Criminal Appeal, Section 482 CrPC, Quashing FIR, Property Dispute, Fraud, Forgery, Supreme Court, Investigation, Civil vs Criminal
 13 Apr, 2026
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Accamma SAM Jacob Vs. The State Of Karnataka & Anr. Etc.

  Supreme Court Of India 2026 INSC 362
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Case Background

As per case facts, Accamma Sam Jacob, an NRI, alleged that a plot she purchased in a residential layout was illegally encroached upon and subsequently transferred to third parties, including ...

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Document Text Version

2026 INSC 362 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(@SLP(Criminal) No(s). of 2026)

(Diary No(s). 20175 of 2022)

ACCAMMA SAM JACOB ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

& ANR. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(@ SLP(Criminal) No(s). 1749-1751 of 2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(@ (SLP(Criminal) No(s). of 2026)

(@Diary No(s). 20213 of 2022)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Delay condoned.

3. Leave granted.

4. These connected appeals by special leave, take

exception to the common judgment and order dated

2

28

th September, 2016 passed by the High Court of

Karnataka at Bengaluru

1, and arise out of

substantially similar complaints relating to lands

forming part of Survey No.12 of Doddagubbi Village,

Bengaluru, and involve common accused persons,

interconnected transactions and identical issues

concerning the scope of interference by the High

Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973

2. Though each complaint contains

certain individual-specific allegations with reference

to distinct plot numbers and instances of criminal

intimidation, etc. the gravamen of accusation s,

namely the alleged creation of forged General Powers

of Attorney

3, execution of sale deeds, and subsequent

confirmation deeds in respect of the same survey

land, remains identical. Since the impugned order is

common in all the appeals and the factual

substratum is intertwined, the entire batch of

appeals was heard and is being decided together by

this common judgment.

1 Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.

2 For short, ‘CrPC’.

3 For short, ‘GPAs’.

3

5. For the sake of convenience and to avoid

repetition, the facts are being noticed primarily from

Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Diary

No.20175 of 2022, which is treated as the lead

matter, and the conclusions recorded herein shall

govern the outcome of the connected appeals as well,

save and except where any distinguishing feature

warrants separate consideration.

Factual Matrix in the Lead Appeal

6. The substratum of allegations contained in the

complaint, insofar as they are relevant for the present

proceedings, are briefly noted hereunder.

7. Lands comprised in Survey No.12 of

Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru, were originally

owned by Bajjappa and other co-owners

4. The said

landowners executed GPAs in the year 1994 in favour

of the developer-Joseph Chacko, pursuant to which

he undertook development of a residential layout

styled as “Athina Township – Stage I”.

8. The complainant-Accamma Sam Jacob

5, an NRI

residing in Toronto, Canada, purchased a residential

plot admeasuring 60 feet × 80 feet, bearing Plot No.

4 Hereinafter, referred to as the “original landowners”

5 Hereinafter, referred to as the “complainant”.

4

79 in the year 1994, in the said layout under a

registered sale deed executed by the developer -

Joseph Chacko. It is stated that the sale deed was

duly registered in the name of the complainant with

reference to the Gramathana House List numbers

assigned to the property and that the khatha was

subsequently transferred in her favour . Several

similarly placed purchasers, as the complainant, had

acquired the plots as investment properties and

therefore did not undertake immediate construction.

During the years 2003-2004, the developer-Joseph

Chacko is stated to have requested the NRI

purchasers to commence construction on their

respective plots.

9. Towards the end of 2006, which, according to

the complainant, marks the commencement of the

alleged conspiracy, she was informed by George

Varghese (also arraigned as an accused in the

present complaints), then an employee of the

developer-Joseph Chacko, that K.S. Shankar Reddy

(accused-respondent), K.S. Balasundar Reddy

(accused-respondent), B.K. Mohan Kumar, Satish

Kumar and others had forcibly entered the layout

and caused extensive damage. It was alleged that

5

compound walls, storm water drains and electricity

poles were demolished with the aid of heavy

machinery, and boards bearing the name “City Scape

Properties” were erected within the layout.

10. Thereafter, George Varghese, Jacob Thomas,

and Raju C. Ninan (who are also arrayed as accused

in the present complaints) formed an association

styled as the “Athina Township Welfare Society”, with

Jacob Thomas as President, George Varghese as

Vice-President, and Raju C. Ninan as Secretary. It is

alleged that communications were circulated to

several NRI purchasers advising them to join the said

association for the purpose of initiating legal

proceedings against the developer-Joseph Chacko.

An e-mail dated 16

th January 2007, placed on record,

indicated that a criminal petition was being prepared

against the developer -Joseph Chacko, in

consultation with legal advisors. According to the

complainant, the aforesaid narrative was false and

concocted and was projected by the said persons with

a view to mislead the plot purchasers.

11. In May 2007, George Varghese circulated an

MoU among several NRI purchasers seeking

authorisation to represent them before governmental

6

and revenue authorities. The purchasers were also

requested to hand over the original title documents

relating to their plots on the fraudulent

representation that legal complications had arisen in

respect of the lands forming part of Athina Township

Stage-I and that steps were required to rectify the

revenue records, including the RTC (Pahani) entries.

Monetary contributions were also sought from the

purchasers.

12. On 16

th June 2009, the developer -Joseph

Chacko was arrested in connection with criminal

proceedings. The complainant was thereafter

informed that lands comprised in S urvey No.12,

including the layout in question, had been sold to

third parties. She travelled to Bengaluru in July 2009

and was shown copies of sale deeds executed in

favour of K.V. Rajagopal Reddy (accused-

respondent).

13. During this period, she was asked to sign

certain documents and provide her photograph and

thumb impression on the assurance that the same

were required for filing proceedings in the civil Court.

At that time, her original sale deed was allegedly

7

taken away on the pretext of making copies, and she

was later handed a coloured photocopy in its place.

14. When enquiries were made with George

Varghese, he denied having custody of the original

documents. The complainant thereafter caused

enquiries to be made as to whether any civil

proceedings had been instituted on her behalf, and

was shocked to find that no such suit had ever been

filed in her name or on her behalf. Reference is also

made to O.S. No.392/2007, in which pleadings filed

by K.S. Shanker Reddy and B.K. Mohan Kumar

contained statements regarding their lack of

ownership or possession over the suit property. On

basis of these allegations, the complainant asserts

that the civil proceedings were collusive in nature

and that she had been misled into parting with

money and documents and had been deprived of her

lawfully owned piece of land.

15. Upon making enquiries regarding the status of

her plot, the complainant was informed that the

property had been transferred in the name of K.V.

Rajagopal Reddy on the basis of a confirmation deed

dated 20

th July 2009, registered as Document No.

975/2009-10, which purportedly bore her signature.

8

She maintains that she never intended to execute any

such confirmation deed conveying or affirming

transfer of the property and that her signatures had

been obtained on the misrepresentation that the

same were required to swear affidavits and prepare

papers for instituting civil proceedings. The

confirmation deed was thereafter used to effect

transfer of the property in favour of K.V. Rajagopal

Reddy, though the complainant alleged that she had

neither consented to such transfer nor received any

consideration.

16. Based on these allegations, the complainant

contends that George Varghese and the other

accused persons misrepresented the nature of the

documents presented to her and procured her

signatures under false pretences, resulting in

execution and registration of the confirmation deed

without her informed consent and its subsequent use

to transfer the property. Criminal liability is also

attributed to K.V. Rajagopal Reddy and certain others

on the ground that they acted upon the said

confirmation deed and related documents despite

having complete knowledge of the attending

circumstances pertaining to fraud and

9

misrepresentation in execution thereof. On these

assertions, offences under various provisions of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

6, including those relating to

theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery,

preparation and use of forged documents and

criminal conspiracy, have been invoked.

17. The complainant alleges that fresh GPAs were

subsequently obtained from the original landowners

and sale deeds were executed in favour of certain

accused persons, including K.V. Rajagopal Reddy

(accused-respondent). Confirmation deeds

purportedly bearing the signatures of certain NRI plot

purchasers were created without lawful authority

and were intended to retrospectively validate an

otherwise defective chain of title in respect of Survey

No.12. The confirmation deeds do not bear the

signatures of the original landowners, and no

independent sale deeds were executed reconveying

the plots from the NRI purchasers to them.

18. The complainant contends that the cumulative

effect of the aforesaid transactions was to

concentrate control over substantial portions of

6 For short, ‘IPC’.

10

Survey No. 12 in persons or entities associated with

the family of one K.C. Ramamurthy (arrayed as one

of the accused and alleged to be the principal

architect of the conspiracy), purportedly for the

benefit of the CMR Group of Institutions. It is the case

of the complainant that the accused acted in concert

pursuant to a premeditated design to deprive the NRI

plot purchasers of their properties through a series of

documentary instruments executed without lawful

authority.

19. It is further stated that when the developer-

Joseph Chacko had declined demands to transfer the

entire extent of Survey No. 12, this fraudulent design

was hatched and set in motion to exert pressure upon

him and the NRI purchasers.

20. A detailed complaint containing the above

allegations was submitted to the jurisdictional

Kothanuru Police Station, which declined to

entertain the same, upon which the complainant

presented a private complaint before the learned XI

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall,

Bengaluru, setting out the aforesaid allegations.

Upon consideration of the averments contained

therein, the ACMM, by order dated 6

th November

11

2013, exercised powers under Section 156(3) of CrPC

and directed that the complaint be forwarded to the

jurisdictional police for registration of an FIR and

investigation in accordance with law.

21. Pursuant to the said order, the jurisdictional

Police Station, i.e., Kothanuru P.S., Bengaluru City,

registered FIR in Crime No.162/2013 on 16

th

November, 2013, against sixteen accused persons,

namely, K.S. Balasundar Reddy, K.S. Shanker

Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajgopala Reddy,

George Varghese, Satish Kumar, Biju M. Parel, Raju

C. Ninan, Jacob Thomas @ Shaji Mangaltu, B.K.

Mohan Kumar, Jerry Soman, Soman Vazhayil

Abraham, Mohan Vazhayil Ab raham, Suresh John,

Subramani Reddy, C.I. Ravindranath for offences

punishable under Sections 379, 381, 383, 415, 420,

409, 463, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477, 107,

115, 116(1), 117, 118, 120 and 120-B IPC.

22. Aggrieved by the registration of FIR , the

accused-respondents, namely, K.S. Shanker Reddy,

K.S. Balasundar Reddy, and K.V. Rajagopal Reddy,

approached the High Court by filing petitions under

Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal

12

proceedings emanating from the FIR in Crime No.162

of 2013.

23. The High Court, after hearing the parties,

allowed the petitions and quashed the proceedings

vide the common impugned judgment dated 28

th

September, 2016. It examined the nature of the rival

claims and noted that the sale deeds in favour of the

complainants pertained to specific layout plots

described by house list numbers, but without clear

reference to corresponding survey numbers, whereas

the sale deeds relied upon by the accused -

respondents related to larger extents of land

described by survey numbers and acreage. In view of

this clear distinction, the High Court opined that the

identity of the land and the question of overlap

between the rival claims c onstituted seriously

disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by

a competent civil Court.

24. Proceeding on this basis, the High Court

observed that unless the registered instruments

relied upon by the accused were cancelled and

delivered up in terms of Section 31 of the Specific

13

Relief Act, 1963

7, a criminal Court could not proceed

on the premise that such sale deeds were void, as any

such determination would amount to a declaration of

civil invalidity lying beyond the domain of criminal

jurisdiction.

25. The High Court further observed that even the

order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3)

CrPC was unsustainable for want of proper

application of mind. Consequently, the criminal

proceedings emanating from the FIRs were quashed.

26. It is against the aforesaid common judgment

dated 28

th September, 2016 that the appellants (de-

facto complainants) have approached this Court by

way of present appeals arising out of special leave

petitions.

Submissions on behalf of the appellants

27. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants

vehemently and fervently contended that the High

Court erred in quashing the complaint and FIR at the

threshold. It was submitted that the allegations in the

complaint, taken at face value, clearly disclose

commission of cognizable offences, including those of

7 For short, “SRA”.

14

cheating, creation and, use of forged documents and

criminal conspiracy, and therefore the High Court

ought not to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC so as to quash the criminal

proceedings at the inception.

28. Learned counsel argued that the High Court fell

into serious error in holding that criminal

proceedings could not be initiated unless the sale

deeds relied upon by the accused were first cancelled

under Section 31 of SRA. It was submitted that

initiation of civil proceedings for cancellation is not a

sine qua non for launching criminal prosecution and

that civil and criminal remedies can proceed

simultaneously even where allegations are identical.

29. It was further contended that the High Court

failed to appreciate that the power under Section 482

CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases

where the complaint, even if accepted in entirety,

does not disclose any offence. It was urged that the

High Court undertook an expansive evaluation of

disputed questions of fact which exercise could only

be undertaken in a full-fledged trial. It prematurely

concluded that the dispute was purely civil in nature.

15

30. Learned counsel also submitted that the

Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) CrPC

directing investigation did not warrant interference,

particularly when the investigation had only

commenced, and the material collected by the

investigating agency prima facie supported the

allegations set out in the complaint.

31. It was submitted that the High Court erred both

on facts and in law in quashing the entire

proceedings in respect of all accused persons,

including those who were not parties before it. On

these grounds, the appellants have implored this

Court to set aside the impugned judgment and

restore the criminal prosecution at the stage where it

was quashed.

Submissions on behalf of the accused -

respondents

32. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

accused-respondents strenuously opposed the

submissions of learned Counsel for the appellants

and supported the impugned common judgment

passed by the High Court.

33. It was contended at the outset that the criminal

proceedings launched by the appellant-complainant

16

are a gross abuse of the process of law and are

nothing but an attempt to convert a purely civil

dispute over property rights into a criminal

prosecution with an oblique motive of pressurising

and harassing the respondents.

34. Learned counsel appearing for K.V. Rajagopal

Reddy urged that respondent-K.S. Balasundar Reddy

had obtained duly registered GPAs from the original

grantees/landowners of Survey No.12, Doddagubbi

Village, Bengaluru East Taluk, covering an extent of

approximately 11 acres 4½ guntas. On the strength

of such registered GPAs, sale deeds were executed in

his (K.V. Rajagopal Reddy’s) favour and other

purchasers for valid consideration. It was argued that

these are registered instruments and cannot be

casually labelled as “forged” or “fabricated” without

first seeking their cancellation in competent civil

proceedings.

35. It was further submitted that the allegations set

out by the appellants in the complaint pertain to title,

identity and alleged overlap of land parcels. Such

questions necessarily require adjudication by a civil

Court or by a competent Revenue Authority. Unless

the registered sale deeds validly executed in favour of

17

the respondents for consideration are cancelled

under Section 31 of SRA, criminal prosecution

cannot be permitted to proceed merely on the

allegation that such instruments are void as being

borne out of fraud and forgery unless such a

declaration is made by the competent civil Court.

36. It was submitted that appellants had purchased

plots from the developer-Joseph Chacko, and not

from the present respondents. Therefore, if any

grievance subsists, the appellants’ remedy lies

against their own vendor and not against the

respondents, who independently and lawfully

acquired title from the original landowners. There

being no dispute about the signatures of the vendor

on the registered sale deeds, the documents cannot

be termed to be forged and the necessary ingredients

of fraud and falsification of documents are totally

lacking upon a bare perusal of the complaint.

37. It was further contended that admittedly the

appellant(s) have instituted civil suits in respect of

the same subject matter and they suppressed

material facts while invoking criminal jurisdiction.

The belated filing of the appeals, after enormous

18

delay, was also highlighted as indicative of lack of

bona fides.

38. Learned counsel appearing for the accused -

respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the

appeals and affirmation of the impugned judgment.

Discussion and Analysis

39. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions advanced by learned counsel at the

bar and have gone through the impugned judgment

and the material available on record.

40. Considered in light of the rival submissions, the

core question which arises for consideration is

whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the High

Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint and FIR at

a stage when the learned Magistrate had merely

directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.

41. At the very outset, it would be apposite to note

that FIRs registered against the developer-Joseph

Chacko, involving substantially similar allegations,

were also quashed by the High Court vide judgment

and order dated 25

th October, 2016, on more or less

the same line of reasoning. In those matters as well,

the complainants were Non-Resident Indians (NRIs)

19

who had allegedly purchased plots in the project

known as “Athina Township” and other layouts from

the said developer. It was alleged in those complaints

that the developer-Joseph Chacko had represented

that the layouts were duly converted lands and were

being developed with requisite infrastructure and

civic amenities. The purchasers were assured that

the plots carried valid house-list khatas and that the

layouts would be provided with roads, community

spaces, recreational facilities and other allied

amenities. However, upon making enquiries

subsequently, the purchasers allegedly discovered

that the khata numbers were bogus and that the

layouts had not been lawfully developed. It was

further alleged that when the purchasers attempted

to assert their possession over the plots, they were

obstructed and threatened, which ultimately led to

the registration of multiple criminal complaints

against the developer-Joseph Chacko, and other

accused persons.

42. A comparative reading of the complaints in the

said prosecution and the complaints in the present

set of appeals reveal that the substratum of

allegations is substantially similar. In both sets of

20

cases, it is alleged that the layout known as “Athina

Township” was trespassed upon, compound walls

and other demarcations were demolished, and

boards of an entity styled as “Cityscape Properties”

were erected upon the land.

43. The principal point of divergence lies not in the

nature of the incident, but in the identity of the

alleged perpetrators. While in the earlier batch, the

acts of trespass and demolition were attributed to the

developer-Joseph Chacko and his associates, the

present complaints attribute these acts to K.S.

Shankar Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajagopal

Reddy, George Varghese and others, coupled with the

assertion that the earlier narrative itself formed part

of a larger fraudulent design. The complaints thus

present competing versions of the same occurrence,

each attributing culpability to a different set of

perpetrators.

44. Significantly, in both sets of complaints, the

allegations do not rest merely on physical acts of

trespass and destruction, but extend to a broader

scheme involving fraud, fabrication of documents,

and unlawful interference with property rights. The

alleged demolition of the layout is stated to have been

21

accompanied by, and indeed to have facilitated,

subsequent transactions and documentary

instruments affecting title to the land.

45. The High Court, while quashing the cases/FIRs

against developer-Joseph Chacko vide judgment

dated 25

th October, 2016, adopted a line of reasoning

which is substantially similar to that contained in the

judgment impugned herein. The appellants have

placed before us a comparative chart juxtaposing the

two judgments dated 25

th October, 2016, and 28

th

September, 2016 (impugned judgment in the instant

appeals), highlighting the similarity in the reasoning

adopted therein. The said chart is reproduced

hereinbelow for ready reference:

Judgment dated 25

th

Oct.

2016

Judgment dated 28

th

Sep.

2016 [Impugned herein]

3. These petitions are filed by

the accused in criminal

petitions who are differently

arrayed in the several

complaints filed. However,

the grievance of the

complainants appears to be

identical. The complainants

are said to have purchased

the lands described as sites

bearing house list numbers

of several villages in

Hosakote, K.R.Puram and

Dodda Gubbi villages. It

2. These petitions are filed by

the accused in cri minal

petitions who are differently

arrayed in the severa l

complaints filed. However,

the grievance of the

complainants appears to be

identical. The complainants

are said to have purchased

the lands described as sites

bearing house list numbers

of several villages in

Hosakote, K.R.Puram and

Dodda Gubbi villages. It

22

transpires that the

complainants had purchased

the house sites through a

general power of attorney

holder of the original

grantees and they were

purportedly put in

possession of the vacant

sites. It is subsequently

learnt by them that the

house sites formed in the

layout, were no longer

identifiable, as third parties

had intervened and it is in

retrospect they learnt that

the accused have purchased

the same under registered

sale deeds in the face of the

sale deeds in favour of the

complainants and therefore

they have alleged offences

punishable under the

various provisions of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

(Hereinafter referred to as

the ‘IPC’, for brevity) alleging

fraud, forgery, trespass and

criminal conspiracy and so

on. The court below having

taken cognizance, the

present petitions were filed

and interim orders of stay

were granted staying further

proceedings.

transpires that the

complainants had purchased

the house sites through a

general power of attorney

holder of the original

grantees and they were

purportedly put in

possession of the vacant

sites. It is subsequently

learnt by them that the

house sites formed in the

layout, were no longer

identifiable, as third parties

had intervened and it is in

retrospect they learnt that

the accused have purchased

the same under registered

sale deeds in the face of the

sale deeds in favour of the

complainants and therefore

they have alleged offences

punishable under the

various provisions of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

(Hereinafter referred to as

the 'IPC', for brevity) alleging

fraud, forgery, trespass and

criminal conspiracy and so

on. The court below has, by a

cryptic order directed

investigation by the

jurisdictional Police under

Section 156(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973

(Hereinafter referred to as

the 'CrPC', for brevity). It is at

that stage that the present

petitions were filed and

interim orders of stay were

granted staying further

proceedings.

23

4. At the outset, it is to be

noticed that the allegations

of forgery etc., in respect of

the incidental documents

pursuant to the registered

sale deed in favour of the

complainants could not be

adjudicated in a criminal

case, for the reason that

unless the registered sale

deed is cancelled and

delivered up in terms of

Section 31 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963, the same

cannot be ignored. The court

would not be in a position to

proceed on the basis that the

sale deeds set up by the

complainants are void ab

initio. This would again

amount to a declaration by a

criminal court that the sale is

void, which is impermissible.

Therefore, in the face of the

registered sale deed, which

the complainants may claim,

was a subsequent

conveyance and could not

override their sale deeds,

which is earlier in point of

time, also cannot be readily

accepted, since it is an

admitted fact that the sale

deeds in favour of the

complainants is in respect of

particular plots of land

without reference to any

survey number. Admittedly,

the lands in question are not

converted for

nonagricultural purpose. In

3. At the outset, it is to be

noticed that the allegations

of forgery etc., in respect of

the incidental documents

pursuant to the registered

sale deed in favour of the

complainants could not be

adjudicated in a criminal

case, for the reason that

unless the registered sale

deed is cancelled and

delivered up in terms of

Section 31 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963, the same

cannot be ignored. The court

would not be in a position to

proceed on the basis that the

sale deeds set up by the

complainants are void a b

initio. This would again

amount to a declaration by a

criminal court that the sale is

void, which is impermissible.

Therefore, in the face of the

registered sale deed, which

the complainants may claim,

was a subsequent

conveyance and could not

override their sale deeds,

which is earlier in point of

time, also cannot be readily

accepted, since it is an

admitted fact that the sale

deeds in favour of the

complainants is in respect of

particular plots of land

without reference to an y

survey number. Admittedly.

the lands in question are not

converted for non -

agricultural purpose. In the

24

the face of the further

circumstance that the sale

deeds in favour of the

petitioners herein are in

respect of acreage of lands

bearing survey numbers, the

identity would be a serious

matter to assume that the

sites purchased by the

complainants overlap the

lands purchased by the

petitioners. This is an area

which requires to be

adjudicated by a civil court

and in the absence of which,

a criminal court would

hardly be in a position to

appreciate the premise

under which the complaints

are filed. Therefore, the

complaints are premature

and would lack the basic

foundation to demonstrate

that the sale deeds of the

petitioners are void.

face of the further

circumstance that the sale

deeds in favour of the

petitioners herein are in

respect of acreage of lands

bearing survey numbers, the

identity would be a serious

matter to assume that the

sites purchased by the

complainants overlap the

lands purchased by the

petitioners. This is an area

which requires to be

adjudicated by a civil court

and in the absence of which,

a criminal court would

hardly be in a position to

appreciate the premise

under which the complaints

are flied. Therefore, the

complaints are premature

and would lack the basic

foundation to demonstrate

that the sale deeds of the

petitioners are void.

5. Hence, the remedy of the

complainants would only be

before a civil court, where

they would be enabled to

have the sale deeds of the

petitioners declared as void,

if it is their case that they are

void and thereafter may

pursue all consequential

remedies of even criminal

prosecution for having

proceeded to lay claim to the

lands under a void sale deed.

Consequently, the

Magistrate having taken

cognizance, cannot be

4. Hence, the remedy of the

complainants would only be

before a civil court, where

they would be enabled to

have the sale deeds of the

petitioners dec1ared as void,

if it is their case that they are

void and thereafter may

pursue all consequential

remedies of even criminal

prosecution for having

proceeded to lay claim to the

lands under a void sale deed.

Consequently, the

Magistrate having directed

investigation by the Police,

25

sustained. Since the

complaint itself was not

sustainable, before the court

below in the circumstances

which are not disputed, the

petitions are summarily

allowed. The proceedings

initiated before the court

below in each of thes e

petitions are quashed.

by a cryptic order, also

cannot be sustained, for it is

the law laid down by this

court as well as the Supreme

Court that even for purposed

of directing investigation,

there ought to be some

application of mind not to the

degree of taking cognisance

of the case, but at least to

decide that the matter

requires investigation. Even

on that ground, the order of

the court below is not

sustainable. In any event,

since the complaint itself was

not sustainable, before the

court below, in the

circumstances which are not

disputed, petitions ar e

summarily allowed. The

proceedings initiated before

the court below in each of

these petitions are quashed.

46. The special leave petitions arising out of the

judgment dated 25

th October, 2016 were initially

heard along with the present batch of appeals, as the

allegations and legal issues involved appeared to be

substantially similar. However, by order dated 28

th

November, 2024, the present batch of appeals was

de-tagged from the earlier matters.

26

47. It is pertinent to note that by the self-same

order

8 dated 28

th November, 2024, this Court allowed

the appeals involving the developer-Joseph Chacko

and set aside the judgment dated 25

th October, 2016.

48. While allowing the appeals, this Court observed

that the High Court had quashed the proceedings in

a cryptic and cursory manner without assigning

cogent reasons. It was further noticed that in most of

those cases, charge-sheets had already been filed and

yet the High Court proceeded to quash the

proceedings.

49. This Court further observed that in cases where

serious allegations of fraud, forgery, trespass and

criminal conspiracy affecting a large group of persons

were involved, the High Court ought to have exhibited

restraint while invoking its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC.

50. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on

the merits of the cases, this Court concluded that the

High Court had committed a gross error in quashing

the proceedings without properly considering the

serious allegations made against the accused therein

8 The State of Karnataka v. Joseph Chacko and Anr. , Criminal

Appeal Nos. 5207-5221 of 2024.

27

and without granting opportunity of hearing to the

complainants. Based on the said reasoning, the

impugned judgment therein, i.e., order dated 25

th

October, 2016 was set aside and the cases were

restored to the files of the concerned trial Court(s),

leaving all contentions open to be urged by the

accused before the trial Court.

51. In our considered view, the fact that the

judgment of the High Court dated 25

th October, 2016

has already been set aside by this Court itself

furnishes a sufficient ground to condone the delay

and extend similar relief in the present batch of

appeals. Upon a careful perusal of the judgments

passed by the High Court i.e., one in the present

appeals and the other in the case involving Joseph

Chacko as the accused, we find that the reasoning

adopted by the High Court in both cases proceeds on

substantially identical lines and rests on the same

foundational premise, namely, that the dispute

between the parties is predominantly civil in nature

and that criminal proceedings could not be sustained

unless the registered sale deeds were first cancelled

by resorting to proceedings under Section 31 of SRA.

In such circumstances, the divergence in attribution

28

cannot be a ground to discard the present complaints

at the threshold. On the contrary, the existence of

rival narratives in respect of the similar allegations

underscores the necessity of a proper investigation to

ascertain the identity and role of the persons

involved.

52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings

were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely

exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC

and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be

gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to

merely peruse the application filed by the

complainant and examine whether the facts

disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary

ingredients of cognizable offences requiring

investigation by police. The Magistrate is not

expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of

evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the

allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion

that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed,

then he would be fully justified in directing the

concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with

investigation in accordance with law. The High Court,

29

while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in

interfering with such an exercise of power and ought

to intervene only where it is evident that the order

lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or

that the same may result in failure of justice.

53. In such circumstances, the High Court, while

exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel

beyond the allegations contained in the complaint

and the material placed by the complainant by

delving into the defences sought to be projected by

the accused-respondents.

54. The facts in the case at hand manifest that the

High Court proceeded to examine documents relied

upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale

deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same

as determinative of the dispute and observed that the

sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first,

before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such

an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope

of scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section

482 of CrPC. Consideration of defence material,

including sale deeds or other title documents would

necessarily involve adjudication on disputed

30

questions of fact, which fall squarely within the

domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any

such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of CrPC

would amount to conducting a mini-trial and would

be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence

material to be weighed at the threshold would

frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an

investigation by the police.

55. This Court has, time and again, emphasised

that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at

the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex

facie does not disclose the commission of any

cognizable offence or where continuation of the

proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process

of law. The power of the High Court under Section

482 of CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India

to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great

circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty

of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable

offences. The said position has been eruditely

explained by this Court in Neeharika

31

Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra

9,

wherein it was observed as under: -

“In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse

of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a

criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the

accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint

itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law.

The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all

disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In

such cases and in exceptional cases with

circumspection, the High Court may stay the further

investigation. However, at the same time, there may

be genuine complaints/FIRs and the

police/investigating agency has a statutory

obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable

offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck

between the rights of the genuine complainants

and the FIRs disclosing commission of a

cognizable offence and the statutory

obligation/duty of the investigating agency to

investigate into the cognizable offences on the

one hand and those innocent persons against

whom the criminal proceedings are initiated

which may be in a given case abuse of process of

law and the process. However, if the facts are

hazy and the investigation has just begun, the

High Court would be circumspect in exercising

such powers and the High Court must permit the

investigating agency to proceed further with the

investigation in exercise of its statutory duty

under the provisions of the Code.”

[Emphasis supplied]

9 (2021) 19 SCC 401.

32

Applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand,

it becomes evident that the High Court has

transgressed the well-settled boundaries governing

the exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC at the

threshold stage. The order impugned before the High

Court was one passed by the learned Magistrate

under Section 156(3) of CrPC, whereby the police

were merely directed to register an FIR and to

undertake investigation in accordance with law. At

such a stage, the Court is only required to ascertain

whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the

commission of a cognizable offence warranting

investigation.

56. In the facts and circumstances noted above, it

was not at all justified for the High Court to have

quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the

dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled

that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by

itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations

prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable

offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute

on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing

investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the

investigative process at its inception. Such an

33

approach runs contrary to the principles consistently

laid down by this Court.

57. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that the High Court clearly fell

into error while quashing the proceedings at a stage

when the Magistrate had merely directed registration

of FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC

(Corresponding to Section 175(3) of Bhar atiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

58. Accordingly, the common impugned judgment

and order dated 28

th September, 2016, passed by the

High Court is set aside. The FIRs and the proceedings

arising therefrom are revived and restored to the file

of the concerned Police Station and/or Magistrate,

for being proceeded in accordance with law.

59. It goes without saying that the parties shall be

at liberty to produce material to indicate their

defence(s)/position during the course of the police

investigation, as also before the Court concerned, in

accordance with law, at the appropriate stage.

60. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to clarify

that the observations made in the present judgment

are confined to the adjudication of the issues arising

in these appeals. The same shall not be construed as

34

an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and

shall neither prejudice nor influence the proceedings

pending before the competent court/forum.

61. The appeals stand allowed in the aforesaid

terms.

62. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 13, 2026.

Description

2026 INSC 362

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ___________ OF 2026
(@SLP(Criminal) No(s). _________ of 2026)
(Diary No(s). 20175 of 2022)

ACCAMMA SAM JACOB ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
& ANR. ETC. ....RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ___________ OF 2026
(@SLP(Criminal) No(s). 1749-1751 of 2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ___________ OF 2026
(@ (SLP(Criminal) No(s). _________ of 2026)
(@Diary No(s). 20213 of 2022)

JUDGMENT

In a significant ruling from the Supreme Court of India, the principles governing the Supreme Court quashing FIR and the precise ambit of Section 482 CrPC jurisdiction have been reaffirmed. This judgment, now available on CaseOn, meticulously dissects the complex interplay between civil dispute criminal proceedings, offering crucial insights for legal professionals and students alike. The Court has clarified the circumstances under which an FIR, registered pursuant to a Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can or cannot be quashed at its nascent stage.

Mehta, J.

  1. Heard.
  2. Delay condoned.
  3. Leave granted.
  4. These connected appeals by special leave, take exception to the common judgment and order dated 28th September, 2016 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru¹, and arise out of substantially similar complaints relating to lands forming part of Survey No.12 of Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru, and involve common accused persons, interconnected transactions and identical issues concerning the scope of interference by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732. Though each complaint contains certain individual-specific allegations with reference to distinct plot numbers and instances of criminal intimidation, etc. the gravamen of accusations, namely the alleged creation of forged General Powers of Attorney³, execution of sale deeds, and subsequent confirmation deeds in respect of the same survey land, remains identical. Since the impugned order is common in all the appeals and the factual substratum is intertwined, the entire batch of appeals was heard and is being decided together by this common judgment.

Issue

The core question which arises for consideration is whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the High Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint and FIR at a stage when the learned Magistrate had merely directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. The High Court, after hearing the parties, allowed the petitions and quashed the proceedings vide the common impugned judgment dated 28th September, 2016. It examined the nature of the rival claims and noted that the sale deeds in favour of the complainants pertained to specific layout plots described by house list numbers, but without clear reference to corresponding survey numbers, whereas the sale deeds relied upon by the accused-respondents related to larger extents of land described by survey numbers and acreage. In view of this clear distinction, the High Court opined that the identity of the land and the question of overlap between the rival claims constituted seriously disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by a competent civil Court. The High Court further observed that even the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC was unsustainable for want of proper application of mind. Consequently, the criminal proceedings emanating from the FIRs were quashed. In our considered view, the fact that the judgment of the High Court dated 25th October, 2016 has already been set aside by this Court itself furnishes a sufficient ground to condone the delay and extend similar relief in the present batch of appeals. Upon a careful perusal of the judgments passed by the High Court i.e., one in the present appeals and the other in the case involving Joseph Chacko as the accused, we find that the reasoning adopted by the High Court in both cases proceeds on substantially identical lines and rests on the same foundational premise, namely, that the dispute between the parties is predominantly civil in nature and that criminal proceedings could not be sustained unless the registered sale deeds were first cancelled by resorting to proceedings under Section 31 of SRA. In such circumstances, the divergence in attribution cannot be a ground to discard the present complaints at the threshold. On the contrary, the existence of rival narratives in respect of the similar allegations underscores the necessity of a proper investigation to ascertain the identity and role of the persons involved.

Rule

The High Court, proceeding on the basis that unless the registered instruments relied upon by the accused were cancelled and delivered up in terms of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 19637, a criminal Court could not proceed on the premise that such sale deeds were void, as any such determination would amount to a declaration of civil invalidity lying beyond the domain of criminal jurisdiction. Learned counsel argued that the High Court fell into serious error in holding that criminal proceedings could not be initiated unless the sale deeds relied upon by the accused were first cancelled under Section 31 of SRA. It was submitted that initiation of civil proceedings for cancellation is not a sine qua non for launching criminal prosecution and that civil and criminal remedies can proceed simultaneously even where allegations are identical. It was further contended that the High Court failed to appreciate that the power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the complaint, even if accepted in entirety, does not disclose any offence. It was urged that the High Court undertook an expansive evaluation of disputed questions of fact which exercise could only be undertaken in a full-fledged trial. It prematurely concluded that the dispute was purely civil in nature. Learned counsel also submitted that the Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing investigation did not warrant interference, particularly when the investigation had only commenced, and the material collected by the investigating agency prima facie supported the allegations set out in the complaint. It was submitted that the High Court erred both on facts and in law in quashing the entire proceedings in respect of all accused persons, including those who were not parties before it. On these grounds, the appellants have implored this Court to set aside the impugned judgment and restore the criminal prosecution at the stage where it was quashed. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse the application filed by the complainant and examine whether the facts disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in interfering with such an exercise of power and ought to intervene only where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice. In such circumstances, the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel beyond the allegations contained in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant by delving into the defences sought to be projected by the accused-respondents. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex facie does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable offences. The said position has been eruditely explained by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra9, wherein it was observed as under: “In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRS and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code.” [Emphasis supplied]

Analysis

Factual Matrix in the Lead Appeal

  1. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, the facts are being noticed primarily from Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Diary No.20175 of 2022, which is treated as the lead matter, and the conclusions recorded herein shall govern the outcome of the connected appeals as well, save and except where any distinguishing feature warrants separate consideration.

The substratum of allegations contained in the complaint, insofar as they are relevant for the present proceedings, are briefly noted hereunder.

  1. Lands comprised in Survey No.12 of Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru, were originally owned by Bajjappa and other co-owners. The said landowners executed GPAs in the year 1994 in favour of the developer-Joseph Chacko, pursuant to which he undertook development of a residential layout styled as “Athina Township – Stage I”.
  2. The complainant-Accamma Sam Jacob5, an NRI residing in Toronto, Canada, purchased a residential plot admeasuring 60 feet × 80 feet, bearing Plot No. 79 in the year 1994, in the said layout under a registered sale deed executed by the developer-Joseph Chacko. It is stated that the sale deed was duly registered in the name of the complainant with reference to the Gramathana House List numbers assigned to the property and that the khatha was subsequently transferred in her favour. Several similarly placed purchasers, as the complainant, had acquired the plots as investment properties and therefore did not undertake immediate construction. During the years 2003-2004, the developer-Joseph Chacko is stated to have requested the NRI purchasers to commence construction on their respective plots.
  3. Towards the end of 2006, which, according to the complainant, marks the commencement of the alleged conspiracy, she was informed by George Varghese (also arraigned as an accused in the present complaints), then an employee of the developer-Joseph Chacko, that K.S. Shankar Reddy (accused-respondent), K.S. Balasundar Reddy (accused-respondent), B.K. Mohan Kumar, Satish Kumar and others had forcibly entered the layout and caused extensive damage. It was alleged that compound walls, storm water drains and electricity poles were demolished with the aid of heavy machinery, and boards bearing the name "City Scape Properties" were erected within the layout.
  4. Thereafter, George Varghese, Jacob Thomas, and Raju C. Ninan (who are also arrayed as accused in the present complaints) formed an association styled as the “Athina Township Welfare Society", with Jacob Thomas as President, George Varghese as Vice-President, and Raju C. Ninan as Secretary. It is alleged that communications were circulated to several NRI purchasers advising them to join the said association for the purpose of initiating legal proceedings against the developer-Joseph Chacko. An e-mail dated 16th January 2007, placed on record, indicated that a criminal petition was being prepared against the developer-Joseph Chacko, in consultation with legal advisors. According to the complainant, the aforesaid narrative was false and concocted and was projected by the said persons with a view to mislead the plot purchasers.
  5. In May 2007, George Varghese circulated an MoU among several NRI purchasers seeking authorisation to represent them before governmental and revenue authorities. The purchasers were also requested to hand over the original title documents relating to their plots on the fraudulent representation that legal complications had arisen in respect of the lands forming part of Athina Township Stage-I and that steps were required to rectify the revenue records, including the RTC (Pahani) entries. Monetary contributions were also sought from the purchasers.
  6. On 16th June 2009, the developer-Joseph Chacko was arrested in connection with criminal proceedings. The complainant was thereafter informed that lands comprised in Survey No.12, including the layout in question, had been sold to third parties. She travelled to Bengaluru in July 2009 and was shown copies of sale deeds executed in favour of K.V. Rajagopal Reddy (accused-respondent).
  7. During this period, she was asked to sign certain documents and provide her photograph and thumb impression on the assurance that the same were required for filing proceedings in the civil Court. At that time, her original sale deed was allegedly taken away on the pretext of making copies, and she was later handed a coloured photocopy in its place.
  8. When enquiries were made with George Varghese, he denied having custody of the original documents. The complainant thereafter caused enquiries to be made as to whether any civil proceedings had been instituted on her behalf, and was shocked to find that no such suit had ever been filed in her name or on her behalf. Reference is also made to O.S. No.392/2007, in which pleadings filed by K.S. Shanker Reddy and B.K. Mohan Kumar contained statements regarding their lack of ownership or possession over the suit property. On basis of these allegations, the complainant asserts that the civil proceedings were collusive in nature and that she had been misled into parting with money and documents and had been deprived of her lawfully owned piece of land.
  9. Upon making enquiries regarding the status of her plot, the complainant was informed that the property had been transferred in the name of K.V. Rajagopal Reddy on the basis of a confirmation deed dated 20th July 2009, registered as Document No. 975/2009-10, which purportedly bore her signature. She maintains that she never intended to execute any such confirmation deed conveying or affirming transfer of the property and that her signatures had been obtained on the misrepresentation that the same were required to swear affidavits and prepare papers for instituting civil proceedings. The confirmation deed was thereafter used to effect transfer of the property in favour of K.V. Rajagopal Reddy, though the complainant alleged that she had neither consented to such transfer nor received any consideration.
  10. Based on these allegations, the complainant contends that George Varghese and the other accused persons misrepresented the nature of the documents presented to her and procured her signatures under false pretences, resulting in execution and registration of the confirmation deed without her informed consent and its subsequent use to transfer the property. Criminal liability is also attributed to K.V. Rajagopal Reddy and certain others on the ground that they acted upon the said confirmation deed and related documents despite having complete knowledge of the attending circumstances pertaining to fraud and misrepresentation in execution thereof. On these assertions, offences under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 18606, including those relating to theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, preparation and use of forged documents and criminal conspiracy, have been invoked.
  11. The complainant alleges that fresh GPAs were subsequently obtained from the original landowners and sale deeds were executed in favour of certain accused persons, including K.V. Rajagopal Reddy (accused-respondent). Confirmation deeds purportedly bearing the signatures of certain NRI plot purchasers were created without lawful authority and were intended to retrospectively validate an otherwise defective chain of title in respect of Survey No.12. The confirmation deeds do not bear the signatures of the original landowners, and no independent sale deeds were executed reconveying the plots from the NRI purchasers to them.
  12. The complainant contends that the cumulative effect of the aforesaid transactions was to concentrate control over substantial portions of Survey No. 12 in persons or entities associated with the family of one K.C. Ramamurthy (arrayed as one of the accused and alleged to be the principal architect of the conspiracy), purportedly for the benefit of the CMR Group of Institutions. It is the case of the complainant that the accused acted in concert pursuant to a premeditated design to deprive the NRI plot purchasers of their properties through a series of documentary instruments executed without lawful authority.
  13. It is further stated that when the developer-Joseph Chacko had declined demands to transfer the entire extent of Survey No. 12, this fraudulent design was hatched and set in motion to exert pressure upon him and the NRI purchasers.
  14. A detailed complaint containing the above allegations was submitted to the jurisdictional Kothanuru Police Station, which declined to entertain the same, upon which the complainant presented a private complaint before the learned XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall, Bengaluru, setting out the aforesaid allegations. Upon consideration of the averments contained therein, the ACMM, by order dated 6th November 2013, exercised powers under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed that the complaint be forwarded to the jurisdictional police for registration of an FIR and investigation in accordance with law.
  15. Pursuant to the said order, the jurisdictional Police Station, i.e., Kothanuru P.S., Bengaluru City, registered FIR in Crime No.162/2013 on 16th November, 2013, against sixteen accused persons, namely, K.S. Balasundar Reddy, K.S. Shanker Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajgopala Reddy, George Varghese, Satish Kumar, Biju M. Parel, Raju C. Ninan, Jacob Thomas @ Shaji Mangaltu, B.K. Mohan Kumar, Jerry Soman, Soman Vazhayil Abraham, Mohan Vazhayil Abraham, Suresh John, Subramani Reddy, C.I. Ravindranath for offences punishable under Sections 379, 381, 383, 415, 420, 409, 463, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477, 107, 115, 116(1), 117, 118, 120 and 120-B IPC.
  16. Aggrieved by the registration of FIR, the accused-respondents, namely, K.S. Shanker Reddy, K.S. Balasundar Reddy, and K.V. Rajagopal Reddy, approached the High Court by filing petitions under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings emanating from the FIR in Crime No.162 of 2013.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants

  1. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently and fervently contended that the High Court erred in quashing the complaint and FIR at the threshold. It was submitted that the allegations in the complaint, taken at face value, clearly disclose commission of cognizable offences, including those of cheating, creation and, use of forged documents and criminal conspiracy, and therefore the High Court ought not to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC so as to quash the criminal proceedings at the inception.
  2. Learned counsel argued that the High Court fell into serious error in holding that criminal proceedings could not be initiated unless the sale deeds relied upon by the accused were first cancelled under Section 31 of SRA. It was submitted that initiation of civil proceedings for cancellation is not a sine qua non for launching criminal prosecution and that civil and criminal remedies can proceed simultaneously even where allegations are identical.
  3. It was further contended that the High Court failed to appreciate that the power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the complaint, even if accepted in entirety, does not disclose any offence. It was urged that the High Court undertook an expansive evaluation of disputed questions of fact which exercise could only be undertaken in a full-fledged trial. It prematurely concluded that the dispute was purely civil in nature.
  4. Learned counsel also submitted that the Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing investigation did not warrant interference, particularly when the investigation had only commenced, and the material collected by the investigating agency prima facie supported the allegations set out in the complaint.
  5. It was submitted that the High Court erred both on facts and in law in quashing the entire proceedings in respect of all accused persons, including those who were not parties before it. On these grounds, the appellants have implored this Court to set aside the impugned judgment and restore the criminal prosecution at the stage where it was quashed.

Submissions on behalf of the Accused-Respondents

  1. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents strenuously opposed the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellants and supported the impugned common judgment passed by the High Court.
  2. It was contended at the outset that the criminal proceedings launched by the appellant-complainant are a gross abuse of the process of law and are nothing but an attempt to convert a purely civil dispute over property rights into a criminal prosecution with an oblique motive of pressurising and harassing the respondents.
  3. Learned counsel appearing for K.V. Rajagopal Reddy urged that respondent-K.S. Balasundar Reddy had obtained duly registered GPAs from the original grantees/landowners of Survey No.12, Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru East Taluk, covering an extent of approximately 11 acres 4½ guntas. On the strength of such registered GPAs, sale deeds were executed in his (K.V. Rajagopal Reddy's) favour and other purchasers for valid consideration. It was argued that these are registered instruments and cannot be casually labelled as “forged” or “fabricated” without first seeking their cancellation in competent civil proceedings.
  4. It was further submitted that the allegations set out by the appellants in the complaint pertain to title, identity and alleged overlap of land parcels. Such questions necessarily require adjudication by a civil Court or by a competent Revenue Authority. Unless the registered sale deeds validly executed in favour of the respondents for consideration are cancelled under Section 31 of SRA, criminal prosecution cannot be permitted to proceed merely on the allegation that such instruments are void as being borne out of fraud and forgery unless such a declaration is made by the competent civil Court.
  5. It was submitted that appellants had purchased plots from the developer-Joseph Chacko, and not from the present respondents. Therefore, if any grievance subsists, the appellants' remedy lies against their own vendor and not against the respondents, who independently and lawfully acquired title from the original landowners. There being no dispute about the signatures of the vendor on the registered sale deeds, the documents cannot be termed to be forged and the necessary ingredients of fraud and falsification of documents are totally lacking upon a bare perusal of the complaint.
  6. It was further contended that admittedly the appellant(s) have instituted civil suits in respect of the same subject matter and they suppressed material facts while invoking criminal jurisdiction. The belated filing of the appeals, after enormous delay, was also highlighted as indicative of lack of bona fides.
  7. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeals and affirmation of the impugned judgment.

Discussion and Application of Law

  1. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel at the bar and have gone through the impugned judgment and the material available on record.
  2. Considered in light of the rival submissions, the core question which arises for consideration is whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the High Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint and FIR at a stage when the learned Magistrate had merely directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.
  3. At the very outset, it would be apposite to note that FIRs registered against the developer-Joseph Chacko, involving substantially similar allegations, were also quashed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 25th October, 2016, on more or less the same line of reasoning. In those matters as well, the complainants were Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) who had allegedly purchased plots in the project known as “Athina Township” and other layouts from the said developer. It was alleged in those complaints that the developer-Joseph Chacko had represented that the layouts were duly converted lands and were being developed with requisite infrastructure and civic amenities. The purchasers were assured that the plots carried valid house-list khatas and that the layouts would be provided with roads, community spaces, recreational facilities and other allied amenities. However, upon making enquiries subsequently, the purchasers allegedly discovered that the khata numbers were bogus and that the layouts had not been lawfully developed. It was further alleged that when the purchasers attempted to assert their possession over the plots, they were obstructed and threatened, which ultimately led to the registration of multiple criminal complaints against the developer-Joseph Chacko, and other accused persons.
  4. A comparative reading of the complaints in the said prosecution and the complaints in the present set of appeals reveal that the substratum of allegations is substantially similar. In both sets of cases, it is alleged that the layout known as “Athina Township" was trespassed upon, compound walls and other demarcations were demolished, and boards of an entity styled as “Cityscape Properties" were erected upon the land.
  5. The principal point of divergence lies not in the nature of the incident, but in the identity of the alleged perpetrators. While in the earlier batch, the acts of trespass and demolition were attributed to the developer-Joseph Chacko and his associates, the present complaints attribute these acts to K.S. Shankar Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajagopal Reddy, George Varghese and others, coupled with the assertion that the earlier narrative itself formed part of a larger fraudulent design. The complaints thus present competing versions of the same occurrence, each attributing culpability to a different set of perpetrators.
  6. Significantly, in both sets of complaints, the allegations do not rest merely on physical acts of trespass and destruction, but extend to a broader scheme involving fraud, fabrication of documents, and unlawful interference with property rights. The alleged demolition of the layout is stated to have been accompanied by, and indeed to have facilitated, subsequent transactions and documentary instruments affecting title to the land.
  7. The High Court, while quashing the cases/FIRs against developer-Joseph Chacko vide judgment dated 25th October, 2016, adopted a line of reasoning which is substantially similar to that contained in the judgment impugned herein. The appellants have placed before us a comparative chart juxtaposing the two judgments dated 25th October, 2016, and 28th September, 2016 (impugned judgment in the instant appeals), highlighting the similarity in the reasoning adopted therein. The said chart is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
Judgment dated 25th Oct. 2016Judgment dated 28th Sep. 2016 [Impugned herein]
3. These petitions are filed by the accused in criminal petitions who are differently arrayed in the several complaints filed. However, the grievance of the complainants appears to be identical. The complainants are said to have purchased the lands described as sites bearing house list numbers of several villages in Hosakote, K.R.Puram and Dodda Gubbi villages. It transpires that the complainants had purchased the house sites through a general power of attorney holder of the original grantees and they were purportedly put in possession of the vacant sites. It is subsequently learnt by them that the house sites formed in the layout, were no longer identifiable, as third parties had intervened and it is in retrospect they learnt that the accused have purchased the same under registered sale deeds in the face of the sale deeds in favour of the complainants and therefore they have alleged offences punishable under the various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC', for brevity) alleging fraud, forgery, trespass and criminal conspiracy and so on. The court below having taken cognizance, the present petitions were filed and interim orders of stay were granted staying further proc

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