2026 INSC 917 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 6992 of 2026)

YASH MAHESH GAIKWAD ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11038 of 2026)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11039 of 2026)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11037 of 2026)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present appeals, by special leave, arise out

of separate orders passed by the High Court of

2

Judicature at Bombay, Circuit Bench at Kolhapur,

1

and the learned Additional Sessions Court, Satara

2 in

connection with FIR No.261 of 2024 dated 12

th June,

2024, registered at Satara Taluka Police Station, for

offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 323,

109, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860

3, whereby regular bail was granted

to accused No. 3-Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde

4,

accused No. 4-Jyotiraditya Ajitsinh Jadhav

5, and

accused No. 5-Ranjit @ Dadaso Balkrushna Mane

6,

while regular bail application filed by accused No. 2-

Yash Mahesh Gaikwad

7 came to be rejected. The

impugned orders are summarized as follows: -

a. The final order dated 12

th

November, 2025, passed

by the High Court in Criminal Bail Application

No.3422 of 2025, whereby accused No.4-Jyotiraditya

was granted regular bail.

b. The final order dated 8

th

January, 2026, passed by

the High Court in Criminal Bail Application No.3511

of 2025, whereby accused No.5-Ranjit @ Dadaso was

granted regular bail.

c. The order dated 13

th

January, 2026, passed by the

trial Court in Sessions Case No.59 of 2024 whereby

accused No.3-Pruthviraj was granted regular bail.

1

Hereinafter, referred to as “the High Court”.

2

Hereinafter, referred to as “the trial Court”.

3

Hereinafter, referred to as “IPC”.

4

Hereinafter, referred to as “to accused No.3-Pruthviraj”.

5

Hereinafter, referred to as “to accused No.4-Jyotiraditya”.

6

Hereinafter, referred to as “to accused No.5-Ranjit @ Dadaso”.

7

Hereinafter, referred to as “to accused No.2-Yash”.

3

d. The final order dated 27

th

March, 2026, passed by

the High Court in Criminal Bail Application No. 208

of 2026, whereby the application for grant of regular

bail made by accused No.2-Yash was rejected.

4. Being aggrieved, accused No. 2-Yash has

approached this Court seeking release on regular

bail, whereas other appeals have been preferred by

the State of Maharashtra

8, assailing the grant of

regular bail to the respective accused persons and

seeking setting aside of the orders whereby such bail

came to be granted.

BRIEF FACTS

5. The brief facts relevant and essential for

disposal of the appeals are noted hereinbelow.

6. All the accused persons came to be arrested in

connection with FIR No. 261 of 2024, registered at

Satara Taluka Police Station, District Satara, at the

instance of Anil Madhukar Shinde

9 for offences

punishable under Sections 302, 307, 323, 109, 504

and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, alleging inter

alia, as follows: -

“I, Anil Madhukar Shinde, aged 56 years, by

occupation agriculture, residing near the Jyotiba

Temple, Patkal, Taluka and District Satara

(Mobile No. 9356544967), hereby give this

8

Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-State of Maharashtra”.

9

Hereinafter, referred to as “deceased-complainant” or “deceased”.

4

statement while fully conscious and undergoing

treatment/admitted at the Civil Hospital, Satara.

I state that I reside at the aforementioned address

along with my wife, Ujjwala. My two sons are

engaged in business in Pune. I earn my livelihood

and support my family through farming.

On June 11, 2024, while I was in Satara, I

received a phone call from my wife around 9:00 PM.

I informed her that I was on my way home.

Subsequently, at around 10:22 PM, I received

another call from her informing me to return home

immediately. She explained that Shivjit Ranjit

Mane (alias ‘Dadaso’), an acquaintance from our

village, along with three unidentified men-four

individuals in total-had arrived in a four-wheeled

vehicle. They were demanding that my son,

Prajwal, should apologize for a dispute that had

occurred during his wedding; they threatened that

if he did not apologize, they would not spare us,

and were violently kicking the door. Upon learning

this over the phone, I immediately left Satara and

arrived at my residence around 10:40 PM. As I was

parking my vehicle at my home, Shivjit Mane and

his three unidentified accomplices approached me

from behind, rushed aggressively towards me, and-

while the outdoor lights at our house were switched

on-proceeded to assault me with kicks and

punches.

At that moment, Shivjit Mane said to me, ‘Since

your son has not apologized to us, we will not spare

either him or you alive; I am going to finish you off

today.’ The other three individuals present also

joined in, declaring, ‘Let’s just kill him right now.’

Shivjit Mane then retrieved a can of petrol from his

four-wheeled vehicle. His three accomplices held

me down while Shivjit Mane poured the petrol from

the can over my body, shoved me to the ground,

and after lighting a matchstick and throwing it onto

my body-causing me to catch fire-I screamed

loudly, pleading for help. My wife, Ujjwala, and our

neighbor, Pratik Ketan Shinde, rushed to my aid;

5

however, Shivjit Mane and his three accomplices

shoved them aside and fled the scene in a vehicle.

My wife, Ujjwala, immediately switched on the

borewell pump, sprayed water on my body using a

pipe, and extinguished the fire. Subsequently,

several villagers-including Rajaram Shinde, Anna

Shinde, Amol Shinde, Sandeep Shinde, and

Rajaram Maruti Shinde-arrived to offer assistance.

I was then transported in Rajaram Shinde’s Omni

van and admitted to the Civil Hospital, Satara, for

medical treatment. The motive behind this attack

was my son Prajwal’s refusal to offer an apology; on

this pretext, Shivjit Mane and his three

accomplices physically assaulted [me] with their

hands, verbally abused [me], poured petrol over my

body, and attempted to kill me. I would be able to

identify Shivjit Mane and his three accomplices-

who attempted to kill me by dousing me in petrol-

if I will see them again. Therefore, I hereby lodge a

formal complaint against Shivjit Mane and his

three accomplices. This statement has been

recorded exactly as narrated by me; I have read it

thoroughly, and I confirm that it accurately reflects

my account.”

7. During the course of investigation, accused

No.2-Yash, accused No.3-Pruthviraj, and accused

No.4-Jyotiraditya, who were initially referred to as

“unidentified accomplices” in the First Information

Report, came to be identified as the assailants

allegedly involved in the commission of the offence

along with accused No.1-Shivjit Ranjit Mane

10. Their

identity was established through a Test Identification

10

Hereinafter, referred to as “to accused No.1-Shivjit”.

6

Parade conducted by the Executive Magistrate,

Satara, wherein they were identified by the

eyewitnesses. The said identification was further

corroborated by the forensic analysis of the CCTV

footage recorded at the scene of occurrence and the

mobile-phone video recordings seized by the

investigating agency during the course of

investigation.

8. Notwithstanding the aforesaid material forming

part of the investigation, the learned trial Court vide

order dated 13

th January, 2026, in Sessions Case No.

59 of 2024, granted regular bail to accused No.3-

Pruthviraj on the premise that the co-accused had

already been enlarged on regular bail. The said two

co-accused, with whom parity was established, were

none other than accused No.4-Jyotiraditya and

accused No.5-Ranjit @ Dadaso, who were granted

regular bail by the High Court.

9. The High Court, vide order dated 12

th

November, 2025, passed in Criminal Bail Application

No. 3422 of 2025, granted regular bail to accused

No.4-Jyotiraditya, assigning the following reasons: -

“5. I have heard both learned counsels, perused

the FIR and documents produced on record. The

allegations against the applicant are that he

7

recorded the incident of pouring petrol by

accused No.1 on deceased and setting him on

fire. It appears from the said recording that there

was altercation between the deceased and

accused No.1 and after that altercation, the

accused No.1 poured petrol on deceased and set

him on fire. It appears from record that the

applicant had not participated in the said act

and he recorded the incident. To prove the

conspiracy, evidence is required. The applicant

is behind bar for more than one year. It may take

time to conclude the trial. The applicant is 19

years old student. He has no antecedents.”

10. The High Court, vide order dated 8

th January,

2026, passed in Criminal Bail Application No.3511 of

2025, granted regular bail to accused No.5-Ranjit @

Dadaso, observing that, although allegations of

instigation had been levelled against him, he had not

physically participated in the act of setting the

deceased-complainant ablaze. The High Court

further took into consideration his limited criminal

antecedents, completion of investigation and filing of

the chargesheet, the fact that charges had not yet

been framed, and the likelihood of the trial taking

considerable time to conclude, and accordingly held

that his continued incarceration as an undertrial

would serve no useful purpose.

8

11. In contrast, the High Court vide order dated 27

th

March, 2026, passed in Criminal Bail Application

No.208 of 2026, declined to grant regular bail to

accused No.2-Yash, having regard to the prima facie

nature of the offence as heinous and premeditated.

The High Court, upon consideration of the material

on record, found that the conscious act attributed to

the said accused of transporting the co-accused to

the residence of the deceased-complainant, while

they were carrying petrol and other inflammable

articles and taking them back after commission of the

crime, prima facie indicated a common intention

within the meaning of Section 34 of the IPC. His role

as the driver of the vehicle and lookout during the

occurrence was considered to be an integral

component of the concerted attack, rejecting the

contention that he had remained passively present in

the vehicle.

12. Being aggrieved, accused No.2 -Yash and

appellant-State of Maharashtra have approached this

Court by way of the instant appeals by special leave.

9

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT -STATE

OF MAHARASHTRA AND DECEASED -

COMPLAINANT

13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-

State of Maharashtra and learned counsel appearing

for the complainant party urged that the High Court

and the learned trial Court had committed grave

error in releasing accused No. 3-Pruthviraj, accused

No. 4-Jyotiraditya, and accused No. 5-Ranjit @

Dadaso on bail.

14. The learned counsel contended that the

allegations levelled against the said accused are grave

and serious in nature and that their presence at the

place of occurrence and active participation in the

ghastly crime has been proved by cogent evidence in

form of statements of witnesses who identified these

accused persons in the test identification

proceedings.

15. It was further submitted that accused No.4-

Jyotiraditya himself recorded the gruesome incident

in which the deceased-complainant was allegedly set

to fire by accused No.1-Shivjit, thereby furnishing

concrete evidence establishing his active

participation in the occurrence.

10

16. It was urged that, prior to the incident in which

the deceased-complainant was set ablaze, all four

accused persons had repeatedly launched an

offensive against the house of the deceased -

complainant asking for his son, Prajwal, to come out,

allegedly with the intention of teaching him a lesson

in connection with an incident that had occurred

during marriage ceremony of Prajwal. According to

the learned counsel, the said conduct, viewed in its

entirety, prima facie demonstrates that the accused

persons had acted in concert with the intent to wreak

vengeance upon the complainant party.

17. It was submitted that feeling threatened by the

persistent and hostile affronts launched by the

assailants at the residence of the deceased-

complainant, Ujjwala Shinde, wife of the deceased-

complainant, contacted her husband, Anil Madhukar

Shinde (deceased-complainant), who immediately

returned and arrived at the spot at approximately

10:40 P.M., only to be aggressively confronted,

assaulted, and was given death threats by the group

of assailants. While the deceased-complainant was

trying to reason with the assailants, a bottle

containing inflammable fluid was brought to the spot;

11

the deceased -complainant was forcefully

overpowered and restrained by the accused persons.

Thereafter, the principal assailant, accused No.1-

Shivjit, poured the fluid on the deceased -

complainant and then set him on fire, while accused

No.4-Jyotiraditya continued to record the gruesome

incident. The assailants went back in the same

vehicle after committing the crime.

18. Thus, it was urged that the conduct of the

accused persons, considered cumulatively,

demonstrates that their intention was all along to kill

the deceased-complainant and that they ultimately

succeeded in executing their nefarious design.

19. Learned counsel urged that having regard to the

gruesome nature of the offence, the High Court and

the learned trial Court were required to undertake a

careful and meaningful consideration of the facts and

circumstances of the case, as also the crucial

evidence collected by the Investigating Officer and

only thereafter, should the prayer for bail have been

considered. However, the reasoning assigned by the

High Court and the learned trial Court, as recorded

in the impugned orders for granting bail to the

accused persons, is flimsy and laconic, and does not

12

reflect due consideration of the material

circumstances bearing upon the gravity of the

allegations and the role attributed to the accused

persons.

20. It was, therefore, contended that the impugned

orders granting bail to accused No.3-Pruthviraj,

accused No.4-Jyotiraditya, and accused No.5-Ranjit

@ Dadaso, being patently perverse, warrant

interference by this Court and are liable to be set

aside, and the bail granted to the accused persons

deserves to be cancelled. At the same time, learned

counsel supported the impugned order dated 27

th

March, 2026, whereby the application for regular bail

made by accused No.2-Yash was rejected by the High

Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED

PERSONS

21. Per contra, learned counsel representing the

accused persons including accused No. 2-Yash,

vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions

advanced by learned counsel for the appellant-State

of Maharashtra and learned counsel for the

deceased-complainant.

13

22. Learned counsel submitted that the FIR merely

contains a general reference to “three unidentified

accomplices”, without disclosing their identities or

attributing any specific overt act, individual role, or

act of violence to accused No.2-Yash, accused No.3-

Pruthviraj, or accused No.4-Jyotiraditya. It was

contended that the FIR, therefore, does not prima

facie indicate any active or specific participation on

the part of these accused in the commission of the

alleged offence. It was submitted that t heir

subsequent identification and implication during the

course of investigation cannot, by itself, substitute

the absence of any specific attribution in the FIR and

must be assessed with due regard to the material

collected during investigation.

23. They urged that the accused persons are young

college going boys, aged about 20-21 years, and had

no knowledge whatsoever that the principal accused,

accused No.1-Shivjit, would bring petrol and set the

deceased-complainant to fire. It was contended that

there was no common intention for these accused

persons in the assault made on the deceased-

complainant and hence, the High Court and the

learned trial Court were justified in granting bail to

14

these accused persons keeping in view the non-

attribution of specific role to each of these accused

persons.

24. Learned counsel appearing for accused No.5-

Ranjit @ Dadaso submitted that the impugned order

granting regular bail to the said accused neither

suffers from any legal infirmity nor any perversity

warranting interference by this Court. It was

submitted that it is an admitted position that

accused No.5-Ranjit @ Dadaso was not physically

present at the place of occurrence when the fatal

incident took place. Learned counsel further

contended that the allegation of abetment under

Section 109 of the IPC levelled against the said

accused is wholly unsubstantiated by the material on

record and, therefore, does not furnish any basis for

interfering with the order granting him regular bail.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

25. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the facts prevailing on record and have perused the

impugned orders passed by the High Court and the

learned trial Court.

26. Suffice it to say that the case of accused No.5-

Ranjit @ Dadaso, father of the main accused No.1-

15

Shivjit, stands on a materially different footing from

that of the other accused persons. It is an admitted

position that the said accused was not present at the

place of occurrence when the deceased was set

ablaze. He has been implicated in the present case

with the allegation that the conspiracy was hatched

at his instance and that the petrol used in setting the

deceased-complainant ablaze was taken out from his

motorcycle and handed over to his son i.e., accused

No.1-Shivjit. However, the evidence to this effect is

circumstantial in nature.

27. Keeping in view the fact that admittedly,

accused No.5-Ranjit @ Dadaso was not present at the

spot when the ghastly incident of setting the

deceased ablaze took place, and the nature of the

evidence relied upon against him, we are not inclined

to interfere in the order granting bail to the accused

No. 5-Ranjit @ Dadaso. The order granting bail to him

is thus affirmed.

28. The position, however, stands on a materially

different footing insofar as accused No.1-Shivjit,

accused No.2-Yash, accused No.3-Pruthviraj, and

accused No.4-Jyotiraditya, are concerned.

16

29. The foundation on which accused No.4 -

Jyotiraditya was granted regular bail, and which, in

turn, formed the basis for extending the benefit of

parity to accused No.3-Pruthviraj, has been

reproduced above.

11 Suffice it to say that, while

granting bail, the High Court and the learned trial

Court completely overlooked the important facts

recorded in the FIR.

30. The deceased-complainant had specifically

stated in the FIR that accused No.1-Shivjit and three

unknown assailants, who were subsequently

identified as accused No.2-Yash, accused No.3-

Pruthviraj, and accused No.4-Jyotiraditya, launched

repeated attacks on his house on the fateful night.

The assailants were trying to call out his son, Prajwal,

with the avowed intention of taking vengeance in

relation to an earlier incident which happened during

Prajwal’s wedding. The deceased’s wife Ujjwala

Shinde, panicked because of the offensive launched

by the accused persons in the dead of the night

between 9 P.M. and 10 P.M. and hence, fearing for

her own safety and the safety of her son, she called

11

Supra para No. 9.

17

the deceased-complainant, who immediately

proceeded to his house. The four assailants who

arrived together at the place of occurrence in a four-

wheeler were carrying a can containing petrol. The

accused No.1-Shivjit initially threatened the

deceased-complainant and thereafter, he brought the

can of petrol from the vehicle, poured the same over

the deceased-complainant and threw a burning

matchstick on his person thereby setting him ablaze.

These facts are narrated in detail in the statement of

the deceased-complainant recorded by the police

officer based whereupon the FIR came to be

registered.

31. The facts as stated above clearly indicate, prima

facie, that the accused persons were acting in concert

and in furtherance of a common intention. They were

indulged in a sustained offensive on the house of the

deceased-complainant, demanding that his son,

Prajwal, should come out and apologize for a dispute

which had occurred during Prajwal’s wedding and if

the apology was not tendered, the complainant party

would not be spared. Thus, the intention of all four

assailants was to cause harm to the family members

of the deceased-complainant. It is not a situation

18

where the dispute erupted suddenly and without any

pre-meditation. It was a pre-planned attack launched

by these assailants and in the culmination thereof,

the deceased-complainant was set afire after

inflammable fluid was poured on his body.

32. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.

Sudarshan Singh & Ors.

12, Mahipal v. Rajesh

Kumar & Anr.

13, Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v.

Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr.

14, has

categorically laid down that in serious offences like

murder, the order granting bail must reflect proper

application of mind to the facts of the case and

justifiable reasons have to be recorded before bail is

granted to such an accused. The Court in Mahipal

(supra) observed as follows:-

“26. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh

Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh

Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528] , a two-Judge Bench

of this Court was required to assess the

correctness of a decision [Rajesh Ranjan v. State

of Bihar, Criminal Misc. No. 28179 of 2002, order

dated 23-5-2003 (Pat)] of a High Court enlarging

the accused on bail. Santosh Hegde, J. speaking

for the Court, discussed the law on the grant of

bail in non-bailable offences and held : (SCC p.

535, para 11)

12

(2002) 3 SCC 598.

13

(2020) 2 SCC 118.

14

(2021) 6 SCC 230.

19

“11. The law in regard to grant or

refusal of bail is very well settled.

The court granting bail should

exercise its discretion in a judicious

manner and not as a matter of

course. Though at the stage of

granting bail a detailed examination

of evidence and elaborate

documentation of the merit of the

case need not be undertaken, there

is a need to indicate in such orders

reasons for prima facie concluding

why bail was being granted

particularly where the accused is

charged of having committed a

serious offence. Any order devoid of

such reasons would suffer from non-

application of mind.”

27. Where an order refusing or granting bail

does not furnish the reasons that inform the

decision, there is a presumption of the non-

application of mind which may require the

intervention of this Court. Where an earlier

application for bail has been rejected, there is a

higher burden on the appellate court to furnish

specific reasons as to why bail should be

granted.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

33. This Court, in Shabeen Ahmad v. State of

Uttar Pradesh

15, reiterated the settled principles

governing the exercise of jurisdiction in matters

concerning grant of bail and power of the appellate

court to interfere with and set aside an order granting

15

(2025) 4 SCC 172.

20

bail which is bereft of cogent reasons, and observed

as follows:-

“18. A superficial application of bail parameters

not only undermines the gravity of the offence

itself but also risks weakening public faith in

the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of

dowry deaths. It is this very perception of

justice, both within and outside the courtroom,

that courts must safeguard, lest we risk

normalising a crime that continues to claim

numerous innocent lives . These observations

regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were

thoroughly dealt with by this Court

in Ajwar v. Waseem [Ajwar v. Waseem, (2024) 10

SCC 768] in the following paras : (SCC pp. 783-84,

paras 26-28)

“26. While considering as to whether bail

ought to be granted in a matter involving

a serious criminal offence, the Court

must consider relevant factors like the

nature of the accusations made against

the accused, the manner in which the

crime is alleged to have been committed,

the gravity of the offence, the role

attributed to the accused, the criminal

antecedents of the accused, the

probability of tampering of the witnesses

and repeating the offence, if the accused

are released on bail, the likelihood of the

accused being unavailable in the event

bail is granted, the possibility of

obstructing the proceedings and evading

the courts of justice and the overall

desirability of releasing the accused on

bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of

U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7

SCC 525] ; Kalyan Chandra

Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra

Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC

528]; Masroor v. State of

21

U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC

286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis

Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis

Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496] ; Neeru

Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State

of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar

Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar

Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC

129]; Mahipal v. RajeshKumar [Mahipal v.

Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118]

27. It is equally well settled that bail once

granted, ought not to be cancelled in a

mechanical manner. However, an

unreasoned or perverse order of bail is

always open to interference by the

superior court. If there are serious

allegations against the accused, even if

he has not misused the bail granted to

him, such an order can be cancelled by

the same Court that has granted the bail.

Bail can also be revoked by a superior

court if it transpires that the courts

below have ignored the relevant material

available on record or not looked into the

gravity of the offence or the impact on

the society resulting in such an order.

In P. v. State of M.P. [P. v. State of M.P.,

(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three -

Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one

of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the

considerations that must weigh with the

Court for interfering in an order granting

bail to an accused under Section

439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p.

224, para 24)

‘24. As can be discerned from the

above decisions, for cancelling

bail once granted, the court must

consider whether any

supervening circumstances have

arisen or the conduct of the

22

accused post grant of bail

demonstrates that it is no longer

conducive to a fair trial to permit

him to retain his freedom by

enjoying the concession of bail

during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of

Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349] . To

put it differently, in ordinary

circumstances, this Court would

be loathe to interfere with an

order passed by the court below

granting bail but if such an order

is found to be illegal or perverse or

premised on material that is

irrelevant, then such an order is

susceptible to scrutiny and

interference by the appellate

court.’

Considerations for setting aside

bail orders

28. The considerations that weigh with

the appellate court for setting aside the

bail order on an application being

moved by the aggrieved party include

any supervening circumstances that

may have occurred after granting relief

to the accused, the conduct of the

accused while on bail, any attempt on

the part of the accused to

procrastinate, resulting in delaying the

trial, any instance of threats being

extended to the witnesses while on

bail, any attempt on the part of the

accused to tamper with the evidence in

any manner. We may add that this list

is only illustrative and not exhaustive.

However, the court must be cautious

that at the stage of granting bail, only

a prima facie case needs to be

examined and detailed reasons relating

to the merits of the case that may

23

cause prejudice to the accused, ought

to be avoided. Suffice it is to state

that the bail order should reveal the

factors that have been considered by

the Court for granting relief to the

accused.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

34. On going through the order dated 12

th

November, 2025 passed by the High Court in the case

of accused No.4-Jyotiraditya, which is the

foundational bail order following which accused No.

3-Pruthviraj was granted bail on parity by the trial

Court, we fail to find any such reasons which could

justify the grant of bail to the said accused. The

reasons assigned by the High Court for granting bail

are flimsy and untenable in the eyes of law.

35. The High Court and the learned trial Court

completely ignored the preceding facts where all the

four accused persons continuously attacked the

house of the complainant party threatening that they

would not spare the complainant party in case

Prajwal failed to apologize.

36. The fact that the accused persons were

prepared well in advance to commit some grave

offence is prima facie borne out from the fact that the

24

can containing petrol was carried in the vehicle in

which all four accused persons had arrived at the

crime scene. The time of the incident, the prior

preparation of the accused persons to commit the

crime and the repeated threats extended to the

complainant party constitute significant and grave

circumstances, which, when considered

cumulatively, indicate the premeditated nature of the

ghastly attack in which an innocent human being

was burnt alive by pouring inflammable fluid on his

body.

37. In our considered view, the aforesaid

circumstances weigh heavily against the grant of the

discretionary relief of bail and disentitle the accused

persons from claiming the indulgence of bail.

38. We make it clear that the observations made

hereinabove are confined solely to the consideration

of the prayer for grant or cancellation of bail. Nothing

contained in this order shall be construed as an

expression of opinion on the merits of the case, nor

shall any of the observations hereinabove influence

or prejudice the learned trial Court in the

adjudication of the case on its merits. The trial Court

25

is directed to complete the trial within a period of two

years from the date of presentation of this order.

39. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, the

Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11037 of 2026 and

11039 of 2026 preferred by the appellant-State of

Maharashtra are accordingly allowed and order dated

12

th November, 2025 passed by the High Court

granting bail to accused No. 4-Jyotiraditya and order

dated 13

th January, 2026 passed by the learned trial

Court granting bail to accused No. 3-Pruthviraj, are

hereby set aside. The bail granted to these accused

persons is cancelled. They shall surrender within a

period of three weeks from today, failing which the

learned trial Court shall take appropriate steps to

arrest these accused persons and bring them to trial.

40. The appeal filed by accused No. 2-Yash

16 and

the appeal filed by the appellant -State of

Maharashtra against grant of bail to accused No. 5-

Ranjit @ Dadaso

17, are dismissed as being devoid of

merit.

16

Crl. Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 6992 of 2026.

17

Crl. Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 11038 of 2026.

26

41. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 20, 2026.