As per the case facts, a development authority appealed a High Court judgment that had set aside the authority's demand for additional payments from plot allottees, which was based on ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.41784197 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.10015
10034 of 2020]
YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE
SOCIETY & ORS. ETC. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.41984217 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.98919910
of 2020]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4218 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.14141 of
2020]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.300 of 2022]
1
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1.Leave granted.
2.This batch of appeals challenge the judgment and order
dated 28
th
May, 2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in
various writ petitions filed by the allottees of plots of land. The
writ petitions were filed challenging the demand of additional
amount made by the appellant hereinYamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as
“YEIDA”) in respect of plots of land leased out to the allottees;
the resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15
th
September,
2014, and the Government Order dated 29
th
August, 2014, vide
which the State Government had permitted YEIDA to recover
the additional amount from the allottees.
3.The facts in the present case are not in dispute. For the
sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual details as are
found in Writ Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed before the High
2
Court of Allahabad by M/s Shakuntla Education and Welfare
Society (the respondent No.1 herein).
4.A vast area of land was acquired by the State of Uttar
Pradesh in Gautam Budh Nagar district for public purposes.
The said area of land was acquired for the benefit of YEIDA.
After the land was acquired, YEIDA invited applications for the
allotment of plots of land in the area developed by it. In
response to the notice inviting applications for such allotment,
various allottees including the respondent No.1 herein applied
and were allotted plots admeasuring different sizes.
5.The respondent No.1 was informed by letter dated 14
th
September, 2009, that a plot of 50 acres of land has been
reserved for it. Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated 10
th
December, 2009 was issued to the respondent No.1, allotting
plot No.2 in Sector 7A, having an area of 50 acres, i.e.,
equivalent to 2,02,350 sq. meter. In the allotment letter, it was
stated that the premium of the land allotted was Rs.1,055/ per
sq. meter. It was also mentioned that the respondent No.1 had
3
deposited 10% of the premium amount and the balance 90% of
the premium amount was payable in monthly installments as
specified in the chart contained therein. The allotment letter
further stated that the lease deed shall be executed and the
possession of the land shall be handed over after completion of
the acquisition proceedings. It was stated that the land was
already in possession of YEIDA.
6.It was the contention of the respondent No.1 that on the
basis of the aforesaid allotment letter, a lease deed came to be
executed in favour of the respondent No.1 on 22
nd
January,
2010 for a period of 90 years after the respondent No.1 had
made substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of
the allotment and had deposited the necessary amount. The
lease deed provided that in addition to the amount payable by
the respondent No.1, as mentioned in the allotment letter, a
further amount, i.e., 2.5% of the total premium of the plot was
payable as annual lease rent.
4
7.It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that during
measurement, it was found that the plot allotted to it, had an
excess area of about 2 acres. The said excess land was also
leased out to it on the same terms and conditions. It was
further the case of the respondent No.1 that it was thereafter
given possession of the aforesaid land and on it, a University
known as Galgotias University was developed.
8.It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that
subsequently YEIDA came out with a policy and gave an option
to the respondent No.1 to deposit the entire premium amount
in lumpsum rather than in installments. This was subject to
certain rebate. It was stated that in accordance with the said
policy, a lumpsum amount was worked out by YEIDA and the
same was also paid by the respondent No.1. An undertaking
was also taken from the respondent No.1 on an affidavit on 7
th
June, 2012, that in the event there was any clerical error or
miscalculation of the lumpsum amount, the respondent No.1
would make good the deficiency.
5
9.The State of Uttar Pradesh had also made largescale
acquisition of lands for the benefit of New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (“NOIDA” for short) and Greater NOIDA.
A number of writ petitions came to be filed by farmers
challenging the said acquisition on various grounds before the
Allahabad High Court. The main ground of challenge was that
there was no urgency for acquiring the land and as such,
invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as “the L.A. Act”) was not warranted. It
was contended that on account of invoking of Section 17 of the
L.A. Act, a valuable right available to the writ petitioners under
Section 5A of the L.A. Act was taken away. All the said writ
petitions came to be decided vide the judgment and order dated
21
st
October, 2011. In the leading case, i.e., Gajraj and others
vs. State of U.P. and others
1
, the Full Bench of the Allahabad
High Court came to a finding that the urgency clause ought not
to have been invoked and the farmers were unlawfully denied
the benefit of Section 5A of the L.A. Act, wherein they could
1 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711
6
raise objections to the acquisition of the land. However, taking
into consideration the subsequent developments that the lands
had already been developed and third party rights had accrued,
the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Gajraj (supra) considered it appropriate not to disturb the
acquisition. In order to balance the equities, the Full Bench of
the Allahabad High Court directed payment of additional
compensation of 64.7% plus some other benefits to certain
class of farmers. It also directed certain other benefits to be
given to the farmers. The aforesaid additional compensation of
64.7% was worked out by the Court taking into consideration
the fact that in respect of one of the villages, i.e., Patwari,
NOIDA itself had entered into negotiations with the farmers and
had extended the benefit of additional compensation at the
aforesaid rate over and above the compensation awarded.
10.The aforesaid judgment and order of the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) came to be
7
confirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and others
2
.
11.Since the farmers, whose lands were acquired for the
benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, were being paid
additional compensation of 64.7%, there was unrest amongst
the farmers whose lands were acquired for YEIDA. It appears
that on account of agitation by the farmers, vast stretches of
lands could not be developed. As such, the Chief Executive
Officer (hereinafter referred to as “CEO”) of YEIDA addressed a
letter dated 10
th
April, 2013, to the State Government,
requesting to find a solution. The State Government, acting on
the said letter, instructed the Commissioner, Meerut Division,
Meerut, vide its letter of the same day, i.e., dated 10
th
April,
2013, to meet various groups of farmers and submit a report.
12.Accordingly, the Commissioner held a meeting with
various groups of farmers and the concerned District
Magistrates, and submitted a report to the State Government
2 (2015) 7 SCC 21
8
on 16
th
July, 2013, recommending constitution of a HighLevel
Committee.
13.The State Government vide Office Memo dated 3
rd
September, 2013, constituted a HighLevel Committee under
the Chairmanship of Sri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of
Prison, State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the
Chaudhary Committee”). The Chaudhary Committee also
consisted of the Divisional Commissioner of the concerned
Division and the Collector of concerned District. The
Chaudhary Committee submitted its recommendations to the
State Government, inter alia, recommending for the payment of
64.7% additional amount as “no litigation incentive” to the
farmers and for its reimbursement from the allottees in the
appropriate proportion.
14.The State Government accepted the recommendations of
the Chaudhary Committee and issued a Government Order
dated 29
th
August, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the said
G.O.”). The said G.O. provided that the farmers should be
9
offered 64.7% additional amount on the condition that they
withdraw their petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings
and undertake not to institute any litigation and create any
hindrance in the development work of YEIDA. It was clarified
in the said G.O. that the Government would not bear the
burden of the additional amount.
15.The said G.O. was placed before the Board of YEIDA in its
meeting, held on 15
th
September, 2014, and the same was
approved in the said meeting on the very same day, vide
Resolution dated 15
th
September, 2014.
16.In pursuance to the said G.O. and the Resolution dated
15
th
September, 2014 of the Board of YEIDA, additional demand
notices were issued to various allottees. In case of the
respondent No.1, an additional premium at the rate of Rs.600/
per sq. meter, for the land allotted and leased out, came to be
demanded, totaling to Rs.12,14,10,000/.
10
17.It was in this background that various writ petitions came
to be filed before the Allahabad High Court, including Writ
Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed by the respondent No.1.
18.By the impugned judgment and order dated 28
th
May,
2020, the Allahabad High Court allowed the said writ petitions
holding that:
(i)the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra), as approved
by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), was
not a judgment in rem and could not have been applied
to proceedings for acquiring the land under different
notifications or for YEIDA;
(ii)the said G.O. and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA
dated 15
th
September, 2014 were violative of the
provisions of the L.A. Act; and
(iii)the policy of the State Government was unfair,
unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
11
19.Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals by way of
special leave have been filed on behalf of YEIDA, State of Uttar
Pradesh and farmers whose lands were acquired.
20.We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, Shri C.U. Singh and
Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of YEIDA, Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar
Pradesh, Shri Rakesh U. Upadhyay and Dr. Surat Singh,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers whose lands
were acquired, Shri Nakul Dewan, Shri Sunil Gupta, Shri
Ravindra Srivastava and Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentsoriginal
allottees of land.
21.The main contention of the appellants in the present
appeals is that the said G.O. was a policy decision of the State
Government, taken in public interest. It is submitted that the
said policy decision was taken after taking into consideration
the farmers’ agitation, the report of the Chaudhary Committee
12
and all other relevant factors. It is submitted that in order to
avoid acquisitions from being declared illegal, the Cabinet of
Ministers of the State Government had taken a considered
decision to adopt a formula, which was carved out by the
judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the
case of Gajraj (supra) and approved by this Court in the case of
Savitri Devi (supra).
22.It is also the contention on behalf of the appellants that
the policy of the State Government was in consonance with the
decision of this Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest
Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others
3
,
wherein this Court has held that it is obligatory on the State to
ensure that people are adequately compensated for the transfer
of resource to the private domain. Relying on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union
of India and others
4
, it is submitted that the policy of the
State Government was formulated by looking at the welfare of
3 (2012) 3 SCC 1
4 (2000) 10 SCC 664
13
the people at large rather than restricting the benefit to a small
section of the society. Relying on various judgments of this
Court, it is submitted that when the change in the policy of the
State is in public interest, it will override all private agreements
entered into by the State.
23.It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that, as
a matter of fact, on account of agitation of the farmers,
development could not take place in the concerned area. It is
submitted that various plot owners had approached the State
Government and its authorities for finding out a solution to
these problems, so that the development could proceed further.
It is submitted that the proceedings of the Chaudhary
Committee would itself reveal that all the stakeholders
including the representatives of allottees were heard by the
Chaudhary Committee. Not only that, but various allottees
had, in writing, agreed that they are willing to pay the
additional compensation so that the hindrance in the
development is removed. It is therefore submitted that it does
14
not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the said
G.O. and oppose the payment of additional compensation.
24.Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is further
submitted on behalf of the appellants that the lease deed itself
permitted additions, alterations or modifications in the terms
and conditions of the lease. As such, even as per the lease
deed, the appellants were entitled to modify or alter the terms
and conditions of the lease. It is submitted that the word
“modify” has to be used in a broader sense and not in a
narrower sense.
25.Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
the High Court fell in great error in holding that no writ
petitions were pending. It is submitted that, as a matter of fact,
more than 600 writ petitions were pending when the policy
decision was taken by the State Government. It is submitted
that the policy decision was taken so as to save the acquisition,
which was otherwise liable to be quashed and set aside. It is
submitted that it is, in fact, the respondents, who are the
15
beneficiaries of the said measure and as such, having taken
benefit of the said measure, they cannot be permitted to refuse
to pay the additional compensation.
26.It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the
allotees had an option, either to make additional payment or to
take refund with interest. Having opted not to seek refund with
interest, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to
refuse to pay the additional compensation.
27.It is also submitted on behalf of appellantYEIDA that it
had specifically submitted that stay orders passed by the High
Court were in force in most of the cases related to residential
plots, due to which the development work could not be
completed.
28.Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers also
support the stand of YEIDA. It is submitted that the builders
had already recovered additional compensation from the
homebuyers. As such, the additional compensation was
already passed on by the builders to the homebuyers. It is
16
submitted that if the contention of the respondents is accepted,
it will amount to nothing else but allowing of unjust
enrichment.
29.It is further submitted that the respondents were not
entitled to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The writ petitions filed by them before
the Allahabad High Court were filed without impleading the
farmers who were necessary parties as respondents to the writ
petitions.
30.Elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the
respondents. To summarize, they are as under:
(i)The respondents had not given any undertaking to pay
additional compensation, as stated;
(ii)The term “modification/addition” with regard to
payment was restricted only to any clerical or technical
error;
17
(iii)The High Court has rightly held that Gajraj (supra) and
Savitri Devi (supra) applied only to the peculiar facts
and circumstances of those cases. In the case of
Gajraj (supra), the High Court had done elaborate
exercise of categorizing the cases into three types. In
any case, it is submitted that the State itself was
aggrieved by the decision in Gajraj (supra), which has
been challenged by it before this Court;
(iv)In the present case, many of the acquisitions were by
private negotiations and as such, there is no question of
applicability of either Section 17 or Section 5A of the
L.A. Act;
(v)There were concluded contracts entered between the
allottees and YEIDA. As such, it was not open for
YEIDA to unilaterally change the terms and conditions
of the contract and enhance the lease premium;
18
(vi)The High Court has rightly held that the socalled
policy of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational
and therefore not sustainable in law;
(vii)On behalf of the respondent No.19Supertech Limited,
an additional submission was made that the
appropriate authority has already passed an order
admitting the petition filed under Section 7 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;
(viii)On behalf of the individual plot owners, it is submitted
that the said plot owners, who belong to the middle
class section of the society cannot be burdened with the
additional amount.
(ix)The respondents also placed reliance on the judgment
of this Court in the case of ITC Limited vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others
5
to support the proposition
that concluded contracts cannot be interfered with or
reopened.
5 (2011) 7 SCC 493
19
31.With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties,
we have perused the material on record.
32.The main reasons that weighed with the High Court while
allowing the writ petitions are thus:
(i)That the lands which were acquired for YEIDA in the
present case were under different notification than the
notification which fell for consideration in the case of
Gajraj (supra);
(ii)That this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) has
categorically held that the directions given in the case
of Gajraj (supra) were issued by the High Court in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and
therefore, the same could not have been applied to the
facts of the present case;
(iii)That some other petitions filed before the High Court
claiming the benefit on the basis of Gajraj (supra) were
ultimately rejected by the High Court;
20
(iv)That the State Government has to strictly act in
accordance with the law or statutory provisions. It
cannot act arbitrarily or in an unfair manner in breach
of specific provisions of law;
(v)That it is only for the Courts to grant equitable relief
and the Government is not entitled to pass order on
equitable ground of law.
33.We are called upon to examine the correctness of these
findings.
34.The relevant portion of the judgment of the Full Bench of
the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) is reproduced by
this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra). It will be
apposite to refer to following observations in the case of Savitri
Devi (supra):
“20. In a nutshell, relief was categorised in
three compartments. In the first instance,
those writ petitions which were filed belatedly
were dismissed. In the second category, three
villages, namely, Devala (Group 40), Village
21
Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village
Asdullapur (Group 42) the acquisition was set
aside. Land acquisition in respect of remaining
61 villages is concerned, the acquisition was
allowed to remain but the additional
compensation was increased to 64.7%with
further entitlement for allotment of
development abadi plot to the extent of 10%of
the acquired land of those landowners subject
to maximum of 2500 sq m.
21. We now reproduce the exact nature of
direction [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] given by
the High Court, which reads as follows: (Gajraj
case [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] , SCC
OnLine All)
“In view of the foregoing conclusions we
order as follows:
1. Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011,
Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating
to Village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522
of 2011 relating to Village Sadarpur, Writ
Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 45208 of 2011, Writ Petition No.
45211 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of
2011, Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011,
Writ Petitions Nos. 4522324 of 2011,
Writ Petition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ
Petitions Nos. 4522930 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 45238 of 2011, Writ Petition No.
45283 of 2011 relating to Village Khoda,
Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 46785 of 2011 relating to
22
Village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No.
46407 of 2011 relating to Village Chaura
Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of
2011 relating to Village Alaverdipur
which have been filed with inordinate
delay and laches are dismissed.
2. (i) The writ petitions of Group
40 (Village Devla) being Writ Petition No.
31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of
2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010,
Writ Petition No. 37118 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 42812 of 2009, Writ Petition
No. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No.
54424 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54652 of
2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009,
Writ Petition No. 57032 of 2009, Writ
Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition
No. 22798 of 2010, Writ Petition No.
37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of
2010, Writ Petitions Nos. 3112425 of
2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 2011,
Writ Petition No. 32987 of 2011, Writ
Petition No. 35648 of 2011, Writ Petition
No. 38059 of 2011, Writ Petition No.
41339 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of
2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011
are allowed and Notifications dated 265
2009 and 2262009 and all
consequential actions are quashed. The
petitioners shall be entitled for
restoration of their land subject to
deposit of compensation which they had
received under agreement/award before
the Authority/Collector.
23
(ii) Writ Petition No. 17725 of
2010 Omveer v. State of U.P. (Group 38)
relating to Village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi
is allowed. Notifications dated 1042006
and 692007 and all consequential
actions are quashed. The petitioners shall
be entitled for restoration of their land
subject to return of compensation
received by them under agreement/award
to the Collector.
(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of 2011
(Rajee v. State of U.P.) of Group 42
relating to Village Asdullapur is allowed.
Notifications dated 2712010 and 42
2010 as well as all subsequent
proceedings are quashed. The petitioners
shall be entitled to restoration of their
land.
3. All other writ petitions except as
mentioned above at (1) and (2) are
disposed of with the following directions:
(a) The petitioners shall be entitled
for payment of additional
compensation to the extent of same
ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for Village
Patwari in addition to the
compensation received by them under
the 1997 Rules/award which payment
shall be ensured by the Authority at an
early date. It may be open for the
Authority to take a decision as to what
proportion of additional compensation
be asked to be paid by the allottees.
Those petitioners who have not yet
24
been paid compensation may be paid
the compensation as well as additional
compensation as ordered above. The
payment of additional compensation
shall be without any prejudice to rights
of landowners under Section 18 of the
Act, if any.
(b) All the petitioners shall be
entitled for allotment of
developed abadi plot to the extent of
10%of their acquired land subject to
maximum of 2500 sq m. We however,
leave it open to the Authority in cases
where allotment of abadi plot to the
extent of 6%or 8%has already been
made either to make allotment of the
balance of the area or may compensate
the landowners by payment of the
amount equivalent to balance area as
per average rate of allotment made of
developed residential plots.
4. The Authority may also take a
decision as to whether benefit of
additional compensation and allotment
of abadi plot to the extent of 10%be also
given to:
(a) those landholders whose earlier
writ petition challenging the
notifications has been dismissed
upholding the notifications; and
(b) those landholders who have not
come to the Court, relating to the
notifications which are the subject
25
matter of challenge in the writ
petitions mentioned at Direction 3.
5. Greater Noida and its allottees are
directed not to carry on development and
not to implement the Master Plan 2021
till the observations and directions of the
National Capital Regional Planning Board
are incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to
the satisfaction of the National Capital
Regional Planning Board. We make it
clear that this direction shall not be
applicable in those cases where the
development is being carried on in
accordance with the earlier Master Plan
of Greater Noida duly approved by the
National Capital Regional Planning
Board.
6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the
State to appoint officers not below the
level of Principal Secretary (except the
officers of Industrial Development
Department who have dealt with the
relevant files) to conduct a thorough
inquiry regarding the acts of Greater
Noida (a) in proceeding to implement
Master Plan 2021 without approval of
NCRP Board, (b) decisions taken to
change the land use, (c) allotment made
to the builders, and (d) indiscriminate
proposals for acquisition of land, and
thereafter the State Government shall
take appropriate action in the matter.”
(emphasis in original)
26
22. We may point out at this stage that in
respect of all these three categories, the High
Court has provided its justification for granting
relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall be
referring to the same while discussing the
cases of the appellants belonging to one or the
other category.”
35.After considering various judgments, this Court in the
case of Savitri Devi (supra) observed thus:
“46. Thus, we have a scenario where, on
the one hand, invocation of urgency
provisions under Section 17 of the Act
and dispensing with the right to file
objection under Section 5A of the Act, is
found to be illegal. On the other hand, we
have a situation where because of delay
in challenging these acquisitions by the
landowners, developments have taken
place in these villages and in most of the
cases, thirdparty rights have been
created. Faced with this situation, the
High Court going by the spirit behind the
judgment of this Court in Bondu
Ramaswamy [(2010) 7 SCC 129 : (2010)
3 SCC (Civ) 1] came out with the solution
which is equitable to both sides. We are,
thus, of the view that the High Court
considered the ground realities of the
matter and arrived at a more practical
and workable solution by adequately
compensating the landowners in the form
of compensation as well as allotment of
27
developed abadi land at a higher rate i.e.
10%of the land acquired of each of the
landowners against the eligibility and to
(sic under) the policy to the extent of
5%and 6%of Noida and Greater Noida
land respectively.
36.It could thus be seen that this Court in the said case has
found that a peculiar situation arose, where on one hand
invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the L.A.
Act and dispensing with the right to file objections under
Section 5A of the L.A. Act, were found to be illegal, while on the
other hand, the developments had already taken place in the
villages and in most of the cases, thirdparty rights were
created. Faced with this situation, the High Court came out
with the solution which was equitable to both sides. This
Court found that the High Court considered the ground
realities of the matter and arrived at a more practical and
workable solution by adequately compensating the landowners
in the form of compensation as well as allotment of
developed abadi land at a higher rate.
28
37.No doubt that this Court in paragraph 50 of the judgment
in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) makes it clear that the
directions of the High Court were given in the unique and
peculiar/specific background and therefore, it would not form
precedent for future cases.
38.It is to be noted that in the case of Greater Noida
Industrial Development Authority vs. Savitri Mohan (Dead)
Through Legal Representatives and others
6
, this Court was
considering the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, wherein
it had quashed and set aside the Notification under Section 4(1)
and Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act as well as the Notification
under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act. A
specific question was framed by this Court in the said case in
paragraph 10, which reads thus:
“10. The only question for consideration
is whether the matter is covered by the
judgment of this Court in Savitri
Devi [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7
SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , as
claimed by the appellant in which case
6 (2016) 13 SCC 210
29
the respondents will be entitled to relief of
higher compensation and allotment of
land instead of quashing of acquisition
proceedings.”
39.Answering the aforesaid question, this Court in the said
case observed thus:
“13. A perusal of the above shows that
compensation had already been
disbursed to the extent of 76%.
Thereafter, for the entire land of Village
Chhapraula falling in Group 18, the relief
granted is payment of additional
compensation and allotment of land. As
already noted, the part of the order where
relief of quashing of notification has been
given is not of the category of the present
case. In these circumstances, we find
merit in the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant that the Division Bench
was in error in distinguishing the present
case from the judgment
in Gajraj [Gajraj v. State of U.P., (2011) 11
ADJ 1 : 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] .
14. As observed by this Court in Savitri
Devi [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7
SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , in
spite of the finding that invocation of
urgency clause was uncalled for, the
relief of setting aside the acquisition was
not granted having regard to the
30
development that had already been
undertaken on substantial part of the
land. However, to balance the equities
higher compensation and allotment of
land was ordered to meet the ends of
justice. [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P.,
(2015) 7 SCC 21, para 17]”
40.It could thus clearly be seen that though this Court in the
case of Savitri Devi (supra) observed that the judgment in the
case of Gajraj (supra) has to be construed particularly in the
unique and peculiar/specific background, in the case of
Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra), this Court had followed the
principle laid down in the cases of Gajraj (supra) and Savitri
Devi (supra) and held that to balance the equities, it was
appropriate to issue directions for payment of higher
compensation and allotment of additional land. It was observed
that it was necessary to do so to meet the ends of justice.
41.At this juncture, we will have to consider the policy
decision of the State Government as formulated in the said
31
G.O. in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present
case.
42.After the decision of this Court in the cases of Gajraj
(supra) and Savitri Devi (supra), 64.7% additional
compensation and 10% of the land acquired of each of the land
owners, instead of 5% and 6% was made available to the
farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA as
well as Greater NOIDA. The lands acquired for the benefit of
YEIDA were also for the development of adjoining areas.
Feeling discriminated that they were being paid compensation
at much lesser rate as compared to the farmers whose lands
were acquired for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, various farmers’
organizations started agitations. It is some of the allottees who
made representations to the CEO of YEIDA. One of such
representations was made by the respondent No.19Supertech
Private Limited to the CEO of YEIDA on 22
nd
November, 2013,
stating therein that on account of agitation by the Bhartiya
Kisan Union, they had to stop their work with effect from 20
th
32
November, 2013. The said letter/representation stated that that
the main grievance of the officeholders of the Bhartiya Kisan
Union was that they want increased compensation and for
compensating the same, the Authority wants money from the
Builders. The said representation states that:
““the Authority is not resolving the
problems of the Farmers. The main issue
of farmers is that they want increased
compensation, and for compensating the
same, the Authority wants money from
the Builders. Builders are not ready to
pay this amount, due to which, we are
stopping the construction works of
Builders.” During the discussion, it was
said by the Company that “We are not
against the farmers or against their rights
and company gives it’s consent on this
fact that whatever the consent would be
made out between the Authority and
Government on the compensation
amount of farmers, that would be
accepted by the company.”
43.The said letter/representation categorically states that the
Company was not against the farmers or against their rights
and that it was willing to abide by whatever decision was
33
arrived at between the Authority and the Government on the
compensation amount of farmers.
44.Similar representations were made by Orris Greenbay Golf
Village on the same day, by Sunworld City Pvt. Ltd. on 26
th
November, 2013, and by Gaursons Realtech Pvt. Ltd. on 4
th
December, 2013.
45.It could thus be seen that on account of farmers’
resistance and their agitation, the development work of the
projects was stalled. When this was brought to the notice of
the State Government, the State Government nominated the
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide order dated 10
th
April, 2013, for looking into the issue. The Commissioner after
holding various meetings with the farmers’
organization/representatives submitted his report on 16
th
July,
2013, stating therein that the lands have been acquired by
YEIDA at large scale and taking into consideration the nature of
demands having wide implications, it was necessary that a
HighLevel Committee at the State Government level for
34
examining the demands of farmers be constituted. In this
background, the State Government vide order dated 3
rd
September, 2013 constituted a Committee under the
Chairmanship of Shri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of Prison,
State of Uttar Pradesh. The Divisional Commissioner of the
concerned Division and the Collector of the concerned District
were also the members of the Chaudhary Committee. The
Chaudhary Committee was constituted for the purpose of
resolving the problems of the villagers/farmers and the
problems related to the industries. The Chaudhary Committee
considered the following issues:
“a. Demands raised by the Farmers/
Farmers' Organizations/
Representatives and
Memorandums/ Demand Letters
produced by them and the favour
put forth by them during the
personal hearing.
b. Favour put forth by the
Industrialists/ Builders/ Allottees
during personal hearing.
35
c. Favour and opinion of Yamuna
Expressway Authority.”
46.The Chaudhary Committee conducted its proceedings on
30
th
September, 2013 with the representatives of the farmers.
The said Committee thereafter held deliberations with the
representatives of the allottees on 29
th
October, 2013. It will be
apposite to refer to the relevant part of the discussion that took
place in the meeting held with the representatives of the
allottees on 29
th
October,2013, which reads thus:
“2. It was informed by the representative
of M/s. SDIL that due to the agitation
of local farmers on the issues of their
problems/demands, at present, we
are not available to carry out any
work on the spot, therefore, whatever
the decision will be taken by the
Committee/ Government for disposal
of the problems of farmers, we will
cooperate in the same.
3. It was informed by the representative
of M/s. Supertech Pvt. Ltd. that the
farmers are agitating in the entire
area and they are interrupting the
development work. It is necessary to
solve the problems of farmers. It was
also informed by him that he will
36
cooperate in the decision to be taken
by the Government/Committee for
disposal of the problems.
4. It was informed by the
representatives of M/s. Silverline and
other Units/Institutions that due to
interrupting their development works
as a result of the demands being
raised by the farmers of the area, the
project cost is getting escalated. Due
to solving the problems of farmers,
the investment will be increased in
the area and in disposal of the same,
they will provide their assistance.
5. Regarding the demand of giving 10%
abadi land in place of 7% abadi land
to be given to the ancestral farmers,
it was said by the representative of
M/s. J.P. Infratech Pvt. Ltd. namely
Sh. Sameer Gaur that earlier, they
have been paid value of 7% abadi
land and development charges, now,
if any other cost is imposed, then,
company is not in position to bear the
same.”
47.It could thus be seen that even the representatives of the
allottees were of the opinion that on account of the agitation of
the local farmers, the developers were not in a position to carry
37
out any work on the spot. It was also impressed upon that on
account of this, the cost of the project was getting escalated.
As such, it was urged to solve the problem.
48.The Chaudhary Committee also considered the
submissions made on behalf of the appellantYEIDA. It was
submitted on behalf of the appellantYEIDA that on account of
the judgment delivered in a similar case, i.e., in the case of
Gajraj (supra), the farmers, whose lands were acquired, were
also demanding the compensation on similar lines.
49.After considering the rival submissions, the Chaudhary
Committee gave its recommendation as under:
“Recommendation of Committee:
The opinion of Authority as well as the
demands of the Farmers' Organizations
were carefully considered by the
Committee. In the common order passed
in the different Writ Petitions filed by
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, the
Hon'ble High Court by not finding the
proceedings conducted under Section 17 of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be proper,
38
had directed that the Authority shall pay
64.7% additional compensation to the
farmers and return them 10% developed
land. Also in the Yamuna Expressway
Authority, around 700 Writ Petitions have
been filed by the farmers by challenging
the different notifications, wherein, stay
orders have been passed in the most of the
Petitions, the circumstances which were
existing in the acquisition made by Noida
and Greater Noida Authority, same
circumstances are also existed in the most
of the cases of acquisition of Yamuna
Expressway. The lands acquired by the
Authority, have been allotted to the
different allottees for different projects, due
to which, the third party rights have been
created in this acquired land and if order
is passed against the Authority in the
Petitioners filed against the Acquisition
Proceedings, then, many difficulties would
arise. Therefore, keeping in view the legal
expected legal complications, it is required
to do the out of court settlement with the
affected farmers. At the time of discussion,
it was assured by the farmers'
representatives that if the Government/
Authority agrees to give 64.7% additional
compensation, then, the farmers will
withdraw the Petitions filed in the Court.
Therefore, Committee recommends that:
I .(a) If, all the farmers/ Petitioners of a
village related to the land acquired/
purchased by the Yamuna
Expressway Authority, withdraw their
39
Petitions filed in the Hon'ble High
Court or in any other Court and if
they give written assurance for future
that they will not file any claim
against the Authority or it's allottees
in any Court and will not cause any
obstruction in the Development
Works, then, like the Greater Noida
Authority, the Authority may consider
to give amount equivalent to 64.7%
additional compensation in the form
of No Litigation Incentive/ Additional
Compensation, which may be
compensated proportionally from the
concerned allottees and same may
also be imposed proportionally in the
costing of allotment of land available
with the Authority.
These benefits shall be allowed also
to those farmers, whose' lands have
been purchased by the Authority vide
Sale Deed on mutual consent basis.
(b)The process of payment of additional
compensation, be completed
villagewise in accordance with the
Schemes/ Priorities of Authority after
obtaining physical possession of on
the spot and after withdrawal of all
the Writ petitions/ Cases of
concerned village after doing
settlement with the farmers. In view
of the financial condition of
Authority, if the payment of
additional compensation is not
40
possible in lumpsum, then, the
consideration could also be made
regarding payment in installments or
in the form of developed land.
2. Regarding allotment of 10%
developed land in place of 7%
developed land, the proceedings be
conducted according to the order of
Appeal/SLP filed by the
Noida/Greater Noida Authorities.
3. The proceedings of amendment
proposed by the Authority in Abadi
Rules, are at final stage of approval,
the proceedings be conducted as per
the decision of Government.
4. Regarding abolishing the distinction
between ancestral and nonancestral,
this decision has been taken in the
48th meeting dated 08.01.2014 of
Yamuna Expressway Authority
Board, that such land owners of the
lands acquired or to be
acquired/purchased by the
Authority, whose' names have
remained recorded in Six Yearly
Register/ Khatauni on the acquired
land prior to the date of
establishment of Authority i.e.
24.04.2001, and the landowners are
residents of any village related to any
District lying within the notified area
of Yamuna Expressway Authority,
then, the benefit of 7% abadi land be
granted to him against his acquired
land. In the decision of Authority
41
Board, this facility has also been
allowed to the successors of eligible
land owners, who fulfill the aforesaid
conditions. The further proceedings
be conducted as per the decision of
Authority Board.
5. In view of the demands of farmers
organizations and local public of
District Mathura, after taking into
consideration the proposal submitted
by Concessionaire namely M/s. J.P.
Infratech Ltd., in the 48th meeting
dated 08.01.2014 of Yamuna
Expressway Authority Board, a
decision in principle has been taken
for construction of Exist & Entry
Ramps at BajnaNauhjheel Road at
Yamuna Expressway and by making
necessary amendments in DPR
accordingly, a letter has been sent to
the Concessionaire namely M/s. J,P.
Infratech for necessary action. The
further proceedings be conducted as
per the decision of Authority Board.
It is recommended by the Committee that
the aforementioned additional benefits be
granted to the landowners only in that
case when they will handover the physical
possession of land to the Authority and
withdraw Writ Petition/Case pending in
Hon'ble High Court or any other Court and
agreement for not causing any obstruction
in future in the development works of
allottees and for not filing any claim in any
Court against the acquisition of land in
future. Regarding the other demands, the
42
Committee will give it's recommendation
after further consideration.”
50.It could thus be seen that the recommendations of the
Chaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolve the
issue between the farmers and the allottees, and to find out a
workable solution to the problem. The Chaudhary Committee
recommended similar treatment to be given to the farmers
whose lands were acquired for YEIDA, as was given to the
farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA
and Greater NOIDA. The Chaudhary Committee found that the
same benefits as were given to the farmers whose lands were
acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA in view of
the judgment of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), as
affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra)
should also be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired
for the benefit of YEIDA. However, this was made conditional.
Additional benefit was granted to the landowners on the
condition that they would handover the physical possession of
43
land to YEIDA and withdraw the writ petitions/cases filed by
them pending before the High Court.
51.The State Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to the
recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. YEIDA too, in
its Board meeting dated 15
th
September, 2014, resolved to
implement the decision of the State Government. Accordingly,
demand notices came to be issued to the allottees.
52.It could thus be seen that the policy decision of the State
Government is preceded by various factors. Firstly, the
farmers’ agitation, after they were denied the benefits which
were granted to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the
benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA; the report of the
Commissioner, the appointment of the Chaudhary Committee,
the deliberations of the Chaudhary Committee with various
stakeholders, and thereafter the recommendations of the
Chaudhary Committee.
53.It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in
the case of the Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of
44
India and another
7
, wherein this Court has referred to various
earlier pronouncements and the treatise of Prof. S.A. de Smith
on “Judicial Review of Administrative Action”. The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment read thus:
“12. It has been settled by this Court that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
applicable against the Government also
particularly where it is necessary to
prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The
doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into
aid to compel the Government or the
public authority “to carry out a
representation or promise which is
contrary to law or which was outside the
authority or power of the officer of the
Government or of the public authority to
make”. There is preponderance of judicial
opinion that to invoke the doctrine of
promissory estoppel clear, sound and
positive foundation must be laid in the
petition itself by the party invoking the
doctrine and that bald expressions,
without any supporting material, to the
effect that the doctrine is attracted
because the party invoking the doctrine
has altered its position relying on the
assurance of the Government would not be
sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In
our opinion, the doctrine of promissory
7 (1995) 1 SCC 274
45
estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract
and the courts are bound to consider all
aspects including the results sought to be
achieved and the public good at large,
because while considering the applicability
of the doctrine, the courts have to do
equity and the fundamental principles of
equity must for ever be present to the
mind of the court, while considering the
applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine
must yield when the equity so demands if
it can be shown having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case that it
would be inequitable to hold the
Government or the public authority to its
promise, assurance or representation.
13. The ambit, scope and amplitude of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel has been
evolved in this country over the last
quarter of a century through successive
decisions of this Court starting with Union
of India v. IndoAfghan Agencies
Ltd. [(1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718]
Reference in this connection may be made
with advantage to Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.
Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal
Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582 : (1970) 3 SCR
854] ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(1979) 2 SCC 409 :
1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR
641] ; Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of
Haryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11 : (1980) 3 SCR
689] ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips
46
India Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC 369 : 1986 SCC
(Tax) 11] ; Indian Express Newspapers
(Bom) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1
SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] ; Pournami
Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1986 Supp SCC
728 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 134] ; Shri Bakul Oil
Industries v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC
31 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 74 : (1987) 1 SCR
185] ; Asstt. CCT v. Dharmendra Trading
Co. [(1988) 3 SCC 570 : 1988 SCC (Tax)
432] ; Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of
Punjab [(1992) 2 SCC 411] and Union of
India v. Hindustan Development
Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499 : JT (1993) 3 SC
15] In Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [(1985) 4
SCC 369 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 11] this Court
opined: (SCC p. 388, para 13)
“We may also point out that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel being an
equitable doctrine, it must yield when
the equity so requires; if it can be
shown by the Government or public
authority that having regard to the facts
as they have transpired, it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or
public authority to the promise or
representation made by it, the Court
would not raise an equity in favour of
the person to whom the promise or
representation is made and enforce the
promise or representation against the
Government or public authority. The
doctrine of promissory estoppel would
be displaced in such a case, because on
47
the facts, equity would not require that
the Government or public authority
should be held bound by the promise or
representation made by it.”
14. In Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram
Kumar [(1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax)
360 : AIR 1976 SC 2237] four learned
Judges of this Court observed: (SCC p.
545, para 19)
“The fact that sales of country liquor
had been exempted from sales tax vide
Notification No. ST1149/X802 (33)51
dated 641959 could not operate as an
estoppel against the State Government
and preclude it from subjecting the
sales to tax if it felt impelled to do so in
the interest of the revenues of the State
which are required for execution of the
plans designed to meet the ever
increasing pressing needs of the
developing society. It is now well settled
by a catena of decisions that there can
be no question of estoppel against the
Government in the exercise of its
legislative, sovereign or executive
powers.”
15. Prof. S.A. de Smith in his celebrated
treatise Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, 3rd Edn., at p. 279 sums up the
position thus:
48
“Contracts and covenants entered
into by the Crown are not to be
construed as being subject to implied
terms that would exclude the exercise
of general discretionary powers for
the public good. On the contrary they
are to be construed as incorporating
an implied term that such powers
remain exercisable. This is broadly
true of other public authorities also.
But the status and functions of the
Crown in this regard are of a higher
order. The Crown cannot be allowed
to tie its hands completely by prior
undertakings is as clear as the
proposition that the Courts cannot
allow the Crown to evade compliance
with ostensibly binding obligations
whenever it thinks fit. If a public
authority lawfully repudiates or
departs from the terms of a binding
contract in order to have been bound
in law by an ostensibly binding
contract because the undertakings
would improperly fetter its general
discretionary powers the other party
to the agreement has no right
whatsoever to damages or
compensation under the general law,
no matter how serious the damages
that party may have suffered.”
49
54.It has been held by this Court that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the
courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results
sought to be achieved and the public good at large. It has been
held that while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the
courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of
equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while
considering the applicability of the doctrine. It has been held
that the doctrine being an equitable doctrine, it must yield
when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the
Government or Public Authority that having regard to the facts
and circumstances as they have transpired, it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority to
the promise, assurance or representation made by it. The
judgment of this Court in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra)
has been consistently followed.
55.If we apply the principle as laid down in the case of
Kasinka Trading (supra) to the facts of the present case, it
50
will be clear that the policy decision of the State Government
was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest
of the respondents. The projects were stalled on account of the
farmers’ agitation. The farmers felt discriminated as they found
that the compensation paid to them was much lesser than the
one being paid to the equally circumstanced farmers in NOIDA
and Greater NOIDA. It was the allottees of the land who had
approached the State Government for redressal of the problem.
In these circumstances, the Government took cognizance of the
problem and appointed the Commissioner to look into the
issue. Since the Commissioner recommended appointment of a
HighLevel Committee, the Chaudhary Committee was
appointed. The Chaudhary Committee had threadbare
discussions with all the stakeholders. It also took into
consideration that on account of stay orders passed by the High
Court in various writ petitions, the development of the project
was stalled. On account of pendency of the writ petitions, there
was always a hanging sword over the entire acquisition of it
51
being declared unlawful. In this premise, in order to find out a
workable solution and that too, on the basis of the law laid
down by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) as
affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) and
followed by this Court in the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead)
(supra), recommendations were made by the Chaudhary
Committee. The Chaudhary Committee specifically
recommended that the additional compensation and other
incentives would be paid only if the landowners agree to
handover physical possession of the land to YEIDA and
withdraw all the litigations.
56.It could thus be seen that the recommendations, which
were accepted by the State Government and formulated in the
policy, were made taking into consideration the interests of all
the stakeholders. As held by this Court, it is not only the
interest of a small section of the allottees which should weigh
with the Government, but the Government should also give due
52
weightage to the interest of the large section of farmers, whose
lands were acquired.
57.We further find that the High Court fell in error in
observing that no writ petitions were filed challenging the
acquisition for YEIDA. The report of the Chaudhary Committee
itself would clarify that YEIDA had itself submitted that insofar
as the residential plots are concerned, there were stay orders
operating in majority of the writ petitions due to which the
development of the project work was stalled.
58.We are therefore of the considered view that the policy
decision of the State Government was in the larger public
interest. It was taken considering entire material collected by
the Chaudhary Committee after due deliberations with all the
stakeholders. The factors which were taken into consideration
by the State Government were relevant, rational and founded
on ground realities. In this view of the matter, the finding of
the High Court that the policy decision of the State Government
was arbitrary, irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect.
53
59.The law with regard to interference in the policy decision
of the State is by now very well crystalized. This Court in the
case of Essar Steel Limited vs Union of India and others
8
had an occasion to consider the scope of interference in the
policy decision of the State. After referring to various decisions
of this Court, the Court observed thus:
“43. Before we can examine the validity of
the impugned policy decision dated 63
2007, it is crucial to understand the extent
of the power vested with this Court to
review policy decisions.
44. In DDA [DDA v. Allottee of SFS Flats,
(2008) 2 SCC 672 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 684]
on issue of judicial review of policy
decisions, the power of the Court is
examined and observed as under: (SCC pp.
69798, paras 6465)
“64. An executive order termed as a
policy decision is not beyond the pale of
judicial review. Whereas the superior
courts may not interfere with the nitty
gritty of the policy, or substitute one by
the other but it will not be correct to
contend that the court shall lay its
judicial hands off, when a plea is raised
that the impugned decision is a policy
8 (2016) 11 SCC 1
54
decision. Interference therewith on the
part of the superior court would not be
without jurisdiction as it is subject to
judicial review.
65. Broadly, a policy decision is
subject to judicial review on the
following grounds:
(a) if it is unconstitutional;
(b) if it is dehors the provisions of
the Act and the Regulations;
(c) if the delegatee has acted
beyond its power of delegation;
(d) if the executive policy is
contrary to the statutory or a larger
policy.”
45. Thus, we will test the impugned policy
on the above grounds to determine
whether it warrants our interference under
Article 136 or not. Further, this Court
neither has the jurisdiction nor the
competence to judge the viability of such
policy decisions of the Government in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of
India [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of
India, (2013) 7 SCC 1] , this Court has
further held as under: (SCC p. 17, para 41)
“41. … This Court sitting in the
jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over
the commercial or business decision
taken by parties to the agreement, after
evaluating and assessing its monetary
55
and financial implications, unless the
decision is in clear violation of any
statutory provisions or perverse or
taken for extraneous considerations or
improper motives. States and its
instrumentalities can enter into various
contracts which may involve complex
economic factors. State or the State
undertaking being a party to a contract,
have to make various decisions which
they deem just and proper. There is
always an element of risk in such
decisions, ultimately it may turn out to
be a correct decision or a wrong
one. But if the decision is taken bona
fide and in public interest, the mere fact
that decision has ultimately proved to be
wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold
that the decision was mala fide or taken
with ulterior motives.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu
Maiyam v. Union of India [Villianur
Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of
India, (2009) 7 SCC 561] , it was held as
under: (SCC p. 605, para 169)
“169. It is neither within the domain
of the courts nor the scope of judicial
review to embark upon an enquiry as to
whether a particular public policy is
wise or whether better public policy can
be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined
to strike down a policy at the behest of a
56
petitioner merely because it has been
urged that a different policy would have
been fairer or wiser or more scientific or
more logical. Wisdom and advisability of
economic policy are ordinarily not
amenable to judicial review. In matters
relating to economic issues the
Government has, while taking a
decision, right to “trial and error” as long
as both trial and error are bona fide and
within the limits of the authority. For
testing the correctness of a policy, the
appropriate forum is Parliament and not
the courts.”
(emphasis supplied)
47. A threeJudge Bench of this Court
in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of
India [Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union
of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664] cautioned
against courts sitting in appeal against
policy decisions. It was held as under:
(SCC p. 763, para 234)
“234. In respect of public projects
and policies which are initiated by the
Government the courts should not
become an approval authority. Normally
such decisions are taken by the
Government after due care and
consideration. In a democracy welfare of
the people at large, and not merely of a
small section of the society, has to be the
concern of a responsible Government. If
a considered policy decision has been
57
taken, which is not in conflict with any
law or is not mala fide, it will not be in
public interest to require the court to go
into and investigate those areas which
are the function of the executive. For any
project which is approved after due
deliberation the court should refrain
from being asked to review the decision
just because a petitioner in filing a PIL
alleges that such a decision should not
have been taken because an opposite
view against the undertaking of the
project, which view may have been
considered by the Government, is
possible. When two or more options or
views are possible and after considering
them the Government takes a policy
decision it is then not the function of
the court to go into the matter afresh
and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a
policy decision.”
(emphasis supplied)
48. A similar sentiment was echoed by a
Constitution Bench of this Court
in Peerless General Finance & Investment
Co. Ltd. v. RBI [Peerless General Finance &
Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC
343] , wherein it was observed as under:
(SCC p. 375, para 31)
“31. … Courts are not to interfere
with economic policy which is the
function of experts. It is not the function
of the courts to sit in judgment over
58
matters of economic policy and it must
necessarily be left to the expert bodies.
In such matters even experts can
seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts
cannot be expected to decide them
without even the aid of experts.”
49. A perusal of the abovementioned
judgments of this Court would show that
this Court should exercise great caution
and restraint when confronted with
matters related to the policy regarding
commercial matters of the country.
Executive policies are usually enacted after
much deliberation by the Government.
Therefore, it would not be appropriate for
this Court to question the wisdom of the
same, unless it is demonstrated by the
aggrieved persons that the said policy has
been enacted in an arbitrary,
unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that
it offends the provisions of the
Constitution of India.”
60.It is trite law that an interference with the policy decision
would not be warranted unless it is found that the policy
decision is palpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative
of the statutory provisions. We are therefore of the considered
view that the High Court was also not right in interfering with
59
the policy decision of the State Government, which is in the
larger public interest.
61.It will also be apposite to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of APM Terminals B.V.
vs. Union of India and another
9
:
“67. It has been the consistent view of this
Court that a change in policy by the
Government can have an overriding effect
over private treaties between the
Government and a private party, if the
same was in the general public interest
and provided such change in policy was
guided by reason. Several decisions have
been cited by the parties in this regard in
the context of preventing private
monopolisation of port activities to an
extent where such private player would
assume a dominant position which would
enable them to control not only the
berthing of ships but the tariff for use of
the port facilities.”
62.It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that a
change in policy by the Government can have an overriding
effect over private treaties between the Government and a
9 (2011) 6 SCC 756
60
private party, if the same was in the general public interest.
The additional requirement is that such change in policy is
required to be guided by reason.
63.Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on the
judgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited (supra) is
concerned, in our considered view, the said judgment would not
be of any assistance to the case of the respondents. This Court
in the said case in paragraph 107.1 has clearly observed that in
the case of conflict between public interest and personal
interest, public interest should prevail.
64.A number of judgments of this Court have been cited at
the Bar by the respondents in support of the proposition that in
view of concluded contracts, it was not permissible for the
appellants to unilaterally increase the premium by framing a
policy.
65.We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a
policy is changed by the State, which is in the general public
interest, such policy would prevail over the individual
61
rights/interests. In that view of the matter, we do not find it
necessary to refer to the said judgments. The policy of the
State Government as reflected in the said G.O. was not only in
the larger public interest but also in the interest of the
respondents.
66.We further find that the respondents have indulged into
the conduct of approbate and reprobate. They have changed
their stance as per their convenience. When their projects were
stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation, it is they who
approached the State Authorities for finding out a solution.
When the State Government responded to their representations
and came up with a policy which was equitable and in the
interest of both, the farmers and the allottees and when the
said policy paved the way for development, when called upon to
pay the additional compensation, the respondentsallottees
somersaulted and challenged the very same policy before the
High Court, which benefitted them. We have already
hereinabove made reference to the various communications
62
made by the allottees of the land for intervention of the State
Government.
67.Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, it will
be worthwhile to mention that the residential plot owners in
Sectors 18 and 20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed an
association, viz., Yamuna Expressway ResidentialPlotOwners
Welfare Association (hereinafter referred to as “the YERWA”).
The communication addressed by the president of the YERWA
to the CEO of YEIDA would reveal that 98.5% of the
allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additional
premium demanded by the Authority. The only request made
by the YERWA is with regard to making a provision for paying
additional premium in installments.
68.It can thus be seen that even insofar as the individual
residential plot owners are concerned, more than 98% of the
plot owners do not have any objection to the payment of the
additional compensation.
63
69.With respect to the contention of the respondent No.19
Supertech with regard to initiation of CIRP, we are not
concerned with the said issue in the present proceedings. The
law will take its own course.
70.In conclusion, we are of the considered view that the
policy decision of the State Government as reflected in the said
G.O. dated 29
th
August, 2014 and the Resolution of the Board
of YEIDA dated 15
th
September, 2014 were in the larger public
interest, taking care of the concerns of the allottees as well as
the farmers. As already discussed hereinabove, had the said
decision not been taken, there was a hanging sword of the
acquisition being declared unlawful. The development of the
entire project was stalled on account of farmers’ agitation.
Before taking the policy decision, the State Government,
through the Chaudhary Committee, had done a wide range of
deliberations with all the stakeholders including the allottees,
farmers and YEIDA. The policy decision was taken after taking
into consideration all relevant factors and was guided by
64
reasons. In any case, it is a settled position of law that in case
of a conflict between public interest and personal interest,
public interest will outweigh the personal interest. The High
Court was therefore not justified in holding that the policy
decision of the State was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary.
We are of the considered view that the High Court has erred in
allowing the writ petitions. The present appeals, therefore,
deserve to be allowed.
71.In the result, we pass the following order:
(i)The appeals are allowed;
(ii)The impugned judgment and order dated 28
th
May,
2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ
Petition No. 28968 of 2018 and companion matters is
quashed and set aside;
(iii)The writ petitions filed by the respondents covered by
the impugned judgment and order dated 28
th
May, 2020
passed by the Allahabad High Court are dismissed;
65
72.Applications for Intervention are allowed. Pending
applications, including the applications for directions, shall
stand disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order
as to costs.
…..….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 19, 2022.
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