2026 INSC 85 Page 1 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No.3738 of 2023

Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa

...Appellant

Versus

The State of Meghalaya

...Respondent

W I T H

Criminal Appeal No. of 2026

[@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1798 of 2025]

J U D G M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. An enquiry, commenced with a missing person

complaint, led, to the arrest of the appellants, discovery of

the body; exhumed from a graveyard, recovery of a rope;

allegedly used to strangulate the victim, allegation of

ransom calls received and recovery of material possessions

of the victim from the house of one of the accused and a

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

mobile phone from a witness. These coupled with the last

seen theory; as purportedly stated by the witnesses,

resulted in the prosecution being lodged before the Trial

Court. The Trial Court after examining the evidence found it

to be not sufficient to enter a finding of guilt, resulting in the

acquittal of the accused. The High Court on an appeal by the

State found that the five golden principles as enunciated in

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

1

adequately satisfied, bringing forth a conclusion only of a

hypothesis of guilt excluding all possible hypothesis of

innocence. There is no weak link, and the chain of

circumstances is complete was the finding of the High

Court. The High Court reversed the judgment of the Trial

Court but found no kidnapping as charged, all the same

finding the accused guilty of murder (Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

2

) and causing disappearance of

evidence (Section 201 of the IPC).

3. We are, in the above appeals, confronted with the

divergence of opinion as expressed by the Trial Court and

1

(1984) 4 SCC 116

2

For brevity ‘the IPC’

Page 3 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

the High Court respectively. We heard Sh. Subhro Sanyal,

Advocate-on-Record and Sh.Ajay Sabharwal, Advocate

appearing for the two appellants and Sh. Avijit Mani

Tripathi, Advocate-on-Record appearing for the State.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the accused argued

that a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal was reversed by

the High Court without any compelling reason and without

recording a clear finding as to whether the view taken by

the Trial Court was a possible view, bringing forth a

reasonable doubt. The trite principle that an acquittal by

one Court reinforces the presumption of innocence

available to the accused, not liable to be displaced lightly,

was thrown to the winds. The High Court has substituted its

own inferences on the evidence led. There is no valid last

seen theory coming out of the evidence and there is no

clarity as to the exact time of death. Neither was the

recovery of the murder weapon (rope) proved, nor was it

found to have any connection with the crime, the traces of

which having not been detected in a forensic analysis. The

allegation of ransom calls having been made to the father of

the victim was not at all established. The confessional

Page 4 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

statements are full of inconsistencies, not made voluntarily

and does not contain any inculpatory statements. Further,

there can be no conviction based merely on the

confessional statement, which also was retracted. The

cumulative effect of the lapses in investigation and the

complete absence of incriminating circumstances; the

former of which was specifically noticed by the High Court,

ought to have persuaded the High Court to not disturb the

acquittal by the Trial Court.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the State would,

however, vehemently put forth the incriminating

circumstances coming out from the last seen theory and

recovery of the weapon and the other possessions of the

victim, as also the confessional statement, the last of which,

per State, corroborates the entire prosecution story. The

learned counsel specifically referred to the decisions of this

Court in Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v.

State of Maharashtra

3

and Manoharan v. State by

Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station,

3

(2012) 9 SCC 1

Page 5 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

Coimbatore

4

to urge that a confessional statement

voluntarily made, even if retracted, can still be reckoned to

bring home a conviction, which has been successfully done

in the present case. The High Court rightly reversed the

judgment of the Trial Court, and the conviction has to be

upheld, asserts learned Counsel for the State.

6. We would examine the evidence led, keeping in mind

the principles regulating a case of circumstantial evidence

stated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

1

as harmonized with the

principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court in

dealing with an appeal from an acquittal as has been

delineated in Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka

5

.

As we noticed, the prosecution went to trial with the last

seen together theory, the discovery of the dead body at the

instance of A1, recovery of the rope; allegedly used for

strangulation, at the instance of A2 and the seizure of various

articles belonging to the deceased from the house of A2, the

seizure of a mobile from the possession of PW11, and the

confessional statement of both the accused under Section

4

(2020) 5 SCC 782

5

(2007) 4 SCC 415

Page 6 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

6

as also the medical

and forensic evidence put forth before the Trial Court,

which though disbelieved by the Trial Court was reckoned

by the High Court to enter a conviction. We will in the

course of the judgment only refer to the witnesses who are

relevant from the 34 witnesses paraded by the prosecution

before the Trial Court.

7. The First Information Statement (FIS) was by PW1, a

Professor of the College in which the deceased was

studying, who was also his local guardian. PW1 was

informed by the roommates of the deceased that he did not

return to his room on the evening of 18.02.2006. It was also

stated that the deceased reportedly was last seen in Police

Bazar with a friend by the name of Bernard; the first accused.

Even according to PW1, who deposed in tandem with the

FIS, he along with the roommates of the deceased

approached Bernard, the first accused and met him at Police

Bazar, when the later told him that though he was with the

deceased on the evening of 18.02.2006, the deceased had

6

For brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.’

Page 7 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

left in a Maruti car bearing registration number of Delhi with

a dent on the right side, in which car there were two more

persons who claimed to be friends of the deceased from

Siliguri.

8. On the next day, the first accused was arrested at 10

AM i.e. on 20.02.2006. On the arrest of A1, he is said to have

led PW33 to the house of A2 from where a silver color chain

and a spectacle was seized, which allegedly belonged to

the victim. On 21.02.2006, again it was stated that A1 led the

police party under PW33 to the graveyard at Mawroh from

where the body of the deceased was exhumed and sent for

post-mortem. But for the I.O, none spoke of A1 having led

the police to the spot nor was there any statement recorded

under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.

9. A2 was arrested on 23.02.2006, who led to the

recovery of the rope. One another person, Mohd. Akbar

Qureshi, though arrested on 21.02.2006, was discharged

after investigation. The post-mortem report was marked by

PW2, doctor. PW2 spoke of ligature marks on the front

portion of the neck of the dead body and the spleen in a

ruptured state, on opening the abdomen. There was also

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

presence of air bubbles in the lungs and there were multiple

abrasions on the left lateral aspect of the chest and

abdomen. On the basis of the above findings, it was opined

in the post-mortem report that the cause of death was

asphyxia by strangulation with a ‘hard, blunt and long rope’

(sic). The time of death of the victim was recorded as about

48 hours prior to the conduct of post-mortem.

10. Before we proceed further, we have to first deal with

the inconsistency urged by the accused regarding the time

of death. The post-mortem conducted on 22.02.2006 found

that the death occurred prior to two days; i.e. prior to 48

hours. The deceased was missing from 18.02.2006 and the

body was discovered on 21.02.2006; a day after which the

post-mortem was conducted. Hence the death could have

occurred any time before 20

th

of February. This would

necessarily warrant a closer look at the last seen together

theory, is the argument of the learned counsel.

11. Be that as it may, in cross examination by A2, it was

categorically stated by the doctor that the hyoid bone was

found broken at both sides, which could happen in a

strangulation suspending the body, that is by hanging. It

Page 9 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

was also opined that it could be a case of suicide by hanging

in the instant case, especially since the larynx of the

deceased was found intact and not broken, which could

happen in case of strangulation. The doctor went further to

say that there was no blood clot in the nostrils, ears or mouth

or cyanosis (bluish or purple discolouration) of nails or face

of deceased, which are again common symptom s of

strangulation. Hence, the medical evidence is not

conclusive as to a homicide, but the fact remains that even if

the death was by hanging, the body was exhumed from

where it was buried, which raises strong suspicions at least

as to the burial of the body.

12. The inconclusive medical evidence will have to be

looked at on the basis of other incriminating circumstances

put forth by the prosecution.

13. On the theory projected of last seen together, we

cannot but notice that there is no proof of the deceased

having been seen together with the accused immediately

before the death occurred. We say this despite the fact that

there is no clear-cut time specified on which the death

occurred, when it is trite that the last seen together theory

Page 10 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

projected by the prosecution should be proximate to the

death of the victim. Even the prosecution story that the

victim was in the company of the accused on the evening of

18.02.2006 is not established in the trial. It is the roommates

of the deceased who informed PW1 that they were told by a

friend of the deceased that he was going to meet A1 in the

evening. The roommates of the deceased were not

examined but the friend to whom the deceased talked about

the meeting in the evening, was examined as PW6. PW6

deposed that she was a close friend of the deceased and

they also did projects together for which reason the laptop

of the deceased was entrusted to PW6. It was the statement

of PW6 that the deceased had rung her up in the course of

the day, i.e. on 18.02.2006, to tell her that he will be

collecting the laptop later and also that he would be meeting

A1 in the evening. This is not in proof of the victim having

been seen with the accused in the evening.

14. One other witness projected to prove the last seen

together theory was PW12, the auto rikshaw driver who is

said to have picked up three persons from the Police Bazar

and dropped them near the scene of occurrence. PW12

Page 11 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

spoke in tandem with his statement under Section 161

Cr.P.C. and identified both the accused in the dock. The

prosecution interestingly did not put any question

regarding the acquaintance, the witness had with the

accused so as to identify them in the dock. However, on

cross-examination by A2, the witness, on a specific query

stated that he has known A2 from childhood. Still, there was

nothing to indicate how A1 was identified as having

travelled in the auto rickshaw on the fateful day and more

particularly, there was no statement regarding the identity

of the third person who travelled along with the two

accused.

15. It is also disturbing that the witness stated in cross-

examination that the first identification was done in the

Thana (Police Station) where he was taken for the

identification of the accused. It was also stated that there was

no other person standing with the accused at the time of

identification. Hence, there was no Test Identification

Parade carried out, as is required, in the course of an

investigation, which in any case only lends credence to the

line of investigation and not necessarily to the eventual

Page 12 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

conviction. However, it has to be noticed that the

identification of the accused was first done at the Police

Station putting the identification in the dock under a cloud.

Further, though PW14 a Sub-Inspector of Police speaks of

the seizure of the auto rickshaw corroborated by a Police

Constable, PW16, there is nothing brought on record to

indicate the ownership of the auto rickshaw or the

possession by PW12, who was alleged to be the driver of

the auto rickshaw. There was an interpolation to the

registration number of the autorickshaw as seen from the

seizure mahazar Ext-15, admitted by PW14 in cross

examination, but not satisfactorily explained by the

prosecution. The auto was also not produced at the time of

trial despite its seizure. The last seen together theory

projected by the prosecution fails miserably in the above

circumstances.

16. PW5, the father of the victim deposed about two phone

calls in his mobile number demanding ransom, which the

police did not follow up in their investigation. PW1 and

PW17; a classmate and friend of the deceased, spoke of

their visit to a PCO from where they obtained documents to

Page 13 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

indicate a call having been made to PW6, the lady friend of

the deceased. PW17 also spoke of the PCO owner having

told him about A1 having come to the PCO on the night of

18.02.06 and requested him not to disclose the factum of his

visit. A1 had accompanied PW1 & PW17 to the PCO and was

sitting in the taxi was the testimony. This does not in any

manner prove the ransom calls alleged to have been made

to PW5. PW22 was the PCO owner who did speak of some

persons having come to his PCO on 18.03.2006 and the same

persons having requested him, the next day, to not disclose

their identity. But the witness categorically stated that he

would not recognize them, if he met them again. The ransom

calls hence remained an unsolved puzzle.

17. The discovery of the body also is not supported by any

statement recorded from A1. The police party under PW33

is said to have been led by A1 to the graveyard from which

the body was exhumed. PW20, a photographer summoned

to the scene at the time of exhumation does not speak of the

presence of A1 either at the police station at Sadar, Shillong;

from where the police party started or at the exhumation

spot. The discovery so made cannot be pinned against the

Page 14 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

accused under Section 27 but could very well have been

proved as an incriminating circumstance if the ‘last seen

together’ theory was proved and there was sufficient

evidence to establish the burial spot having been spoken of

by A1. But for the exhumation of the body from the

graveyard, there is nothing to indicate that A1 had led the

police party to the graveyard. PW23, the helper of a

Cameraman who was summoned to the exhumation spot,

deposed that the body was recovered on 25.04.2006 but

another Cameraman, PW31 deposed that he witnessed the

exhumation on 21.02.2006. PW31 testified that the exact spot

was pointed out by a person, whom he was told was A1, but

there was no attempt to identify the accused from the dock

at the time of trial.

18. Likewise, the rope was recovered allegedly at the

instance of A2 as spoken of by PW33 and PW34

Investigating Officers, on 24.03.2026. The witnesses to such

recovery; PW25, 26 and 27 categorically deposed that no

statement was recorded from A2 before such recovery was

made. The IO also did not mark any such disclosure

statement which was recorded. A2 was arrested on

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

23.03.2006 and the rope is alleged to have been recovered

on the next day. But PW18 a police driver spoke of the rope

having been seized from the graveyard on 18.03.2006 in the

presence only of police personnel. Neither was a statement

of A2 recorded of a concealment nor is there anything in the

deposition of the IOs or the witnesses to indicate that the

rope was recovered from a place of concealment. The rope

is recovered from the open at the crime scene itself, from

where the exhumation was carried out earlier, making it

suspect and not worthy of reliance under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act.

19. At the time of recovery, the seizure report indicated

blood stains on the rope. PW3 who is the Senior Scientific

Assistant of Meghalaya Forensic Science Laboratory

deposed only of a few strands of synthetic cloth fiber, of

various shades, having been detected in the rope sent to the

FSL. In cross-examination, it was brought out that there was

no human skin or hair present in the rope nor were any

blood stains spoken of in the forensic report or in the

deposition of PW3. The discovery of the body and the

Page 16 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

recovery of the alleged weapon hence fail to impress, as

incriminating circumstances against the accused.

20. As has been rightly noticed by the Trial Court, there

were many seizures made of the material possessions of the

victim, which could have been the personal property of the

victim. These, however, were not identified as that

belonging to the victim and some seizure witnesses like

PWs 23 & 24 turned hostile. The laptop was recovered from

the father of the victim, PW5, who identified it as belonging

to his son, the deceased. The laptop was received by the

father from PW6, the friend of the deceased, with whom it

was retained at the request of the deceased. The

identification of the laptop as that belonging to the

deceased is not a link to the crime.

21. The prosecution case also spoke of a mobile of the

victim having been taken from the deceased after his death,

by A2. A2 is said to have entrusted this mobile, for sale, to

PW11. The wife of PW11 examined as PW8, spoke of the

entrustment, but she admitted to have not witnessed it.

PW11 interestingly spoke of very close acquaintance with

A2 and the mobile having been found with A2 for long.

Page 17 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

Hence, even the evidence of PW11 does not indicate that the

mobile was the proceeds of the crime alleged, of murder

and in any event the seized mobile was never put to PW5,

the father of the deceased for identification as that

belonging to his son.

22. Similarly, there was seizure of a bag, purse and rakhi

spoken of by PW10 and the seizure of wrist watch and

spectacles spoken of by PW13, from the house of A2, which

was alleged to be belongings of the deceased. These

material objects were also not confronted to PW5, the father

of the deceased, for identification. The recoveries made

thus do not form a link, in the conspicuously absent chain of

circumstances.

23. The learned counsel appearing for the State had

specifically urged the confession made by the two accused,

which at least indicates their presence with the deceased on

18.02.2006, is the argument. The confessions were retracted

by the accused and in any event, they do not bring out any

inculpating circumstances against the persons who

confessed. In this context, we have to examine the

confessions, which are produced in the Criminal Appeal

Page 18 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

No.3738 of 2023 as Annexure P5 and P6 and available in the

records. Annexure P5 is the confession of A1 who states that

after they reached the graveyard, A2 asked for a cigarette,

to purchase which he had gone out of the graveyard. It was

A1’s statement that when he came back, he saw A2

strangulating the deceased with a plastic rope. It is his

statement that he asked A2 why he killed their friend, to

which A2 did not respond. A1, in the confession, spoke of

having opened the shoes of the deceased and rubbed his

feet to revive him. The confession so made is exculpatory in

nature and clearly incriminates the co-accused.

24. The reliance placed by the State on Mohammed

Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab

3

to urge the acceptability

of the confessions in this case may not be appropriate.

Therein, the confession was argued to be not voluntary, but

a tutored statement to suit the prosecution’s case. It was

argued that the language, tone and tenor of the confession

coupled with its inordinate length and also the unnecessary

details contained therein made it highly suspect. This Court

on an examination of the facts leading to the confession

found it to be a voluntary statement. Though, some of the

Page 19 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

statements made were vague that was found to be no reason

to eschew the confession altogether. It was categorically

found from the statements that it was not made under any

influence or under duress and that the tone and tenor

indicated that it was truthful and voluntary, especially since

the statement indicated that the confession was not made out

of a feeling of weakness or a sense of resignation or out of

remorse but on the other hand made, more out of pride and

to project himself to be a role model. The Court also noticed

that in the course of the trial, after 58 prosecution witnesses

were examined, the accused requested to make a

statement, which though not so detailed had almost similar

contents as in the confessional statement.

25. Examined, in the light of the above findings, we find

the confessional statements as seen from the records,

juxtaposed with the deposition of PW 32, the Magistrate who

recorded the confession under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C, to

be highly suspect. The confession of A1 as deposed before

the Court was recorded on 07.03.2006. Insofar as A2 is

concerned, in the testimony before the Court, PW32

deposed that the confessional statement of A2 was recorded

Page 20 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

on 09.03.2006. The confessional statement, however, does

not record any date nor is the signature of the Magistrate

accompanied by a date. The signature of A2 is accompanied

with a date; i.e. 08.03.2006. The recorded statement of A2 in

the handwriting of the Magistrate, in the loose sheets affixed

to the printed form, the signature of the Magistrate is

accompanied with the date 09.03.2006. The said

discrepancy was specifically put to the Magistrate in cross-

examination. There was no satisfactory answer to the

question, regarding discrepancy of the accused having

signed on 08.03.2006 but the Magistrate having signed the

recorded confession on 09.03.2006. The printed portion of

the confessional statement also indicates the statements

having been recorded of A1 in English while that of A2 is

stated to be in Khasi. This is contrary to the testimony of

PW32 before Court and both the recorded statements are

completely in English as seen from the records.

26. One other compelling circumstance is the fact that the

accused, when produced before the Magistrate for the

purpose of recording the confession, they were never asked

as to whether they required the assistance of a lawyer. In

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab

3

, a similar

contention raised was negated by the Court finding that the

accused had initially refused representation by an Indian

lawyer and had been seeking the services of a Pakistani

lawyer. Examining the question of legal assistance at the

pre-trial stage on a conspectus of Article 22(1) of the

Constitution of India and Section 304 of the Cr.P.C. read with

Article 39A of the Constitution of India, it was held so in

paragraphs 474 and 475:

“474. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding

that the right to access to legal aid, to consult and to

be defended by a legal practitioner, arises when a

person arrested in connection with a cognizable

offence is first produced before a Magistrate. We,

accordingly, hold that it is the duty and obligation of

the Magistrate before whom a person accused of

committing a cognizable offence is first produced to

make him fully aware that it is his right to consult and

be defended by a legal practitioner and, in case he

has no means to engage a lawyer of his choice, that

one would be provided to him from legal aid at the

expense of the State. The right flows from Articles 21

and 22(1) of the Constitution and needs to be strictly

enforced. We, accordingly, direct all the Magistrates

in the country to faithfully discharge the aforesaid

duty and obligation and further make it clear that any

failure to fully discharge the duty would amount to

dereliction in duty and would make the Magistrate

concerned liable to departmental proceedings.

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

475. It needs to be clarified here that the right to

consult and be defended by a legal practitioner is not

to be construed as sanctioning or permitting the

presence of a lawyer during police interrogation.

According to our system of law, the role of a lawyer

is mainly focused on court proceedings. The accused

would need a lawyer to resist remand to police or

judicial custody and for granting of bail; to clearly

explain to him the legal consequences in case he

intended to make a confessional statement in terms

of Section 164 CrPC; to represent him when the court

examines the charge-sheet submitted by the police

and decides upon the future course of proceedings

and at the stage of the framing of charges; and

beyond that, of course, for the trial. It is thus to be

seen that the right to access to a lawyer in this country

is not based on the Miranda [(1966) 16 L Ed 2d 694:

384 US 436] principles, as protection against self-

incrimination, for which there are more than

adequate safeguards in Indian laws. The right to

access to a lawyer is for very Indian reasons; it flows

from the provisions of the Constitution and the

statutes, and is only intended to ensure that those

provisions are faithfully adhered to in practice.”

[underlining by us for emphasis]

27. We do not find PW32 having offered any such legal

assistance to the accused at the time of production before

her before recording the confession under Section 164.

28. Yet again, as we found, the confession of A1 is purely

exculpatory and accuse A2 of having strangulated his

Page 23 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

friend, leading to his death. The exculpatory statements

made by A1 to absolve himself from the liability and accuse

A2 of having caused the death, cannot at all be relied on

against A2. Insofar as A2 is concerned, he does not speak of

the murder having been committed and merely admits that

the deceased took his last breath in A2’s lap, which is not a

confession as such. True, if the incidence of death as spoken

in both confessions is eschewed and the other aspects of the

three having been together on the crucial evening, even if

accepted, can only be used for corroborating the

circumstantial evidence otherwise established, which we

find to be totally absent in the above case. Neither has the

last seen theory been proved nor has the recoveries or the

seizures established as having any connection with the

crime proper.

29. It has been held in a host of decisions as noticed in

Manoharan

4

that a confession can form a legal basis of a

conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was

voluntarily made. However, it was also held that a Court

shall not base a conviction on such a confession without

Page 24 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

corroboration [Pyarelal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan

7

].

Quoting the Privy Council, it was held in Kanda Pandyachi

@ Kandaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu

8

that ‘a confession

has to be a direct acknowledgment of guilt of the offence in

question and such as would be sufficient by itself for

conviction. If it falls short of such a plenary acknowledgment

of guilt it would not be a confession even though the same is

of some incriminating fact which taken with other evidence

tends to prove his guilt.’ (sic para 11). In the instant case

there is no such acknowledgment of the crime proper nor is

there any shred of evidence to establish the various

circumstances put forth by the prosecution.

30. The confession allegedly made by the appellants is of

no use in bringing home a conviction, especially when there

was no corroboration available, of the statements made,

from other valid evidence. There was thus no single

circumstance available, incriminating the accused in the

death of their friend, the son of PW5.

7

AIR 1963 SC 1094

8

(1971) 2 SCC 641

Page 25 of 26

Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

31. Having discussed the evidence, we fail to see any

circumstance having been found from the evidence led, in

the prosecution before the Trial Court to arrive at a

hypothesis of guilt. The High Court proceeded on the

premise that the Trial Court lost its way on the minor details

and failed to see the larger picture, which was obviously

and eventually admitted in the confession statements. The

admissions were only that made in the confessional

statements, of the death having occurred in the presence of

the accused, on the day the deceased was found missing,

which we have found to be not worthy of acceptance.

32. We find absolutely no reason to uphold the conviction

of the accused as entered into by the High Court reversing

the order of acquittal of the accused by the Trial Court. We

reverse the order of the High Court and restore that of the

Trial Court, which acquitted the accused. We have already

granted bail to the accused on the conclusion of hearing. We

direct that if the accused are still in jail, then they shall be

released forthwith, if not required in any other case and if

they are already released on bail, the bail bonds will stand

cancelled.

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Crl.A.No.3738 of 2023 etc.

33. The appeals stand allowed with the above directions.

34. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

...…….……………………. J.

(SANJAY KUMAR)

...…….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN )

NEW DELHI

JANUARY 27, 2026.