criminal law, procedure
 06 Feb, 2026
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Aniket S/O Damodar Hatwar Vs. State Of Maharashtra & Sanjubai W/O Jodhraj Bagriya

  Bombay High Court APL NO. 1440 OF 2025
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Case Background

As per case facts, the applicant was convicted for offences including causing death by negligence and rash driving following an accident where his car hit a minor girl. After conviction, ...

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1 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO. 1440 OF 2025

Aniket s/o Damodar Hatwar,

Age 39 years, Occ: Service,

R/o Siraspeth, Telipura, Plot No.

365, Near Hanuman Temple, Nagpur.APPLICANT

Versus

1.State of Maharashtra,

Through Police Station Imamwada,

Nagpur.

2.Sanjubai w/o Jodhraj Bagriya,

Age 39 years, Occ: Household,

R/o Gram Dhakad, Khedi, Tahsil -

Anta, Dharan, Kheri, Baran District

Rajasthan – 325202. NON-APPLICANTS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mr. S.M. Mate, Advocate for the Applicant.

Mr. A.M. Joshi, APP for the Non-applicant No. 1/State.

Mr. A.G. Shitut, Advocate for the Non-applicant No.2.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CORAM :URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.

RESERVED ON : 04

th

FEBRUARY, 2026.

PRONOUNCED ON : 06

th

FEBRUARY, 2026.

ORAL JUDGMENT :- 2026:BHC-NAG:1975-DB

2 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

1. Heard.

2. ADMIT. Heard finally by the consent of learned

Counsel for the respective parties.

3. The present Application is preferred by the

Applicant under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 for quashing the judgment of conviction

of the Applicant and for acquitting him of the charges.

4. Heard Mr. Mate, learned Counsel for the Applicant,

Mr. Joshi, learned APP for the Non-applicant No.1/State and

Mr. Shitut, learned Counsel for the Non-applicant No.2.

5. Learned Counsel for the Applicant submitted that,

the present Applicant was convicted in S.C.C. No.4888/2023 of

the offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal

Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six

months and pay a fine of Rs.45,000/- and in default to suffer

simple imprisonment for one month. He further convicted for

the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the

Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous

3 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in

default to suffer simple imprisonment for fifteen days

respectively. He was also convicted for the offence punishable

under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act and sentenced to

pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- and in default to suffer simple

imprisonment for ten days.

6. After conviction the Applicant preferred an Appeal.

However, during the pendency of the Appeal, the parties arrived

at a settlement and as per the settlement the Applicant has paid

the compensation to the Non-applicant No.2. Now, the

Non-applicant No.2 do not want to proceed with the further

proceeding. She has also filed affidavit in reply, wherein she has

accepted the settlement terms between them. As regards, the

law regarding the settlement after conviction is concerned, he

submitted that, now the issue is not remained as res integra, the

High Court can quash such proceedings in exercise of its

inherent powers under Section 482 of Code of Criminal

Procedure (for short “CrPC”), even if the offences are

non-compoundable. The High Court can evaluate the

consequential effects of the offence and thereafter, adopt a

4 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

pragmatic approach. Thus, it is submitted that, in view of the

catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court the power of the

High Court under Section 482 of CrPC/528 of BNSS are not

restricted one.

7. In support of his contention he placed reliance on

Maya Sanjay Khandare & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra,

2021(1) Mh.L.J. 613, Ramgopal & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (2022) 14 SCC 531 and Criminal Application (APL)

No. 308/2024 decided on 20.06.2024.

8. Per contra, learned APP vehemently opposed the

said Application and submitted that, if such compromises are

allowed to be considered after the conviction, then it will give a

wrong message to the society. He submits that, though this

Court has power to consider the settlement post conviction,

however the principles have been summarised by the Hon’ble

Apex Court as to the quashment of the proceeding. The offence

are not compoundable in view of Section 320 of CrPC. In view

of that, the Application deserves to be rejected.

5 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

9. Learned Counsel for the Non-applicant No.2,

supported the contention of the learned Counsel for the

Applicant and submitted that in view of settlement, the Non-

applicant No.2 has no objection to quash the FIR.

10. Before entering into the issue whether this is a fit

case wherein the FIR can be quashed post conviction, it is

necessary to refer the Full Bench decision of this Court in the

case of Maya Sanjay Khandare (supra), wherein the following

questions were framed, which are as under:

“(A) In a prosecution which has culminated in a

conviction, whether the power under section 482, Criminal

Procedure Code ought to be exercised for quashing the

prosecution/conviction altogether, (instead of maintaining

it and considering the issue of modification of the

sentence) upon a settlement between the convict and the

victim/complainant?

(B) Whether the broader principles/parameters as set out

in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, 2013(1)

Mh.L.J. (Cri.) (S.C.) 417 = (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder

Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014(4) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) (S.C.)

241 = (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Parbatbhai Aahir and others

vs. State of Gujarat, 2018(2) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) (S.C.) 1 =

(2017) 9 SCC 641 have been correctly applied in deciding

Udhav Kisanrao Ghodse, Ajmatkhan Rahematkhan and

Shivaji Haribhau Jawanjal?”

11. While considering the questions framed and after

taking into consideration the previous decisions of this Court as

6 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Full Bench of this Court

held in para 33, which reads as under:

“33. While answering Question (A) we may observe in

the light of the settled legal position as under:

At the conclusion of the criminal trial the Court on

finding the evidence on record led by the prosecution to be

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused would proceed

to convict the accused. The remedy of challenging the

order of conviction is available to the accused by way of an

appeal. Any compromise entered into post-conviction for a

non-compoundable offence cannot by itself result in

acquittal of the accused. Similarly, the Court has no power

to compound any offence that is non-compoundable and

not permitted to be compounded under Section 320 of the

Code. The compromise entered into therefore is just a

mitigating factor that can be taken into account while

hearing the appeal/revision challenging the conviction and

which factor has to be taken into consideration while

imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. It is not

permissible to set aside the judgment of conviction at the

appellate/revisional stage only on the ground that the

parties have entered into a compromise. In a given case the

appellate Court/revisional Court also has the option of not

accepting the compromise. Thus if the judgment of

conviction cannot be set aside in an appeal/revision only

on the ground that the parties have entered into a

compromise similar result cannot be obtained in a

proceeding under Section 482 of the Code.

Hence, we hold that ordinarily the contention that

the convict and the informant/complainant have entered

into a compromise after the judgment of conviction can be

raised only before the appellate/revisional Court in

proceedings challenging such conviction. It would be a

sound exercise of discretion under Section 482 of the Code

and in accordance with the law of the land to refuse to

quash criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non-

compoundable offence only on the ground that the parties

have entered into a compromise. Instead the Court can

permit the convicted party to bring to the notice of the

appellate/revisional Court the aspect of compromise.

Having said so, it is only in rarest of rare cases that the

Court may quash the criminal proceedings post-conviction

7 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

for a non-compoundable offence on settlement between

the convict and the informant/complainant. To illustrate,

where a jurisdictional issue going to the root of the matter

is raised for challenging the conviction or in matrimonial

disputes where the parties have agreed to settle their

differences, jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code

could be exercised. Such exercise of jurisdiction should be

limited to the rarest of rare cases when found necessary to

prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure

the ends of justice. Thus while holding that inherent power

under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised for

quashing criminal proceedings even at the

appellate/revisional stage as held in Kiran T. Ingale (supra)

such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the extent

stated hereinabove. The ratio of the decision in Kiran T.

Ingale (supra) has to be applied subject to aforesaid

limitations. Further, the expression “criminal proceedings”

would cover the entire journey of the proceedings

commencing from its initiation till the proceedings

culminate giving it seal of finality. Question (A) is

answered accordingly.”

12. In the case of Ramgopal & Anr. (supra), wherein the

Hon’ble Apex Court as to the legal position as to exercise of

inherent powers by the High Court while quashing of criminal

proceedings or the conviction for the non-compoundable

offences, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise

between the victim and the offender, summarised as under:

(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable

offences under Section 320 CrPC can be exercised having

overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or

arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes

and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute

amongst themselves;

8 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

(2) Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions

which involved heinous and serious offences of mental

depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such

offences are not private in nature and have a serious

impact on society;

(3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the

offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of

Corruption Act or the offences committed by public

servants while working in that capacity are not to be

quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the

victim and the offender;

(4) While exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-

compoundable offences, which are private in nature and

do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that

there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and

the offender, the High Court is required to consider the

antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused,

namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he

was absconding, how he had managed with the

complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”

13. In para 19 of Ramgopal & Anr. (supra), wherein it is

further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which reads as under:

“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section

320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the

compromise between the parties in respect of offences

“compoundable” within the statutory framework, the

extraordinary power enjoined upon a High

Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court

under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked

beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC.

Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide

amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of

quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:

19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of

the society;

19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;

19.3. Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused

and the victim; and

9 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

19.4. Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after

the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other

relevant considerations.”

14. In Ramgopal & Anr. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court

was of the view that when the dispute is settled, then it should

be seen by the Court that the complete justice is done in order

to maintain peace and relation between the parties if they

arrived at a compromise at the later point of time, within the

parameters laid down, such powers under Section 482 of CrPC

can be exercised. The Full Bench of this Court in Maya Sanjay

Khandare (supra) was called upon to decide the issue regarding

the scope of Section 482 of CrPC in setting aside the conviction

due to compromise between the parties. Various decisions have

been considered by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex

Court, which include the decisions referred above and

thereupon, the question ‘A’ has been answered. On repetition it

can be said that, the Full Bench of this Court held that while

exercising inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC for

quashing a criminal proceedings, the decision of this Court in

Kiran Tulshiram Vs. Anupama, reported in 2006(2) Mh.L.J.

(Cri.) 402, can be exercised in a limited way. The expression

“Criminal Proceedings” would cover the entire journey of the

10 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

proceedings commencing from its initiation till the proceedings

culminate giving it seal of finality. Thus, there is no hurdle in

considering the settlements arrived at between the parties

subject to the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in Ramgopal & Anr. (supra) and in Maya Sanjay Khandare

(supra) by the Full Bench of this Court. It is with this view to

see whether the parties in respective cases can be allowed to

compound the offence or not.

15. The facts of the present case shows that on

18.12.2022 in the evening at about 06.00 to 07.00 hours the

Complainant was selling caps and clothes of Santa Claus and

Toys near Aasha Nursing Home at Apsara Square. At the

relevant time, her two daughters were with her. Her one of the

daughter aged about 7 years went at the shop near Amma

Hospital to bring chocolate. There was one black dog standing

near the said shop. The said dog came towards her, and

therefore, deceased frightened and ran towards the road from

the front side of the standing car. At that time, one red colour

Car came from Aawari Square and was proceeding from Apsara

Square to Ashok Chowk. The said Car was in speed. The said

11 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

Car dashed to her daughter Suman and she met with the said

accident and sustained injuries. The number of the said Car was

MH-12-EX-4130. Thereafter, Suman was taken in the Hospital

and she was declared dead. Hence, the report was lodged. On

the basis of said report Police have registered the crime and

during investigation the Investigating Officer has prepared spot

panchnama, recorded the relevant statements of witnesses and

collected the P.M. notes. After completion of the investigation,

the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet against the

accused for the said offence. During trial the prosecution has

adduced the evidence to prove the charge against the present

Applicant. After appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial

Court held the present Applicant guilty under the provisions

mentioned above.

16. Learned Counsel for the Applicant submitted that,

even accepting the evidence of the prosecution as it is, the

evidence of the Investigating Officer shows that she admitted

during the cross examination that this could be a pure accident

because the car driver who is coming from the back side unable

to see the person who is proceeding front side of the said black

12 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

colour four wheeler vehicle which is standing in no-parking

zone. The Investigating Officer further admitted all the incident

of said footage that as it is seen that there is one girl and one

black dog and one girl due to fear of the said dog is proceeding

towards the road from the front side of black car standing in

front of Hotel, at that time, it is seen that one red colour car is

proceeding on the spot of incident which came from Apsara

Square to Aawari Square. The Investigating Officer further

admitted that, it is seen that one red colour four wheeler vehicle

slowly taking turn and on the spot of incident, one black colour

four wheeler vehicle was standing in no-parking zone. Thus, the

evidence of the Investigating Officer shows that at the time of

incident one black dog and one black colour four wheeler car

were standing in front of Tanduri Chaska and at that time

deceased scared of the dog and ran towards the road, at the

relevant time the car came and there was a dash. Thus, it is a

pure accident. The CCTV footage of the timing which was

shown to the Investigating Officer and he has admitted the said

fact.

17. He also invited my attention towards the evidence

of the Complainant. During cross-examination the Complainant

13 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

has admitted that in front of the chocolate shop one car was

standing there and near the said chocolate shop one black dog

was also there and the said dog came towards her daughter, and

therefore, her daughter ran towards the road. She also admitted

that, one red colour car came from Aawari Square and turned

on left side and also turned to Ashok Square.

18. Thus, he submitted that not only the Investigating

Officer but the Complainant the mother of the deceased also

admitted these facts. Therefore, the inference can be drawn that

the accident took place as the deceased suddenly ran towards

the road due to she scared from the dog, at that time the

offending car came and dashed her. Thus, it is a pure accident.

19. He also invited my attention towards the

observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramgopal

& Anr. (supra), wherein it is observed that true it is that

offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be

compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its

powers under Section 320 CrPC. Any such attempt by the court

would amount to alteration, addition and modification of

Section 320 CrPC, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature.

14 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of

Section 320 CrPC, which may justify its wider interpretation and

include such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences

which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable.

Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence

within the framework of Section 320 CrPC is not an embargo

against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it

under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court, keeping in view the

peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable

reasons can press Section 482 CrPC in aid to prevent abuse of

the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

20. It is further observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

para 12, 13 & 14, which reads as under:

“12.The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature

of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably

settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented

to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such

proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under

Section 482 CrPC, even if the offences are non-

compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate

the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of

an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach,

to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does

not tinker with or paralyse the very object of the

administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving

non-heinous offences or where the offences are

predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled

15 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

irrespective of the fact that trial has already been

concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.

Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering

justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always

subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that

the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the

High Court ought to exercise such discretion with

rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding

the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has

been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and

seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the

accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for

exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482

CrPC would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be

no hard-and-fast line constricting the power of the High

Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of

inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC may lead to rigid

or specious justice, which in the given facts and

circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice.

On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have

been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to

be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in

Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 and

State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688.

14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences

which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on

the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters

concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two

individuals or groups only, for such offences have the

potential to impact the society at large. Effacing

abominable offences through quashing process would not

only send a wrong signal to the community but may also

accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or

professional offenders, who can secure a

‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes

or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty

man escape, if it can be avoided.”

21. Admittedly, it is not necessary to go into much

details as to whether the learned Trial Court was justified in

convicting the Applicant and while awarding the punishment

when he was invoking Sections 304 and 279 of IPC but taking

16 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

into consideration the facts of the case and the evidence as

discussed above, it is certain that the accident occurred as the

deceased scared of dog and she suddenly ran towards the road,

at that time the vehicle approached to the road and driver of the

vehicle could not see and the accident occurred. It is true that,

the driver of the vehicle to take into consideration the road

situation and has to take due care and caution while driving the

vehicle which is in his possession.

22. However, considering the principles laid down by

the Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., 2012(10) SCC 303,

wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:

“61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a

criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of

its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from

the power given to a criminal court for compounding

the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent

power is of wide plenitude with no statutory

limitation but it has to be exercised in accord

with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.(i) to secure

the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent

abuse of the process of any court. In what cases

power to quash the criminal proceeding or

complaint or FIR may be exercised where the

offender and the victim have settled their

dispute would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no category can

be prescribed. However, before exercise of such

power, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious

17 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,

rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even

though the victim or victim's family and the offender

have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private

in nature and have a serious impact on society.

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the

offender in relation to the offences under special

statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the

offences committed by public servants while working

in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for

quashing criminal proceedings involving such

offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly

and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different

footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the

offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile,

civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences

arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the

family disputes where the wrong is basically private or

personal in nature and the parties have resolved their

entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court

may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because

of the compromise between the offender and the victim,

the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and

continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to

great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice

would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case

despite full and complete settlement and compromise with

the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider

whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest

of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or

continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount

to abuse of process of law despite settlement and

compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and

whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that

the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the

above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court

shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.”

23. Having apprise the above parameters and the law

laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court the Application can be

categorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminal

18 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

proceedings of private nature in the light of the observation

made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr.

(supra). Especially in the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court

that the cause of administration of criminal justice system

would remain uneffected on acceptance of the amicable

settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the

Appellants; more so looking at their present age.

24. Insofar as the present Application is concerned, the

Applicant and the Complainant have jointly stated before this

Court that they have settled their disputes. The reply filed by

the Non-applicant No.2, wherein also she has stated that she

has settled the dispute with the present Applicant. Admittedly,

the factum of compromise and settlement between the parties

have been raised for the first time before this Court. However,

considering the nature of the offence and as rightly pointed out

by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that despite the

settlement, continuation of the criminal proceeding would

tantamount to abuse of process of law.

19 APL.1440-2025.JUDGMENT.odt

25. In view of the above said observation and nature of

the offence, the Application deserves to be allowed. Accordingly,

I proceed to pass the following order.

O R D E R

i.The Application is allowed.

ii.The judgment of conviction passed in S.C.C.

No.4888/2023 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Nagpur, is hereby quashed and set aside.

Consequently, the Applicant is acquitted from the

charges.

26. Pending application/s, if any, shall stand disposed of

accordingly.

(URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)

S.D.Bhimte

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