2025 INSC 512 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.8592 of 2024)

RIKHAB BIRANI & ANR. ..... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ..... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna Birani, had entered

into an oral agreement to sell Roti Godown No. 28/27, Birhana Road,

Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh , to respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, for a

consideration of ₹1,35,00,000/ - (Rupees one crore thirty five lakhs

only) in June, 2020.

Respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, and her husband claimed that

they had paid an amount of ₹19,00,000/ - (Rupees nineteen lakhs only)

towards part-sale consideration between June and September , 2020.

It is the case of the appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna

Birani, that respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, had to pay 25 per cent

of the total sale consideration amount as advance on or before

15.09.2020. However, she was unable to pay the same. In fact, a

cheque of ₹10,00,000/ - (Rupees ten lakhs only) given by respondent

No.2, Shilpi Gupta, bounced due to insufficient funds. The

appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna Birani, relied upon some

2

WhatsApp messages and other communications inter se them and

respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, and her husband, whereby the latter

was asked to pay the unpaid amount and complete the sale transaction

by execution of a registered document. This was not done.

After about one year, on 03.09.2021, the appellants, Rikhab

Birani and Sadhna Birani, sold the aforesaid property by way of

registered sale deed dated 03.09.2021 at the lower price of

₹90,00,000/- (Rupees ninety lakhs only) statedly due to changed

circumstances.

It is the case of the appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna

Birani, that they had suffered losses of ₹45,00,000/- (Rupees forty

five lakhs only) on account of the failure of respondent No. 2,

Shilpi Gupta, and her husband , in paying the sale consideration amount

and abiding by the oral agreement; hence, they are not liable to

refund or pay any amount to respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta.

It is the accepted position that n either the appellants, Rikhab

Birani and Sadhna Birani, nor respondent No. 2, Shilpi Gupta,

initiated any civil proceedings. On the other hand, respondent No.2,

Shilpi Gupta, approached the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate ,

Kanpur Nagar, for registration of a First Information Report

1

by

taking recourse to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 .

2

However, by the detailed and reasoned order

dated 26.04.2022, the Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar ,

dismissed the application

3

under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.,

1

For short, “FIR”.

2

For short, “Cr.P.C.”.

3

Misc. Case No. 4732/2021.

3

holding that this is a civil matter and no criminal offence is made

out.

Respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, thereupon filed another criminal

complaint

4

on 14.06.2022 before the Court of the Metropolitan

Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar . The Metropolitan Magistrate had , thereupon,

called the Station House Officer of the Police Station – Harbans

Mohal, District - Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, to submit a report

under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. After receiving the report, the

Metropolitan Magistrate , Kanpur Nagar, vide judgment dated

14.07.2023, dismissed the criminal complaint, holding that the matter

is of civil nature.

Notwithstanding the two orders passed by the Metropolitan

Magistrate, referred to above, respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta,

directly approached the Police Station – Harbans Mohal, District –

Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, and registered FIR No. 78/2023 dated

22.07.2023 for the offence(s) punishable under Section s 420, 406,

354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

5

Aggrieved thereby and apprehending their arrest, the

appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna Birani, filed an application

for grant of anticipatory bail, which was granted to them till the

filing of the chargesheet.

The investigating officer, on 12.09.2023, filed a chargesheet

in the aforesaid FIR No.78/2023. We shall subsequently refer to the

contents of the chargesheet.

On the aforesaid chargesheet being filed, the Metropolitan

4

Complaint Case No. 90180/2022.

5

For short, “IPC”.

4

Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, notwithstanding the two earlier orders ,

passed on the same allegations , dismissing the criminal complaints

of respondent No.2, Shilpi Gupta, passed order dated 17.01.2024

taking cognizance and summoning the appellants, Rikhab Birani and

Sadhna Birani.

Thereupon, the appellants, Rikhab Birani and Sadhna Birani,

preferred a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before the High

Court,

6

which was dismissed by the High Court , vide the impugned

order dated 09.05.2024 , notwithstanding the aforesaid facts, stating

that at that stage, only a prima facie case was to be seen in the

light of the law laid down by this Court.

We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it

is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this

Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal

offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where

the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file

chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases .

During the last couple of months, a number of judgments /orders

have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from

the State of Uttar Pradesh , deprecating the stance of the police as

well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong

in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard

to and violation of contractual terms ; and a criminal offence under

Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite

different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is

6

A482 No. 7415/2024.

5

entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof.

In Lalit Chaturvedi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another,

7

this Court quoted an earlier decision in Mohammed Ibrahim

and Others v. State of Bihar and Another,

8

wherein, referring to

Section 420 of the IPC, it was observed that the offence under the

said Section requires the following ingredients to be satisfied:

“18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of

an offence of cheating are made out. The essential

ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as

follows:

(i) deception of a person either by making a false

or misleading representation or by dishonest

concealment or by any other act or omission;

(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that

person to either deliver any property or to consent

to the retention thereof by any person or to

intentionally induce that person so deceived to do

or omit to do anything which he would not do or

omit if he were not so deceived; and

(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to

cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind,

reputation or property. ”

Reference was also made to the decision in V.Y. Jose and Another

v. State of Gujarat and Another

9

and it was observed:

“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “ V.Y.

Jose v. State of Gujarat”, explicitly states that

a contractual dispute or breach of contract per

se should not lead to initiation of a criminal

proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as

defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence

of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making

initial promise or representation thereof, from the

very beginning of the formation of contract.

Further, in the absence of the averments made in

the complaint petition wherefrom the ingredients of

the offence can be found out, the High Court should

7

2024 SCC Online SC 171 .

8

(2009) 8 SCC 751.

9

(2009) 3 SCC 78.

6

not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. saves the inherent power of the High

Court, as it serves a salutary purpose viz. a

person should not undergo harassment of litigation

for a number of years, when no criminal offence is

made out. It is one thing to say that a case has

been made out for trial and criminal proceedings

should not be quashed, but another thing to say

that a person must undergo a criminal trial despite

the fact that no offence ha s been made out in the

complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose (supra) placed

reliance on several earlier decisions in “ Hira Lal

Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI”, “ Indian Oil

Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. ”, “Vir Prakash

Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal” and “All Cargo Movers

(I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain ”.”

This Court, in Delhi Race Club (194 0) Limited and Others v.

State of Uttar Pradesh and Another ,

10

highlighted the fine distinction

between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating,

observing that the two are antithetical in nature and cannot coexist

simultaneously. Police officers and courts must carefully apply their

minds to determine whether the allegations genuinely constitute the

specific offence alleged.

In Kunti and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another ,

11

this Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Another

12

wherein it was observed that a breach of contract does not give rise

to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest

intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely

on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to

initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on the

part of the party who is alleged to have committed the offence of

10

(2024) 10 SCC 690.

11

(2023) 6 SCC 109.

12

(2023) 5 SCC 360.

7

cheating should be established at the time of entering into the

transaction with the complainant, otherwise the offence of cheating

is not established or made out.

It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a great

deal of caution in issuing process, particularly when the matter is

essentially of civil nature.

13

The prevalent impression that civil

remedies, being time-consuming, do not adequately protect the

interests of creditors or lenders should be discouraged and rejected

as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure.

14

Failure to

do so results in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to

misuse and abuse of the legal process.

In yet another case , again arising from criminal proceedings

initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh ,

15

this Court was constrained

to note recurring cases being encountered wherein parties repeatedly

attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing

vexatious complaints, camouflaging allegations that are ex facie

outrageous or are pure civil claims . These attempts must not be

entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. Reference was

made to a judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited and Others v.

K.M. Johny and Others,

16

which held that courts should be watchful of

the difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though there can

be situations where the allegation may constitute both civil and

criminal wrongs. Further, there has to be a conscious application of

13

G. Sagar Suri and Another v. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636.

14

Vijay Kumar Ghai and Others v. State of West Bengal and Others , (2022) 7

SCC 124.

15

Deepak Gaba and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2023) 3 SCC

423.

16

(2011) 13 SCC 412.

8

mind on these aspects by the Magistrate , as a summoning order has

grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though

the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons , there

should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings

into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence

on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating

officer etc. to elicit answers to find out the truth about the

allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint

or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that

supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence. The

summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.

Lastly, we would refer to another detailed judgment of this

Court in Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another,

17

which draws out the ingredients required to establish an

offence under Sections 406, 415, 420, 503 and 506 of the IPC in the

following terms:

“36. An offence under Section 406 of

the IPC requires entrustment, which carries the

implication that a person handing over any property

or on whose behalf the property is handed over,

continues to be the owner of the said property.

Further, the person handing over the pr operty must

have confidence in the person taking the property

to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A

normal transaction of sale or exchange of

money/consideration does not amount to entrustment.

Clearly, the charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is

not even remotely made out.

37. The chargesheet states that the offence under

Section 420 is not made out. The offence of cheating

under Section 415 of the IPC requires dishonest

inducement, delivering of a property as a result of

the inducement, and damage or harm to the person so

17

2024 SCC OnLine SC 726.

9

induced. The offence of cheating is established

when the dishonest intention exists at the time

when the contract or agreement is entered, for the

essential ingredient of the offence of cheating

consists of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of

a person by deceiving him to deliver any property,

to do or omit to do anything which he would not do

or omit if he had not been deceived. As per the

investigating officer, no fraudulent and dishonest

inducement is made out or established at the time

when the agreement was entered.

38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when

the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim,

though it does not matter whether the victim is

alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to

cause alarm must be established by bringing

evidence on record. The word ‘intimidate’ means to

make timid or fearful, especially : to compel or

deter by or as if by threats. The threat

communicated or uttered by the person named in the

chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and

communicated by the said pe rson to threaten the

victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The

word ‘threat’ refers to the intent to inflict

punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury

involves doing an illegal act.

39. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of

Karnataka, had referred to Section 506 which

prescribes punishment for the offence of ‘criminal

intimidation’ as defined in Section 503 of the IPC,

to observe that the offence under Section 503

requires that there must be an act of threating

another person with causing an injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or

reputation of any one in whom that person is

interested. This threat must be with the intent to

cause alarm to the person threaten ed or to do any

act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to

do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere

expression of any words without any intent to cause

alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an

offence under Section 506 of the IPC. The material

and evidence must be placed on record to show that

the threat was made with an intent to cause alarm

to the complainant, or to cause them to do, or omit

to do an act. Considering the statutory mandate,

offence under Section 506 is not shown even if we

accept the allegation as correct. ”

10

Significantly, this Court in Sharif Ahmed (supra) cautioned

courts to check such attempts of making out a criminal case on the

basis of vague and ex facie false assertions.

Further, Sharif Ahmed (supra) exposits the legal position

relating to the ingredients and contents of a chargesheet, drawing

upon several earlier judgments of this Court which elucidate the

contents of a police report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It

also clarifies the course of action to be adopted by the Magistrate

when the chargesheet is found to be incomplete or vague in content.

In this context, reference may be made to Sections 190 and 204 of

the Cr.P.C., as well as Sections 211 to 213 and 218 of the Cr.P.C.,

which collectively govern the framing and contents of a charge. Some

of the portions of this judgment are reproduced below:

“13. The question of the required details being

complete must be understood in a way which gives

effect to the true intent of the chargesheet under

Section 173(2) of the Code. The requirement of

“further evidence” or a “supplementary chargesheet”

as referred to under Section 173(8) of the Code, is

to make additions to a complete chargesheet,8 and

not to make up or reparate for a chargesheet which

does not fulfil requirements of Section 173(2) of

the Code. The chargesheet is complete when it refers

to material and evidence sufficient to take

cognizance and for the trial. The nature and

standard of evidence to be elucidated in a

chargesheet should prima facie show that an offence

is established if the material and evidence is

proven. The chargesheet is complete where a case is

not exclusively dependent on further evidence. The

trial can proceed on the basis of evidence and

material placed on record with the chargesheet.

This standard is not overly technical or fool -

proof, but a pragmatic balance to protect the

innocent from harassment due to delay as well as

prolonged incarceration, and yet not curtail the

right of the prosecution to forward further

evidence in support of the charges.

11

XX XX XX

16. This Court in Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of

Delhi) while referring to Sections 190 and 204 of

the Code has observed that the expression

“cognisance” in Section 190 merely means “becoming

aware of”, and when used with reference to a court

or a judge it connotes “to take notice of

judicially”. It indicates the juncture at which the

court or Magistrate takes judicial notice of the

offence with a view to initiate proceedings in

respect of such an offence. This is different from

initiation of proceedings. Rather, it is a

condition precedent to the initiation of

proceedings by a Magistrate or judge. At this stage,

the Magistrate has to keep in mind the averments in

the complaint or the police report, and has to

evaluate whether there is sufficient ground for

initiation of proceedings. This is not the same as

the consideration of sufficient grounds for

conviction, as whether evidence is sufficient for

supporting the conviction or not, can be determined

only at the stage of trial, and not at the stage of

cognisance. This aspect i s important and will be

subsequently referred to when we examine the

decision of this Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of

India, and the observations therein which have been

referred to on several occasions in other

judgments.

17. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the

Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for

issue of summons and this is not a prerequisite for

deciding the validity of the summons. Nevertheless,

the requirement of the Code is that the summons is

issued when it appears to the Magistrate that there

is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused. Summons is issued to the person against

whom the legal proceedings have commenced. Wilful

disobedience is liable to be punished under

Section 174 of the Penal Code, 1860. As a sequitur,

keeping in mind both the language of Section 204 of

the Code and the penal consequences, the Magistrate

is mandated to form an opinion as to whether there

exists sufficient ground for summons to be issued.

While deciding whether summons is to be issued to

a person, the Magistrate can take into

consideration any prima facie improbabilities

arising in the case. The parameters on which a

summoning order can be interfered with are well

settled by the decision of this court in Bhushan

Kumar (supra). The Magistrate in terms of Section

204 of the Code is required to exercise his judicial

12

discretion with a degree of caution, even when he

is not required to record reasons, on whether there

is sufficient ground for proceeding. Proceedings

initiated by a criminal court are generally not

interfered with by High Courts, unless necessary to

secure the ends of justice.

XX XX XX

19. Sections 211 to 213 and Section 218 of the Code

deal with the contents of the charge. The object

and purpose of these provisions is to bring the

nature of allegations against the accused to his

notice. These allegations have to be proved and

established by leading evidence. The accused should

not be taken by surprise or be unbeknownst so as to

cause prejudice to him. The provisions of the Code

also prescribe how to interpret the words used in

the charge in terms of Section 214 of the Code, the

effect of defects in the charge in terms of Section

215 of the Code, the power of the court to alter

the charge and recall of the witnesses when a charge

is altered in terms of Sections 216 and 217 of the

Code.

20. There is an inherent connect between the

chargesheet submitted under Section 173(2) of the

Code, cognisance which is taken under Section 190

of the Code, issue of process and summoning of the

accused under Section 204 of the Code, and thereupon

issue of notice under Section 251 of the Code, or

the charge in terms of Chapter XVII of the Code.

The details set out in the chargesheet have a

substantial impact on the efficacy of procedure at

the subsequent stages. The chargesheet is integral

to the process of taking cognisance, the issue of

notice and framing of charge, being the only

investigative document and evidence available to

the court till that stage. Substantiated reasons

and grounds for an offence being made in the

chargesheet are a key resource for a Magistrate to

evaluate whether there are sufficient grounds for

taking cognisance, initiating proceedings, and then

issuing notice, framing charges etc.

XX XX XX

26. The object and purpose of the police

investigation is manyfold. It includes the need to

ensure transparent and free investigation to

ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an

offence is committed, identify the offender if an

offence is committed, and to lay before the court

13

the evidence which has been collected, the truth

and correctness of which is thereupon decided by

the court.

27. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of

Delhi21, this Court notes that the process of

investigation generally consists of : 1) proceeding

to the concerned spot, 2) ascertainment of facts

and circumstances, 3) discovery and arrest, 4)

collection of evidence which includes examination

of various persons, search of places and seizure of

things, and 5) formation of an opinion on whether

an offence is made out, and filing the chargesheet

accordingly. The formation of opinion is therefore

the culmination of several stages that an

investigation goes through. This Court in its

decision in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra22

states that the submission of the chargesheet or

the final report is dependent on the nature of

opinion formed, which is the final step in the

investigation.

28. The final report has to be prepared with these

aspects in mind and should show with sufficient

particularity and clarity, the contravention of the

law which is alleged. When the report complies with

the said requirements, the court concerned should

apply its mind whether or not to take cognisance

and also proceed by issuing summons to the accused.

While doing so, the court will take into account

the statement of witnesses recorded under Section

161 of the Code and the documents placed on record

by the investigating officer.

29. In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in

ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Magistrate

can, before taking cognisance, call upon the

investigating officer to clarify and give better

particulars, order further investigation, or even

record statements in terms of Section 202 of the

Code.

XX XX XX ”

The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars

and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the

Cr.P.C. It merely reproduce s the contents of the FIR which make s

reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the

14

revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of

Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted

that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that

Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund

of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and

evidence available and collected during the course of the

investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354,

504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid

are not established and made out.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned

judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the

resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet.

We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question

of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations

on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2.

We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/ - (Rupees

fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as , in spite of

repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with

cases of civil wrong s being made the subject matter of criminal

proceedings by filing chargesheet s, etc.

These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh within

a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this

order. It will be open to the State of Uttar Pradesh to conduct

internal enquiries and collect this amount from the delinquent and

responsible officers. Registry is directed to communicate a copy of

this order to the Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh who

shall be responsible for ensuring the payment of costs.

15

We would have imposed costs on the complainant -respondent No.2

also but are refraining from doing so on account of the possibility

that she was persuaded and guided by wrong legal advice.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

................CJI.

(SANJIV KHANNA)

..................J.

(SANJAY KUMAR)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 16, 2025.