IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL SPECIAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

CRLCP 5 of 2025

With

CRLCP 6 of 2025

With

CRLCP 7 of 2025

In the matter of: Court on its own motion

v.

Raju Das & Ors.

Before: The Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee

The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

&

The Hon’ble Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj

for the informant in

CRLCP 5 of 2025

: Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Samim Ahammed, Adv.

Mr. Siddharth Sankar Mondal, Adv.

Mr. Arka Maiti, Adv.

Mr. Tapas Maity, Adv.

Ms. Anjana Mahaboob, Adv.

Ms. Saloni Bhattacharya, Adv.

Ms. Reshma Khatun, Adv.

Ms. Sabnam Mustari, Adv.

for the informants in

CRLCP 7 of 2025

: Mr. Ritzu Ghosal, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Mainak Ghoshal, Adv.

Mr. Rajosik Dutta, Adv.

Mr. Naman Shah, Adv.

2

For the alleged contem-

nor nos. 1 to 7

: Mr. Saurav Mallick, Adv.

For the alleged contem-

nor no. 8

: Mr. Kalyan Kumar Bandopadhyay, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Ayan Chakraborty, Adv.

Mr. Rahul Kr. Singh, Adv.

Ms. Sohini Mukherjee, Adv.

for the office of the Ld.

AG.

:

Mr. Vivekananda Bose, Jr. St. Counsel

for the office of the Ld.

ASGI (UOI)

: Mr. Kumar Jyoti Tewari, Adv.,

Ms. Rashmi Bothra, Adv.

Mrs. Amrita Pandey, Adv.

Ms. Samriddhi Nayak, Adv.

for the Bar Library Club

:

Mr. Sabyasachi Choudhury, Adv.

Mr. S. Nag, Adv.

Mr. Anindya Basu, Adv.

for the Incorporated

Law Society

: Mr. Mukul Lahiri, Adv.,

Mr. Soumya Majumder, Adv.

Mr. Saikat Banerjee, Adv.

Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee, Adv.

Mr. Anirban Pramanick, Adv.

Judgment on

:

13.07.2026

Arijit Banerjee, J.:-

1. On April 28, 2025, several learned Advocates appeared before the Division

Bench presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and drew the attention of the

Bench to certain acts and conduct of a group of persons including the alleged

contemnors in these proceedings which the learned advocates perceived as

amounting to criminal contempt of this Court. Three affidavits were filed before the

Division Bench. One was affirmed by Amitabha Ghosh, Advocate , on April 28,

2025, and was registered as CRLCP 5 of 2025. Another was affirmed by Tapas

Maity, Advocate, on April 28, 2025, and was registered as CRLCP 6 of 2025. The

third affidavit was affirmed on the same date by Tisha Guha, a Law Student, which

was registered as CRLCP no. 7 of 2025.

3

2. On the same date i.e., April 28, 2025, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice passed

an order on the administrative side, which reads as follows:-

“The matter was mentioned before Court Room No. 1 today (28.04.2025)

by several learned Advocates, who were uniform in their submission that

the incidents which occurred on 25.04.2025 at Kiran Sankar Roy Road,

Kolkata 700001, is a clear interference to the administration of justice

and a threat meted out to the Judiciary and the learned Members of the

Bar. Video Clipping was shown to us in whic h it was seen that one

person was stamping the photograph of a Hon'ble Judge with his feet.

The interview given to the concerned Youtube channel was translated

and explained to the undersigned in English, from which it appeared,

prima facie, clear that the person was mentioning about the name/s of

Hon'ble Judges present and past, there was also mention about orders

passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the names of Senior

Advocates were also taken.

Thus I am convinced that the matter requires immediate at tention, to

protect the image of the Judiciary from scurrilous and baseless

allegations.

Hence I deem it appropriate to constitute the following Special Bench

comprising:-

(1) Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee,

(2) Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, AND

(3) Hon'ble Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj.

The petitions along with this note be placed before Hon'ble Judges so as

to enable the Hon'ble Special Bench to fix a date for the matter to be

listed.”

4

3. This Bench first assembled on May 2, 2025. On that date we had passed an

order which reads as follows:-

“1. These proceedings for criminal contempt have been initiated suo

motu by the Court of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by reason of an

extremely unfortunate incident.

2. We have gone through the materials, which have so far been

brought on record including affidavits of persons, who were present

at the place of occurrence. Prima facie, we are of the view that

criminal contempt has been committed in this case by the alleged

contemnors by interfering with due administration of justice and

scandalizing the judiciary.

3. Hence, let notice be issued to the 8 alleged contemnors named in

CRLCP 7 of 2025 who include the contemnor nos.1, 2 and 3 both in

CRLCP 5 of 2025 and CRLCP 6 of 2025.

4. Let copies of all affidavits and other materials available so far in

the records of these contempt proceedings be made available to the

alleged contemnors. They will be at liberty to file replies within a

fortnight from the date of receipt of notice.

5. The Commissioner of Police is directed to cause due enquiry and

identify the persons who are responsible for and who contributed to

the unfortunate incident. The Commissioner is requested to file a

report in this regard on the adjourned date.

6. The Commissioner of Police shall also ensure that the concerned

CCTV footage of the incident on April 25, 2025, is preserved,

particularly between 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. in respect of the CCTV

cameras installed at or in the vicinity of Kiran Shankar Roy Road

and Old Post Office Street.

5

7. The Office of learned Advocate General is requested to ensure

that the police report that we have called for, is available before us

on the adjourned date on prior circulation to learned Advocates

appearing in different matters.

8. The Commissioner of Police is also requested to ensure due

protection to all the members of the profession and to see that the

unfortunate incident or the like does not recur.

9. Learned Registrar General of this Court is requested to ensure

that notices of these proceedings are served on the persons

mentioned above along with the relevant material immediately.

Learned Registrar General shall also communicate this order to the

Police Commissioner forthwith.

10. List these matters once again on May 19, 2025, at 12.30 p.m.

11. On the adjourned date, learned Registrar General shall file a

report as regards service to the alleged contemnors and the Police

Commissioner.

12. All concerned will be at liberty to file affidavits to bring on

record any relevant material.

13. All parties shall act in terms of server copy of the order

downloaded from the official website of this Court.”

4. On May 19, 2025, when we again assembled, we recorded the following

order:-

“1. Report filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Police be kept with the

records.

2. Affidavit filed on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society be also

retained with the records.

6

3. By our order dated May 2, 2025, we had recorded that prima facie we

are satisfied of commission of criminal contempt by the alleged

contemnors. We had granted liberty to the alleged contemnors to file

their replies within a fortnight from the date of receipt of notice.

4. Today all the alleged contemnors are represented through learned

Advocates. None of them has filed any affidavit. The allegations against

them remain uncontroverted.

5. There will be Rules against the alleged contemnors. The Rules are

made returnable on June 16, 2025 at 12.30 p.m.

6. Learned Advocate representing the Incorporated Law Society is

requested to supply copies of the affidavit filed today to the other learned

Advocates who request for the same. Since the report of the

Commissioner of Police has already been circulated amongst learned

Advocates, we do not pass any direction for circulating the same once

again.”

5. Thereafter from time to time on various dates, we heard the matters. On

April 9, 2026, hearing was concluded.

6. The alleged contemnors filed affidavits answering the rule. A report dated

May 17, 2025, was filed by the then commissioner of police, Calcutta, in terms of

our order dated May 2, 2025.

7. The contents of the three affidavits are similar. To avoid prolixity we may

note the contents of the affidavit affirmed by Amitava Ghosh, captioned complaint

in the form of affidavit.

8.

“COMPLAINT IN THE FORM OF AFFIDAVIT

I, Amitabha Ghosh, son of Dilip Ghosh, aged about 52 years, residing at

30 Rajmohan Road, New Telephone Exchange, Uttarpara Kotrung,

7

Uttarpara, Hooghly, Pin Code-712258, by faith-Hindu, by occupation-

Advocate, presently holding the office of President of the All India

Lawyers Union - Calcutta High Court Committee, do hereby solemnly

verify, affirm and state as follows:

1. I say that I am constrained to draw the urgent and immediate

attention of this Hon'ble Court to a most grave and unprecedented

incident which took place on 25th April 2025 at approximately 4:45 p.m.

at 10, Kiran Sankar Roy Road, opposite the City Civil Court, Kolkata-

700001, where numerous advocates maintain their professional

chambers.

2. I say that at the said time and place, a large group of individuals

unlawfully assembled, blocked the main entrance to the building as well

as the adjoining public thoroughfare, and wrongfully restrained

advocates, litigants, clerks, and other persons from exiting the premises.

Several advocates including Sudipto Dasgupta, Bikram Banerjee,

Sagarika Goswami, Gopa Biswas, Firdous Samim, Sinjini Chakraborty,

Dipa Acharya, Arka Nandi and Baibhab Roy were wrongfully confined

within their chambers, and such acts caused fear, panic, and a complete

disruption of professional and legal duties, constituting a direct and

deliberate obstruction to the administration of justice.

3. I say that certain members of the said mob have been identified who

are as follows;

i. Raju Das of Village - Layer, Post Office - Janta, District -Bankura,

Pin Code-722122;

ii. Suvendu Das, son of Dibakar Das of Village - Dhoshpara, Post

Office - Kalitala, Police Station - Sagar, District - South 24 Parganas,

Pin Code - 743373;

8

iii. Atanu Roy, residing at Village - Gargeswar, Post Office - Paharhati,

Police Station - Memari, District - Purba Burdwan, Pin Code-713146.

4. I say that the aforesaid persons along with Rajesh Sarkar Chaudhury,

and unknown persons, were acting in a contemptuous mann er and were

continuously shouting provocative, abusive, and menacing slogans. A

copy of the pictures of the said so called protestors are annexed hereto

and marked as Annexure A collectively.

5. I say that the aforementioned persons and other unknown perso ns

hurled threats of grievous bodily harm and directed vulgar and obscene

abuses, particularly aimed at female advocates, with the manifest

intention to outrage their modesty and dignity for being associated with

a case being WPA 25056 of 2022 while repres enting the petitioners in

the said case.

6. I say that the said individuals further crossed all bounds of legality

and propriety by raising scandalous and defamatory slogans against the

Hon'ble Justice Biswajit Basu of this Hon'ble Court, expressing

resentment over judicial orders passed in W.P.A. No. 25056 of 2022. The

said Raju Das while addressing the media made following statement;

“সেটা স া ওনার সেটটিং জাজ েুপ্রীম স ার্টের ওর্োর মানর্েনা েুপ্রীম স ার্টের ওর্োর্র

পররস্কার বলা আর্ে এর্ের জর্েরনিং সলটার সেওো স া ববধ বর্ল প্রমাণ রর া শর্ েও

রবশ্বজজৎ বেু সটাটাল জাজ সে এম. রপ. ওোর জনয মূল এম. রপ. ওোর জনয

এ জন গাঙ্গুরল এম. রপ. র্ের্েন রব াশ বাবুর া ধর্র এখন উরনও আর্গ সেটা

স োররিং সের্খর্েন া সটাটারল অ্যাভর্ের্ মার্ন আমার্ের লইোরর্ স ার্না পাত্তা

রের্েনা র ন্তু উরন রিরর্েৌের্ রনর্ে োরা রমর্যয সিল রা যাজির্র্ট ার্েরর্

রনর্ে োরখল রর্ে সেটা অ্যালাও রর্ে র ন্তু আমার্েরটা অ্যালাও রর্েনা এই

9

সমার্মর্ে আমার্ের এ টাই োরব এই রার্ের্ জাজ, রার্ের্ রব াশ বাবুর রবরুর্ে

েন্দ স া ”

(He is not complying with the Supreme Court's order despite being a

sitting judge. The Supreme Court’s order clearly states that joining

letters should be issued and that the appointments are to be treated as

valid, subject to proof. Still, Biswajit Basu, who is entirely biased, is

mainly aiming to become an MP, and another person named Ganguly

has already become an MP through Bikas Babu's influence. Now,

Biswajit Basu is completely avoiding the earlier hearing he conducted

and is ignoring our lawyer. On the other hand, he is allowing

submissions on behalf of failed candidates through Firdous, but he is

not allowing ours. At this moment, our only demand is that there must

be an investigation against this corrupt judge and corrupt Bikas Babu.)

Their utterances were clearly intended to scandalize this Hon'ble Court,

lower its authority in the eyes of the public, and erode public confidence

in the judicial institution, thereby constituting a grave and deliberate act

of criminal contempt.

7. I say that the said individuals displayed photographs of the Hon'ble

Judge and distinguished advocates on the public road, trampled upon

them, spat upon them, and recorded these shameful acts on video. Such

acts of desecration of the image of members of the judiciary and the Bar

strike at the very root of the authority of this Hon'ble Court and the

dignity of the legal profession and constitute a manifest interference with

the due course of justice. Copy of screenshots of video showing acts of

desecration from the so called protest is annexed hereto and marked as

Annexure B collectively. I crave leave to produce the entire video at the

time of hearing if necessary.

10

8. I say that despite the extreme gravity of the situation, police personnel

present at the scene failed in their solemn duty to intervene, control, or

disperse the unlawful assembly, thereby emboldening the wrongdoers

and aggravating the obstruction to justice.

9. I say that in fact police has failed to take any steps despite the fact

that contemporaneous complaints were made by and/or on behalf of the

trapped advocates seeking help. Copy of the contemporaneous

complaints are annexed hereto and marked as Annexure C collectively.

10. I say that in fact Advocate Sudipto Dasgupta has previously on April

1, 2025 made a complaint to the police authorities in regard to a social

media post made by the said Raju Das by which the said Raju Das

targeted Advocate Dasgupta and his wife for appearing in a matter. In

the said complaint explicit mention was made of apprehension of harm.

Despite thereof, no steps were taken by the police authorities. Copy of

the said complaint is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure D. Copy

of the Facebook post by Raju Das is annexed hereto and marked as

Annexure E.

11. I say that at about 8:00 p.m., upon being informed of the grave

threat to the safety of advocates, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya,

Learned Senior Advocate, arrived at the scene and sought to facilitate the

evacuation of the trapped advocates. However, he too became the target

of hostile slogans, intimidation, and an attempted assault, and despite

his courageous efforts, the mob launched a violent attack, hurling stones

and bottles, leading to injuries and assaults on several advocates,

including female members of the Bar.

12. I say that only much later in the night, and in a perfunctory manner,

did the police intervene and facilitate the escape of the trapped

11

advocates, by which time substantial damage to the dignity of the Court

and the legal profession had already been inflicted.

13. I say that on the same day, Mr. Kunal Ghosh, a senior leader of the

Trinamool Congress, made highly inflammatory and contemptuous

statements in public and before the media, scandalizing this Hon'ble

Court and vilifying respected members of the Bar, thereby seeking to

lower the authority of the judiciary and interfere with the due course of

justice while purporting to defend the action of the members of the mob.

14. I say that Mr. Kunal Ghosh stated in the public domain, “এেএলএেটট

শারীর রশক্ষা ও ম েরশক্ষা চা ররপ্রাযীর্ের স ন্দ্র র্র াইর্ ার্টে এ টট ঘটনা ঘর্ট।

প্রর রনরধরা সেখা রর্ আর্েন। এর্ের অ্রবলর্ে রনর্োর্গ সে স্থরগ ার্েশ আর্ে, া

ুর্ল রনর্োগ রা উরচ । এরা ে র্ল সোগয। রেরবআই-এর স ানও অ্রভর্োগ সনই।

সেই ারর্ণ মুখযমন্ত্রী সর র্মিশন সলটার রের্ের্েন। র ন্তু ারপর রেরপএর্মর

উর লরা এর্ের পররবারর্ জটটল াে সির্লর্েন। এই স্থরগ ার্েশ েীঘ েরেন ধর্র

চর্লর্ে।”

(An incident occurred in the High Court regarding SLST Physical

Education and Work Education job candidates. Representatives came to

meet regarding the matter. The stay order that currently exists on their

immediate appointment should be lifted, and they should be appointed.

All of them are qualified. There are no CBI allegations against them. For

this reason, the Chief Minister has issued a recommendation letter.

However, later, lawyers associated with the CPI(M) have compli cated

matters for the families of these candidates. This stay order has been

ongoing for a long time.)

By these remarks, Mr. Ghosh falsely alleged that the stay orders passed

by this Hon'ble Court were improper and the result of political

12

manipulation by certain advocates, thereby attacking the judicial

process and attributing mala fides to judicial orders.

15. I say that Mr. Kunal Ghosh further scandalized the judiciary by

stating, “আর রবচারপর র র েু র েু রেরপএর্মর আইনজীবীর্ সেখর্ল ী ে জারন

না। অ্রভজজৎ গর্ঙ্গাপাধযাের্ সের্খরে। ভগবান-ভগবান- ারপর োিংেে।”

(And as for the judge, we do not know what happens when he sees

certain lawyers from the CPI(M). We have seen what happened with

Abhijit Gangopadhyay- first “God-God,” and then he became a Member

of Parliament (MP).)

By such statements, he contemptuously suggested that judicial officers

were acting in a politically biased manner, thereby gravely undermining

public confidence in the impartiality and independence of this Hon'ble

Court.

16. I say that Mr. Kunal Ghosh additionally made a direct attack on the

professional integrity of Senior Advocate Mr. Bikash Ranjan

Bhattacharyya, by stating publicly, “রব াশরঞ্জন ভট্টাচাে ে এ েমে এনার্ের

পর্ক্ষ রের্লন। ২৭ লক্ষ টা া রনর্ের্েন। আজ বাধা রের্েন রব াশরঞ্জন ভট্টাচাে ে। উরন

বলর্েন, টা া রনর্ে াজ র্ররে। র ন্তু এটা স ান সপশাোররত্ব? োাঁর্ের সযর্ টা া

রনর্ে াজ র্রর্েন, াাঁর্েরই চা রর আট ার্ মামলা র্রর্েন...।”

(At one point, Bikas Ranjan Bhattacharya was on their side. He took 27

lakh rupees. Today, Bikas Ranjan Bhattacharya is obstru cting their

work. He claims that he worked after taking the money. But is this

professionalism? The very people from whom he took money, he has now

filed cases to block their jobs).

By these reckless and baseless allegations of unethical conduct against a

senior member of the Bar, Mr. Ghosh sought to destroy the professional

13

credibility of an officer of the Court and thereby obstructed the

administration of justice.

17. I say that Mr. Kunal Ghosh further showed photographs of various

political leaders and advocates, publicly questioning their professional

and political integrity by saying, “এরা েখন ধরনাে রের্লন খন ম ম্মে সেরলম

ওই ধরনা মর্ে রগর্ে ী রর্েন? লজ্জা র্র না? রব াশ ভট্টাচাে ে আবার চা রর

আট ার্েন। েুজন চক্রব ী এর্ের ধরনাে বর্ে আর্ে।”

(When they were on a sit-in, what was Mohammad Selim doing on the

protest stage? Doesn't he feel ashamed? Bikas Bhattacharya is again

blocking their jobs. Sujan Chakraborty is sitting at their sit-in. By such

actions, Mr. Ghosh maliciously mischaracterized the legitimate

professional activities of advocates as political betrayal, thereby

intimidating members of the legal profession and undermining their

independence.

18. I say that in addition, Mr. Kunal Ghosh maligned Advocate Mr.

Firdous Shamim, stating publicly, “শারমম ে ইো গালাগারল োও ভাই। ুরম

মর্ে ী রর্ রগর্েরের্ল? শারমম ৭ লাখ রনর্ের্েন। এর্ের ের্ঙ্গ রের্লন। আজ

রবর্রারধ া রর্েন স ন?”

(Shamim, you can abuse as much as you want, brother. What were you

doing on the stage? Shamim took 7 lakh rupees. He was with them. Why

is he opposing them now?)

Copy of the news report of the said press conference is annexed hereto

and marked as Annexure F.

19. I say that such public insults and provocations, constitute a gross

and calculated attempt to bring the advocates into public hatred,

14

ridicule, and contempt, and to disrupt the sanctity of judicial

proceedings.

20. I say that Mr. Kunal Ghosh, by these successive and deliberate

statements, made serious imputations against the judicial process,

attempted to coerce judicial outcomes through public pressure, and

scandalized the Court and the Bar, thus committing acts that squarely

fall within the definition of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

21. I say that the acts of Mr. Ghosh are part of a larger design to

obstruct the access to justice by creating a hostile and fear -laden

atmosphere for advocates who are discharging their solemn duty of

representing clients in Court, thereby attacking both the Bar and the

Bench, the two essential pillars of the justice delivery system.

22. I say that the actions of the said individuals amount to a direct

attack upon the right of access to justice, as advocates, who were merely

representing their clients in accordance with their professional duties,

were targeted and subjected to criminal intimidation, wrongful restraint

and confinement, physical assault, and public humiliation.

23. I say that the incident also constitutes a grievous attack on both the

Bar and the Bench, which are integral and inseparable components of

the justice delivery system. An attack on either the Bench or the Bar is

an attack on the system of justice itself and strikes at the very heart of

the rule of law.

24. I say that the acts committed by the said individuals amount to

criminal offences under the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023, including but

not limited to wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, criminal

intimidation, assault, and public mischief. Additionally, the acts amount

15

to criminal contempt under the Contempt of Cou rts Act, 1971, by

scandalizing the Court, prejudicing judicial proceedings, and obstructing

the administration of justice.

25. I say that in the circumstances, I respectfully pray that this Hon'ble

Court may be pleased to take suo motu cognizance of the ac ts of

contempt committed by the aforesaid persons and such others as may

be found guilty upon inquiry, and be pleased to initiate appropriate

criminal contempt proceedings as well as any other proceedings deemed

fit in order to uphold the majesty of the law, protect the dignity of the

judiciary and the legal profession, and reaffirm public faith in the

administration of justice.

26. That the statements made in paragraphs 1, 2, 14 (part) 15 to 25, are

true to my knowledge, those made in paragraphs 3 to 13, 14 (Part) are

my information derived from the records, which I verily believe to be

true, and the rest are my humble submissions before this Hon'ble

Court.”

9. An affidavit was affirmed by Atanu Roy, one of the alleged contemnors in

CRLCP 7 of 2025 on behalf of himself as also on behalf of the other alleged

contemnors excepting the alleged contemnor no. 8, Kunal Ghosh. Paragraph nos.

3,4,5,14,15 and 20 of the said affidavit may be noted:-

“3. I say that the present Affidavit is being filed pursuant to the rule

issued by this Hon'ble Court by the order dated 19th May, 2025 which

was received by the contemnor no. 1 on 08.06.2025 and by contemnor

no. 2, 3 and 7 on 11.06.2025 and by the contemnor no. 6 on 12.06.2025

and the same may also be treated as the affidavit pursuant to the

direction passed by the order dated 2nd May, 20 25.

16

4. At the outset, I tender unconditional apology for the incidents that

transpired on 25th April, 2025. I say that we have the highest regard for

the judiciary as well as this Hon'ble Court and would never do or say

anything to disrespect or malign the institution. I say that we are deeply

remorseful for our actions and acknowledge the seriousness of the same.

I say that it was never our intention to disrespect or hurt the sentiments

of any person and whatever happened is very unfortunate and I pray for

forgiveness before this Hon'ble Court.

5. I say that we are victims of the situation and are literally on the verge

of starvation and whatever happened was out of frustration and not with

the intention to disrespect this Hon'ble Court or the sentiments of any

Learned Advocate or any other person. I say that there cannot be any

justification of what has happened, and we are humbly praying for Your

Lordships’ apology and we tender our unconditional apology before this

Hon’ble Court.

14. I say that the agitation which took place was by the candidates who

despite being successful and recommended were not issued appointment

letters because of the interim order passed in the writ petition being

W.P.A. No. 25056 of 2022 (Minakshi Ghosh & Ors. -v/s- The State of

West Bengal & Ors). I say the candidates are literally on the verge of

starvation and have been demonstrating since the year 2022 and

whatever unfortunate incident has happened was because of the mental

agony and pain and also out of insecurity and frustration.

15. I say that we are not criminals or habitual offenders, but victims of

the situation and whatever incidents unfolded on 25th April, 2025 was

not intentional but out of mere frustration and we tender unconditional

17

apology before this Hon'ble Court and also undertake that such incident

will never happen and/or repeat in the future.

20. I state that all the charges levied against us in the rule served on us

on 08.06.2025, 11.06.2025 and 12.06.2025 are denied. It is reiterated

that we never had any intention to disrespect this Hon'ble Court or any

Hon'ble Judge or any Learned Lawyer and if unknowingly we have done

anything to hurt the sentiments of any person, we apologize for the same

and undertake that the same will not repeat in the future.”

In the other paragraphs of the said affidavit, the deponent has narrated

certain facts which, according to him, triggered the agitation and contemptuous

conduct of the alleged contemnors on whose behalf the said affidavit was filed.

10. The alleged contemnor no. 8 in CRLCP 7 of 2025 filed a separate affidavit

affirmed on June 11, 2025. In paragraph 3 of the said affidavit the deponent stated

as follows:-

“3. At the outset, I tender my unconditional and unqualified apology for any

inadvertent act of mine which may be perceived to lower the majesty,

sanctity and authority of this Hon'ble Court. I have immense respect and full

faith in the judiciary, and I do not have any ill intention to lower the sanctity

and majesty of this Hon'ble Court. I respectfully submit that I hold this

Hon'ble Court in the highest regard and esteem, and I will always ensure to

make all possible efforts to comply with any direction which would be passed

by this Hon'ble Court in its letter and spirit.”

11. In the subsequent paragraphs of the affidavit the deponent Kunal Ghosh

challenged the maintainability of the suo moto contempt proceedings by referring

to Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Primarily he contended that the

proceedings are not suo moto but have been set into motion by the three affidavits

18

filed by the complainants. Therefore, in the absence of consent of the Advocate

General, the proceedings are not maintainable.

12. In the various sub-paragraphs under paragraph 8 of his affidavit, Mr. Ghosh

stated as follows:-

“8. Before dealing with para-wise allegations and/or averments made

and/or contained in the Affidavit filed by the Complainant in connection

with the instant Criminal Contempt, I say as follows:

i. At the outset, it is stated that I was not present at the 10, Kiran

Shankar Roy Road or in the vicinity of the Hon'ble High Court at

Calcutta on 25th April 2025. I have no relation whatsoever with the

protests at 10, Kiran Shankar Road on 25th April 2025. The report filed

by the Commissioner of Police confirms this statement of mine. Thus,

impleading me in the said criminal contempt petition is unwarranted as I

had no connection whatsoever with the protests in question. I have been

implicated in the instant contempt proceedings for oblique motives.

ii. The complainants in their affidavits have prayed for initiation of

contempt proceedings for the incident which took place on 25th April,

2025, from 4:00 pm to 9:00 pm at 10, Kiran Sankar Roy Road, opposite

the City Civil Court, Kolkata-700001. The cause title of the Affidavit

prays for initiation of contempt proceedings for obstruction of Justice,

intimidation of advocates, scandalisation of the Court, and interference

with the administration of justice committed on 25th April 2025 at 10,

Kiran Sankar Roy Road, Kolkata 700001. It is reiterated that I was not

present with the other alleged contemnors on the said date and time in

the vicinity of the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta. I was recording an

interview in the News 18 Studio, which is situated in New Town, Kolkata.

19

iii. I am a law-abiding citizen of this Country and I harbour deepest

respect towards the judiciary of our country. I have never made any

willful attempt to malign or scandalise the judiciary of this country.

iv. It is stated that I am an ardent well-wisher of the candidates who are

not getting employment in schools despite being otherwise eligible for the

same, and I wholeheartedly wish that the eligible and honest candidates

secure their deserving employment. However, I have always advised

these candidates to repose their faith and trust in the judiciary, and I

have never instigated anyone to commit any illegal act under the garb of

protests.

v. Some of the candidates including alleged Contemnors No. 1 to 7

approached me on 26th April 2025 with their grievances that a group of

Learned Advocates, including Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Learned

Senior Advocate, represented them before this Hon'ble Court in WP No.

944(W) of 2019 and WP No. 947(W) of 2019. These candidates further

informed me that two applications being CAN 9268 of 2019 in WP No.

944(W) of 2019 and CAN No. 9269 of 2019 in WP No. 947(W) of 2019,

were filed and moved by the Learned Advocate Mr. Firdou s Samim for

addition of some of the candidates who were supporting the prayers in

the aforesaid two Writ Petitions.

vi. The Petitioners in WP No. 944(W) of 2019 and WP No. 947(W) of 2019

primarily prayed for a direction to appoint them as Assistant Teachers in

Physical Education and Work Education, for publication of the interview

list containing the details of all the candidates in strict compliance with

Rules 8 and 9 of the 2016 Rules and to maintain the reservation policy.

This Hon'ble Court vide Judgment and Order dated 1st November 2019,

directed the West Bengal Central School Service Commission to publish

20

the interview list with relevant details as per the mandate of Rules 8 and

9 of the 2016 Rules within 18th November 2019. I crave leave of this

Hon'ble Court to refer and rely upon the Writ Petitions being WP No.

944(W) of 2019 and WP No. 947(W) of 2019 and the Orders passed

therein at the time of hearing, if necessary.

vii. I was further informed by these candidates that in compliance with

the Judgment and Order dated 1st November 2019, the School Service

Commission published an interview list. However, there were several

discrepancies in the selection process, which were pointed out before

this Hon’ble Court by these candidates by filing two Writ Petitions, being

WP No. 23033(W) of 2019 and WP No. 23034(W) of 2019. The candidates

thus prayed for the cancellation of the panel prepared for Work

Education and Physical Education before this Hon ’ble Court and for

their appointment to the post of Assista nt Teachers in Physical

Education and Work Education. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya,

Learned Senior Advocate, was representing these candidates in WP No.

23033(W) of 2019 and WP No. 23034(W) of 2019 as well. These two Writ

Petitions are currently pending adjudication before this Hon’ble Court. I

crave leave of this Hon'ble Court to refer and rely upon the Writ Petitions

being WP No. 23033(W) of 2019 and WP No. 23034(W) of 2019 and the

Orders passed therein at the time of hearing. if necessary.

viii. Simultaneously, these candidates were also protesting against the

delay in their appointment at various places in the city of Kolkata, like

the Press Club, Matangini Hazra Statue, etc. Several Learned Advocates,

including Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate,

and Mr. Firdous Samim supported these candidates by visiting their

protest sites during the years 2019 to 2021.

21

Photostat copies of the images showing the presence of Learned

Advocates in the protests organised by these candidates are collectively

annexed hereto and are marked with Annexure "A".

ix. Finally, on 19th May 2022, the Government of West Bengal, in

response to the demands of these candidates, created supernumerary

posts to give appointments to these candidates to the posts of Assistant

Teachers in Physical Education and Work Education and for some other

posts. After the creation of the supernumerary posts, these candidates

visited the office of Mr. Firdous Samim, Learned Advocate, to express

their gratitude and such an event was shared by Mr. Firdous Samim,

Learned Advocate, on his Facebook account.

A copy of the relevant Facebook Post of Mr. Firdous Samim, Learned

Advocate, is annexed hereto and is marked with Annexure "B".

x. I was further informed by these candidates that after the creation of

the supernumerary posts, these candidates were called for counselling

and they were recommended by the West Bengal Central School Service

Commission for appointment to the posts of Assistant Teachers in

Physical Education and Work Education in November 2022.

xi. In the meantime, some of the unsuccessful candidates, by filing WPA

No. 25056 of 2022, challenged the creation of supernumerary posts. To

the shock and dismay of these recommended candidates, the Petitioners

of WPA 25056 of 2022 were being represented by Mr. Bikash Ranjan

Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate. Thus, Mr. Bikash Ranjan

Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate, who represented these

recommended candidates in several litigations like WP No. 944(W) of

2019, WP No. 947(W) of 2019, WP No. 23033(W) of 2019, and WP No.

23034(W) of 2019, where the principal prayer was to give appointment to

22

these candidates to the post of Assistant Teachers in Physical Education

and Work Education and received his professional fees for representing

these recommended candidates, is now representing some other persons

who wanted to stall the appointments of these recommended candidates

to the posts of Assistant Teachers in Physical Education and Work

Education by challenging the creation of supernumer ary posts. Mr.

Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate, is thus arguing

against the interests of these recommended candidates.

xii. These recommended candidates also informed me that on 25th

March 2025, an application, being CAN No. 8 of 2025 in WPA 25056 of

2022, was filed by some persons who were supporting the prayers of the

Petitioners in WPA 25056 of 2022. Mr. Firdous Samim, Learned

Advocate, represented this group of persons who filed CAN No. 8 of 2025.

Thus, Mr. Firdous Samim, who was supporting these recommended

candidates in their protests and also represented a group of these

recommended candidates in multiple litigations, is now appearing in

support of some other persons who are seeking a stay in the

appointment of these recommended candidates.

xiii. Upon learning about these facts and the shifting stand of some of

the Learned Advocates of this Hon'ble Court on the issue of appointment

of these recommended candidates for the posts of Assistant Teachers in

Physical Education and Work Education and seeing proofs in support of

the allegations of these recommended candidates, I was taken aback.

xiv. Being one of the spokespersons of All India Trinamool Congress and

a journalist by profession, I was thus constrained to call out the political

double-facedness practised by Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya,

Learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Firdous Samim, Learned Advocate, in

23

the press conference of 26th April 2025. However, I did not intend nor

tried to defame or lower the sanctity of the judicial system of this Hon'ble

Court in the said press conference. Any wayward statement made by me

in such a press conference that tends to scandalise the sanctity of this

Court was unintentional, and I deeply regret making such a statement.

xv. I state that my statements about receiving legal fees from the

protesting candidates for fighting their legal battle and then opposing

these candidates now when the West Bengal Central School Service

Commission has issued recommendation letters, come from the

grievances which were expressed by these recommended candidates

themselves and are not my personal knowledge which I have clearly

stated in the video that the complainants are relying on in their

Affidavits.

xvi. Even on 25th April 2025, when I came to know about the gatherings

and protests outside the premises of the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta.

I, as a well-wisher of these protesting candidates, had asked them

through WhatsApp not to violate the law of the land while holding their

protests and advised them not to take any illegal or wrong steps to vent

out their anger and frustration.

A copy of the screenshot of my WhatsApp Messenger Communication to

the protesting candidates is annexed hereto and is marked with

Annexure "C".

xvii. I state that I have the highest regard for the Judiciary and faith in

the judicial system. In my personal life, I have attended several hearings

before the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta as well as different

District/Magistrate Courts, and I have always tried to comply with all

24

the directions of the Hon'ble Courts in their letter and spirit with utmost

respect.

xviii. It is pertinent to mention here that the decision of Hon'ble Justice

Abhijit Gangopadhyay (Retd.) to join a political party immediately after

resigning from the post of Judge of this Hon'ble Court was criticised by

me as the said decision was a political decision. Thus, I had expressed

my views from a political outlook and never disrespected or tried to lower

the sanctity of this Hon'ble Court while making any statement in this

regard.

xix. It is reiterated that I was nowhere near the vicinity of this Hon'ble

Court on 25th April 2025, and I had no role whatsoever i n the said

incident. On the other hand, I had tried to stop the said protests by

sending a text to one of the protesters. This fact has not been

contradicted in the report of the fact has not been contradicted in the

report of the Commissioner of Police, Kolkata, which was filed before this

Hon'ble Court on 19th May, 2025.

xx. It is pertinent to mention herein that the aforementioned Advocates

are also political personalities, and these Learned Advocates have given

statements against the ruling dispensation of the State as well against

the Hon'ble Chief Minister of West Bengal on umpteen occasions to

which, being a spokesperson of All India Trinamool Congress, I was

required to answer to. Links of some of the political statements made by

Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate and Mr.

Firdous Samim, Learned Advocate, are mentioned herein below:

1.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1BSaYebY4W/

2.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1SMwKC4t7Q/

3.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1Ejr16Sorj/

25

4.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/15iSe9zu7T/

5.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1DrMG7fb7Q/

6.https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1C8GORY8M8/

I crave leave of this Hon'ble Court to produce the video footage of these

political speeches at the time of hearing, if necessary.

xxi. It is reiterated that I deny the charges levied against me in the rule

issued on 19th May 2025, which was served upon me on 06th June

2025. I was not present at 10 Kiran Shankar Roy Road, Kolkata 700001

on 25th April 2025. Thus, I have not participated in any activity that

would lower the majesty of this Hon'ble Court in any manner

whatsoever.

xxii. Notwithstanding the statements made in the aforementioned

paragraphs, I am tendering my unconditional and unqualified apology

for any inadvertent act of mine which may be perceived to lower the

majesty, sanctity and authority of this Hon'ble Court. I have immense

respect and full faith in the judiciary and do not have ill intention to

lower the sanctity and majesty of this Hon'ble Court. I respectfully

submit that I hold this Hon'ble Court in the highest regard and esteem,

and I will always ensure to make all possible efforts to comply with any

direction which would be passed by this Hon'ble Court in its letter and

spirit.”

13. Paragraphs 13 to 16 of Mr. Ghosh’s affidavit may also be noted:-

“13. It is submitted that I have the highest regard and respect for the

dignity and majesty of the Hon'ble Court and that I have no intention

whatsoever either to demean the majesty and sanctity of this Hon'ble

Court or to transgress, disobey, or violate the Solemn Order dated 2nd

May, 2025 passed by this Hon'ble Court. I have the highest regard for

26

the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court, and I treat the same in the

highest esteem.

14. It is submitted that even if the allegations made in paragraphs No. 7

to 9, vis-à-vis my statements relating to the Learned Advocates of this

Hon'ble Court are proved to be true, then also the same would not

constitute an act of contempt as the statements made on the conduct of

the Learned Advocates would not reflect upon the sanctity and majesty

of this Hon'ble Court.

15. However, I tender an unqualified apology to this Hon'ble Court, in

the event this Hon'ble Court finds that there is any omission on my part

or any of my actions have adversely affected the sanctity of this Hon'ble

Court in any manner whatsoever. It is humbly and respectfully

submitted that such omission and/or action is neither willful nor

deliberate.

16. In the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is most

respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to dispense

with the Rule issued against me, reject the prayers of the complainant

made in the contempt petition for the reason stated herein above, and

discharge me from the proceeding.”

14. Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the

alleged Contemnor No. 8 in CRLCP 7 of 2025 (Mr Kunal Ghosh, in short, referred to

as ‘Kunal’), tendered sincere, profound, unqualified and unconditional apology to

the Court. It was submitted that Kunal holds the institution of the judiciary and

this Court in the highest esteem and regard. If any statement or act of Kunal

howsoever inadvertent is perceived to have lowered the majesty and sanctity of this

Court, Kunal expresses his deepest and unreserved regret for the same.

27

15. It was then submitted that the instant proceeding for criminal contempt is

not maintainable in law. It has been initiated in contravention of the mandatory

procedure established under the Contempt of Courts Act,1971, and the Contempt

of Courts (Calcutta High Court) Rules, 1975. Mr. Bandopadhyay argued that the

proceedings, though styled as ‘suo moto’, were in fact initiated on the basis of

affidavits filed by private informants who have effectively acted as petitioners and

were shown as petitioners in several orders passed in the instant proceeding. Such

a course is impermissible since the same circumvents the statutory safeguard

under Section 15 of the Act, which mandates obtaining of consent of learned

Advocate General for any motion by a private person. This procedural safeguard is

not a mere technicality but a substantive protection against misuse of the

contempt jurisdiction for collateral purpose. In this connection learned Counsel

referred to a decision in Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurta and Anr

reported at (2010) 8 SCC 673, paras 24 to 28.

16. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the very assumption of jurisdiction

by this Court is flawed. Under the 1975 Rules, the Chief Justice possesses the

power to assign a Rule, once issued, for hearing, to another Bench. However, the

1975 Rules do not empower the Chief Justice to assign the contempt application

itself for initiation of proceedings, particularly by way of an administrative order.

The initiation of suo moto contempt is a judicial function which cannot be

delegated or exercised through an admi nistrative fiat. Therefore, the instant

proceedings suffer from a fundamental jurisdictional defect. The Rule issued by

this Bench is thus ultra vires the provisions of the 1975 Rules.

17. It was then submitted that on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., April 25,

2025, Kunal was not physically present at or near the premises of the Calcutta

High Court or at the site of the protest at 10, Kiran Shankar Roy Road, Kolkata. At

the relevant time, he was at the News 18 Studio in Newtown, Kolkata, for a

28

professional engagement. This fact can be easily verified. The charge levelled

against Kunal, which presumes his physical involvement in the concerned protest,

is baseless and untenable. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel drew our

attention to the Rule communicated to Kunal which mentions the charges against

him.

18. Learned Counsel submitted that far from instigating or participating in any

unlawful activity, Kunal, upon learning of the protest, took immediate and

proactive steps to advise restraint. He commun icated with the protesters via

WhatsApp Messenger, explicitly asking them to act in accordance with law and not

to get involved in any illegal act. This act on the part of Kunal demonstrates a clear

absence of any mens rea or intent on his part to encourage any action that could

even remotely be construed as contemptuous. It evidences his respect for the rule

of law and the judicial process.

19. It was then submitted that the statements made by Kunal during a press

conference on April 26, 2025, must be understood in their proper context. He made

such statements in his capacity as the official spokesperson of All India Trinamool

Congress (AITC). Those statements were a political rebuttal to the public

statements and actions of certain learned Advocates who are al so prominent

political personalities actively associated with an opposition political party and

have repeatedly made scurrilous comments about the leader of AITC. Kunal, in his

political role, was duty bound to respond to such political attacks.

20. It was submitted that Kunal’s criticism was directed at the perceived political

conduct and professional inconsistency of the said Advocates and not at this Court,

or its solemn orders. The statements made by Kunal did not scandalize the Court

nor did they interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice. The intention

was to highlight what was perceived as political hypocrisy, and not to undermine

the authority of the judiciary.

29

21. Mr. Bandopadhyay submitted that the press conference was held on April

26, 2025, i.e., one day after the day of protest. Therefore, the statements made in

such press conference could not have, by any stretch of imagination, instigated,

abetted or influenced the events that had already happened on the previous day.

The allegations connecting Kunal’s statements to the physical protest are based on

conjecture and are an attempt to attribute vicarious liability to him where none

exists.

22. It was finally submitted by learned Senior Counsel that contempt

proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. The alleged contemnor is entitled to all

the protections and safeguards which are available to an accused in criminal

jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. In this connection the learned

Counsel referred to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 20

of the decision in Sahdeo @ Sahdeo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors,

reported at (2010) AIR SCW 1852: (2010) 3 SCC 705 .

23. Mr. Bandopadhyay also relied on the following decisions:-

(i) Yatin Narendra Oza v. Khemchand Rajaram Koshti & Ors.,

reported at (2016) 9 SCC 343.

(ii) In Re: Harijai Singh and Anr, In Re: Vijay Kumar , reported at

(1996) 6 SCC 466.

I will revert to these decisions later in this judgment, if necessary.

24. Appearing for all the alleged contemnors excepting Sri Kunal Ghosh, Mr.

Prateek Majumder, learned Advocate, adopted the submissions of Mr. Kalyan

Banerjee, Learned Senior Advocate on the point of maintainability of the present

proceedings. He submitted tha t even assuming that these proceedings are

maintainable in law, his clients tender unconditional apology. They do not try to

justify their action and conduct. The incident was unfortunate. They are victims of

circumstances. Having participated in the conc erned recruitment process

30

concerning teachers and having been recommended as candidates, their

appointment was inordinately delayed by reason of interim orders passed in legal

proceedings pending before this Court. They were frustrated, financially insecure

and mentally disturbed. They had no intention to dishonour or malign the High

Court or any of its judges. They undertake not to conduct themselves in similar

manner in the future. They however denied stamping on any judges’ photo by foot.

25. Appearing for the informant in CRLCP 5 of 2025 , Mr. Partha Sarathi

Sengupta, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the informants are not

petitioners. Rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid of justice. The dignity

and majesty of Court is at stake. The Chief Justice has general power to assign any

matter to any Bench in his capacity as Master of Roster. The Rules framed under

the Contempt of Courts Act cannot take away that power.

26. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that Section 15 of the Contempt of

Courts Act is not an enabling provision. That section is not the source of the High

Court’s power to punish for contempt. That power originates from Article 215 of the

Constitution of India. That general power cannot be curtailed by the Contempt of

Courts Act.

27. Referring to Rule 18 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Court Rules,

1975, learned Senior Counsel argued that the Chief Justice has the power to assign

a ‘rule’ issued by one bench to anoth er bench if required in the special

circumstances of the case. That Rule however does not limit the Chief Justice’s

power to assign the entire matter to a particular bench like the Chief Justice did in

this case. The Chief Justice assigned the entire matter to this bench which issued

the Rule suo moto. Under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, any bench of

the High Court can issue Rule suo moto.

28. Learned Counsel submitted that in the present case there is no petition

before the court. There are only affidavits of complaint. The Court took cognizance

31

of the contents of the affidavits as information placed before the Court. It was not

that any motion was moved by any person. Had that been the case, the consent of

the Advocate General may have been necessary. In this case, the three complaints

merely drew the attention of the Chief Justice to the acts of contempt. The Chief

Justice assigned the entire matter for consideration by this bench. This bench

issued Rule suo moto being prima facie satisfied that the acts and conduct of the

alleged contemnors mentioned in the three affidavits of complaint constituted

criminal contempt of Court.

29. Referring to the alleged Contemnor No. 8 in CRLCP 7 (Shri Kunal Ghosh),

learned Senior Counsel submitted that it not an essential ingredient of criminal

contempt that an alleged contemnor must be personally present at the scene where

the acts of contempt were committed. He submitted that ‘criminal contempt’ as

defined in Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, includes the doing of any Act

whatsoever which tends to scandalise or tends to lower the authority of the

Court or tends to interfere with due course of judicial proceeding or tends to

interfere with or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any

manner.

30. Mr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel, relied on the following decisions:-

(i) Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurta and Anr., reported at

(2010) 8 SCC 673.

(ii) Prashant Bhushan & Anr, In Re …Alleged Contemnors , reported

at (2021) 1 SCC 745.

(iii) Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayan an v. High Court of Madras

reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1011 .

(iv) Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur through

Registrar, reported at 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529.

32

(v) Mrs. Damayanti G. Chandiramani v. S. Vaney, reported at AIR

1966 BOM 19.

(vi) Bal Kishan Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported at

(2014) 7 SCC 280.

(vii) Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,

reported at (2011) 7 SCC 776.

31. Mr. Ritzu Ghosal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the informant in

CRLCP 7 of 2025 submitted that the impugned conduct of the alleged contemnors

clearly amounted to criminal contempt. He submitted that the High Court has

inherent power to punish for Contempt of Court. Procedural technicalities do not

matter. Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act does not stand in the way of the

High Court exercising such inherent jurisdiction to uphold the majesty and dignity

of the Court.

32. Mr. Ghosal further submitted that Section 15 of the 1971 Act does not

specify the basis or the source of information on which the High Court can act on

its own motion. If the High Court is directly moved by a private person feeling

aggrieved, not being the Advocate General, the High Court has, in such a situation,

a discretion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own

motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. If the

petitioner is a responsible member of the legal profession, the Court may act suo

moto, more so, if the petitioner – Advocate, as in the instant case, prays that the

Court should act suo moto. The whole object of prescribing the procedural modes

of taking cognizance in Section 15 of the 1971 Act is to safeguard the valuable time

of the High Court or the Supreme Court from being wasted by frivolous complaints

of Contempt of Court.

In this connection Mr. Ghosal relied on the decisions in:-

33

(i) Surendranath Banerjea v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High

Court of Bengal, reported at 10 Indian Appeals 171.

(ii) Gilbert Ahnee and Ors v. Director of Public Prosecutions, reported at

(1999) 2 Appeal Cases 294.

(iii) S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow v. Vinay

Chandra Misra, reported at (1981) 1 SCC 436.

33. Mr. Subhankar Nag, learned Counsel appearing for the Bar Library Club

submitted that to ascribe motives to a judge is to sow the seed of distrust in the

minds of the public about the administration of justice as a whole and nothing is

more pernicious in its consequence than to prejudice the mind of the public against

judges of the Court who are responsible for implementing the law. In this

connection he relied on the decision in J.R. Parashar, Advocate and Ors v.

Prasant Bhushan, Advocate and Ors, reported at (2001) 6 SCC 735.

34. Mr. Nag further submitted that the Courts are obliged not only to protect the

dignity of the Court and uphold its majesty, but also to extend the umbrella of

protection to all the limbs of administration of justice and advocates, while

discharging their professional duties, also play a pivotal role in the administration

and dispensation of justice. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to protect the

advocates from being threatened by interested parties and such threats amount to

criminal contempt since they interfere with administration of justice. In this

connection learned Counsel relied on the decisions in Telhara Cotton Ginning Co.

Ltd. v. Kashinath Gangadhar Namjoshi, reported at AIR 1940 Nag 110 and

H. Syama Sundara Rao v. Union of India and Ors, reported at 2006 SCC

Online Delhi 1392.

35. Appearing for Incorporated Law Society, Mr. Mukul Lahiri, learned Senior

Counsel drew our attention to paragraphs 12 to 15 of the affidavit filed by his

client, which read as follows: -

34

“12. On 28/02/2025, Sri Kunal Ghosh, a member of the ruling political

dispensation in the State of West Bengal was found to lead a procession

and demonstration from Dharmatala to this Hon'ble Court and he openly

threatened the Hon'ble Justice Biswajit Basu. The procession and

demonstration was adjoining the main building of this Hon'ble Court and

he was accompanying a large group of persons claiming to be such

candidates who had been deprived employment by reason of the

litigations. Such incident was caught in the camera. In fact, various

news channels had aired such meeting of Sri Kunal Ghosh which he

held with the protestors. The said Sri Kunal Ghosh had in fact led a

procession on that day to protest against the appearance and argument

of Sri Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, Senior Advocate of this Hon'ble

Court who had been the lead counsel in the matters of education scam

against the alleged rampant illegalities conducted in the recruitment

process. Such conduct of meeting, sit in demonstration and protest

carried on by Sri Ghosh with protestors was a direct threat and

aggravated act of criminal contempt of this Hon'ble Court. The

procession and sit in demonstration was aimed at hindering the smooth

administration of justice.

13. On the fateful day as involved in this proceeding, the hearing of the

case in relation to the recruitment process was being conducted in Court

Room No. 17 of the Main Building. Surprisingly a huge assembly of

persons in an unruly manner went on hurling abusive language on the

corner of Old Post Office Street near the Assembly and also on Old Post

Office Street protesting against the carriage of judicial proceedings. In

fact, a procession was taken out by such large number of persons

constituting an unlawful assembly between 3.15 p.m. and 4 p.m.

35

approximately with shouting of slogans and hurling of abuses with

derogatory remarks against the Hon'ble Judge in Court Room No. 17

taking up the matters, concerned on that day and also against the

learned counsels who were participating in the hearing challenging the

recruitment process. The hurling of abusive language was audible from

the Main Building itself.

14. On the same day, at around the same time [3: 15 PM to 4 PM] the

crowd assembled near Gate No. F of the Hon'ble Court which is visible

from the wooden corridor of the Main Building connecting Bar

Association Room Nos. 1 and 2 with Court Room Nos. 11 and 12. The

crowd shouted abuses and slogans from Old Post Office Street, abusing

the Hon'ble Judge who was hearing the concerned matters of

recruitment scam on that date and also abused Sri Bikash Ranjan

Bhattacharyya who was conducting the case. There was a clear threat to

the judiciary and a well calculated onslaught by criminal intimidation to

prevent free and fair justice to be dispensed.

15. There was a huge assembly of persons, in belligerent and violent

manner who had hurled abuses at the Hon'ble Judge, desecrated the

photographs of the Hon'ble Judge of this Court, trampled on photos of

the Hon'ble Judge, hurled abuses and made procession on the stretch

between the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and up to a portion of

Kiran Shankar Roy Road (City Civil Court Building). It has been aired

and shown in electronic and social media all along that the unlawful

assembly and procession was being carried on just outside this Hon'ble

Court's Main Building for a stretch of about 5-6 hours at least and in

various spells. The crowd had made arrangement for sit in

demonstration on Kiran Shankar Roy Road and Old Post O ffice Street by

36

bringing in huge tarpaulins and even the chambers of the learned

advocates on Kiran Shankar Roy Road were sought to be attacked and

vandalized and the modesty of the learned lady advocates appearing in

the matters challenging the recruitment process were sought to be

outraged by threat and violence, in the night. There was thus a clear and

calculated effort to prevent the carriage of justice to be done in this

Hon'ble Court, without any fear and hindrance.”

36. Mr. Lahiri then submitted that the purported apology tendered by the

alleged contemnors should not be accepted. An apology must be articulately

sincere and unconditional. It must not be a second line of defence if justification

fails.

Court’s view

37. To start with, let us note the definition of criminal contempt in Section 2 (c)

of the Contempt of Courts Act,1971 :-

““criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken

or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any

matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which—

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the

authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of

any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct,

the administration of justice in any other manner;”

38. Sections 14 and 15 of the of the 1971 Act should also be noticed since

referring to the said provisions, learned Counsel for the alleged contemnors

challenged the maintainability of the present proceedings:-

37

“14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a

High Court.—

(1) When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High

Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt

committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person

to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court,

on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter, shall—

(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is

charged;

(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge;

(c)after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered

by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after

adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and

(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as

may be just.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub -section (1), where a

person charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether

orally or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by some Judge

other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence

is alleged to have been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is

practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of

justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be

placed, together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the

Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects

the trial thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a

person charged with contempt under sub -section (1) which is held, in

38

pursuance of a direction given under sub-section (2), by a Judge other

than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is

alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge

or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have

been committed to appear as a witness and the statement placed before

the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in

the case.

(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a

person charged with contempt under this section shall be detained in

such custody as it may specify: Provided that he shall be released on

bail, if a bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient is

executed with or without sureties conditioned that the person charged

shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and shall

continue to so attend until otherwise directed by the Court: Provided

further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail from

such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for

his attendance as aforesaid.

15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.—

(1)In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to

in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on

its own motion or on a motion made by—

(a) the Advocate-General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing to the Advocate -

General, or

(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law

Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official

39

Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in

writing of such Law Officer.

(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High

Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court

or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union

territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

(3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the

contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty.

Explanation.—

In this section, the expression “Advocate-General” means—

(a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney -General or the

Solicitor-General;

(b) in relation to the High Court, the Advocate-General of the State or

any of the States for which the High Court has been established;

(c) in relation to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner, such Law Officer

as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

specify in this behalf.”

39. Two issues arise for our consideration. Firstly, whether the present

proceedings, initiated suo moto by the Court, are maintainable in law? Secondly, if

the proceedings are maintainable, whether or not the alleged contemnors are guilty

of committing criminal contempt of this Court?

40. The issue of maintainability has been argued at some length by Mr.

Bandopadhyay, learned Senior Counsel, representing alleged contemnor no. 8, Shri

Kunal Ghosh. According to learned Senior Counsel, the present proceedings have

not been initiated suo moto by the Court but have been initiated on the basis of

petitions made by three persons. In other words, three persons namely Amitava

40

Ghosh, Tapas Maity and Tisha Guha were instrumental in initiation of the present

contempt proceedings. Therefore, prior consent of the Advocate General was

necessary in terms of Section 15 of the 1971 Act.

41. It was secondly argued by Mr. Bandopadhyay that on a conjoint reading of

Rules 16 and 18 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975, all

petitions presented under Section 15 of the 1971 Act shall be moved before the

bench presided over by the Chief Justice or by such other bench as the Chief

Justice may from time to time appoint. The Chief Justice cannot assign the entire

case to another Bench. He can only assign a rule for being heard by another Judge

or Bench. In the present case, the transfer of the entire matter by the Chief Justice

to another Bench was legally not tenable. That other Bench did not have the

jurisdiction to issue Rule or hear the matter.

42. We do not find any merit in either of these contentions.

43. Firstly, no contempt petition was filed by any party before the Chief Justice’s

Bench. Three complaints in the form of affidavit were filed. There were no prayer in

the said affidavits excepting a prayer that this Court may take suo moto cognizance

of the acts of contempt committed by the alleged contemnors. Rule was issued by

us not on the basis of submission made on behalf of the three complainants but on

the basis of information placed before us by way of the three complaints in the form

of affidavit. It is an entirely different thing that we invited learned Advocates for the

informants and the 3 wings of the Bar, to assist us on behalf of the informants

after issuance of the Rule.

44. Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurata ,

supra. In particular, learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 24 to 28 of the reported

decision which read as follows:-

“24. The High Court in the present case rested its conclusion relying on

averments made in the petition stating that “even a suo motu contempt

41

proceedings may be initiated” at the instance of the petitioners “on going

through the newspapers”. Be it noted that there is no prayer in the

contempt petition filed by the respondents to initiate suo motu

proceedings. We are unable to sustain the finding of the High Court in

this regard for the same is not supported by any material available on

record. The order dated 17-10-2003 and the rule issued in clear and

categorical terms reflects that law was set in motion exclusively based on

the averments made in the petition and the affidavit of verification filed

in support of the petition and the arguments of the counsel. There is

nothing on record suggesting that the contents of the petition were

treated as information placed before the Court for initiating the contempt

proceedings suo motu by the Court. The contents of the petition of the

respondents, their affidavit of verification dated 13-10-2003, the exhibits

and annexures to the said petition and the arguments of the counsel

alone constituted the foundation, based on which the law was set in

motion. The petition itself is not styled as any piece of information that

was placed before the Court for its consideration. It is not a case where

the High Court refused to entertain the petition and took cognizance on

its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in the

petition. The record does not bear any such proceedings of the Court.

Had it been so, the respondents would have been nowhere in the picture.

25. It is true that any person may move the High Court for initiating

proceedings for criminal contempt by placing the facts constituting the

commission of criminal contempt to the notice of the Court. But once

those facts are placed before the Court, it becomes a matter between the

Court and the contemner. But such person filing an application or

petition does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceeding.

42

His duty ends with the facts being placed before the Court. The Court

may in appropriate cases in its discretion require the private party or

litigant moving the Court to render assistance during the course of the

proceedings. In D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal [(1988) 3 SCC 26:1988 SCC

(Cri) 546] this Court observed that: (SCC p. 32, para 12)

“12. … A contempt is a matter between the court and the alleged

contemner. Any person who moves the machinery of the court for

contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts

constituting contempt of court. After furnishing such information

he may still assist the court, but it must always be borne in mind

that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely,

the court and the contemner.”

Thus the person bringing the facts constituting contempt to the

notice of the Court can never be a party to the lis nor can join the

proceedings as a petitioner. Similar is the view taken by this Court

in State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy [(1996) 4 SCC 411 :

1996 SCC (Cri) 675] .

26. In Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal [(2000) 3 SCC 171] this Court

held that: (SCC pp. 178-79, para 17)

“17. … the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings [for] contempt as also

the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of

contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the

court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a

matter between the court and the alleged contemner. No one can

compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt.

Certain principles have emerged.”

43

27. It was further observed: (Om Prakash case [(2000) 3 SCC 171] , SCC

p. 179, para 17)

“17. … Source of initiation of contempt proceedings may be suo

motu, on a reference being made by the Advocate General or any

other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or

on reference made by a subordinate court in case of criminal

contempt. A private party or a litigant may also invite the attention

of the court to such facts as may persuade the court in initiating

proceedings for contempt. However, such person filing an

application or petition before the court does not become a

complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer

or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice

of the court. It is thereafter for the court to act on such information

or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the court

may at the discretion of the court continue to render its assistance

during the course of proceedings.” (emphasis supplied)

28. In the case in hand, it is evident from the record, the respondents

were continued to be shown as the petitioners in the contempt case

before the High Court and participated throughout as if they were

prosecuting the appellant. There is no order reflecting that the Court

having taken note of the information made before it, initiated suo motu

proceedings on the basis of such information furnished and required the

respondents only to assist the Court till the disposal of the matter. On

the contrary, the respondents are shown as the petitioners in the

contempt case before the High Court. It is thus clear, it is the

respondents who initiated the proceedings and continued the same but

44

without the written consent of the Advocate General as is required in

law. The proceedings, therefore, were clearly not maintainable.”

45. In the Supreme Court decision, on facts it was found that there was nothing

on record to suggest that the contents of the petition were treated as information

placed before the Court for initiation of proceedings suo moto by the Court. In the

present case, treating the contents of the three affidavits as information, this Court

initiated suo moto contempt proceedings against the alleged contemnors. With

great respect to learned Senior Counsel, the said decision does not help his

argument in the present case. There is no petition in this case. This Court

considered the information placed before it by way of three affidavits of complaint

and issued Rule suo moto. There is very much a prayer in each of the affidavits of

complaint to initiate suo moto proceedings. Factually the decision in Biman Basu,

(Supra) is completely distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

46. It is also recognised in Biman Basu (Para 25 of the judgment) that the Court

may in appropriate cases in its discretion require the private party or litigant

moving the Court to render assistance during the course of the proceedings. Hence,

this Court was justified in requesting learned lawyers for the deponents of the three

affidavits and learned advocates representing the 3 wings of the Bar to advance

argument before us.

47. In this connection we may note the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P ., Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra

Misra, (Supra). Paragraphs 8, 15 and 19 of the judgment may be noticed:-

“8. A preliminary objection was taken by the appellant before the High

Court, that the latter was not competent to take cognizance of the

contempt alleged to have been committed in the petition moved by Shri

Misra without any reference from the subordinate court or without a

motion by the Advocate-General. Reliance in this connection was placed

45

on sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. The High Court rejected this

preliminary objection with these observations:

“Since Article 215 (of the Constitution) states that every High Court

shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a

court, it follows that through that Article the Constitution preserved

to the High Courts its power as a Court of record to punish

contempt of subordinate courts. No doubt a special reference is

made in Article 215 to the power of the High Court to punish

contempt of itself. That has only been done to emphasise that

particular power of the High Court. The aforesaid words do not

exclude what the preceding part of Article 215 preserves to or

confers on the High Court....

The result of incorporating Article 215 in the Constitution is that

the power of every High Court as a Court of record to punish

contempt of the “subordinate courts now carries a constitutional

sanction behind it and that the power cannot be done away with

except through an amendment of the Constitution.

.... Section 2 of the 1926 Act and Section 3 of the 1952 Act do not

confer any new power but recognise the power that a High Court

already possesses as a Court of record; it can be said with equal

force about Section 10 of the 1971 Act that it does not confer any

new jurisdiction in the High Court but onl y recognised the

jurisdiction which was initially inherent in every High Court as a

Court of record and which now has the sanction of the Constitution

behind it by virtue of Article 215.

If Section 15, sub-section (2) is interpreted to mean that a High

Court cannot take cognizance of the contempt committed of a

46

subordinate court, whether committed by the court itself or by a

stranger, except in one of the modes specified therein it can lead to

anomalous results....

... Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 15 in that manner would

be inconsistent with Section 10 of the Act and shall be violative of

the powers of this Court as a Court of record, which powers now

carry constitutional sanction by virtue of Article 215 of the

Constitution.

... Section 10 of 1971 Act explicitly states that every High Court

shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power and authority

in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of

the contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in

respect of contempt of itself....”

15. Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court

and the High Court, respectively, as a Court of record which include the

power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in

Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1625 : (1964) 5 SCR

86 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 590] there are no curbs on the power of the High

Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the

Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what

constitutes contempt of court. Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid

entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and

limit the powers of the courts in punishing contempt of court and to

regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated

in the preamble of the Act of 1971.

19. It is, however, to be noted that Section 15 does not specify the basis

or the source of information on which the High Court can act on its own

47

motion. If the High Court acts on information derived from its own

sources, such as from a perusal of the records of a subordinate court or

on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech, without

there being any reference from the subordinate court or the Advocate-

General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion. But

if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private person

feeling aggrieved, not being the Advocate-General, can the High Court

refuse to entertain the same on the ground that it has been made

without the consent in writing of the Advocate-General? It appears to us

that the High Court, has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to

entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the

basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. If the petitioner is

a responsible member of the legal profession, it may act suo motu, more

so, if the petitioner-advocate, as in the instant case, prays that the court

should act suo motu. The whole object of prescribing these procedural

modes of taking cognizance in Section 15 is to safeguard the valuable

time of the High Court or the Supreme Court from being wasted by

frivolous complaints of contempt of court. If the High Court is prima

facie satisfied that the information received by it regarding the

commission of contempt of a subordinate court is not frivolous, and the

contempt alleged is not merely technical or trivial, it may, in its

discretion, act suo motu and commence the proceedings against the

contemner. However, this mode of taking suo motu cognizance of

contempt of a subordinate court, should be resorted to sparingly where

the contempt concerned is of a grave and serious nature. Frequent use

of this suo motu power on the information furnished by an incompetent

petition, may render these procedural safeguards provided in sub -

48

section (2), otiose. In such cases, the High Court may be well advised to

avail of the advice and assistance of the Advocate -General before

initiating proceedings. The advice and opinion, in this connection ,

expressed by the Sanyal Committee is a pertinent reminder:

“In the case of criminal contempt, not being contempt committed in

the face of the Court, we are of the opinion that it would lighten the

burden of the court, without in any way interfering with the sanctity

of the administration of justice, if action is taken on a motion by

some other agency. Such a course of action would give considerable

assurance to the individual charged and the public at large. Indeed,

some High Courts have already made rules for the association of the

Advocate-General in some categories of cases at least. . .the

Advocate-General may, also, move the court not only on his own

motion but also at the instance of the court concerned…” .”

[Emphasis added]

We, therefore see that even when a private person moves a petition for

initiation of contempt proceedings without the consent of the Advocate General, the

Court has a discretion whether or not to accept such petition. This is because the

rules of procedure have been engrafted in the statute to save court’s time and

warding off frivolous and motivated contempt petitions filed to settle private scores.

48. Further, in paragraph 13 of Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayan an v. High

Court of Madras, Supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: -

“13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “Pallav Sheth” (supra) has held

thus:

“30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts

are courts of record, and the Constitution has given them the

powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly

49

show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the

power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute, can there be

any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the

power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which

stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article

215, there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded

as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that

providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not

be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of

limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to

be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt

jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.”

49. We should also take note of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur through Registrar,

(Supra). Paragraphs 15 and 41 of the judgment read as follows:-

“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held that the High

Court has inherent power to deal with a contempt of itself summarily

and to adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a fair and

reasonable opportunity to the contemnor to defend himself. But the

procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise

of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the Seventh Schedule of

the Constitution. Though the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court and the High Court can be regulated by legislation by appropriate

legislature under Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of

which the Parliament has enacted the Act of 1971, the contempt

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court is given a

constitutional foundation by declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under

50

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the inherent

power of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken away

by any legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section 22

of the Act lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to

and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to

contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the constitutional

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129

and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The above

position of law has been well settled by this Court in Sukhdev Singh

Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2

SCC 571 : 1954 SCR 454 : AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 Cri LJ 460] holding

thus: (SCR p. 463)

“In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned,

as distinct from one of a subordinate court, the Constitution vests

these rights in every High Court, so no Act of a legislature could

take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own

authority.”

41. The position of law that emerges from the above decisions is that the

power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court, being

Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution

respectively is an inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a

special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India (See D.N. Taneja v.

Bhajan Lal [(1988) 3 SCC 26 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 546] ) and therefore the

constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation

or abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be controlled or limited by any

statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any

51

Rules. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent

power by summary procedure is that the power should be used

sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the

contemnor should be made aware of the charge against him and given a

reasonable opportunity to defend himself.” [Emphasis added]

50. It may also be noted that in CRLCP 5 of 2025 and CRLCP 6 of 2025 , the

deponent of the affidavits have been described as ‘informants’ in the various orders

recorded by this Court. However, the deponent in CRLCP 7 of 2025 has been

described as ‘petitioner’ in the said orders. This in our opinion, is in-advertent and

in any event nothing turns on such description. This Court always treated the

deponent of the affidavit in CRLCP 7 of 2025 as an informant and not as a

petitioner.

51. Coming to the second limb of Mr. Bandopadhyay’s argument on

maintainability of these proceedings, we should note Rules 16 and 18 of the

Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975, which read as follows:-

“16. All petitions presented by the Advocate-General and all petitions

presented by any other person under section 15 of the Act shall be

moved before the Bench presided over by the Chief Justice or by such

other Bench as the Chief Justice may from time to time appoint.

All matters relating to contempt of subordinate courts, brought or

coming to the notice of this Court shall be dealt with by the Bench

presided over by the Chief Justice or by such other Bench as the Chief

Justice may from time to time appoint.

18. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 15 to 17 above, the

Chief Justice may assign a rule for hearing before another Judge or

Bench if required in the special circumstances of the case or if the Judge

or the Bench reports or report to the Chief Justice for so doing.”

52

52. On a bare reading of the aforesaid Rules, we see that the Chief Justice has a

complete discretion as to whether or not to hear a contempt proceeding, whether

initiated suo moto or at the instance of a private party, or to assign the matter to

any other Bench. In the present case, the Chief Justice’s Bench could have chosen

to issue a Rule suo moto treating the affidavits of complaint as information placed

before that Bench and thereafter could have assigned the Rule to us or any other

Bench for hearing and disposal. However, the Hon’ble Chief Justice in his

administrative capacity, chose to assign the entire matter to this Bench for taking

appropriate action “to protect the image of the Judiciary from scurrilous and

baseless allegations”. The Hon’ble Chief Justice was well within his powers to do

so. There is nothing in Rules 16 and 18 of the 1975 Rules of this Court which

prevented the Chief Justice from adopting the course of action that His Lordship

did. We are unable to read Rules 16 and 18 in a manner as Mr. Bandopadhyay

would like us to read and hold that assignment of the matter by the Chief Justice

to this Bench was contrary to the 1975 Rules. Having been given seisin of the

entire matter from the very inception, this Bench was and is fully competent and

within its jurisdiction to issue the Rule suo moto and carry the same to its logical

conclusion.

53. We must not forget that it is not the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, far less

the Rules framed thereunder, which vests power in this Court to punish for its

contempt. This is an inherent right that this Court always had, especially as a

Court of Record. Article 215 of the Constitution of India merely gave recognition to

such inherent right to punish for contempt. Procedural technicalities cannot in any

manner curtail or abridge or restrict the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to

punish for Contempt of Court to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Court. In

any event, as we have opined, there has been no infraction of the 1975 Rules in the

present case.

53

54. The objection of the alleged contemnor no. 8 to the maintainability of these

proceedings, the arguments in support whereof were adopted by learned Counsel

for the other alleged contemnors, is therefore, overruled. The question then arises

as to whether or not the acts and conduct of the alleged contemnors and the words

they spoke amount to criminal contempt of this Court. Before expressing our

opinion on this issue it would be helpful to notice the ambit of the High Court’s

jurisdiction to punish for criminal contempt, as expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in various cases.

55. In Sahdeo @ Sahdeo Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., Supra , paragraph 20

of the judgement reads as follows:-

“20. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that the High

Court has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings suo motu for

ensuring the compliance of the orders passed by the Court. However,

contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the same standard

of proof is required in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The

alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights

which are provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the benefit

of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration

of justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of

the said provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed as what is

the charge, he has to meet. Thus, specific charge has to be framed in

precision. The alleged contemnor may ask the Court to permit him to

cross-examine the witnesses i.e. deponents of affidavits, who have

deposed against him. In spite of the fact that contempt proceedings are

quasi-criminal in nature, provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter called, "Cr.P.C.") and Evidence Act are not attracted for the

reason that proceedings have to be concluded expeditiously. Thus, the

54

trial has to be concluded as early as possible. The case should not rest

only on surmises and conjectures. There must be clear and reliable

evidence to substantiate the allegations against the alleged contemnor.

The proceedings must be concluded giving strict adherence to the

statutory Rules framed for the purpose.”

56. In M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & Ors,

reported at (1991) 3 SCC 600, the appellant, a practising advocate, having failed

to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad interim injuncti on

pending filing of a counter by the opposite party, made certain derogatory remarks

against the learned Judge who instead of succumbing to such unprofessional

conduct made a record of the derogatory remarks and forwarded the same to the

High Court through the District Judge to initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court

against the appellant. The High Court, holding that the remarks made on the

learned Sub Judge, are disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of

the judiciary, found the appellant guilty under Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of

Courts Act. The appellant, while denying having made such remarks, offered an

unqualified apology. The High Court without accepting the apology punished the

appellant with a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Ahmadi J. in his separate judgment observed

as follows:-

“The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by

disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the

increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member

of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to

browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When

there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the

confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is

not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to the fair

55

name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of

disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like

the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a

judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger

issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but

the entire institution. The foundation of our system which is based on

the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if

disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the presiding

judicial officers with impunity. It is high time that we realise that the

much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from

the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral

part of the system.”

57. We may also take note of a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mrs.

Damayanti G. Chandiramani v. S. Vaney, Supra. Paragraphs 18 to 20, 22 and

27 of the judgment may be noted:-

“18. The view taken by the Nagpur High Court has been endorsed by the

Allahabad, Madras and Lahore High Courts. In Rajendra Singh v. Uma

Prasad [(1934) I.L.R. 57 All. 573.] during the pendency of the suit a

notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiff through his advocate to the

defendant, threatening him that unless he withdrew the plea and paid a

certain sum as damages he would be criminally prosecuted for

defamation of the plaintiff's deceased father. Proceedings for contempt

were taken out on this notice. It was held:

“Interference with the administration of justice is one of the well

recognized heads of contempt of Court. In the present case the

notice was undoubtedly intended to put extraneous pressure on the

56

defendant in order to compel him, under threat of drastic action

being taken against him, to withdraw the plea which had been

taken by him specifically in the written statement. It amounted to a

direct interference with the administration of justice in preventing

or attempting to prevent the defendant from pressing the plea,

which might prove to be a very substantial and legitimate defence;

and in that way an indirect attempt was made to exclude that plea

from the consideration of the court”.

19. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judges relied upon the

decision in Smith v. Lakeman [(1856) 26 L.J. Ch. 305.] in which an

unsigned letter had been sent by the plaintiff to the defendant with a

view to intimidating him in the conduct of his defence. The letter warned

the defendant that he had a suit pending in Chancery and should it go

up for judgment, he would at once be indicted for swindling, perjury and

forgery and thus bring disgrace on his family. It was not mentioned who

would start such prosecution, but the threat was that certain legal action

in Court would be taken if the matter was pressed to final conclusion.

Stuart, V.C., in committing the plaintiff for contempt remarked that the

letter amounted to a threat for the purpose of intimidating him as a

suitor, and therefore, whether it had that effect or not, was

unquestionably a contempt of Court. It would be clear from the above

decisions that a piece of conduct intended or calculated to bring pressure

upon a party, which must necessarily include his advocate, not to pursue

the matter according to his choice, would amount to an attempt to

interfere with the administration of justice. Secondly, the threat need not

be direct, in the sense that the contemner specifically asserted that he

would take such action. It is sufficient if the context showed that the

57

action contemplated was the action of the contemner himself. A similar

question arose in Thirumalaiappa v. Kumaraswami [[1956] A.I.R. Mad.

621.]. The Madras High Court referred to the leading case

of French v. French [(1824) 1 Hog. 138.], which formed the basis of the

statement on this subject contained in Oswald's Contempt of Court. The

passage in Oswald (part of which has already been quoted) runs thus:

“An insult to counsel may be punished as a con tempt. All

publications which offend against the dignity of the Court, or are

calculated to prejudice the course of justice, will constitute

contempts. Offences of this nature are of three kinds, namely, those

which (1) scandalise the Court, or (2) abuse the parties concerned

in causes there, or (3) prejudices mankind against persons before

the cause is heard. Under the first head fall libels on the integrity of

the Court, its Judges, officers or proceedings; under the second and

third heads anything which tends to excite prejudice against the

parties or their litigation, while it is pending. For example, attacks

on or abuse of a party, not amounting to an interference with the

course of justice, does not amount to contempt, the party being left

to his remedy by action.”

20. In French v. French an insult was given to a counsel while he was

attending in the Master's office, which was situated within the precincts

of the Court, it was held (p. 623):

“…Advocates who appear for the parties being officers of Court, any

abuse or insult or aspersions cast oil them, which would interfere

with the course of administration of justice, must necessarily be

held to amount to contempt of Court”.

58

22. In Nand Lal Bhalla v. Kishori Lal [(1946) 48 Cr. L.J. 757.], the

Inspector of Police issued threats and used insulting language towards

an advocate. It was held that the advocate was threatened in the

performance of his duties, and although there was no contempt of the

Court directly, there was contempt inasmuch as an officer of the Court

such as an advocate appearing in his professional capacity was

threatened and insulted while in the performance of his professional

duties in the Court.

27. The law on this question has been clarified in a recent judgment of

the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh Singh [[1962] A.I.R.

S.C. 1172.]. In that case, after citing the passage from Oswald's

Contempt of Court, which has already been quoted by us above, their

Lordships referred to the facts of the case and observed that although

departmental proceedings were started against the officer in accordance

with the directions contained in the circular still the launching of these

proceedings would have a deterring effect upon the officer, who had

already filed a suit to ventilate his grievances. At page 1177, their

Lordships observed:

“…What would be the effect of these proceedings on the suit which

was pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge,

Amritsar? From the practical point of view, the institution of the

proceedings at a time when the suit in the Court of the Senior

Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, was pending could only be to put

pressure on the respondent to withdraw his suit, or face the

consequences of disciplinary action. This, in our opinion,

undoubtedly amounted to contempt of Court. There are many ways

of obstructing the Court and ‘any conduct by which the course of

59

justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt;

thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his

suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be

witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts’. …The

question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but whether it

had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The

action taken in this case against the respondent by way of a

proceeding against him can, in our opinion, have only one

tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force

him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the

clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against

the respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the

appellants have been guilty of contempt of Court, even though they

were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular

letter”.” [Emphasis added]

58. In a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of H. Syama Sundara Rao

v. Union of India and Ors, Supra, in paragraphs 1, 19 and 31 of the judgment,

the Court observed as follows:-

“1. The present proceedings for contempt have been initiated against the

petitioner, who appears in person, pursuant to our orders dated 5th

October, 2006. In the course of proceedings held on the said date, Mr.

B.L. Wall, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 drew

our attention to a notice dated 28th April, 2006 issued by the petitioner,

Mr. H. Syama Sundara Rao to Mr. Wali. In the said notice, the petitioner

levelled a series of allegations against the counsel for the respondent and

cast aspersions on him. The notice issued by the petitioner states that

the counsel has made a mockery of the judiciary and the High Court;

60

has indulged in grave professional misconduct and has deliberately

misled the High Court. In the last para of the notice, the petitioner has

stated that he gives three days time to the counsel to take corrective

steps, failing which the petitioner shall initiate appropriate action

against the counsel before the High Court or before the Bar Council of

Delhi. On perusal of the aforementioned notice issued by the petitioner,

this Court issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why he

should not be punished for contempt of Court proceedings for violation

of and obstruction of the Courts of Justice. The petitioner was called

upon to file his reply within one week and the matter was adjourned to

16th October, 2006.

……

19. The Courts are under an obligation not only to protect the dignity of

the Court and uphold its majesty, but also to extend the umbrella of

protection to all the limbs of administration of justice and advocates,

while discharging their professional duties, also play a pivotal role in the

administration and dispensation of justice. It is thus the duty of the

Courts to protect the advocate from being cowed down into submission

and under pressure of threat of menace from any quarter and thus

abandon their clients by withdrawing pleas taken on then behalf or by

withdrawing from the brief itself, which may prove fatal not only to the

legal proceeding in question but also permit an impression to gain

ground that adoption of such tactics are permissible or even acceptable.

Failure to deal with such conduct and nip it in the bud shall result in

the justice system itself taking a severe knocking, which tendency must

61

be put down as it amounts to direct interference with the administration

of justice and is, therefore, a contempt of a serious nature.

…….

31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the

petitioner has brought himself within the ambit of contempt of Court and

he is accordingly found guilty of criminal contempt of the Court. As

regards the quantum of punishment, we have ta ken into consideration

certain relevant factors. As stated above, the apology tendered by the

petitioner is not unconditional nor is it supported by bona fide. In fact, it

appears to be a sheer afterthought and such an apology from which the

petitioner resiled during the course of arguments, is a clear indication of

the trend of his mind. As the petitioner is neither penitent nor sincere in

tendering the apology, such a hollow apology serves no useful purpose.

However, in view of the act that the petitioner has pleaded that his wife is

a heart patient and needs medical care, by erring on the side of leniency,

we award the contemner punishment of simple imprisonment for a

period of three days and impose a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on him. We hope

that the imposition of the aforesaid punishment shall have a sobering

effect on the contemner. This order shall take effect immediately. The

contemner, who is present in the Court, shall be taken into custody

immediately and he shall be sent to the Tihar Jail to undergo the

sentence.” [Emphasis added]

59. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court,

Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Ors reported at (1991) 4 SCC 406, a Chief

Judicial Magistrate was assaulted, arrested, handcuffed and tied with a thick rope

around his arms and body by the police officers as if he was a wild animal. He was

62

taken in that condition to the hospital for medical examination on the alleged

ground that he was drunk. In the hospital he was made to sit in the verandah

exposing him to public gaze, providing opportunity to the members of the public to

see that the police had the power and privilege to apprehend and deal with a Chief

Judicial Magistrate according to its sweet will. In that context, the Supreme Court

observed at paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment observed as follows:-

“42. The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any

act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of

justice or which would lower the authority of court. The public have a

vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court

has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due

administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to

commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of the Court

against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the

public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced,

obstructed or interfered with. “It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of

law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.”

[Frankfurter J. in Offutt v. U.S. reported (1954) 348 US 11, 14: 99 L ed

11] The object and purpose of punishing contempt for interference with

the administration of justice is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of

the Judge or the Magistrate, but the purpose is to preserve the authority

of the courts to ensure an ordered life in society. In Attorney General v.

Times Newspapers reported at (1974) AC 273 @ 302, the necessity for

the law of contempt was summarised by Lord Morris as:

“In an ordered community courts are established for the pacific

settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In

63

the general interests of the community it is imperative that the

authority of the courts should not be imperilled and that recourse

to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When

such unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because

those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are

concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of

ordered life is at risk if the recognised courts of the land are so

flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted.”

43. The Chief Judicial Magistrate is head of the Magistracy in the district

who administers justice to ensure, protect and safeguard the rights of

citizens. The subordinate courts at the district level cater to the need of

the masses in administering justice at the base level. By and large the

majority of the people get their disputes adjudicated in subordinate

courts, it is, in the general interest of the community that the authority

of subordinate courts is protected. If the CJM is led into trap by

unscrupulous police officers and if he is assaulted, handcuffed and

roped, the public is bound to lose faith in courts, which would be

destructive of basic structure of an ordered society. If this is permitted

Rule of Law shall be supplanted by Police Raj. Viewed in this perspective

the incident is not a case of physical assault on an individual judicial

officer instead it is an onslaught on the institution of the judiciary itself.

The incident is a clear interference with the administration of justice,

lowering its judicial authority. Its effect was not confined to one District

or State, it had a tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the country.

The incident highlights a dangerous trend that if the police is annoyed

with the orders of a presiding officer of a court, he would be arrested on

flimsy manufactured charges, to humiliate him publicly as has been

64

done in the instant case. The conduct of police officers in assaulting and

humiliating the CJM brought the authority and administration of justice

into disrespect, affecting the public confidence in the institution of

justice. “The summary power of punishment for contempt has been

conferred on the courts to keep a blaze of glory around them, to deter

people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the

public. These powers are necessary to keep the course of justice free, as

it is of great importance to society.” (Oswald on Contempt of Court). The

power to punish contempt is vested in the Judges not for their personal

protection only, but for the protection of public justice, whose interest

requires that decency and decorum is preserved in Courts of Justice.

Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of justice are protected by

the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties, any deliberate

interference with the discharge of such duties either in court or outside

the court by attacking the presiding officers of the court, would amount

to criminal contempt and the courts must take serious cognizance of

such conduct.” [Emphasis added]

60. In the case Of Daroga Singh and Other s v. B.K. Pandey reported at

(2004) 5 SCC 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the constitutional

scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and

the laws. Apart from interpreting the Constitution and the laws, the judiciary

discharges the function of securing maintenance of law and order by deciding

disputes in a manner acceptable to a civilised and peace-loving society. In order to

maintain the faith of the society in the rule of law, the role of the judiciary cannot

be undermined. In a number of cases the Supreme Court has observed that the

foundation of the judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people of the nation

and when such foundation or trust is rudely shaken by means of any disrespect,

65

people's perception of efficacy of the system gets eroded. If the judiciary has to

perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity and the

authority of the courts have to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all

concerned failing which, the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the

judiciary runs the risk of being lost.

61. In Arundhati Roy, In Re reported at (2002) 3 SCC 343, it was observed

that 'Rule of law' is the basic rule of governance of any civilised society. The scheme

of the Constitution of India is based upon the concept of rule of law. Everyone,

whether individually or collectively, is unquestionably under the supremacy of law.

Whoever the person may be, however, high he or she is, no one is above the law

notwithstanding how powerful and how rich he or she may be. For achieving the

establishment of the rule of law, the Constitution has assigned the special task to

the judiciary in the country. It is only through the courts that the rule of law

unfolds its contents and establishes its concept. For the judiciary to perform its

duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which it is sacredly

entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and

protected at all costs. The only weapon of protecting itself from the onslaught to the

institution is the long hand of contempt of court left in the armoury of judicial

repository which, when needed, can reach any neck howsoever high or far away it

may be.

Freedom of speech and expression, so far as they do not contravene the

statutory limits as contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, are to prevail without

any hindrance. However, the maintenance of dignity of courts is one of the cardinal

principles of rule of law in a democratic set-up and any criticism of the judicial

institution couched in language that apparently appears to be mere criticism but

ultimately results in undermining the dignity of the courts, cannot be permitted

when found to have crossed the limits and has to be punished. The law of contempt

66

has been enacted to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If

such confidence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the

institution of judiciary and democratic set-up is likely to be eroded which, if not

checked, is sure to be disastrous for the society itself.

All citizens cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the courts

in the name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution

itself. A Litigant losing in the court would be the first to impute motives to the

Judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism, which cannot be allowed

for preserving public faith in an important pillar of democratic set-up i.e. judiciary.

If a citizen, therefore, in the garb of exercising the right of free expression under

Article 19(1) of the Constitution, tries to scandalise the Court or undermines the

dignity of the Court, then the Court would be entitled to exercise the power under

Article 129 or Article 215, as the case may be.

62. In the case of Prem Surana v. Additional Munsif & Judicial Magistrate

and Another reported at 2002 6 SCC 722, the appellant was an advocate who

made scurrilous remarks about a Judge. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that

the conduct of the appellant does not bespeak of good behaviour, good gesture nor

suits an advocate. A Judge has a duty to discharge and he had passed his order in

a manner as he thought fit under the circumstances and no litigant, far less an

advocate, has any right to take the law into his own hand and then attack a judge

with a slap. It is a slur on the entire judiciary; it is a slur on the justice delivery

system of the country.

It was further observed that while judges should not be hypersensitive, that

does not mean and imply that they ought to maintain angelic silence also.

Immaterial it is as to the person but it is the seat of justice which needs protection:

it is the image of the judicial system which needs protection. Nobody can be

permitted to tarnish the image of the temple of justice. The majesty of the court

67

shall have to be maintained and there ought not to be any compromise or leniency

in that regard.

The introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, has been for the

purposes of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general for due and

proper administration of justice in the country. Contemptuous conduct and

obstruction to the majesty of law is the basic reasoning for which the law-makers

thought it prudent to engraft in the statute-book this particular legislation.

The slap on the face of the Judicial Officer is in fact a slap on the face of the

justice delivery system in the country and as such, the question of acceptance of

any apology or an undertaking does not and cannot arise, nor can there be any

question of leniency as regards the sentence.

63. In the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. State of Uttar

Pradesh reported at AIR 1954 SC 10 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, while holding that on the facts of that case the contempt

proceedings should have been dropped, observed that the summary jurisdiction

exercised by superior courts in punishing for contempt of their authority exists for

the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for

maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. The object of

contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from

imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a

protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act

or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of

confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened.

A defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is

concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper

action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is

68

calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law

by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to

the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an

injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people

regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and

prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's

administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of

the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is not necessary to prove

affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of

justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends

in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law.

64. In the case of E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar

reported at AIR 1970 SC 2015 , a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court,

speaking through the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court , Justice

Hidayatullah, held that the law of contempt stems from the right of the courts to

punish by imprisonment or fines persons guilty of words or acts which either

obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in

India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae and by the superior

courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them even if

committed outside the courts. Formerly, it was regarded as inherent in the powers

of a court of record and now by the Constitution of India, it is a part of the powers

of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. There are many kinds of contempts.

The chief forms of contempt are insult to Judges, attacks upon them, comment on

pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial, obstruction to officers

of courts, witnesses or the parties, abusing the process of the court, breach of duty

by officers connected with the court and scandalising the Judges or the courts. The

last form occurs, generally speaking, when the conduct of a person tends to bring

69

the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. In this

conduct are included all acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or

which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority. Such

contempt may be committed in respect of a Single Judge or a Single Court but may

in certain circumstances, be committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or

judicial system.

While it is intended under Article 19 of the Constitution that there should be

freedom of speech and expression, it is also intended that in the exercise of the

right, contempt of court shall not be committed.

Where therefore, a person charged the judiciary as an “instrument of

oppression” and the Judges as “guided and dominated by class hatred, class

interests and class prejudices instinctively favouring the reach against the poor”, it

is clearly an attack upon Judges calculated to raise a sense of disrespect and

distrust of all judicial decisions. It weakens the authority of law and law courts and

the person is guilty of contempt of court. That the person did not intend any such

result cannot serve as a justification.

65. In Queen v. Gray reported at (1900) 2 QB 36 (40), Lord Russell, speaking

for the bench observed that any act done or writing published calculated to bring a

Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a

Contempt of Court. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to

obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the

Courts is a Contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord

Hardwicke - L.C. characterised as “scandalising a Court or a Judge” in re Read and

Huggonson, (1741) 2 Atk.291,469.

66. In Chokolingo v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago reported at

(1981) 1 All ER 244, Lord Diplock, observed that “scandalising the Court” is a

70

convenient way of describing a publication which, although it does not relate to any

specific case either past or pending or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on

the judiciary as a whole, which is calculated to undermine the authority of the

Courts and public confidence in the administration of justice.

67. What can be culled out from the decisions discussed above are as follows:-

(i) The judiciary is one of the three pillars of the Constitution along

with the executive and the legislature. It has been entrusted with

the job of upholding the rule of law by orderly administration of

justice. The judiciary functions through Judges and Judicial

Officers.

(ii) The majesty of the Courts must be protected. This is because

the Court is often the last resort for a citizen who has been wronged

or who perceives to have been wronged. It is the Court which is

empowered to afford redress to a person who complains of having

been treated in a manner contrary to law.

(iii) Courts and Court orders must be respected and obeyed.

Otherwise, lawlessness will become the order of the day.

(iv) A litigant or any stakeholder in a litigation cannot launch a

scurrilous attack on the Court or a Judge before whom the

concerned lis is pending. However dissatisfied such a person may

be with the adjudicatory process or a Court order, he cannot

indulge in any act or conduct and cannot publish any material,

whether verbally or in writing, or indulge in any act or conduct that

lowers or tends to lower the majesty of the Court. This would

amount to interference with the administration of justice and will

constitute criminal contempt.

71

(iv) While a citizen’s fundamental right of free speech under Article

19 of the Constitution is a valuable right, exercise of such right

must be subject to the law relating to Contempt of Courts.

(v) The law of contempt has been designed and promulgated not for

protecting any particular Judge or Judicial Officer, but for

preserving and upholding the institutional majesty of the Judiciary

and justice delivery system and the sanctity of Court orders. This is

of utmost importance since if a person can get away after unfair

and self-serving criticism of a Judge or can otherwise tarnish the

image of the Judiciary with impunity, public confidence in the

justice delivery system will erode. The biggest casualty will be the

members of the public and greater public interest.

(vi) While fair criticism of a judicial order or judicial conduct may be

acceptable, imputing improper or dishonest motive to a Judge

cannot be permitted. Otherwise, in every litigation, the losing side

is likely to denigrate the concerned Judge by imputing nefarious

motive to him.

68. The facts of the present case, in so far as the alleged Contemnors Nos. 1 to 7

(in short “C-1 to C-7”) are concerned, are fairly admitted. They were part of a much

bigger group which assembled in close vicinity of the High Court. They blocked

public road, they shouted slogans against a particular sitting Judge of the High

Court imputing improper motive to His Lordship in dealing with a litigation pending

in his Court in a particular manner. They obstructed the lawyers’ ingress to and

egress from their chambers/offices located in that area and hurled abuses at them.

They put up photographs of a particular Hon’ble Judge on placards as a part of

their public demonstration. They trampled on photos of that Hon’ble Judge.

72

69. By the aforesaid conduct C- 1 to C- 7 and indeed their associates tried to

express their displeasure and demonstrate how disgruntled they were with the

manner the concerned Hon’ble Judge was dealing with a particular case in which

the demonstrators were interested. The question is, did the law of the land permit

them to do so? The answer must be in the negative. This is because their acts and

conduct constituted an unwarranted and legally unacceptable scurrilous attack on

the functioning of the Judiciary as a whole and its impartiality. The acts and

conduct of the alleged contemnors lowered or tended to lower the majesty of the

Court and sanctity of Court orders thereby interfering with the administration of

justice. This clearly was criminal contempt of Court going by our discussion above.

70. While substantially admitting the acts and conduct which the informants

have complained of, the alleged contemnors C-1 to C-7 have sought to contend that

what happened was a spontaneous reaction out of long pent-up frustration

because of the delay in appointing them as teachers caused by the ongoing

litigation. This cannot be an acceptable explanation for or justification of the

impugned acts and conduct of C-1 to C- 7. Condoning the demeanour of the alleged

contemnors on the ground that they were driven by their emotions running amok,

will be setting a dangerous precedent and in any event is not envisaged in law. One

cannot justify an act of contempt of Court by saying that he was overtaken by his

emotions. If the alleged contemnors were aggrieved by any order of the concerned

Judge or in the manner His Lordship was conducting the concerned proceedings, it

was open to the alleged contemnors to ventilate their grievance before a higher

forum. They would have been within their legal rights to do so. However, by making

derogatory and disparaging comments concerning a sitting Judge of this Court, the

alleged contemnors have exceeded the bounds of their legal rights and have

interfered with the course of justice, thereby committing criminal contempt of

Court.

73

71. The informants produced a Pen Drive along with the affidavits they have

affirmed. The affidavits refer to the Pen Drive. The Pen Drive contains videos of the

incident in question. C- 1 to C- 7 have not challenged the contents of those videos.

The videos would clearly show the public demonstration, shouting of slogans

against the Hon’ble Judge, remarks that the Hon’ble Judge in unholy entente with

a Senior Advocate of this Court is refusing to vacate the stay order on employment

of the demonstrators and also slogans to the effect that they would not allow the

case to be heard by that particular Judge.

72. The rigours of the provisions of the Evidence Act and its successor statute,

the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, relating to production and proof of electronic

evidence govern suits and trials. However, those are not applicable to a contempt

proceeding. Moreover, in view of no specific challenge to the authenticity of the

video clips having been raised, the Court can very well rely on those for the present

purpose.

73. Although in their affidavit, C-1 to C-7 denied having stamped on

photographs of the concerned Hon’ble Judge, with their feet, there is a material on

record including photographs and videos to show that they actually did so.

74. C-1 to C- 7, in their affidavit as also through their learned Advocate, have

tendered apology. Is this a case where apology should be accepted? We think not.

The demonstrators including the alleged contemnors are educated people. They are

presumed to know the consequences of what they did. They were trying, in effect,

to browbeat an Hon’ble Judge of this Court. They are not illiterate people or from a

rustic background who did not know what they are entitled to do in law and what

law prohibits them from doing.

75. Hence, we are not inclined to let go the alleged contemnor nos. 1 to 7 merely

by accepting their apology. Their acts and conduct were a vicious attack on the

independence and impartiality of the judiciary. They showed utter disregard for the

74

judiciary. However, on an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of

the case including the fact that they have been embroiled in litigation concerning

their appointment as teachers and the resultant frustration, we are inclined to take

a lenient view and impose fine of Rs. 1000/- on each of alleged contemnor Nos. 1 to

7. Such fine is to be paid within 4 weeks from date to the Government Exchequer

under the appropriate head. In default, each of them will suffer simple

imprisonment for three days and for t hat purpose the jurisdictional police

authorities shall take them into custody. This disposes of the contempt proceedings

in so far as contemnor nos. 1 to 7 are concerned.

76. Now, let us take up the case of the Contemnor No. 8 (C-8) which is

somewhat different from the case of C-1 to C- 7.

77. From the material on record including the annexures to the affidavits of

complaint and the videos in the Pen Drive referred to above, the authenticity of the

contents whereof has not been challenged by anybody, one thing is clear. C-8 was

nowhere near the High Court on April 26, 2025, i.e., the date of the incident. There

is nothing on record to show that C -8 instigated or incited the public

demonstration on April 25, 2025.

78. However, there is a video in the aforesaid Pen Drive recording an interview of

C-8. The alleged contemnor no. 1 is also seen in that video next to C-8. That also,

per se, may not be sufficient to hold C-8 guilty of criminal contempt. But, in course

of his interview, C- 8 clearly said, “আর রবচারপর র র েু র েু রেরপএর্মর আইনজীবীর্

সেখর্ল ী ে জারন না। অ্রভজজৎ গর্ঙ্গাপাধযাের্ সের্খরে। ভগবান-ভগবান- ারপর োিংেে।”(I

do not know what happens to the Judge when some of the lawyers belonging to the

CPI (M) camp appear before him. I have seen Abhijit Gangopadhyay - “God-God,”

and then became Member of the Parliament (MP)).

The aforesaid is an unequivocal imputation against the Hon’ble Judge that

he gets swayed when some particular lawyers belonging to a particular political

75

camp appear before him. This clearly impinges on the impartiality and

independence of the Hon’ble Judge and is an attack on the entire justice delivery

system.

79. In the interview there is also a subtle indication that the Hon’ble Judge is

raising a new issue at every hearing and calling for fresh documents / information.

In spite of all documents and information being furnished, the stay order on

appointment of the teachers was continuing. There definitely is an innuendo in

these statements that the Hon’ble Judge is partisan towards the party to the

litigation which obtained stay order and wanted cancellation of the appointment

letters issued by the then Chief Minister. This, in our opinion, going by the

definition of ‘criminal contempt’ in the 1971 Act as interpreted by the Supreme

Court decisions referred to above, would amount to criminal contempt of Court. We

therefore hold Shri Kunal Ghosh guilty of criminal contempt of court.

80. The next question is, whether or not we should accept the apology tendered

by Shri Ghosh through his learned Senior Counsel? An apology which deserves to

be accepted must be unconditional, sincere and genuine. It must convey a feeling

of regret, repentance and contrition. It must not be a pretended apology. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, as discussed herein before, it is one thing to say

sorry and another, to feel sorry. The “slap and say sorry” practice cannot be

countenanced.

81. In the present case, Shri Ghosh, while tendering apology, has in the same

breath challenge the maintainability of the present proceedings and tried to justify

his conduct complained of in these proceedings. In the context of contempt of

Court, true apology and justification of the contemptuous act/conduct, cannot go

hand in hand. They are mutually exclusive. One who seeks to justify his conduct

cannot be permitted to get away by tendering apology as a second line of defence.

76

Similarly, when an alleged contemnor offers genuine apology, he ought not to

simultaneously try to justify his conduct.

In our opinion, the purported apology tendered on behalf of Shri Ghosh, is

not real or genuine and is undeserving of acceptance. We therefore impose the

maximum fine of Rs. 2000/- on him. The fine shall be paid within 4 weeks from

date to the Government Exchequer under the appropriate head. In default, Shri

Ghosh shall suffer simple imprisonment for 3 days for which purpose he shall be

taken into custody by the jurisdictional police authorities.

82. The contempt proceedings stand disposed of accordingly.

83. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied for,

be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.

(Arijit Banerjee, J.)

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

(Rajarshi Bharadwaj, J.)

Later:

84. After the Judgment is pronounced in open court, Mr. Bandopadhyay,

learned Senior Counsel appearing for the alleged contemnor no. 8 in CRLCP

7 of 2025, Mr. Kunal Ghosh, prays for stay of operation of the judgment and

order.

85. The prayer is considered and refused.

(Arijit Banerjee, J.)

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

(Rajarshi Bharadwaj, J.)