P a g e 1 | 23

REPORTABLE

Item No. 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

W.P.(CRL.) No. 10 of 2026

Yambem Manichandra Singh, aged about 52 years, F/o

Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, a resident of

Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, District –

Thoubal, Manipur – 795138.

… Petitioner

- Versus -

1. The State of Manipur represented by Chief

Secretary, Government of Manipur, Babupara P.O. &

P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur –

795001.

2. The District Magistrate, Imphal East, District, P.O. &

P.S. Porompat, Manipur – 795005.

3. The Union of India through the Secretary to the

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs,

Department of Internal Security, North Block, New

Delhi-110001.

… Respondents

B E F O R E

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

For the petitioner : Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, Advocate.

For the respondents : Mr. Th. Vashum, Deputy

Government Advocate for

respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Mr. W. Darakeshwar, Senior Panel

Counsel for Central Government

for respondent No. 3.

Date of Judgment & Order : 09.06.2026

P a g e 2 | 23

JUDGMENT & ORDER

(ORAL)

[M. Sundar, CJ]

[1] The following abbreviations/short forms/references have

been used in the order:

Sl.

No.

Abbreviation/short

forms/references

for the sake of

brevity/convenience

and clarity

Full form/Expansion

1. NSA National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)

2. COFEPOSA Conservation of Foreign Exchange and

Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,

1974

3. R-1 State of Manipur represented by Chief

Secretary, Government of Manipur,

Babupara P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West

District, Manipur

4. R-2 District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur /

Detaining Authority

5. R-3 Union of India through the Secretary to the

Government of India, Ministry of Home

Affairs, Department of Internal Security,

North Block, New Delhi-110001

6. WP Writ Petition

7. Detenu Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, S/o

Yambem Manichandra Singh, aged about

22 years, a resident of Charangpat Mamang

Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District,

Manipur – 795138.

8. Father of detenu Shri Yambem Manichandra Singh, a

resident of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S.

Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur –

795138.

9. FIR First Information Report

10. UAPA Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

(37 of 1967)

11. BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

(46 of 2023)

12. BNS Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023)

P a g e 3 | 23

13. Impugned

preventive

detention order

Order dated 08.03.2026 bearing reference

No. Cril./NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by R-

2

14. Impugned approval

order

Order dated 16.03.2026 bearing reference

No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1

15. Impugned

confirmation order

Order dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference

No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1

16. Sr. PCCG Senior Panel Counsel for Central

Government

[2] Captioned WP has been filed with a habeas corpus plea qua

detenu who is now incarcerated in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, Imphal

East, Manipur inter alia owing to a preventive detention order dated

08.03.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by

detaining authority i.e., R-2.

[3] In the hearing, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, learned counsel on record

for writ petitioner, Mr. Th. Vashum, learned State counsel for R-1 and R-

2 and Mr. W. Darakeshwar, learned Sr. PCCG are before this Court

(Physical Court). R-1 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 30.05.2026

(wrongly mentioned as 30.05.2025 in the affidavit-in-opposition), R-2 has

filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as

29.05.2025 in the affidavit-in-opposition) and R-3 has filed an affidavit-

in-opposition dated 16.05.2026. To be noted, R-2 is detaining authority.

[4] The afore-referred impugned preventive detention order

made by R-2 was approved by R-1 vide order dated 16.03.2026 bearing

reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1 in exercise of power

under Section 3(4) of NSA Act (impugned approval order) and it was

subsequently confirmed by R-1 in and vide order dated 08.04.2026

P a g e 4 | 23

bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1 in exercise of

power under Section 12(1) of NSA Act (impugned confirmation order).

[5] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, in his campaign against

the afore-referred impugned preventive detention order made by R-2

(detaining authority) which was subsequently approved and confirmed by

R-1 vide impugned approval and confirmation orders, notwithstanding

myriad grounds in the WP, predicated his challenge on one point and that

one point is, in the grounds of detention dated 09.03.2026 (served on the

detenu on 11.03.2026 at 06:15 p.m.) the detaining authority vide

paragraph 10 threat has prescribed a time limit of 3 (three) weeks {from

the date of detention} for making representation to the Government of

Manipur as well as Central Government. Learned counsel submits that

such fixing of time frame for the detenu to make representations to State

Government (appropriate Government as well as Central Government) is

a clear infraction of rights enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of

India. In support of his contention, learned counsel for writ petitioner

pressed into service two case laws namely, Mutum Ranjan Meitei’s

case reported in 2026 (1) MNLJ 126 : 2026 Legal Eagle 6 and Smt.

Laishram Nilajit Shija’s case reported in 2026:MNHC:43-DB

(Manipur High Court neutral citation). To be noted, further details

of these two cases are Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba -vs-

District Magistrate, Thoubal, Thoubal District & Ors. being order

dated 11.02.2026 made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 and Smt. Laishram

P a g e 5 | 23

Nilajit Shija -vs- State of Manipur & Ors. being order dated

12.03.2026 made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1 of 2026. In Laishram Nilajit Shija,

Mutum Ranjan Meitei has been followed and both judgments have

been rendered by this Division Bench by respectfully following Prem Lata

Sharma rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e., Prem Lata Sharma

[(1998) 4 SCC 260]. To be noted, in Prem Lata Sharma, the principle

laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court is, right of a detenu to make

representations subsists as long as preventive detention order operates.

To be noted, there will be a little more elaboration on these case laws

elsewhere infra in this order.

[6] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, submitted that 3 (three)

weeks time from the date of detention elapsed on 30.03.2026 and detenu

did not make any representation either to State Government or to the

Central Government as he was under the firm belief that he cannot make

the representation after 3 (three) weeks from the date of detention had

elapsed. It was submitted that this has been clearly articulated in the WP,

more particularly in paragraph 10 and ground (e) thereat which read as

follows :

’10. That, it is humbly submitted that in paragraph No. 10 of

the grounds of detention under Section 8 of the NSA, 1980

[Annexure – N/2], it has been informed by the Respondent No.

2 that the detenu have a right to make a representation to

Respondent No. 1 & 3 against the impugned order of detention

order and he is given the earliest opportunity for making such

representation and these representation should be submitted

within 3 (three) weeks time from the date of detention, i.e. 08-

03-2026. However, since the detenu has been incarcerated in

Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa in pursuance of the impugned

detention order he could not make the said representations to

P a g e 6 | 23

the concerned authorities within the stipulated time period or

thereafter. In other words, the detenu is under the firm itself

belief that he cannot make any representation after three weeks

owing to the time period being fixed in the grounds of detention

[Annexure -N/2]. The relevant paragraph No. 10 of the said

grounds of detention [Annexure – N/2] is reproduced herein

below:

“That, you are hereby informed that your have a right to

make representation to the Government of Manipur as

well as to the Central Government against this order of

detention passed against you and you are hereby given

the earliest opportunity for making such representation. If

you wish to do so, your representation is to be sent

through the Superintendent of Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa

to the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur”, Manipur

Secretariat, South Block, Imphal, Manipur – 795001 in

respect of representation to the Government of Manipur

and to the “Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry

of Home Affairs” (Department of Internal Security), North

Block, New Delhi – 110001 in respect of representation to

the Central Government and should be submitted within 3

weeks time from the date of detention. Further, you are

hereby informed that you have the right to make

representation to the detaining authority within 12 days

from the date of detention or until the order is approved

by the State Government whichever is earlier. The

representation is to be sent to the District Magistrate,

Imphal East District, Porompat, Manipur – 795005 though

Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. The

representation if any would be placed before the Advisory

Board within 3 weeks time from the date of your detention

as the Government is bound under law to produce before

the board for its consideration.”

GROUNDS

a) ……………………………………………………………………….

……………………………………………………………………….

………………………………………………………………………..

d) ………………………………………………………………………..

e) For that, that fixing of time period by the

Respondent No. 2 in the grounds of detention

[Annexure-N/2] for submitting representations to

the Respondent No. 1 and 3 has infringed the right

of the detenu enshrined under Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India.’

P a g e 7 | 23

[7] It was further pointed out that in response to the afore-

referred grounds raised with clarity and specificity, R- 1 and R-3 in their

counter affidavits dated 30.05.2025 and 16.05.2026 respectively have

merely said that this is in the domain of R-2 (detaining authority) and it

is for R-2 (detaining authority) to respond to this. It was further pointed

out that R-2 (detaining authority) in her affidavit-in-opposition dated

29.05.2026 has merely referred to Section 10 of NSA Act and averred that

it prescribes three weeks time frame. Relevant paragraphs in the counter

affidavit of R-1 are paragraphs 7 and 10 and the same read as follows:

‘7. That, with reference to para Nos. 10 and 11 of the writ petition,

the deponents begs to submit that the content in these paras are

closely related to District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur. Hence,

District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur may offer comment.

10. That, with reference to Para Nos. 16(d) and 16(e) of the Writ

Petition, the deponent has no comment to offer as the same may

be replied by the District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur.’

R-3 has merely submitted that there is no allegation against

R-3 and has left it to detaining authority to respond, this is vide paragraph

3 and the same reads as follows:

‘3. That, none of para of the petition is related to action taken by

the Respondent No.3 i.e., the Ministry of Home Affairs. All

averments are related to the other respondents and as such no

reply is being given for these in this affidavit by the answering

respondent.’

[8] Thereafter, it was pointed out that counter affidavit of R-2

(detaining authority) is significant, relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 9

and 13 and the same read as follows:

‘9. That, with reference to Para No.10 of the Writ Petition, the

deponent begs to submit that the detenu was provided the

P a g e 8 | 23

prescribed timeline as admissible U/S 10 of the said Act, and

representation through Superintendent of Police, Manipur Central

Jail, was permitted for placing the same before the Advisory

Board/Committee.

13. That, with reference to Para No.11(e) of the Writ Petition, the

deponent denied the allegations made therein as the period for

submission of representation is specifically provided under the

Act.’

[9] It was reiterated that R-2 has merely taken umbrage under

Section 10 of NSA Act but Section 10 of NSA Act merely prescribes 3

(three) weeks time frame for the appropriate Government to place the

grounds before the Advisory Board and it merely says that the grounds

should be placed before the Advisory Board by the appropriate

Government within 3 (three) weeks together with representation ‘if any’.

[10] In response to the afore-referred point, learned counsel for

R-1 and R-2, drew our attention to afore-referred paragraphs 9 and 13 of

the affidavit-in-opposition of R-2 dated 29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned

as 29.05.2025) and submitted that the intention qua paragraph 10 of the

grounds of detention is merely to let the detenu know that if he makes

a representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before

the Advisory Board though it has not been articulated well. In this regard,

it is deemed appropriate to extract and reproduce paragraph 10 of

grounds of detention, this Court does so and the same reads as follows:

‘10. That, you are hereby informed that you have a right to make

representation to the Government of Manipur as well as to the

Central Government against this order of detention passed against

you and you are hereby given the earliest opportunity for making

such representation. If you wish to do so, your representation is

to be sent through the Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail,

Sajiwa to the "Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur", Manipur

P a g e 9 | 23

Secretariat, South Block, Imphal, Manipur-795001 in respect of

representation to the Government of Manipur and to the

"Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home affairs"

(Department of Internal Security), North Block, New Delhi-110001

in respect of representation to the Central Government and should

be submitted within 3 weeks time from the date of detention.

Further, you are hereby informed that you have the right to make

representation to the detaining authority within 12 days from the

date of detention or till the order is approved by the State

Government whichever is earlier. The representation is to be sent

to the District Magistrate, Imphal East District, Porompat, Manipur-

795005 through Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. The

representation if any would be placed before the Advisory Board

within 3 weeks time from the date of your detention as the

Government is bound under law to produce before the board for

its consideration.’

It was submitted that it is not happily worded but the

intention is only to make the detenu know that if he makes a

representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before the

Advisory Board. Besides this argument, learned counsel placed reliance

on a case law namely, Union of India -vs- Paul Manickam & Anr.

[(2003) 8 SCC 342] and submitted that a detenu who does not make

any representation cannot be heard to contend that fixing of time fame is

infraction of Article 22(5) of Constitution of India.

[11] As regards learned Sr. PCCG for R-3, learned State counsel

for Central Government very fairly submits that R-3 is more in the nature

of a formal party, R-3 has not received representation but there is no

allegation whatsoever against R-3 in the WP. Therefore, a short counter

affidavit has been filed and R-3 really does not have a say with regard to

afore-referred contestation turning on fixing of time limits for making

representations.

P a g e 10 | 23

[12] This Court now embarks upon the legal drill of discussion and

setting out its dispositive reasoning.

[13] In the afore-referred Mutum Ranjan Meitei, this Court

respectfully followed Ameena Begum rendered by Hon’ble Supreme

Court and wrote that a preventive detention order is justiciable at least

on 7 (seven) different grounds in a judicial review and adumbration of

these 7 (seven) grounds has been set out in paragraph 7. The relevant

paragraph in Mutum Ranjan Meitei’s case in this regard is paragraph

7 and the same reads as follows:

‘[7] This Court, carefully examined the rival contentions. At the

outset, it is to be noted that the question of justiciability of subjective

satisfaction of a detaining authority in preventive detention matters

came up for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in several

cases and we respectfully refer to a recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

Court being ‘Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana & Ors.’

reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587. In Ameena Begum, after a survey of

various case laws on preventive detention including case laws on

preventive detentions under NSA, Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear

that areas within which validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested

have been carved out and an adumbration of the carved out areas is as

follows:

(a) When the detaining authority has not applied its

mind at all;

(b) When there is dishonest exercise of power by

detaining authority;

(c) Exercise of power of detaining authority for

improper purpose;

(d) Detaining authority acting under dictation of

another body;

(e) When the subjective satisfaction recorded by

detaining authority is based on application of wrong test

or misconception of a statute;

(f) When the detaining authority has arrived at and

recorded subjective satisfaction without the same being

grounded on materials which are rationally probative

value.

(Underlining made by this Court for ease of reference.)

To be noted, adumbration supra has been set out by this Court

by respectfully following paragraph No. 16 of Ameena Begum

[paragraph No. 16 as in SCC report being (2023) 9 SCC 587] wherein

Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 of ‘Khudiram

P a g e 11 | 23

Das vs. State of West Bengal’ reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81 which

was rendered by a Hon’ble four Judges Bench.’

[14] Instant case is one of detaining authority not applying its

mind i.e., not applying mind in fixing 3 (three) weeks time frame for the

detenu for making representations to State and Central Governments by

misreading Section 10 of NSA Act which prescribes 3 (three) weeks time

frame for the State Government to place grounds of detention before

Advisory Board and merely adds that State Government while doing so

shall also place representation ‘if any’ from the detenu. Be that as it may,

in Mutum Ranjan Meitei, this Court respectfully following Prem Lata

Sharma rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court, made it clear that fixing of

time frames by detaining authority in the grounds, for the detenu for

making representations is clearly an infraction of Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India. To be noted, on facts, Mutum Ranjan Meitei was

also a case of preventive detention order under NSA Act and that was also

a case where time frame was fixed by detaining authority for the detenu

to make representations. Subsequently, in Laishram Nilajit Shija, this

Court reiterated Mutum Ranjan Meitei. To be noted, on facts,

Laishram Nilajit Shija is also a case where the detaining authority had

fixed time frames for the detenu to make representations. Relevant

paragraph in Laishram Nilajit Shija is paragraph 16 and the same reads

as follows:

[16] As would be evident from paragraphs 5 and 6 of

grounds of detention (extracted and reproduced supra), the

detaining authority has fixed time frames for sending

representations to the detaining authority, State Government as

P a g e 12 | 23

well as the Central Government. This is the reason why the

detenu has sent the 2

nd

representation i.e., representation dated

08.12.2025 to the Hon'ble Advisory Board. Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Premlata Sharma (Smt.) vs. District Magistrate,

Mathura & Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 held that there

can be no period of limitation regarding exercise of the right of a

detenu to make a representation and corresponding obligation of

the Central Government to consider the same for deciding upon

the question of order of detention as such a right of a detenu

and corresponding/axiomatic obligation of State subsists so long

as the preventive detention order continues to operate. This

Court, respectfully following Premlata principle laid down by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in order dated 11.02.2026 in W.P. (Crl.)

No. 34 of 2025 (Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba vs

District Magistrate, Thoubal District & Ors.) reported in

2026 (2) MNLJ0 : 2026 Legal Eagle 6 which is a case of

preventive detention order couched in a language akin to the

impugned preventive detention order as regards paragraph 5 &

6, held that fixing of timeframes for sending representations is a

clear infraction of sacrosanct Constitutional right enshrined in

Article 22(5). This Court is informed that this 11.02.2026 order

in W.P. (Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 has since been given effect to and

the detenu has since been enlarged. Most relevant portionss of

Mutum Ranjan Meitei case are contained in paragraph 10 &

11 and relevant portions reads as follows:

‘[10] … It has also been made clear that a detenu qua

a impugned preventive detention order is entitled to

have his representation considered as expeditiously/at

the earliest. The significant clincher is, neither the

Constitution nor the long line of authorities have either

provided for or justified fixing of time frames for making

such representations. It comes to light that in

‘Premlata Sharma (Smt.) vs. District Magistrate,

Mathura & Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260,

Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it clear that there can

be no period of limitation regarding exercise of right of

the detenu to make a representation and corresponding

obligation of the Central Government to consider the

same for deciding upon the question of order of

detention as such a right of a detenu and obligation of

State subsist so long as the preventive detention order

continues. To be noted, on facts, Premlata also arose

under NSA, a preventive detention order made under

NSA was assailed and the issue that fell for

consideration is refusal to send detenu’s representation

to Central Government on the ground that the power of

the revocation of a detention order is vested only in the

State Government under Section 14 of NSA. It is in this

context that in Premlata, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid

down the ratio that the right of detenu to make a

representation and corresponding obligation of the

Government to consider the same expeditiously (at the

P a g e 13 | 23

earliest) subsist so long as the preventive detention

order operates/detention continues. In the case on

hand, therefore, fixing of twelve days time frame qua

representation to the detaining authority and fixing of

three weeks time frame for representations to the State

and Central Governments is clearly flawed and

unacceptable. On an extreme demurer, even if the

argument of learned State counsel that the time frames

were fixed as impugned preventive detention order will

be valid only for twelve days unless approved by the

State Government and the State Government has a

responsibility to place the representation before the

Advisory Board within three weeks is accepted, the

same does not come to the aid of learned State counsel

in his effort to defend the impugned preventive

detention order. The reasons are, as regards twelve

days, though there may be some semblance of

justification, there is absolutely no justification as

regards fixing three weeks time frame for

representation to the State Government. The reason is,

Section 10 of NSA captioned ‘Reference to Advisory

Board’ makes it clear that the appropriate Government

shall within 3 weeks from the date of detention of a

person place before the Advisory Board, the grounds on

which order has been made and representation, if any.

Section 10 of NSA reads as follows :

‘10. Reference to Advisory Board.—

Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in

every case where a detention order has been made

under this Act, the appropriate Government shall,

within three weeks from the date of detention of a

person under the order, place before the Advisory

Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds

on which the order has been made and the

representation, if any, made by the person affected

by the order, and in case where the order has been

made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of

section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-

section (4) of that section.’

(underlining and bold font made /used by this

Court for ease of reference).

[11] The above makes it clear that the statute i.e.

Section 10 of NSA is clear as daylight that a State

Government is under obligation to place the

representation of the detenu before the Advisory

Board only if the detenu chooses to send a

representation. To put it differently, it is axiomatic that

if the detenu does not send a representation within

three weeks from the date of detention, State

Government will be under no obligation much less a

statutory obligation to place it before the Advisory

Board and the State Government cannot be found fault

P a g e 14 | 23

with in this regard. Therefore, the argument that three

weeks time frame for representation to State

Government was fixed in grounds of detention to

ensure that the representation is placed before the

Advisory Board does not hold water. The buttressing

factor is, if State Government receives a

representation after three weeks from the date of

detention, it has a sacrosanct duty to consider the

same for revocation under Section 14 of NSA. To be

noted, this is a indefeasible analogy that flaws from

Premlata principle i.e., principle that detenu’s right to

make a representation and obligation/duty of State to

consider the same at the earliest subsist as long as the

preventive detention order operates/detention

continues. As regards the representation to the Central

Government this three weeks phenomenon does not

exist at all and therefore the argument is a non starter.’

To be noted, in afore-referred paragraph 16 of Laishram

Nilajit Shija, relevant paragraph of Mutum Ranjan Meitei had been

extracted and reproduced.

[15] This Court carefully considered the submissions of learned

State counsel for R-1 & R-2 i.e., the submissions that the intention of the

detaining authority in fixing 3 (three) weeks time frame for the detenu to

make representations is only to let the detenu know that if he makes

representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before the

Advisory Board though it has neither been clearly articulated in the

grounds nor are the grounds happily worded. Even on a demurer, this

argument does not pass muster and it does cut ice with this Court for two

clear reasons. The first reason is, 3 (three) weeks time frame has been

fixed by the detaining authority vide paragraph 10 of the grounds of

detention not merely for the representation to be made by the detenu to

State Government but it has been fixed for the representation to be made

P a g e 15 | 23

by the detenu to Central Government also. If the intention of the detaining

authority was merely to ensure representation is made and the same is

placed before the Advisory Board within 3 (three) weeks, 3 (three) weeks

time frame (if at all) should have been fixed for the representation to be

sent to the State Government alone. To be noted, this Court makes it

clear that time frame cannot be fixed and this is only a test on a demurer.

Therefore, it is not mandatory that the detenu should make

representation within 3 (three) weeks. A detenu can make a

representation to the State Government even after 3 (three) weeks as the

State Government has the power to revoke a detention order at any time

by resorting to Section 14 of NSA Act. The second reason as to why the

argument does not cut ice with this Court is the clear language in which

Section 10 of NSA Act is couched and Section 10 of NSA Act reads as

follows:

‘10. Reference to Advisory Board.- Save as otherwise expressly

provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has

been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall,

within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under

the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under

section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the

representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order,

and in case where the order has been made by an officer

mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3, also the report by such

officer under sub-section (4) of that section.’

[16] A plain reading of afore-referred Section 10 of NSA Act makes

it clear that 3 (three) weeks time frame fixed thereat applies only to the

appropriate Government namely R-1 (State Government) and not the

detenu. Moreover, Section 10 of NSA Act makes it clear that R-1 shall

P a g e 16 | 23

place the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board along with

representation ‘if any’ meaning that if there is a representation from the

detenu, the same shall also be placed before the Advisory Board. It is

axiomatic that if there is no representation from the detenu within 3

(three) weeks, it will suffice if the State Government places the grounds

of detention before the Advisory Board and it is not mandatory or

compulsory qua State Government to place the representation of the

detenu. Any representation made to State Government post three weeks

from the date of detention will be considered (expeditiously, without

delay) by the State Government inter-alia in the light of Section 14 of NSA

Act. These two reasons, even on a demurer, flattens the argument of

learned State counsel for R1 and R2 does not cut ice with this Court. In

any event, it is made clear that time frames cannot be fixed in the light

of Prem Lata principle i.e., time frame cannot be fixed even for a

representation to be made to State Government as sanctus right of the

detenue in this regard subsists as long as the preventive detention order

operates.

[17] This takes this Court to Paul Manickam which was pressed

into service by learned State counsel. Paul Manickam is a case which

arose under COFEPOSA. A preventive detention order was made on

26.04.2000 and on 11.05.2000 detenu’s father addressed a

representation to the Hon’ble President of India and thereafter within 4

(four) days i.e., on 15.05.2000 a habeas corpus petition was filed before

P a g e 17 | 23

Madras High Court and in this habeas corpus petition, the writ petitioner

had averred that one representation had been sent to the State of Tamil

Nadu and another representation had been sent to Union of India. This

was clearly incorrect as representation had been sent to Hon’ble President

of India. Be that as it may, 3 (three) different points were raised in the

legal drill of habeas corpus and the habeas corpus writ petition was

dismissed and thereafter, a review application was filed on 08.12.2000

and in the review application, citing the representation sent to the Hon’ble

President of India, the preventive detention order was interfered with by

the High Court. It is in this context that Hon’ble Supreme Court, made it

clear that the writ petitioner had not come to Court with clean hands, had

not made correct averments and had for all practical purposes misled the

Court and therefore, the writ petitioner does not deserve any relief in the

hands of Court. Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that sending a

representation to Hon’ble President of India thereafter deflecting the

course of justice by letting loose red herrings is an unclean approach

which is unacceptable. The facts of Paul Manickam are clearly

distinguishable.

[18] This Court in writing that the facts of Paul Manickam are

distinguishable, respectfully follows the declaration of law made by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) v. State of

Tamil Nadu reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533. As regards Padma

Sundara Rao, this Court chooses to use the expression ‘declaration of

P a g e 18 | 23

law’ rather than ‘ratio’ as Padma Sundara Rao was rendered by a

Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. On facts, Padma Sundara

Rao arose under Central Land Acquisition Act i.e. ‘Land Acquisition Act,

1894’. The question in Padma Sundara Rao was whether after quashing

of Section 6 declaration, will State get a fresh period of one year to make

another declaration under Section 6. In this factual matrix, the

Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court went into the question of

how case laws should be cited and relied upon. It was made clear that

case laws should be cited and relied upon only after setting out the facts

and one factual difference can make a world of difference. This principle

was declared as law by the Constitution Bench inter alia by referring to

Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board. Relevant

paragraph in Padma Sundara Rao is paragraph 9 and the same reads

as follows:

‘9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without

discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact

situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is

always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgement as

though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be

remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the

facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington V. British

Railways Board. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or

different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions

in two cases.’

[19] Respectfully following Padma Sundara Rao declaration,

this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Paul

Manickam is clearly distinguishable on facts and does not come to the

aid of the learned State counsel for R-1 and R-2. The reason is, unlike

P a g e 19 | 23

Paul Manickam, this is not a case of misleading the Court or incorrectly

averring in the WP that the detenu has sent a representation to a

particular authority after having sent it to another authority who is the

highest authority in the Country namely Hon’ble President of India. Suffice

to write that Paul Manickam does not come to the aid of learned State

counsel for this reason and also because the principle is different. Principle

has been set out in paragraph 19 of Paul Manickam and the same reads

as follows:

’19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review application

it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of

India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or

the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties.

This appears to be a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap

an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High

Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review

petition with an entirely new substratum of issues. Considering the

limited scope for review, the High Court ought not to have taken into

account factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed

in the writ petition. While dealing with a habeas corpus application

undue importance is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the

same time where the court is satisfied that an attempt has been made

to deflect the course of justice by letting loose red herrings the court

has to take serious note of unclean approach. Whenever a

representation is made to the President and the Governor instead of

the indicated authorities, it is but natural that the representation

should indicate as to why the representation was made to the

President or the Governor and not the indicated authorities. It should

also be clearly indicated as to whom the representation has been

made specifically, and not in the manner done in the case at hand.

The President as well as the Governor, no doubt are constitutional

Heads of the respective Governments but the day-to-day

administration at respective levels is carried on by the Heads of the

Departments/Ministries concerned and the designated officers who

alone are ultimately responsible and accountable for the action taken

or to be taken in a given case. If really the citizen concerned

genuinely and honestly felt or was interested in getting an expeditious

consideration or disposal of his grievance, he would and should

honestly approach the real authorities concerned and would not

adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of deliberately creating

a situation for delay in consideration and cry for relief on his own

manipulated ground, by directing his representation to an authority

which is not directly immediately concerned with such consideration.’

P a g e 20 | 23

Therefore, the principle is, a manipulated ground flowing

from dubious deliberate deflection should not aid a detenu.

[20] Learned State counsel, made a faint attempt to submit that

the facts in Prem Lata are slightly different. This Court carefully

considered this argument. Prem Lata also arose under NSA Act. In Prem

Lata, representation to State Government was made and the same was

rejected and a copy of the said representation along with para wise

comments was forwarded to Government of India and Central

Government also rejected the representation. Thereafter, the detenu

made another representation to the Government of India but the

representation given to Superintendent of Jail in which the detenu was

incarcerated was not sent to the Central Government on the ground that

it had been sent after an extraordinary delay. It is in this context that

Hon’ble Supreme Court went into the question as to whether time frame

can be fixed for sending representations and whether the concept of delay

in sending representations by the detenu can be countenanced in

preventive detentions. It was made clear that delay on part of State in

disposing of the representation can be infraction of binding with rights

enshrined in Article 22(5) of Constitution of India but the detenu has to

be given earliest opportunity to make an effective representation and the

right of the detenu to make a representation vide Article 22(5) qua a

preventive detention order subsists as long as the preventive detention

order operates. Therefore, Prem Lata is not distinguishable on facts and

P a g e 21 | 23

the principle applies squarely to instant case. This principle laid down in

Prem Lata has been respectfully followed by this Court in Mutum

Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija. To be noted, as regards

Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija, this Court is

informed without any disputation by the learned State counsel that the

State has released the detenus accepting the orders of this Court. To put

it differently, Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija have

been given legal quietus by State and have attained finality. In any event,

both these judgments viz., Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram

Nilajit Shija were rendered by this Court by respectfully following

Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Prem Lata and Ameena Begum.

[21] Before concluding, this court deems it appropriate to

write/record (only for the purposes of completion of facts) that the

impugned preventive detention order is predicated on a lone FIR i.e., FIR

dated 26.12.2025 on the file of LLI Police Station (this Court is informed

that LLI stands for Lamlai) being FIR No. 111(12)2025 LLI-PS for alleged

offences under Sections 109(1)/111(2)/310(6)/329(3) BNS and 25(1-C)

Arms Act added 20 UAPA.

[22] This Court is acutely conscious that a preventive detention

order can be made even on the basis of a lone FIR but the point is,

pursuant to this lone FIR, the detenu was arrested on 26.12.2025 at 08:30

p.m. 90 (ninety) days therefrom elapsed on 05.04.2026. Learned counsel

for writ petitioner, on instructions, asserts that State has neither filed final

P a g e 22 | 23

report nor filed for extension of time for filing final report or for extension

of remand by resorting to Section 43D(2) of UAPA. To be noted, final

report is to be filed within 90 (ninety) days from the date of arrest and as

regards UA(P)A Act, offences vide Section 43D(2) there is a provision for

prosecution to seek extension of time and extension of remand up to 180

(one hundred and eighty) days. Though 90 (ninety) days from the date

of arrest elapsed on 05.04.2026, until this day (09.06.2026) State has

neither filed final report (charge sheet) nor resorted to Section 43D (2) of

UAPA and filed an application for extension of time for filing final report /

extension of remand. This in effect means that the detenu is entitled to

seek default bail. This Court makes it clear that this Court is not interfering

with the impugned preventive detention order now on this ground but

this is being recorded only for completely and comprehensively capturing

facts and making it clear that as regards regular prosecution after letting

the matter slip away in regular Trial Court. State which has not even

sought extension of remand / extension of time for filing final report is

now detaining the detenu solely on the basis of impugned preventive

detention order which has been subsequently approved and confirmed by

R-1 on 16.03.2026 and 08.04.2026 respectively.

[23] In the light of narration, discussion and dispositive reasoning

set out thus far, this Court has no hesitation in writing that the impugned

preventive detention order made by R-2 on 08.03.2026 approved and

confirmed by R-1 on 16.03.2026 and 08.04.2026 deserve to be

P a g e 23 | 23

dislodged/set aside on the ground that there is clear infraction of sanctus

rights enshrined in Article 22(5) and vested in the detenu.

[24] Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned WP is allowed. The impugned

detention order dated 08.03.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of

2026/315 made by R-2 (detaining authority), approval order dated

16.03.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD and confirmation

order dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made

by R-1 are all set aside and Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, S/o Y.

Manichandra Singh of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal

District, Manipur aged about 22 years now lodged in Central Jail Sajiwa,

Imphal East, Manipur is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not

required in any other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

FR/NFR

Bipin

P.S. I : Upload forthwith.

P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by web copy uploaded in High

Court website inter alia as the same is QR coded.