2026 INSC 99 C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 1 of 31

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 30762 OF 2024)

BHOLA NATH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. …RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 28352 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3430 OF 2025)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants in the above-captioned appeals are

the employees of the respondent-State. The relevant

particulars pertaining to the appellants, necessary for

adjudication of the issues arising for consideration

herein, may be summarized as follows:

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Sr. No. Name of lead

petitioner

Case No. before

Single Judge

Case No. before

Division Bench

Special Leave

Petition No.

1. Bhola Nath WP S No. 2597 of

2023

LPA No. 390 of

2024

SLP C No. 30762

of 2024

2. Uday Kant

Yadav

WP S No. 129 of

2023

LPA No. 356 of

2024

SLP C No. 28352

of 2024

3. Prakash

Kumar

WP S No. 3621 of

2023

LPA No. 368 of

2024

SLP C No. 3430 of

2025

3. The present appeals are directed against the

judgments dated 17

th September, 2024, 15

th October,

2024 and 2

nd December, 2024, passed by the High

Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

1 in Letter Patent Appeal

Nos. 390 of 2024, 356 of 2024 and 368 of 2024,

respectively, whereby the Division Bench dismissed the

intra-Court appeals preferred by the appellant -

employees and, in consequence, affirmed the common

judgment dated 14

th May, 2024, passed by the learned

Single Judge dismissing the three writ petitions (supra

table) filed by the appellants.

4. Brief facts, in a nutshell, essential for the disposal

of the present appeals, are as follows: -

4.1. Vide Office Order No. 1395 dated 6

th September,

2012, the Director of Soil Conservation stated, inter alia,

that a total of 22 regular posts of Junior Engineers

(Agriculture) stood sanctioned for the Land

1

Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.

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Conservation Directorate of the respondent-State and

its subordinate offices. Pursuant thereto, in September

2012, respondent No. 5 issued an advertisement

inviting applications for appointment against the

aforesaid 22 sanctioned posts. The terms and

conditions of the advertisement stipulated that the

appointments would be temporary and on a contractual

basis and that the respondent-State would not be liable

to regularize the appointees. It was further provided that

the initial term of engagement would be for a period of

one year, extendable thereafter subject to satisfactory

performance.

4.2. Upon conclusion of the aforesaid recruitment

process, the appellants were declared successful vide

Office Order dated 27

th December, 2012, and were

thereafter allotted their respective postings vide Office

Order dated 29

th December, 2012.

4.3. The appellants were granted extensions on

completion of their annual contractual terms. During

this period, respondent No. 5, vide letter dated 25th

August, 2015, forwarded their representation to the

respondent-State apropos regularization of services of

the appellants and proposed that steps be taken to

frame rules and consider regularization of their services.

4.4. The respondent-State continued to grant yearly

extensions to the appellants from time to time. However,

by the last extension orders issued for the period from

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December 2022 to February 2023, the appellants

apprehended that their engagement was likely to be

discontinued and that the said extension would be the

final one. In this backdrop, the appellants submitted

representations to the respondents, requesting

regularization of their long years of dedicated service

and invoking the obligation of the State to act as a model

employer.

4.5. Aggrieved by the persistent inaction on the part of

the respondents, the appellants approached the High

Court by filing writ petitions seeking, inter alia, a writ of

mandamus directing the respondent-State to regularize

and absorb them against the vacant sanctioned posts of

Junior Engineers (Agriculture), and also seeking a

declaration that Office Order dated 28

th February, 2023,

whereby stipulations were introduced declining further

extension of their engagement, was illegal, arbitrary and

unsustainable in law.

4.6. The learned Single Judge, vide common judgment

dated 14

th March, 2024, dismissed the writ petitions,

holding that the appellants possessed no legal right to

seek renewal or extension of their contractual

engagement and that no corresponding obligation was

cast upon the respondent-State to renew or extend such

contractual appointments.

4.7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single

Judge, the appellant-Bhola Nath preferred an intra-

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Court appeal. The Division Bench, by judgment dated

17

th September, 2024, dismissed the appeal, holding

that the appellant’s engagement being purely

contractual in nature, no interference with the decision

of the learned Single Judge was warranted, and

accordingly affirmed the same.

4.8. Thereafter, the remaining appellants also preferred

intra-Court appeals before the High Court, which came

to be dismissed by separate judgments dated 15

th

October, 2024 and 2

nd December, 2024, respectively,

following and relying upon the decision rendered by the

Division Bench in the intra-Court appeal preferred by

appellant-Bhola Nath.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have preferred

the present appeals before this Court assailing their

respective impugned judgment and orders passed by

the High Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS :

6. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellants strenuously assailed the

concurrent judgments of the High Court, contending,

inter alia, as follows: -

6.1. that the appellants were appointed against vacant

and sanctioned posts pursuant to a duly issued

advertisement and after undergoing the prescribed

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selection process, including roster clearance. Upon

joining service, the appellants were subjected to

transfers, postings and other service incidents

ordinarily applicable to regular employees. The

appellants have rendered continuous service without

any break and there is no adverse material on record

against them. Their performance has consistently been

found satisfactory, as is evident from repeated

recommendations for extension and the uninterrupted

renewals granted to them over the years.

6.2. that the appellants have rendered service for a

period exceeding a decade and are entitled to

consideration for regularization in the light of the

decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Uma

Devi.

2 Denial of such consideration, while continuing to

take advantage of their unequal bargaining position, is

contended to be contrary to the principles of equity and

fairness and violative of the constitutional mandate to

ensure dignity in public employment.

6.3. that the stipulation contained in the appellants’

appointment letters barring any claim for regularization

or permanent absorption is contrary to public policy and

hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It is

contended that at the time of initial appointment, the

appellants were unemployed job seekers and, therefore,

2

(2006) 4 SCC 1.

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did not possess any real or equal bargaining power vis-

à-vis the respondent-State.

6.4. that the appellants were appointed against

sanctioned and vacant posts and, having worked on

such posts for a period of nearly 10 years, are fit to be

considered for regularization in accordance with the

existing policy of the respondent-State.

6.5. that the refusal of the respondent -State to

regularize the appellants is violative of their

fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India

3. It is contended that although the

appellants have been treated at par with regular

employees in matters relating to service conditions,

including postings, transfers and increments, they have

been denied the benefit of regularization. It is further

urged that similarly situated persons have been

extended favourable treatment, while the appellants

have been singled out without any rational or justifiable

basis.

6.6. that the appellants have crossed the age of

eligibility for alternative public employment and that

discontinuation of their services after years of dedicated

public service would leave them and their dependents in

a precarious financial condition, contrary to the

3

Hereinafter, referred to as “Constitution”.

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obligation of the State, as a model employer, to ensure

fairness, dignity and welfare of its employees.

6.7. that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service

has given rise to a legitimate expectation of

consideration for regularization. It is contended that

having diligently served for over a decade pursuant to a

due process of selection, the appellants justifiably

believed that their services would be regularized and

that discontinuation at this stage would result in grave

hardship.

On the aforesaid grounds, the learned senior

counsel urged this Court to set aside the impugned

judgments passed by the High Court, allow the present

appeals, and issue appropriate directions to the

respondent-State for regularization of the services of the

appellants.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT S:

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents opposed the submissions advanced on

behalf of the appellants and made the following

submissions: -

7.1. that the appellants were engaged purely on a

contractual basis for a period of one year by Office Order

issued vide Memo No. 1893 dated 27

th December, 2012,

wherein Clause 1 of the terms and conditions expressly

stipulated that the engagement was temporary and

contractual in nature and that the respondent-State

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was under no obligation to regularize or absorb the

appointees. It was further pointed out that Clause 10 of

the said terms barred any claim for regular appointment

on the basis of such contractual engagement.

7.2. that the appellants entered into an agreement with

the respondent-State with full knowledge of the terms

and conditions governing their engagement, including

an express stipulation that no claim for regularization

or absorption would be made in future. Having

voluntarily accepted such conditions, the appellants are

precluded from resiling therefrom or seeking to deviate

from the contractual terms.

7.3. that the appellants were appointed on a purely

contractual basis and continued in service only by

virtue of periodic renewals for specified terms, and

therefore did not acquire any enforceable right to seek

continuation of service or regularization in the absence

of any applicable scheme governing regularization of

contractual employees.

7.4. that the appellants, having expressly accepted the

terms and conditions of their contractual engagement

and rendered services accordingly, cannot now seek

directions under Article 226 of the Constitution, as any

such relief would amount to re-writing the contract

between the parties, which is impermissible in law.

On these grounds, the learned counsel for the

respondents prayed that the present appeals be

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dismissed and the impugned judgments passed by the

High Court be upheld.

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT :

8. Having heard learned senior counsel for the

appellants and learned counsel for the respondents, the

following issues arise for our consideration: -

I. Whether the judgments passed by the High Court

warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India?

II. Whether the action/inaction of the respondent-

State in not recognizing the appellants’ continuous

service for the purpose of regularization is

arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India?

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION :

ISSUE I. Whether the judgments passed by the High

Court warrant interference by this Court in exercise of

its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India?

9. Both the learned Single Judge as well as the

Division Bench, in the intra-Court appeals, have

rejected the claim of the appellants seeking

regularization. We are conscious that the appellants are

assailing concurrent findings of the High Court;

nevertheless, the scope and ambit of this Court’s

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jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution stands

well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.

9.1. Article 136 of the Constitution confers upon this

Court a plenary and discretionary power to entertain

appeals against any judgment, decree, determination,

sentence or order passed or made by any court or

tribunal within the territory of India. The only limitation

on this power is contained in Article 136(2), which

excludes decisions of tribunals constituted by or under

any law relating to the Armed Forces. The non obstante

clause, namely the expression “notwithstanding

anything in this Chapter”, accords overriding effect to

the power vested in this Court under Article 136 over

the other provisions contained in the preceding and

succeeding Articles of this Chapter.

9.2. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that this Court, in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution, is competent to interfere with concurrent

findings of the High Court where such findings are

shown to be perverse, rendered in violation of the

principles of natural justice or in disregard of statutory

provisions, or where the operation of the impugned

judgment would result in substantial and grave

injustice. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the

three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chandra

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Singh v. State of Rajasthan,

4 wherein it was held as

follows: -

“43. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary

remedy. (See Champalal Binani v. CIT [(1971) 3 SCC

20].) The High Court and consequently this Court

while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction

under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of

India may not strike down an illegal order

although it would be lawful to do so. In a given

case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to

extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the

applicant. Furthermore, this Court exercised its

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India which need not be

exercised in a case where the impugned judgment

is found to be erroneous if by reason thereof

substantial justice is being done . [See S.D.S.

Shipping (P) Ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co. (P)

Ltd. [(2003) 4 Supreme 44]] Such a relief can be

denied, inter alia, when it would be opposed to

public policy or in a case where quashing of an

illegal order would revive another illegal one. This

Court also in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article

142 of the Constitution of India is entitled to pass

such order which will do [ Corrected as per Official

Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed. B.J./11/2004 dated 27-1-

2004] complete justice to the parties.

…

45. This Court said that this principle applies to all

kinds of appeals admitted by special leave under

Article 136, irrespective of the nature of the subject-

matter. So even after the appeal is admitted and

special leave is granted, the appellants must show

that exceptional and special circumstances exist,

and that, if there is no interference, substantial

and grave injustice will result and that the case

has features of sufficient gravity to warrant a

review of the decision appealed against on merits.

So this Court may declare the law or point out the

lower court's error, still it may not interfere if special

circumstances are not shown to exist and the justice

of the case on facts does not require interference or

4

(2003) 6 SCC 545

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if it feels the relief could be moulded in a different

fashion.”

(emphasis laid)

It therefore follows that an appellant must

demonstrate the existence of exceptional and special

circumstances warranting interference by this Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution; failing which, interference would be

declined unless non-interference is likely to result in

substantial or grave injustice.

9.3. In the present case, the respondent-State has

engaged the services of the appellants for a period

exceeding 10 years. Upon completion of this long

tenure, the respondents, as apprehended by the

appellants, declined to grant any further extension on

the ground that the engagement was contractual in

nature. Such a decision necessarily warrants

examination on the touchstone of the equality principles

enshrined in the Constitution, which obligate the State

to act as a model employer and to take decisions free

from arbitrariness. In our consideration of the second

issue, we shall examine whether non-interference with

the impugned judgments would result in substantial

and grave injustice to the appellants.

ISSUE II. Whether the action /inaction of the

respondent-State in not recognizing the appellants’

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continuous service for the purpose of regularization is

arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India?

10. The learned Single Judge, vide common order,

dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants

seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-

State to regularize their services. In doing so, the writ

Court placed reliance on the terms and conditions of the

employment agreement entered into between the

appellants and the respondents. The learned Single

Judge, in this regard, recorded the following findings: -

i. The appellants were appointed on a purely

contractual basis pursuant to a decision of the

Finance Department to fill 22 sanctioned posts

through contractual engagement, the

expenditure being met from non-plan funds.

Following issuance of an advertisement and

completion of the selection process, the

appellants were appointed by entering into

contracts of employment for an initial period of

one year, extendable from time to time for fixed

durations.

ii. The appellants were granted extensions

periodically, with the last extensions having

been issued in the year 2023 as a one -time

measure. The respondent-State treated the said

decision as a conscious policy determination,

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which, according to the learned Single Judge,

did not warrant interference by the Court.

iii. The appellants were held not entitled to

regularization under the regularization scheme

framed by the respondent-State in the year

2015, as modified in 2019, which prescribed

completion of ten years of continuous service as

on the cut-off year 2019. It was further noted

that the appellants had not laid any challenge

to the validity of the said regularization scheme.

iv. Since the appellants were appointed on a

contractual basis and continued only through

periodic extensions, it was held that they did not

possess any statutory or legal right to continue

in service once the contractual period, including

its extensions, came to an end.

v. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the

appellants were fully aware, and were put to

notice on each occasion of renewal, that their

engagement was contractual and limited to a

specified tenure. In view thereof, the learned

Single Judge held that no question of legitimate

expectation or enforceable right to renewal or

regularization could arise, nor could any right

be said to have crystallised in their favour.

vi. It was further noted that the appellants had not

been replaced by another set of contractual

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employees. On the contrary, the material on

record indicated that the respondent-State had

undertaken regular recruitment and appointed

nine persons as regular employees through a

fresh advertisement.

10.1. Aggrieved by the decision of the writ Court, the

appellants preferred intra-Court appeals before the High

Court. The learned Division Bench upheld the judgment

of the writ Court and recorded the following findings: -

i. The law relating to regularization or absorption

of contractual employees was held to be well

settled, namely that such employees are

governed by the terms and conditions of their

engagement, the relationship being founded

upon a bilateral contract between the employee

and the employer.

ii. It was further held that the terms and

conditions of a contract cannot be altered, nor

can new conditions be introduced, by issuance

of judicial directions, as doing so would amount

to impermissible re-writing of the contract.

Once the parties have consciously entered into

contractual terms, they cannot subsequently

resile therefrom or question those conditions.

State as model employer: -

11. At the outset, we find it necessary to express our

disapproval of the manner in which the High Court has

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approached the present lis. The controversy before the

Court was not one of mere acquiescence or implied

waiver of rights. The High Court, in our view, has

proceeded on a mechanical application of precedents

without engaging with the core constitutional issues

involved, thereby reducing the dispute to one of

acceptance of contractual terms, divorced from its larger

constitutional context.

11.1. This Court has consistently held that the State,

being a model employer, is saddled with a heightened

obligation in the discharge of its functions. A model

employer is expected to act with high probity, fairness

and candour, and bears a social responsibility to treat

its employees in a manner that preserves their dignity.

The State cannot be permitted to exploit its employees

or to take advantage of their vulnerability, helplessness

or unequal bargaining position.

11.2. It therefore follows that the State is required to

exercise heightened caution in its role as an employer,

the constitutional mandate casting upon it a strict

obligation to act as a model employer, an obligation from

which no exception can be countenanced.

Fundamental Rights and their waiver:

11.3. In the present case, the appellants were appointed

by the respondent-State against sanctioned posts of

Junior Engineers (Agriculture), with the engagement

being described from the inception as contractual in

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nature. The terms and conditions governing the

engagement stipulated that the appointment would be

for an initial period of one year, extendable thereafter

subject to satisfactory performance.

11.4. The respondent-State accordingly granted

extensions to the appellants from time to time until the

year 2023, when it was expressly clarified that the

extension being granted would be the last. It was

thereafter that the appellants approached the High

Court by filing writ petitions seeking a writ of

mandamus directing the State to regularize their

services.

11.5. The consistent case of the appellants has been that

the respondent-State’s refusal to grant regularization is

arbitrary and therefore warrants judicial interference.

Article 14 of the Constitution casts a negative obligation

upon the State to treat all persons equally, and

arbitrariness, being antithetical to the equality

principle, is proscribed as violative of Article 14.

11.6. The Constitution Bench in Basheshar Nath v.

Comm. Income Tax ,

5 long ago clarified that

fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution

are incapable of waiver. Consequently, if the action of

the respondent-State is found to be violative of Article

14 of the Constitution, the mere fact that the appellants’

5

1958 SCC OnLine SC 7

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engagement was governed by contractual terms and

conditions cannot be construed as a waiver of their

fundamental rights.

Unconscionable Agreements - Contract between Lion

and Lamb:

12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v.

Brojo Nath Ganguly,

6 this Court acknowledged the

increasing imbalance in the bargaining power of

contracting parties. The Court held thus: -

“89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country. Our

judges are bound by their oath to “uphold the

Constitution and the laws”. The Constitution was

enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country

social and economic justice. Article 14 of the

Constitution guarantees to all persons equality

before the law and the equal protection of the

laws. The principle deducible from the above

discussions on this part of the case is in

consonance with right and reason, intended to

secure social and economic justice and conforms

to the mandate of the great equality clause in

Article 14. This principle is that the courts will

not enforce and will, when called upon to do so,

strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract,

or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a

contract, entered into between parties who are

not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to

give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type.

No court can visualize the different situations

which can arise in the affairs of men. One can

only attempt to give some illustrations. For

instance, the above principle will apply where the

inequality of bargaining power is the result of the

great disparity in the economic strength of the

contracting parties. It will apply where the

inequality is the result of circumstances, whether

of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply

to situations in which the weaker party is in a

6

(1986) 3 SCC 156

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position in which he can obtain goods or services

or means of livelihood only upon the terms

imposed by the stronger party or go without

them. It will also apply where a man has no

choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to

give his assent to a contract or to sign on the

dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to

accept a set of rules as part of the contract,

however unfair, unreasonable and

unconscionable a clause in that contract or form

or rules may be. This principle, however, will not

apply where the bargaining power of the contracting

parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may

not apply where both parties are businessmen and

the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's

complex world of giant corporations with their vast

infrastructural organizations and with the State

through its instrumentalities and agencies entering

into almost every branch of industry and commerce,

there can be myriad situations which result in unfair

and unreasonable bargains between parties

possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal

bargaining power. These cases can neither be

enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must

judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.”

(emphasis laid)

Therefore, the Court has held that the Constitution

obliges courts to advance social and economic justice

and to give effect to the equality mandate under Article

14. Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor

hesitate to invalidate contracts, or contractual clauses,

that are unfair or unreasonable when entered into

between parties with unequal bargaining power.

12.1. Relying on the aforesaid reasoning, another two-

Judge Bench in Pani Ram v. Union of India ,

7

7

(2021) 19 SCC 234

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reiterated that the guarantee of equality under Article

14 extends even to situations where a person has no

meaningful choice but to accept imposed contractual

terms, however unfair or unreasonable they may be.

Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court

observed thus: -

“23. As held by this Court, a right to equality

guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution

of India would also apply to a man who has no

choice or rather no meaningful choice, but to give

his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted

line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept

a set of rules as part of the contract, however

unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause

in that contract or form or rules may be. We find

that the said observations rightly apply to the facts

of the present case. Can it be said that the mighty

Union of India and an ordinary soldier, who having

fought for the country and retired from Regular

Army, seeking re-employment in the Territorial

Army, have an equal bargaining power. We are

therefore of the considered view that the reliance

placed on the said document would also be of no

assistance to the case of the respondents.”

(emphasis laid)

Therefore, it is clear that Courts are empowered to

invalidate unconscionable elements of a contract where

the parties lack the ability to exercise any real or

meaningful choice in negotiating its terms. In the

present case, the appellants were left with no alternative

but to accept the conditions unilaterally prescribed by

the respondent-State in order to secure their livelihood

and sustain a source of income. It would be entirely

unrealistic to assume that, in such circumstances, an

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employee seeking temporary employment could

meaningfully negotiate or assert a position against the

overwhelming might of the State machinery.

12.2. At this juncture, the analogy of apples and oranges

serves as a useful reminder that certain relationships

are inherently incapable of being assessed on an equal

plane. A contract between the State and an employee

stands on a similar footing. The State, in such a

relationship, assumes the role of a metaphorical lion,

endowed with overwhelming authority, resources and

bargaining strength, whereas the employee, who is yet

an aspirant, is reduced to the position of a metaphorical

lamb, possessing little real negotiating power. To

suggest parity between the two, i.e. the lion and the

lamb, would be to ignore the stark imbalance that

defines the relationship.

12.3. Therefore, where a lion contracts with a lamb, the

inequality is not incidental but structural, and it is

precisely this disproportion that calls for judicial

sensitivity. In such situations, the conscience of

Constitutional Courts must inevitably tilt in favour of

protecting the lamb. We have no hesitation in holding

that Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to act to

safeguard those who are vulnerable to exploitation, so

that employees are not compelled to meekly submit to

the demands of a vastly dominant contracting party like

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the State, but are instead assured that constitutional

protections will intervene to prevent such exploitation.

Legitimate Expectation of the employees: -

13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case

of contractual employees, such as the present

appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation.

Where employees have continued to discharge their

duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of

time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a

legitimate expectation arises that the State would, at

some stage, recognize their long and continuous service.

It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions

granted by the Executive, that such employees continue

in service and refrain from seeking alternative

employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of

their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to

advert to the principles governing the doctrine of

legitimate expectation as enunciated by this Court in

Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar

Sharma,

8 wherein it was held as follows: -

“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth

the following features regarding the doctrine of

legitimate expectation:

63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based

on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or

anticipation;

8

(2024) 16 SCC 598

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 24 of 31

63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise

either from an express or implied promise ; or a

consistent past practice or custom followed by an

authority in its dealings;

. . .

63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in

the realm of public law, that is, a plea of

legitimate action can be taken only when a public

authority breaches a promise or deviates from a

consistent past practice, without any reasonable

basis.

. . .

64. The aforesaid features, although not

exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in

deciding the applicability of the doctrine of

legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at

hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation,

jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to

maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action.

It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation

of contracts between private parties, wherein the

doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.”

(emphasis laid)

It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the

expectation with which such contractual employees

continue in the service of the State. The repeated

conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence

in their performance and consistently granting

monetary upgrades & tenu re extensions reasonably

nurtures an expectation that their long and continuous

service would receive further recognition.

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 25 of 31

13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of

Karnataka v. Umadevi,

9 cautioned that the doctrine of

legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily be extended to

persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or

contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the

judgment reads as follows: -

“47. When a person enters a temporary

employment or gets engagement as a contractual

or casual worker and the engagement is not based

on a proper selection as recognised by the

relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the

consequences of the appointment bein g

temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such

a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate

expectation for being confirmed in the post when

an appointment to the post could be made only

by following a proper procedure for selection and

in cases concerned, in consultation with the

Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory

of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully

advanced by temporary, contractual or casual

employees. It cannot also be held that the State has

held out any promise while engaging these persons

either to continue them where they are or to make

them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally

make such a promise. It is also obvious that the

theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of

being made permanent in the post.”

(emphasis laid)

However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified

that the bar against invocation of the doctrine of

legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary,

contractual or casual employees whose engagement was

not preceded by a proper selection process in

9

(2006) 4 SCC 1

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 26 of 31

accordance with the extant rules. Consequently, where

such engagement is made after following a due and

lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute bar in

law preventing such employees from invoking the

doctrine of legitimate expectation.

Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements :

13.2. In the present case, the respondent-State had

engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned

posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end

of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated

that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement

was likely to be granted.

13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is

not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear

derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article

14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially

engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge

public duties and functions. Having rendered long and

dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to

fend for themselves, particularly when the employment

opportunities that may have been available to them a

decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age

constraints.

13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the

respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the

appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service.

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 27 of 31

We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship

between the appellants and the respondent-State was

mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of

the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity,

while the appellants remained in public service. In such

circumstances, any departure from a long -standing

practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the

legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be

supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking

order.

13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious

and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily

discharged his duties over several years and has been

granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be

treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to

accept the justification advanced by the respondents as

the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends

to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether

their engagement is contractual or regular.

13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated

the practice adopted by States of engaging employees

under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or

“temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them

by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union

of India,

10 this Court underscored that government

10

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 28 of 31

departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and

stable employment, and evolved the test of examining

whether the duties performed by such temporary

employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of

the organization.

13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam,

11 and Vinod Kumar

v. Union of India,

12 this Court cautioned against a

mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to

deny regularization to temporary employees in the

absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi

(supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise

exploitative engagements continued for years without

undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further

clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between

appointments that are “illegal” and those that are

merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to

regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed

conditions.

13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.

13, this Court

strongly deprecated the culture of “ad-hocism” adopted

by States in their capacity as employers. The Court

criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing

recruitment as a means to evade regular employment

obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate

11

2025 SCC OnLine SC 221

12

(2024) 9 SCC 327

13

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 29 of 31

precarious working conditions while circumventing fair

and lawful engagement practices.

13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time

employees, such as the appellants, constitute an

integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of

the State continues to function. They are not merely

ancillary to the system, but form essential components

thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution,

therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in

a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that

decisions of the State affecting the careers and

livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees

are guided by fairness and reason.

13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to

persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s

contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of

the appellants’ engagement denudes them of

constitutional protection. The State, having availed of

the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a

decade pursuant to a due process of selection and

having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory

performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons

or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such

engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual

clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary,

inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 30 of 31

model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under

Article 14 of the Constitution.

FINAL CONCLUSION :

14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing

paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:

I. The respondent-State was not justified in

continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant

posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of

contractual engagement and thereafter denying

them consideration for regularization.

II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long -standing

engagement solely on the basis of contractual

nomenclature, without either recording cogent

reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly

arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution.

III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims

for regularization cannot override constitutional

guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does

not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and

contractual stipulations cannot immuni ze

arbitrary State action from constitutional

scrutiny.

IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on

contractual labels or mechanical application of

Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or

C.A.No. of 2026@ SLP(C)NO.30762 of 2024 etc.etc. Page 31 of 31

to discard long-serving employees in a manner

inconsistent with fairness, dignity and

constitutional governance.

V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the

respondent-State to forthwith regularize the

services of all the appellants against the

sanctioned posts to which they were initially

appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all

consequential service benefits accruing from the

date of this judgment.

15. Accordingly, the present appeals are disposed of

and all writ petitions are allowed and the judgments

dated 17

th September, 2024, 15

th October, 2024 and 2

nd

December, 2024, in LPA Nos. 390 of 2024, 356 of 2024

and 368 of 2024, respectively, passed by the High Court

of Jharkhand at Ranchi are set aside.

16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

………………………………………..J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

………………………………………..J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI

JANUARY 30, 2026