W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 1 of 25

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 08.01.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 03.02.2026

+ W.P.(C) 7831/2024 and CM APPL. 32435/2024

COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA &

ANR. .....Petitioners

Through: Dr. S. S. Hooda, Mr. Shaurya

Banshtu and Mr. Manpreet

Singh, Advs. (M: 8383035136)

Versus

MANOJ KUMAR .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Anil Nauriya, Mr. Prakhar

Gupta and Ms. Sumita

Hazarika, Advs. (M:

8010409522)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

J U D G M E N T

AMIT MAHAJAN, J.

1.The present writ petition has been field under Article 226/227

of the Constitution of India, 1950, assailing the Order dated

29.05.2023, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,

Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter ‘CAT’) in O.A. No. 1489 of

2015, vide which the orders/charge-memos dated 11.05.2006 and

05.03.2007 were quashed with directions to the Petitioners to

reconsider the matter and impose a lesser penalty than “dismissal

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 2 of 25

from service” against the Respondent/ Charged Official - Sh. Manoj

Kumar.

2.In the present case, the Petitioner No. 1 is the head of the Indian

Audit and Accounts Department, the Petitioner No. 2 is an

independent authority/Office under the aegis of the Petitioner No. 1

and the Respondent is a former employee of the Petitioner No. 1.

3.Succinctly stated, the quintessential facets governing the

present dispute are that the Respondent had joined service as a Peon

on 27.11.1991 and was promoted to the post of Daftry on 01.01.1998

and to the post of Clerk on 03.01.2000.

4.Undisputedly, he was absent without authorization from

04.09.2000 to 29.04.2003, i.e., for a continuous period of nearly three

years, without obtaining prior sanction of leave. According to the

Respondent, he was suffering from Tuberculosis during this period.

5.Upon joining back service on 30.04.2003, the Respondent

submitted Medical Certificate dated 29.04.2003 and Fitness

Certificate dated 30.04.2003 purportedly issued by one Dr. T.P. Singh,

then CMO, CGHS, Sunder Vihar.

6.Correspondence was thereafter exchanged between the

Petitioners and the Central Government Health Scheme (‘CGHS’)

authorities seeking verification of the medical and fitness certificates

submitted by the Respondent. Vide communication dated 08.02.2006,

the Additional Director (HQ), CGHS informed the Petitioners that no

such certificates had been issued from the CGHS dispensaries

concerned.

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 3 of 25

7.On 11.05.2006, a charge memorandum was issued to the

Respondent alleging submission of false/fabricated certificates. In

Reply, the Respondent vide his letter dated 05.06.2006, not only

denied the article of charge but also submitted that the medical

certificate dated 29.04.2003 and fitness certificate dated 30.04.2003

issued to him by Dr. T.P. Singh were genuine as the doctor had never

refused/denied this fact. The Respondent further submitted that Dr.

T.P. Singh was still the CMO, CGHS Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, New

Delhi and the doctor had again certified on 03.06.2006 that the

certificates in question were issued by him.

8.Since, certain additional facts were placed on record which

required verification, the above chargesheet was withdrawn. A fresh

Chargesheet dated 05.03.2007 was issued against the Respondent

alleging giving false statements that Dr. T.P. Singh is still a sitting

CMO, CGHS and submission of false/fabricated medical/fitness

certificates in connivance with the said doctor, amounting to

misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the CCS (Conduct)

Rules, 1964. The Article of charges are as under: -

“ Statement of article of charge framed against

Shri Manoj Kumar, Clerk

Article

Shri Manoj Kumar, Clerk absented himself from

duty w.e.f. 4.9.2000 to 29.4.2003 unauthorisedly.

Shri Manoj Kumar joined duty on 30.4.2003 and

submitted medical certificate dated 29.4.2003 and

fitness certificate dated 30.4.2003 alleged to have

been issued by Dr. (Captain) T.P. Singh, CMO,

CGHS Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, New Delhi in

support of his leave for the period from 5.1.2001 to

29.4.2003 on the ground of self-illness. Subsequently

it revealed that the medical and fitness certificates

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 4 of 25

had not been issued by the aforesaid CGHS

dispensary. Shri Manoj Kumar, Clerk was directed

vide this office memorandum no. PPS/1-

551MK/2006-07/89 dated 11.5.2006 to submit

within 10 days of its receipt, a written statement of

defence on the statement of imputation of

misconduct in support of article of the charge

enclosed with the memorandum dated 11.5.2006. In

reply, Shri Manoj Kumar vide his letter dated

5.6.2006 submitted that the medical/fitness

certificates issued by Dr. (Captain) T.P. Singh, Chief

Medical Officer (CGHS), Sunder Vihar, Delhi to him

were very much genuine as the doctor had never

refused/denied this fact. He submitted another

certificate dated 3.6.2006 issued by Dr. TP. Singh

again certifying that the certificates in question

were issued by him. He also submitted that Dr. T.P.

Singh was still the sitting CMO in the same

dispensary.

Further correspondence with the Additional

Director (Headquarters), Central Government

Health Scheme, New Delhi and the CMO/Incharge,

CGHS Dispensary No. 82, Sunder Vihar, New Delhi

(the concerned dispensary), from where the

certificates in question i.e. medical certificate dated

29.4.2003 fitness certificate dated 30.4.2003 and

certificate dated 3.6.2006 were stated to have been

issued by Dr. TP Singh while working as CMO

there, confirmed that Dr. T.P. Singh was absent on

29.4.2003 and 30.4.2003 and he was not in

government service on 3.6.2006 as he had retired

from government service on 26.12.2005 on invalid

pension under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules,

1972. Both authorities also informed that as per the

provisions of Central Government Health Scheme, a

government employee is entitled to receive CGHS

facility in his allotted dispensary. On the basis of

residential address given by Shri Manoj Kumar, his

allotted CGHS dispensary for· medical treatment

was CGHS Dispensary No. 73, Gurgaon. The

CMO/Incharge, CGHS Dispensary No 82, Sunder

Vihar, New Delhi also informed that medical/fitness

certificate books have serial numbers whereas the

medical and fitness certificates issued by Dr. T.P.

Singh to Shri Manoj Kumar do not bear any serial

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 5 of 25

number. She also informed that Dr. T.P. Singh was

in the habit of issuing medical/fitness certificates by

misutilising official powers.

The above facts establish that Shri Manoj Kumar

repeatedly submitted false statements that the

medical certificate dated 29.4.2003, fitness

certificate dated 30.4.2003 and certificate dated

3.6.2006 were issued to him by CMO, CGHS,

Sunder Vihar, Delhidispensary as Dr TP Singh

who had issued these certificates and stated to be the

sitting CMO of that dispensary was actually on

leave on 29.4.2003 and 30.4 200l and was not even

in Government service on 3.6.2006. Thus the

conduct of Shri Manoj Kumar is grossly immoral

and untrustworthy. By wilfully submitting false

statements and producing fabricated

medical/fitness certificates in connivance with Dr.

T.P. Singh, Shri Manoj Kumar has failed to

maintain absolute integrity and has also acted in a

manner unbecoming of a government servant

thereby violating Rules 3 (1) (i) and 3 (1) (iii) of the

CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

(emphasis supplied)

9.A departmental inquiry was conducted and the Respondent was

afforded opportunity to defend himself, was assisted by a Defence

Assistant, and also participated throughout the proceedings.

10.The Inquiry Officer, vide report dated 31.12.2009, after

examining documentary evidence and considering the defence raised,

returned a categorical finding that the charges stood proved. The

Inquiry Officer concluded that the Respondent had knowingly relied

upon and submitted non-genuine/fabricated certificates to justify his

unauthorised absence.

11.The Disciplinary Authority, by a detailed order dated

18.06.2010, concurred with the Inquiry Officer and concluded as

under: -

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 6 of 25

Considering the above position, it is clear that Shri

Manoj Kumar had produced false medical / fitness

certificates in connivance with Dr. T.P. Singh with

the intention to regularize his unauthorized absence.

This conclusion is based on the following facts:

1)He remained unauthorisedly absent from

duty with effect from 4.9.2000 to 29.4.2003.

He did not submit any leave application

either during the entire period of his

unauthorized absence or at the time of joining

his duty i.e., 30.4.2003.

2)Instead of submitting an application for leave

on medical grounds, accompanied by a

medical certificate, defining as clearly as

possible the probable duration of illness, in

time as required under Rule 19(1)(ii) of the

CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, Shri Manoj Kumar

submitted medical certificate dated 29.4.2003

for the continuous period from 5.1.2001 to

29.4.2003 on 30.4.2003 i.e., after a period of

over 27 months from the date of his absence

from duty / office. The medical certificate for

a continuous period from 5.1.2001 to

29.4.2003, as produced by Shri Manoj Kumar,

was issued by the doctor only on 29.4.2003

i.e., at the end of his illness and just a day

before he was declared fit by the same doctor.

3)The Additional Director (HQ), CGHS, Nirman

Bhawan, New Delhi, vide his letter no. 3-24 /

2004-CGHS / VC / 51 dated 8.2.2006 had

confirmed thatthe medical certificate dated

29.4.2003 and fitness certificate dated

30.4.2003 submitted by Shri Manoj Kumar

were not issued by the CGHS Dispensary,

Sunder Vihar, New Delhi.

4)Both the Additional Director, CGHS (HQ),

New Delhi, vide his letter no. 3-24 / 2004-

CGHS (VC) / 1291 dated 20.9.2006 and the

Chief Medical Officer J/C, CGHS Dispensary,

Sunder Vihar, New Delhi vide her letter dated

2.12.2006, had confirmed that Dr. T. P. Singh

was absent on 29.4.2003 and 30.4.2003, the

dates on which MC and FC respectively were

issued by Dr. T.P. Singh in the capacity of

CMO, CGHS, Sunder Vihar, Delhi.

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 7 of 25

5)The Chief Medical Officer Incharge, CGHS

Dispensary No. 82, Sunder Vihar, New Delhi

vide her letter dated 2.12.2006 had mentioned

that medical certificates / fitness certificates

books used by the CGHS Dispensary No. 82,

Sunder Vihar, New Delhi have serial numbers

whereas the medical and fitness certificates

issued by Dr. T.P. Singh do not bear serial

number. Besides, the Token No. of the

beneficiary was not mentioned on medical /

fitness certificates issued by Dr. T.P. Singh.

6)As per letter dated 2.12.2006 of the Chief

Medical Officer Incharge, CGHS Dispensary,

Sunder Vihar, New Delhi, Dr. T.P. Singh was

in the habit of issuing medical / fitness

certificates by misutilising official powers.

7)Shri Manoj Kumar submitted false statement

on 5.6.2006 that Dr. T.P. Singh was still the

sitting CMO in the same dispensary i.e.,

CGHS Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, Delhi. In

fact, Dr. T.P. Singh was not in government

service at that time as he was permitted to

takeretirement from government service on

26.12.2005 on invalid pension under Rule 38

of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 as confirmed

by the Additional Director, Central

Government Health Scheme (HQ), New Delhi

vide his letter no. 3-24 / 04 / CGHS (VC) /

1291 dated 20.9.2006.

8)As per the provisions of CGHS, a government

servant is entitled to receive CGHS facility in

his allotted dispensary. Shri Manoj Kumar, in

contravention of CGHS rules, took treatment

and medical certificate from CGHS

Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, New Delhi. As per

CGHS card no. 260341 of 113 Shri Manoj

Kumar, his residential address is “Village

Daulatabad, Gurgaon, Haryana” and his

allotted CGHS dispensary for medical

treatment is CGHS Dispensary No. 73,

Gurgaon.

The undersigned also finds from the records that the

Inquiry Officer has followed the due process of

inquiry before coming to the conclusion contained in

her report.”

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 8 of 25

12.Hence, taking into account the grave misconduct and lack of

integrity by the Respondent, the penalty of “Dismissal from service

which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment

under the Government” was imposed upon the Respondent, by the

Disciplinary Authority. It was also held that the period of

unauthorized absence i.e., 04.09.2000 to 29.04.2003 would be treated

as dies-non and no pay and allowances would be admissible for the

said period.

13.The above order on penalty dated 18.06.2010 was upheld by the

Director General of Audit, Central Expenditure, New Delhi and the

Appellate Authority vide order dated 01.12.2010.

14.The Revision Petition, filed by the Respondent against the

penalty imposed, was dismissed vide Order dated 31.07.2014 with the

observations that the penalty imposed is just and adequate.

15.Aggrieved, the Respondent approached the learned CAT by

filing O.A. No. 1489/2015. By the impugned order, the learned CAT

set-aside the disciplinary action primarily on two grounds that firstly,

forgery could not have been established without obtaining any expert

opinion and secondly, no criminal case has been initiated by the

Petitioners with respect to the allegations of forgery. The relevant

paragraph is reproduced as under: -

“14. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted

that the applicant has submitted forged certificate and

forgery has been proved by the respondents.

We are aware of the facts and circumstances of the

case. We are of the view that departmental proceedings

where preponderance of probability has been taken

into consideration and forgery is established, where

expert opinion is required, various other factors are to

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 9 of 25

be seen which normally is done in the judicial

proceedings. But respondents have not chosen to file a

criminal case in the instant case for theforgery which

cannot be proved in the quasi-judicial proceedings

under the law. We are not convinced with the stand

taken by the respondents. We hereby set aside the

impugned orders dated 11.05.2006 and 05.03.2007

and direct the disciplinary authority / appellate

authority to re-consider and to award some other

lesser punishment in terms of the aforesaid Hon’ble

Apex Court decisions in B. C. Chaturvedi vs. UOI &

Others as well as Chairman-cum-Managing Director,

Coal India Limited and Others, vs. Ananta Saha and

Others (supra).”

(emphasis supplied)

16.It is this order which is under challenge in the present writ

petition.

17.Learned counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that the

learned CAT has grossly exceeded the limits of judicial review by

substituting its own conclusions for that of the disciplinary authority,

without giving any cogent reasons for the same.

18.It is submitted that the Inquiry Officer returned a reasoned

finding that the medical and fitness certificates relied upon by the

Respondent were not issued by the CGHS Dispensary and Dr. T.P.

Singh was on leave on the said dates and was not in service on the

date of issuance of the confirmation certificate, and that the

certificates lacked essential features such as serial numbers and OPD

details. Further no other document in support of the medical illness

has been furnished by the Respondent. These findings, also upheld by

the Disciplinary Authority, clearly establish lack of integrity and

misconduct.

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 10 of 25

19.It is further submitted that the learned CAT erred in holding that

misconduct was not proved merely because no criminal prosecution

was launched and that the standard of proof applicable to departmental

proceedings has been overlooked.

20.It is further submitted that the act of projecting private

certificates as CGHS certificates itself constituted serious misconduct

under the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

21.On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the impugned order

of the learned CAT be set aside and the disciplinary penalty be

restored.

22.Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent supports the

impugned order and submits that the entire disciplinary proceedings

are vitiated as they are founded upon a statutory provision which was

not applicable to the Respondent at the relevant time.

23.It is submitted that the Respondent rejoined duty on 30.04.2003

and the medical certificates in question were dated 29.04.2003 and

30.04.2003. On the said date, Rule 19 of the CCS (Leave) Rules,

1972, as it then stood, merely required a medical certificate from an

Authorised Medical Attendant or a Registered Medical Practitioner in

the case of a non-gazetted employee. There was no requirement that

the certificate must be issued by a CGHS Dispensary.

24.It is contended that the inquiry proceeded entirely on the

erroneous premise that the certificates were invalid solely because

they were not issued by the CGHS Dispensary, when the same was

never required as per the governing rule.

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 11 of 25

25.It is further submitted that there is no finding that the

certificates were not issued by Dr. T.P. Singh, whose signatures are

not disputed and who had, in fact, confirmed issuance of the

certificates by issuing a confirmation certificate. At the highest, the

dispute pertains to incorrect institutional attribution of the certificates,

which cannot render them forged or fabricated.

26.It is thus, contended that the learned CAT has rightly set-aside

the disciplinary action and no interference is warranted.

27.Submissions heard and the material placed on record has been

perused.

Analysis

28.At the outset, it would be apposite to mention that the scope of

judicial review in disciplinary matters is well settled. Court exercising

power of judicial review does not sit as an appellate authority over the

findings of the disciplinary authority and ordinarily does not re-

appreciate evidence. Interference is warranted where the findings are

perverse, based on no evidence, or where the inquiry is vitiated by

violation of statutory provisions or principles of natural justice.

29.The decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 749, is a

seminal authority delineating the limited scope of judicial review in

disciplinary matters. The relevant extract is reproduced as under: -

“ 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a

decision but a review of the manner in which the

decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to

ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and

not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority

reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.

When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct

by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 12 of 25

determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent

officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied

with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based

on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the

power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and

authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But

that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither

the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of

fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to

disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts

that evidence and conclusion receives support

therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold

that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The

Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not

act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence

and to arrive at its own independent findings on the

evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the

authority held the proceedings against the delinquent

officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of

natural justice or in violation of statutory rules

prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the

conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary

authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or

finding be such as no reasonable person would have

ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the

conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to

make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13.The disciplinary authority is the sole judge

of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate

authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the

evidence or the nature of punishment. In a

disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence

and findings on that evidence are not relevant.

Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot

be permitted to be canvassed before the

Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964)

4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this

Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon

consideration of the evidence reached by the

disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from

patent error on the face of the record or based on no

evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.

14. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas [(1993) 4

SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 230 : (1993) 25 ATC 844]

when the order of transfer was interfered with by the

Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 13 of 25

appellate authority which could substitute its own

judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The

Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere

with orders of transfer of a government servant.

In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P.

Vora [1993 Supp (1) SCC 551 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 281 :

(1993) 23 ATC 672] it was held that the Administrative

Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could

not substitute the role of authorities to clear the

efficiency bar of a public servant. Recently, in State

Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow [(1994) 2

SCC 537 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 687 : (1994) 27 ATC 149 :

JT (1994) 1 SC 217] a Bench of this Court of which two

of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ.) were

members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which

quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in

detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had

power to appreciate the evidence while exercising

power of judicial review and held that a tribunal could

not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own

conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It

would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot

embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its

own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate

authority.

Xxx xxx xxx

17.The next question is whether the Tribunal

was justified in interfering with the punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution

Bench of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan

Mohapatra [AIR 1963 SC 779 : (1963) 1 LLJ 239] held

that having regard to the gravity of the established

misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and

jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not

open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If

the High Court reached a finding that there was some

evidence to reach the conclusion, it became

unassessable. The order of the Governor who had

jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the

appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had

no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the

penalty. It was further held that if the order was

supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct

for which punishment “can lawfully be imposed”, it

was not for the Court to consider whether that ground

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 14 of 25

alone would have weighed with the authority in

dismissing the public servant. The Court had no

jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie made out a

case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to

reconsider the order of penalty. This view was

reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972)

4 SCC 618 : (1972) 2 SCR 218] . It is true that

in Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 :

1983 SCC (L&S) 342 : AIR 1983 SC 454] a Bench of

two Judges of this Court, while holding that the High

Court did not function as a court of appeal, concluded

that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High

Court could always interfere with the same. In that

case, the finding was that the appellant was to

supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer

marked. The Government had recovered from the

contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees.

Under those circumstances, this Court held that the

finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by

evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to

conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is

empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by

the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami v. State of

T.N. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 617 :

AIR 1989 SC 1137] a Bench of three Judges of this

Court, while considering the power to interfere with the

order of punishment, held that this Court, while

exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the

penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its

own discretion for that of the authority. It would be

seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to

lay down that in no case, the High Court/Tribunal has

the power to alter the penalty imposed by the

disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy

was again canvassed in State Bank of India

case [(1994) 2 SCC 537 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 687 :

(1994) 27 ATC 149 : JT (1994) 1 SC 217] where the

Court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope

of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in

disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the

facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not

adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the

appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.

18.A review of the above legal position would

establish that the disciplinary authority, and on

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 15 of 25

appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding

authorities have exclusive power to consider the

evidence with a view to maintain discipline.They are

invested with the discretion to impose appropriate

punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity

of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while

exercising the power of judicial review, cannot

normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and

impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed

by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority

shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it

would appropriately mould the relief, either directing

the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the

penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may

itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose

appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support

thereof.”

(emphasis supplied)

30.Thus, it is no more res-integra that judicial review in

disciplinary proceedings is concerned not with the correctness of the

decision, but with the decision-making process, and the imposition of

penalty is solely the prerogative of the concerned Disciplinary

Authority and interference is only permissible if the punishment

imposed is so disproportionate or shocks the conscience of the court.

31.In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority’s order dated

18.06.2010 demonstrates application of mind to every defence raised,

appreciation of evidence, and clear reasons for arriving at the

conclusion of guilt. On preponderance of probabilities, the

Respondent was held guilty for attempting to regularize his

unauthorized leave by furnishing false/fabricated certificates and false

statements, essentially on the following grounds: -

a)The Respondent remained unauthorisedly

absent for nearly three years. He had failed to

submit any leave application

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 16 of 25

contemporaneously, either during the period of

absence or at the time of rejoining.

b)The medical and fitness certificates dated

29.04.2003 and 30.04.2003 portrayed to be

issued by Dr. T.P. Singh, then CMO, CGHS,

Sunder Vihar, were not issued by CGHS

Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, as confirmed by the

Additional Director (HQ), CGHS and the

CMO/Incharge of the said Dispensary.

c)Even Dr. T.P. Singh was admittedly

absent and not on duty on 29.04.2003 and

30.04.2003, as verified by CMO/Incharge

CMO/Incharge CGHS, Dispensary, Sunder

Vihar, then the certificates could not have been

issued by him in the first place either in his

official capacity or on behalf of CGHS.

d)The Certificates relied upon by the

respondent did not bear serial numbers or

beneficiary token numbers, which were features

of CGHS medical certificate books, as informed

by CMO/Incharge CGHS, Dispensary, Sunder

ViharIt was stated that while CGHS

beneficiaries from other dispensaries are

ordinarily issued referrals for only 1–2 days,

tuberculosis treatment generally extends for 6–9

months and may be prolonged in cases of poor

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 17 of 25

compliance. The usual practice is that once TB

is diagnosed, the patient is referred to a

specialist at a referral hospital, who initiates the

treatment, although there are no written

guidelines expressly prohibiting a CGHS doctor

from treating a TB patient.

e)The Respondent was an allotted

beneficiary of CGHS Dispensary No. 73,

Gurgaon, yet allegedly obtained certificates

from CGHS Dispensary, Sunder Vihar, New

Delhi, without referral, justification or

emergency.

f)The respondent made a false statement

asserting that Dr. T.P. Singh was the sitting

CMO of CGHS Sunder Vihar in June 2006,

despite his retirement in 2005, thereby

demonstrating deliberate misrepresentation.

32.However, the learned CAT, while addressing the issue that

whether the penalty imposed in the present case is harsher or

disproportionate, has not only quashed the chargesheets/Orders dated

11.05.2006 and 05.03.2007, but also directed reconsideration and

imposition of a lesser penalty than dismissal from service, without

even addressing the cumulative effect of proved grave misconduct i.e.

remaining absent for about 3 years without authorization and

submitting false medical/fitness certificates and statements to

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 18 of 25

regularise unauthorised absence or noting how the punishment

imposed is shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference.

33.Firstly, it is well-settled that in disciplinary proceedings, the

charges against the employee have to be proved by applying the

standard of “preponderance of probabilities”. However, the learned

CAT has erroneously applied the standards of criminal proceedings

i.e. proving guilt “beyond reasonable doubt” and erred in proceeding

on the assumption that in the absence of criminal prosecution or proof

of “forgery” of documents beyond reasonable doubt, disciplinary

action could not be sustained.

34.It has also been overlooked that the charge against the

Respondent was not of “forgery” of a document as applied in criminal

jurisprudence, but of submitting false medical and fitness certificates

and making false statements to regularise prolonged unauthorised

absence.

35.On verification, it stood established that the certificates were

not issued by the CGHS dispensary, and that the doctor whose name

appeared thereon was not on duty on the relevant dates. A doctor who

is not on duty could not have examined a patient on the said dates or

issued medical and fitness certificates on behalf of the CGHS. In the

absence of any record indicating where, when, or in what capacity the

Respondent was examined, the very basis of issuance of the

certificates (which also did not bear the serial number and token

number) remained unexplained, rendering them unreliable. Hence, on

a cumulative consideration of these circumstances, the falsity of the

medical documents stood proved on the touchstone of preponderance

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 19 of 25

of probabilities, rendering the question of seeking a second medical

opinion wholly irrelevant.

36.Furthermore, though it has not been disputed that leave on

medical grounds is required to be supported by a medical certificate,

however it has been argued that there was no requirement to submit a

certificate specifically issued by the CGHS or one from a particular

dispensary. This argument would have been able to aid the case of the

Respondent if he would have furnished any other genuine medical

document issued by an authorized medical attendant to support his

claim.

37.However, in the present case, the Respondent failed to establish

that he was examined by the concerned doctor i.e. Dr. T.P. Singh or

any other doctor or at any authorised medical facility and apart from

the unreliable/false certificates, he has not produced any

contemporaneous medical record whatsoever, including prescriptions,

OPD slips, treatment papers or medical bills, to substantiate his claim

of illness during the extended period of absence.

38.Further the falsity of his statement that Dr. T.P. Singh is still the

sitting CMO of CGHS Sunder Vihar in the year 2006, when he had

retired in 2005, was also proved upon verification.

39.Hence, when the Respondent had absented himself for an

extraordinarily long period and submitted unreliable certificates to get

his leave authorized and even made false statements that were, on due

verification, found to be false, the Disciplinary Authority had rightly

concluded that such conduct reflects deliberate dishonesty, abuse of

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 20 of 25

trust, and lack of integrity which are the core values expected of a

government servant.

40.In the case ofIndian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Rajendra D.

Harmalkar, (2022) 17 SCC 361 the charged official/employee was

proceeded against in disciplinary proceedings for submitting

forged/fabricated documents/Certificates to secure employment-

related benefits. Upon verification, the documents/certificates

produced were found to be not genuine, leading to a finding of serious

misconduct involving lack of integrity by the Inquiry Officer as well

as the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a

major penalty of dismissal from service, which was interfered with by

the High Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, however, reversed such

interference and restored the disciplinary action, holding that

production of false documents constitutes grave misconduct

undermining the employer’s trust. It was observed as under: -

“ 22. In the present case, the original writ petitioner

was dismissed from service by the disciplinary

authority for producing the fabricated/fake/forged

SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave

misconduct. The question is one of a TRUST. How can

an employee who has produced a fake and forged

marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of

appointment be trusted by the employer?Whether

such a certificate was material or not and/or had any

bearing on the employment or not is immaterial. The

question is not of having an intention or mens rea.

The question is producing the fake/forged certificate.

Therefore, in our view, the disciplinary authority was

justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal

from service.

Xxx xxx xxx

27. Even from the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court it does not appear that any

specific reasoning was given by the High Court on how

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 21 of 25

the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority

could be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the

misconduct proved. As per the settled position of law,

unless and until it is found that the punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly

disproportionate and/or there is procedural

irregularity in conducting the inquiry, the High Court

would not be justified in interfering with the order of

punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority

which as such is a prerogative of the disciplinary

authority as observed hereinabove.

Xxx xxx xxx

29. In any case in the facts and circumstances of the

case and for the reasons stated above and considering

the charge and misconduct of producing the fake and

false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious

decision was taken by the disciplinary authority to

dismiss him from service, the same could not have

been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of

powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in

interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the

disciplinary authority while exercising its powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

30. In view of the above and for the reasons stated

above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court in interfering with the order of punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority of dismissing the

original writ petitioner from service and ordering

reinstatement without back wages and other benefits is

hereby quashed and set aside. The order passed by the

disciplinary authority dismissing the original writ

petitioner from service on the misconduct proved is

hereby restored.”

(emphasis supplied)

41.In the judgment of Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal,

(2013) 9 SCC 363, it has also been categorically observed that where

an applicant employee gets an order by misrepresenting the facts or

by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot

be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts,

ecclesiastical or temporal.” Dishonesty should not be permitted to

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 22 of 25

bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have defrauded or

misrepresented themselves and, in such circumstances, the Court

should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their

behalf.

42.Relying on the above precedents, this Court, in the case of

Kiran Thakur v. Resident Commr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2912,

observed that “employees who are guilty of submitting forged

documents to their employer, have to be dealt with in a strict manner.

If a person submits forged and fabricated documents, then such a

person is certainly unfit to be employed. No sympathy or compassion

can be shown to such an employee. Thus, when the charge against the

petitioner stands proved, the punishment of dismissal from service

imposed by the respondent cannot be faulted with.”

43.In State of Odisha & Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Sahoo, Civil

Appeal No. 9514 of 2019, decided on 10 January 2020, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court examined the permissibility of judicial interference in

disciplinary action and imposition of penalty of discharge from

service against a government employee who remained unauthorisedly

absent for nearly seven years and sought to justify such absence on the

strength of a belated and self-serving medical certificate. The Apex

Court deprecated reliance on medical certificates unsupported by

contemporaneous treatment records, particularly where the employee

had deliberately avoided official medical examination and produced a

certificate issued years later by a specialist who had not even treated

him. Emphasising discipline in public service, it was held that such

certificates of convenience cannot dilute the gravity of misconduct nor

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 23 of 25

warrant substitution of punishment on the ground of proportionality.

The relevant extract is reproduced as under: -

19. If the respondent had actually suffered from

cerebral malaria since 3.06.1991 and was subjected to

frequent cyclic attack of Maniac Depression Psychosis,

as claimed, necessary proof of such suffering from the

concerned Doctor/Hospital who were providing him

the treatment, ought to have been produced.

Moreover, he never allowed for cross verification of his

pleaded medical condition by presenting himself before

the CDMO in 1991 or thereafter. Instead, the

respondent only produced the 21.1.1998 certificate of

the HoD, Psychiatry who may have had no role in the

treatment of the respondent. It therefore appears to be

a case of certificate of convenience on the purported

symptoms and mental ailment of the respondent from

1991 to 1998, without support of any

contemporaneous medical records. Most curiously, the

Doctor had issued the certificate on the basis of

reference made by the local MLA but not on the basis

of referral by Doctor/Hospital which might have been

involved with the respondent’s treatment during 1991

to 1998.

20. In the present case, we are inclined to think that

the respondentby remaining away from duty since

1991 to 1998 without producing contemporaneous

medical record has not only been irresponsible and

indisciplined but tried to get away with it by producing

the certificate of a specialist Doctor who may not have

treated the respondent. Significantly, although the

respondent produced a certificate of a psychiatric

specialist, he never claimed that he received treatment

from any psychiatric Doctor.In such backdrop, the

High Court should not have invoked the self serving

medical certificate. The Court wrongfully relied on

Rajinder Kumar (supra) where this Court’s

intervention was in entirely different circumstances.

Besides the doctrine of proportionality is not attracted

in the present facts.

Xxx xxx xxx

22. In the above circumstances, the High Court should

not have granted relief to the respondent solely on the

basis of the medical certificate of the specialist Doctor

who may not have personally treated the patient. In

the absence of relevant and contemporaneous medical

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 24 of 25

records, the High Court should not have interfered with

the disciplinary action and ordered for a lesser penalty.

The gravity of the misconduct of the respondent was

overlooked and unmerited intervention was made with

the Tribunal’s rightful decision to decline relief in the

O.A.1459(C)/2003 filed by the respondent.”

(emphasis supplied)

44.Keeping the above principles in mind, it emerges that Courts

have consistently held that the production of false or fabricated

medical certificates by a government employee amounts to serious

misconduct, reflecting dishonesty and lack of integrity, and justifies

dismissal from service.

45.Despite being aware of the requirement to submit authentic

certificates, the Respondent had absented himself for an extended

period and submitted certificates purportedly issued by a CGHS

doctor who was on leave and could not have examined him. Even

otherwise, no other supporting medical documents, prescriptions, or

OPD records were provided to substantiate his claimed illness.

46.Thus, this Court finds that the Disciplinary Authority has

reasonably concluded that the misconduct was extremely grave,

involving not merely absence, but intentional misrepresentation and

furnishing false information. Hence, the penalty of dismissal cannot

be said to be disproportionate, nor does it shock the conscience of this

Court.

47.The learned CAT has committed a manifest error in interfering

with the penalty and even quashing the charge memos, by substituting

its own assessment and applying the incorrect standard of proof,

without recording cogent reasons for the same.

W.P.(C) 7831/2024 Page 25 of 25

48.Accordingly, the impugned order dated 29.05.2023 is set aside

and the order of dismissal dated 18.06.2010, as upheld by the

Appellate/Revisionary Authority, is restored.

49.In view of the foregoing the present Petition is allowed.

50.The Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

FEBRUARY 03, 2026

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