 August 2025.
17. Thus, after following the due process, the Speaker admitted the motion
received from members of the Lok Sabha and made an announcement to
this effect on 12 August 2025 and kept it pending for inquiry. Accordingly,
considering the fact that Rajya Sabha’s motion was not admitted, on 12
August 2025, only one House, i.e., Lok Sabha, had an admitted motion for
the removal of the Petitioner.
18. Therefore, the requirement of a joint committee under the proviso to
Section 3(2) was not triggered in these circumstances. The proviso
operates only when (i) notices of motion are given on the same day and (ii)
both the Houses admit the motion. The Hon’ble Speaker, before constituting
the Committee, waited for the Rajya Sabha’s decision, and only when he
was formally informed that the Rajya Sabha motion was not admitted, the
Committee was constituted on 12 August 2025.
19. It is pertinent to note that while the proviso bars constituting a
Committee unless both Houses admit the motion, it nowhere says that the
rejection of a motion in one House automatically invalidates an admitted
motion in the other. To hold otherwise would allow one House’s refusal to
admit the motion (potentially even a nefarious rejection) to defeat the
removal process approved by the other House, which is neither the intent
of the law nor a reasonable interpretation of the proviso.
20. The Petitioner’s contention that the constitution of the Committee is
invalid “because the motion was not admitted in both Houses” is misplaced.
Such a situation arose only because the Rajya Sabha’s motion failed to
meet the threshold for admission. The law does not prohibit the Speaker
from acting on a properly admitted motion of one House when the notice
of motion given in the other House did not culminate in an admission. It is
humbly submitted that any other interpretation would undermine the
removal process by effectively giving one House a veto over the initiation
58
of an inquiry, even where the other House has fulfilled all statutory
requirements.
21. At this juncture, it is submitted that it is a settled law that a proviso
has to be understood from the language used in the main provision and not
vice versa. Moreover, it is also a settled law that if the substantive provision
is clear on fair interpretation, the language in the proviso cannot be used
to defeat the basic intent expressed in the said provision.
23
C. DEMONSTRATIVE, GROSS AND REAL PREJUDICE SHOULD BE
SHOWN FOR INVOKING ARTICLE 32
22. It is submitted that the Petitioner has not shown any “demonstrable,
gross or real prejudice” caused to him by the manner in which the process
for removal has been initiated, even if a purported procedural lapse is
assumed to have taken place. It is submitted that such a demonstrable,
gross or real prejudice must be proved by the Petitioner.
24
In substance,
the Petitioner’s complaint is that he lost the “benefit” of a joint committee
constituted by both the Speaker and the Chairman. However, this does not
translate into any prejudice or a real or demonstrable disadvantage.
23. The Committee constituted by the Speaker is a duly authorized body
formed strictly in conformity with Section 3(2) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act.
The Committee is bound to conduct its investigation fairly and give the
Petitioner full opportunity to be heard. The Petitioner remains entitled to
submit his defence, adduce evidence, cross -examine witnesses and
23
See Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 ¶16; Vishesh Kumar
v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 2 SCC 378 ¶9; S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman ,
(1985) 1 SCC 591 ¶27; J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and
Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665 ¶35; Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra
Kumar; (1998) 5 SCC 192 ¶8; Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma , (2013) 11
SCC 451 ¶20.
24
See ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ¶30[v]; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.
Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC ¶28, 33(3) & 33(7); State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh ,
(2021) 19 SCC 706 ¶36 & 42.1-42.5; S.P. Gupta v. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1991)
2 SCC 263 ¶5; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan , 2025 SCC OnLine 1702 ¶20.1.3 -20.1.7; L&T Housing Financing Limited v. Trishul Developers , (2020) 10 SCC 659
¶19.
59
respond to any allegations before this Committee, in the same manner as
he would before a joint committee.
24. It is respectfully submitted that the ultimate safeguard of Parliamentary
approval under Article 124(4) also remains intact. Even if the Committee
holds that the Judge is guilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any
incapacity, then the motion, along with the report of the Committee, would
be taken up for consideration by the Houses of Parliament. Removal of a
Judge cannot take place except by an order of the President passed after
an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the
total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two -
thirds of the members of the House present and voting. Therefore, a
procedural divergence (a single-House Committee as opposed to a Joint
Committee) does not undermine the fairness of th e process or the
Petitioner’s ability to defend himself. He suffers no substantive
disadvantage at this stage.
25. It is submitted that the proviso to Section 3(2) is primarily for avoiding
an anomalous situation arising out of a possibility of two simultaneous
committees being appointed and to avoid a contingency where two motions
remain “pending” with two different committees investigating the same act.
The proviso does not confer any right on anyone, including the recipient of
the charge memo by the Committee. The real purpose behind the proviso
is for the benefit of the members.
26. When the constitution of the Committee jointly does not confer any
right, there can be no prejudice. The prejudice can possibly arise in the
event that both motions are given on the same day and are admitted, and
the Speaker or the Chairman alone constitute a Committee.
27. The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution is
available only to address breaches of fundamental rights or patent gross
injustice. In the present case, the Petitioner’s grievances are at best
technical and procedural. He has not point ed to any breach of his
60
fundamental rights. It is submitted that the Petitioner’s rights are
safeguarded by the presence of an impartial and independent Committee
and the multiple stages of decision-making that lie ahead.
D. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN TO EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
CHAIRMAN WHEN THE OFFICE IS VACANT AS PER ARTICLE 91 OF
THE CONSTITUTION
28. It is submitted that Article 91(1) of the Constitution of India explicitly
provides for the contingency where the office of Chairman of the Rajya
Sabha is vacant. In such a case, the duties of the office shall be performed
by the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. The Constitution thus, ensures
that the absence or vacancy of the Chairman does not paralyze the
functioning of the House. The Deputy Chairman automati cally steps into
the role by a constitutional mandate.
29. It is humbly submitted that a statute cannot be read in isolation to
negate a clear constitutional authorization. In the present case, the trigger
for invoking Article 91 was the resignation of the Hon’ble Chairman from
the office of the Vice-President on 21 July 2025. Since then, by operation
of law, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was empowered to perform
all duties and exercise all the powers of the Chairman, including
admitting/refusing to admit motions, as envisaged under Section 3(1).
Therefore, the Deputy Chairman’s authority in this capacity flows directly
from the Constitution, and any other interpretation would render Article 91,
in the context of the Act, unworkable, redundant, and otiose.
25
25
It is a settled position of law that no provision of the Constitution of India can be
considered to be otiose. See Welfare Assn., A.R.P. v. Ranjit P. Gohil , (2003) 9 SCC
358 ¶28; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India , (2008) 6 SCC 1 ¶126; Chief
Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 ¶74; Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State
of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 ¶13 & 15; Jayant Verma v. Union of India , (2018) 4
SCC 743 ¶25; Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala , (2019) 20 SCC 143 ¶75.
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