1

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

BEFORE:

THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

CRR 4125 of 2024

Amrapali Bose

Vs.

Subra Ghosh

With

CRR 4126 of 2024

Dipanjan Ray @ Dipayan Roy

Vs.

Subra Ghosh

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, ld. Sr. Adv.

Ms. Priyanka Sarkar, Adv.

For the Opposite Party : None.

Judgment reserved on : 24.08.2026

Judgment delivered on : 15.09.2026

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:-

1. The revisional applications have been preferred praying for quashing of

the proceeding being Complaint Case No. C-1610 of 2018 under Sections

406/415/418/420/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, pending

before the Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 7th Court, Alipore,

South 24 Parganas.

2

2. The petitioner states that the complaint case has been registered on a

complaint filed by the complainant who had initially preferred a

complaint before the Consumer Forum in the year 2017 , which was

registered as CC/149/2017, wherein the petitioner was not named.

Thereafter the opposite party instituted this instant proceeding against

as many as ten accused persons including the petitioner herein in order

to recover money which is essentially within the realm of civil

proceedings.

3. The allegation against the petitioners herein in the written complaint

shown as accused nos. 3 and 5 respectively as a director and an

employee of the company and the dispute revolves around the

purchase of a flat from the developers being the accused persons

herein.

4. The main/principle allegations are against the accused number 2 ,

Malay Bose.

5. The only allegations against the petitioners herein is that they were

present at a restaurant on 16

th

June, 2017 along with the principal

accused Malay Bose and had allegedly inf ormed the complain ant

that her money/deposit would be returned within three months. The

petitioners state that the complainant has admittedly also filed a case

before the consumer forum in respect of the dispute relating to the

purchase of a flat from the accused no. 1 company.

3

6. The specific allegation in the complaint petition is that all the accused

person from 1, 2 and 6 to 11 had entered into an agreement for sale of a

flat on 10th July 2013 with the aforementioned Amrapali Hirise Private

Limited a company having its address as mentioned hereinabove,

represented by one of its director being Malay Bose being the Developer

therein and Bampada Pyne, Umapada Pyne, Gurupada Pyne, Radhapada

Pyne, Rampada Pyne, Gourpada Pyne all being the Owners/Vendors

being represented by their constituted attorney being Malay Bose. It is

clear from the said pleading that the petitioners herein being

accused nos. 3 and 5 respectively had not entered into any

agreement for sale.

7. The Supreme Court in Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs Sta te of Uttar

Pradesh & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, decided on 16.04.2025 ,

held:-

“15. In Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this

Court quoted an earlier decision in Mohammed Ibrahim v.

State of Bihar, wherein, referring to Section 420 of the

IPC, it was observed that the offence under the said

Section requires the following ingredients to be satisfied:

“18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an

offence of cheating are made out. The essential

ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as follows:

(i) deception of a person either by making a false or

misleading representation or by dishonest

concealment or by any other act or omission;

(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person

to either deliver any property or to consent to the

4

retention thereof by any person or to intentionally

induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do

anything which he would not do or omit if he

were not so deceived; and

(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause

damage or harm to that person in body, mind,

reputation or property.”

16. Reference was also made to the decision in V.Y.

Jose v. State of Gujarat and it was observed:

“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “V.Y. Jose v.

State of Gujarat”, explicitly states that a contractual

dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to

initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of

„cheating‟, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is

existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of

making initial promise or representation thereof, from

the very beginning of the formation of contract. Further,

in the absence of the averments made in the complaint

petition wherefrom the ingredients of the offence can be

found out, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise

its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section

482 of the Cr. P.C. saves the inherent power of the High

Court, as it serves a salutary purpose viz. a person

should not undergo harassment of litigation for a

number of years, when no criminal offence is made out.

It is one thing to say that a case has been made out for

trial and criminal proceedings should not be quashed,

but another thing to say that a person must undergo a

criminal trial despite the fact that no offence has been

made out in the complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose

(supra) placed reliance on several earlier decisions in

“Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI”, “Indian Oil

Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.”, “Vir Prakash Sharma

v. Anil Kumar Agarwal” and “All Cargo Movers (I) (P)

Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain”.”

17. This Court, in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v.

State of Uttar Pradesh, highlighted the fine distinction

between the offences of criminal breach of trust and

cheating, observing that the two are antithetical in

nature and cannot coexist simultan eously. Police

officers and courts must carefully apply their minds to

5

determine whether the allegations genuinely constitute

the specific offence alleged.

18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court

referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab wherein it

was observed that a breach of contract does not give

rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless

fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the

beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of

failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate

criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on

the part of the party who is alleged to have committed

the offence of cheating should be established at the time

of entering into the transaction with the complainant,

otherwise the offence of cheating is not established or

made out.

19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a

great deal of caution in issuing process, particularly

when the matter is essentially of civil nature. The

prevalent impression that civil remedies, being time-

consuming, do not adequately protect the interests of

creditors or lenders should be discouraged and rejected

as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure.

Failure to do so results in the breakdown of the rule of

law and amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal

process.

20. In yet another case, again arising from criminal

proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh, this

Court was constrained to note recurring cases being

encountered wherein parties repeatedly attempted to

invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing

vexatious complaints, camouflaging allegations that are

ex facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These

attempts must not be entertained and should be

dismissed at the threshold. Reference was made to a

judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited v. K.M.

Johny, which held that courts should be watchful of the

difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though

there can be situations where the allegation may

constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there

has to be a conscious application of mind on these

aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has

grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in

6

motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record

detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on

record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The

Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence on

record and may even put questions to the

complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit answers

to find out the truth about the allegations. The

summoning order has to be passed when the complaint

or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is

material that supports and constitutes essential

ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should

not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.

21. Lastly, we would refer to another detailed judgment

of this Court in Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh,

which draws out the ingredients required to establish

an offence under Sections 406, 415, 420, 503 and 506

of the IPC in the following terms:

“36. An offence under Section 406 of the IPC requires

entrustment, which carries the implication that a person

handing over any property or on whose behalf the

property is handed over, continues to be the owner of

the said property. Further, the person handing over the

property must have confidence in the person taking the

property to create a fiduciary relationship between

them. A normal transaction of sale or exchange of

money/consideration does not amount to entrustment.

Clearly, the charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is not

even remotely made out.

37. The chargesheet states that the offence under

Section 420 is not made out. The offence of cheating

under Section 415 of the IPC requires dishonest

inducement, delivering of a property as a result of the

inducement, and damage or harm to the person so

induced. The offence of cheating is established when

the dishonest intention exists at the time when the

contract or agreement is entered, for the essential

ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of

fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by

deceiving him to deliver any property, to do or omit to do

anything which he would not do or omit if he had not

been deceived. As per the investigating officer, no

fraudulent and dishonest inducement is made out or

7

established at the time when the agreement was

entered.

38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the

accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though

it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not.

The intention of the accused to cause alarm must be

established by bringing evidence on record. The word

„intimidate‟ means to make timid or fearful, especially :

to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat

communicated or uttered by the person named in the

chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and

communicated by the said person to threaten the victim

for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word

„threat‟ refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or

pain on the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.

39. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka,

had referred to Section 506 which prescribes

punishment for the offence of „criminal intimidation‟ as

defined in Section 503 of the IPC, to observe that the

offence under Section 503 requires that there must be

an act of threating another person with causing an

injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the

person or reputation of any one in whom that person is

interested. This threat must be with the intent to cause

alarm to the person threatened or to do any act which

he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do an act which

he is entitled to do. Mere expression of any words

without any intent to cause alarm would not be

sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of

the IPC. The material and evidence must be placed on

record to show that the threat was made with an intent

to cause alarm to the complainant, or to cause them to

do, or omit to do an act. Considering the statutory

mandate, offence under Section 506 is not shown even

if we accept the allegation as correct.”

22. Significantly, this Court in Sharif Ahmed (supra)

cautioned courts to check such attempts of making out a

criminal case on the basis of vague and ex facie false

assertions.”

8

8. The Supreme Court in Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs State of Uttar

Pradesh & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, decided on 16.04.2025,

held:-

“15. In Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this

Court quoted an earlier decision in Mohammed

Ibrahim v. State of Bihar , wherein, referring to

Section 420 of the IPC, it was observed that the offence

under the said Section requires the following ingredients to

be satisfied:

“18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an

offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients

of the offence of “cheating” are as follows:

(i) deception of a person either by making a false or

misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or

by any other act or omission;

(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to

either deliver any property or to consent to the retention

thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person

so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would

not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and

(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause

damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation

or property.”

16. Reference was also made to the decision in V.Y.

Jose v. State of Gujarat and it was observed:

“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “V.Y. Jose v. State

of Gujarat”, explicitly states that a contractual dispute or

breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a

criminal proceeding. The ingredient of „cheating‟, as

defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a

fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise

or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the

formation of contract. Further, in the absence of the

averments made in the complaint petition wherefrom the

ingredients of the offence can be found out, the High Court

should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. saves

the inherent power of the High Court, as it serves a

salutary purpose viz. a person should not undergo

9

harassment of litigation for a number of years, when no

criminal offence is made out. It is one thing to say that a

case has been made out for trial and criminal proceedings

should not be quashed, but another thing to say that a

person must undergo a criminal trial despite the fact that

no offence has been made out in the complaint. This Court

in V.Y. Jose (supra) placed reliance on several earlier

decisions in “Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI”, “Indian

Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. ”, “Vir Prakash

Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal” and “All Cargo Movers (I)

(P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain”.”

17. This Court, in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State

of Uttar Pradesh, highlighted the fine distinction between

the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating,

observing that the two are antithetical in nature and

cannot coexist simultaneously. Police officers and courts

must carefully apply their minds to determine whether the

allegations genuinely constitute the specific offence

alleged.

18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court referred

to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab wherein it was observed

that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal

prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest

intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction.

Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will

not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the

dishonest intention on the part of the party who is alleged

to have committed the offence of cheating should be

established at the time of entering into the transaction with

the complainant, otherwise the offence of cheating is not

established or made out.

19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a

great deal of caution in issuing process, particularly when

the matter is essentially of civil nature. The prevalent

impression that civil remedies, being time-consuming, do

not adequately protect the interests of creditors or lenders

should be discouraged and rejected as criminal procedure

cannot be used to apply pressure. Failure to do so results

in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to misuse

and abuse of the legal process.

20. In yet another case, again arising from criminal

proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh, this

Court was constrained to note recurring cases being

10

encountered wherein parties repeatedly attempted to

invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing vexatious

complaints, camouflaging allegations that are ex

facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These attempts

must not be entertained and should be dismissed at the

threshold. Reference was made to a judgment of this Court

in Thermax Limited v. K.M. Johny, which held that courts

should be watchful of the difference between civil and

criminal wrongs, though there can be situations where the

allegation may constitute both civil and criminal wrongs.

Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind on

these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order

has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in

motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record

detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on

record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The

Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence on

record and may even put questions to the

complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit answers to

find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning

order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet

discloses an offence and when there is material that

supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the

offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly

or as a matter of course.

21. Lastly, we would refer to another detailed judgment of

this Court in Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which

draws out the ingredients required to establish an offence

under Sections 406, 415, 420, 503 and 506 of the IPC in

the following terms:

“36. An offence under Section 406 of the IPC requires

entrustment, which carries the implication that a person

handing over any property or on whose behalf the property

is handed over, continues to be the owner of the said

property. Further, the person handing over the property

must have confidence in the person taking the property to

create a fiduciary relationship between them. A normal

transaction of sale or exchange of money/consideration

does not amount to entrustment. Clearly, the

charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is not even remotely

made out.

37. The chargesheet states that the offence under Section

420 is not made out. The offence of cheating under

11

Section 415 of the IPC requires dishonest inducement,

delivering of a property as a result of the inducement, and

damage or harm to the person so induced. The offence of

cheating is established when the dishonest intention exists

at the time when the contract or agreement is entered, for

the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists

of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by

deceiving him to deliver any property, to do or omit to do

anything which he would not do or omit if he had not been

deceived. As per the investigating officer, no fraudulent

and dishonest inducement is made out or established at

the time when the agreement was entered.

38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the

accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it

does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The

intention of the accused to cause alarm must be

established by bringing evidence on record. The word

„intimidate‟ means to make timid or fearful, especially : to

compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat

communicated or uttered by the person named in the

chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and

communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for

the purpose of influencing her mind. The word „threat‟

refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the

other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.

39. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, had

referred to Section 506 which prescribes punishment for

the offence of „criminal intimidation‟ as defined in

Section 503 of the IPC, to observe that the offence under

Section 503 requires that there must be an act of threating

another person with causing an injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any

one in whom that person is interested. This threat must be

with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or

to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to

do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere expression of any

words without any intent to cause alarm would not be

sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of

the IPC. The material and evidence must be placed on

record to show that the threat was made with an intent to

cause alarm to the complainant, or to cause them to do, or

omit to do an act. Considering the statutory mandate,

offence under Section 506 is not shown even if we accept

the allegation as correct.”

12

22. Significantly, this Court in Sharif Ahmed (supra)

cautioned courts to check such attempts of making out a

criminal case on the basis of vague and ex facie false

assertions.”

9. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993 , Criminal Appeal No(s). ……… of 2022

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the Supreme Court held:-

“15. This Court has an occasion to consider the ambit and

scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482

CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings in Vineet

Kumar and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March,

2017. It may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of

the above judgment where the following was stated:

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is

necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section

482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High Court to

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to

any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and

laid down several principles which govern the exercise of

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A

three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L.

Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that the High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion

that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an

abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice

require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7

of the judgment, the following has been stated :

„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High

Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the

conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would

13

be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of

justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in

civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a

salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding

ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of

harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled

object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the

material on which the structure of the prosecution rests

and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the

proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are

higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to

be administered according to laws made by the legislature.

The compelling necessity for making these observations is

that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose

of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of

the High Court to do justice, between the State and its

subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width

and contours of that salient jurisdiction.‟

41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section

482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of

justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be

abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court

has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court

cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one

of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court

in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be

allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or

harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a

criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides

and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the

proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which is to

the following effect :

„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him

due to private and personal grudge.‟ Above Category 7 is

clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although,

14

the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana

v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not advert to

the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which

final report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully

satisfied that the present is a fit case where the High Court

ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482

CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings.”

16. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the

exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of

the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482

CrPC are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court

has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such

power should be exercised. This Court has held in para

102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal

and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of

decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they are

taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

15

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in

the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

support of the same do not disclose the commission

of any offence and make out a case against the

accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge.”

17. The principles culled out by this Court have

consistently been followed in the recent judgment of this

Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of

Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 315 .”

10. The present case falls under category 1, 3 and 7 of Para 102 of Bhajan

Lal (Supra).

11. The dispute in this case is clearly a civil dispute and that too in the

present case is not directly against the petitioners herein, considering

the nature of allegations.

16

12. The materials on record, do not prima facie show presence of the

ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged against the

petitioners herein and as such the proceeding in this case are liable to be

quashed in the interest of Justice and to prevent an abuse of the process

of law.

13. CRR 4125 of 2024 with CRR 4126 of 2024 are thus allowed.

14. The proceedings being Complaint Case No. C -1610 of 2018 under

Sections 406/415/418/420/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,

pending before the Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 7th Court,

Alipore, South 24 Parganas, is hereby quashed in respect of the

petitioners namely Amrapali Bose and Dipanjan Ray @ Dipayan Roy .

15. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

16. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

17. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary

compliance.

18. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied

expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.

[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]