1

2026:CGHC:16334-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 119 of 2024

Deepak Vaishnav S/o Mahendra Vaishnav Aged About 24 Years R/o

Vill- Amarpur (Bharra), Ps- Pandariya,, District : Kawardha (Kabirdham),

Chhattisgarh

... Appellant

versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through PS- Lalpur, District : Mungeli,

Chhattisgarh

... Respondent

For Appellant :Mr. Syed Majid Ali, Advocate

For Respondent/State :Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Dy. Govt. Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble S hri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

JUDGMENT ON BOARD

Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J .

09.04.2026

1.Today, though the matter is listed for hearing on I.A.No.01/2024,

which is an application for suspension of sentence and grant of

bail to the appellant, however, considering the fact that the

appellant is in jail since 17.10.2022 and with the consent of

learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally.

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2.This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed

against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

16.10.2023 passed by the Special Judge (F.T.S.C.) POCSO Act,

Mungeli, District- Mungeli (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No.

76/2022, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted and

sentenced sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the

sentences concurrently in the following manner :

CONVICTION SENTENCE

U/s 363 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and

fine of Rs. 500/- and in defaults of

payment of fine amount, additional RI

for 02 months

U/s 366 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and

fine of Rs. 500/- and in defaults of

payment of fine amount, additional RI

for 02 months

U/s 6 of the POCSO

Act

Rigorous imprisonment for 20 years

and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in defaults of

payment of fine amount, additional RI

for 02 months

3.Case of the prosecution, if brief, is that on 14.09.2022, the victim's

father/complainant (PW-01) appeared at the Lalpur police station

and lodged a report stating that on 13.09.2022 at around 9:30 am,

his daughter/victim left on her bicycle to go to school and did not

return home till 5:00 pm. Then, when he inquired about the victim

from his daughter's/victim's friend, she told him that the victim had

not come to school and had told him that she was at her maternal

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uncle's village. He inquired about his daughter/victim by calling

the neighbours, relatives and her maternal uncle's village, but the

victim was nowhere to be found. He suspects that some unknown

person has lured his daughter/victim away. On the report of the

victim's father/complainant, a First Information Report (FIR)

Ex.P-01 was registered against the unknown accused under

Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code at Lalpur Police Station and

taken up for investigation.

4.During the investigation, the victim's statement was recorded in

Ex.P.-15 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in the Judicial Magistrate

Court. The spot map was prepared Ex.P.-04. The victim was

medically examined by Dr. Priyadarshini (A.S.-05). After the

medical examination of the victim by the doctor, the medical report

Ex.P.-16 was prepared. The statements of the victim and the

witnesses were recorded as per their instructions. The original

school admission register was seized from Headmaster Ravindra

Kumar Patre (A.S.-02) and seizure memo Ex.P.-11 was prepared.

Sub-Inspector Virendra Singh Kshatriya (A.S.-07) seized two

vaginal slides of the victim and the underwear of the accused in a

sealed envelope and prepared seizure memo Ex.P.-21 and 22.

The genitals of the accused were examined by Doctor Manilal

Bhaskar (ASI-06) and genital examination report Ex.P.-17 was

prepared. The articles seized in the case were sent to Forensic

Science Laboratory, Bilaspur for chemical examination, from

where FSL report Ex.P.-29 was received after examination. The

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accused was arrested in the case and arrest panchnama Ex.P.-19

was prepared. On the basis of the victim's statement, offences

under sections 366, 376 of IPC and sections 4, 6 of the POCSO

Act were added to the case. After necessary investigation, a

charge sheet was presented against the accused for trial before

the Court of Special Judge (F.T.S.C.) POCSO Act, Mungeli,

District- Mungeli (C.G.) under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and

Sections 4, 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

Act against the accused on the basis of the case and attached

documents.

5.After the charges were framed under Sections 363, 366, 376 (2)

(N) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and were read out and

explained to the accused, the accused denied the charges and

sought trial.

6.On behalf of the prosecution, statements of the victim's father

PW-01, Head teacher Ravindra Kumar Patre PW--02, victim

PW-03, victim's mother PW-04, Dr. Priyadarshini PW-05,

Dr.Manilal Bhaskar PW-06, Sub Inspector Virendra Singh

Kshatriya PW-07, Head Constable Gulab Singh Rajput PW-08,

Deputy Superintendent of Police Sadhna Singh PW-09, and Head

Constable Arun Netam PW-10 have been recorded in the case

and 29 documents have been presented and exhibited.

7.On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution in the

case, a statement of charge was prepared under Section 313(1-b)

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of the CrPC and on examination of the accused, the accused

denied the facts of the prosecution evidence and declared himself

innocent and did not want to give evidence in his defence.

8.After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned

trial Court has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as

mentioned in para 2 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

9.Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the

impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is wholly

contrary to the settled principles of law, as well as the facts and

circumstances of the present case, and therefore deserves to be

set aside. He submitted that the learned trial Court has failed to

properly appreciate the evidence available on record in its correct

perspective. Even if the entire prosecution case is taken at its face

value and accepted in its entirety, no offence under Sections 363

and 366 of the IPC, nor under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, is

made out against the present appellant. Learned counsel further

contended that the conduct and statements of the victim, as

reflected in her own deposition, clearly demolish the prosecution

story. The victim herself has categorically stated that she was in

regular telephonic contact with the appellant through an unknown

number. It is further admitted by her that she had voluntarily

accompanied the appellant and travelled with him by bus up to

Mungeli, and thereafter proceeded along with him to Raipur. It

was also pointed out that from Raipur, both the appellant and the

victim travelled together to Hyderabad, where they stayed for a

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day. Thereafter, they again travelled together from Hyderabad to

Vijayawada, and subsequently to Agrapalli, where they resided

together in a room for a period of about one month. Learned

counsel emphasized that during the said period, the victim

remained in the company of the appellant without any resistance

or complaint and voluntarily established physical relations with

him. This continuous and voluntary companionship, as borne out

from the prosecutrix’s own version, clearly indicates absence of

force, inducement, or coercion on the part of the appellant.

10.Per contra, learned counsel for the State strongly opposed the

submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and supported

the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. He

contended that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the

oral as well as documentary evidence available on record and has

arrived at a well-reasoned and legally sustainable finding, which

does not call for any interference by this Hon’ble Court. Learned

State counsel submitted that the victim was a minor at the time of

the incident, and therefore, her alleged consent, if any, is wholly

immaterial in the eyes of law. It was further argued that once the

age of the victim is established to be below 18 years, the question

of consent loses all significance, particularly in view of the

stringent provisions of the POCSO Act. He further contended that

the evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellant had

taken the victim away from the lawful guardianship of her parents,

thereby attracting the offence under Section 363 of the IPC. The

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subsequent acts of taking her to different places including

Mungeli, Raipur, Hyderabad, Vijayawada, and Agrapalli, and

keeping her in his company for a prolonged period, clearly

demonstrate the element of inducement and enticement, thereby

constituting an offence under Section 366 of the IPC. Learned

counsel for the State further submitted that the victim, in her

statement, has categorically stated that she had established

physical relations with the appellant during the said period. In view

of her minority, such physical relationship squarely falls within the

ambit of penetrative sexual assault as defined under the POCSO

Act, and the aggravated nature of the offence has been rightly

considered by the learned trial Court while convicting the

appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

11.We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their

rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the

records with utmost circumspection.

12.The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial

Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under

Section 363 of the IPC ?

13.The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363

of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping. Kidnapping has

been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section

359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India

and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC

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defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as

under:-

“361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.-Whoever

takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a

male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any

person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful

guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind,

without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap

such minor or person from lawful guardianship.”

14.The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect

children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for

improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of

parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of

minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:-

(1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of

unsound mind.

(2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a

male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female.

(3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of

the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound

mind.

(4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of

such guardian.

So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is

concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18

years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful

guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to

leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the

consent of the lawful guardian.

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15. The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of

the IPC in the matter of S.Varadarajan v. State of Madras

1

, took

the view that if the prosecution establishes that though

immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no

active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier

stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if

evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not

be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor

out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:-

“It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution

establishes that though immediately prior to the minor

leaving the father's protection no active part was played

by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or

persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish

one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to

infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of

the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after

she has actually left her guardian's house or a house

where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and

the accused helped her in her design not to return to her

guardian's house by taking her along with him from place

to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could

be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of

the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the

minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and

is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.”

16.Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of ingredients of

offence under Section 361 of the IPC which is punishable under

Section 363 of the IPC & as well as principles of law laid down by

the Supreme Court in the matter of S.Varadarajan (supra), it is

evident that the victim was in regular telephonic contact with the

appellant through an unknown number and she had voluntarily

1AIR 1965 SC 942

10

accompanied the appellant and travelled with him by bus up to

Mungeli, and thereafter proceeded along with him to Raipur. It

was also pointed out that from Raipur, both the appellant and the

victim travelled together to Hyderabad, where they stayed for a

day. Thereafter, they again travelled together from Hyderabad to

Vijayawada, and subsequently to Agrapalli, where they resided

together in a room for a period of about one month. As such,

there is no inducement to the victim by the appellant to leave the

lawful guardianship. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this

Court, the act/omission of the appellant, if any, would not

tantamount to “taking” within the meaning of Section 361 of the

IPC in light of judgment of the Supreme Court in S.Varadarajan

(supra). Similarly, there is no evidence of enticing the minor victim

by the appellant. As such, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in

convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC.

17.The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial

Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under

Section 366 of the IPC ?

18.Dr. Priyadarshini (PW-5) has stated that on medical examination

of the victim, she found no injury on the external and internal parts

of her body. The victim's hymen was already torn and filled.

According to her, no definite opinion has been given regarding the

sexual intercourse with the victim at that time. On examination of

the victim's underwear, no stains were found on it, which were

marked and sealed and two vaginal slides were prepared by her,

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sealed and handed over to the lady constable for chemical

examination. The medical report given by her is Ex.P-16, which is

signed by her. Further, the FSL report (Ex.P-29) is also found to

be negative. As such, there is no corroborative evidence placed

by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for the offence

punishable under Section 366 of the IPC.

19.By perusal of the evidence of the victim girl, it appears that victim

girl was simply accompanied the accused without being enticed or

influenced. Mere accompanying a person without being induced

does not constitute an offence under Section 366 of the IPC.

Though, the learned State counsel vehemently contended that

age of the victim girl has proved by the prosecution that she is

minor as on the date of incident, nevertheless, in order to convict

the accused for the offence under Section 366 of the IPC, other

two essential ingredients i.e. the victim girl must be induced by the

accused and she must be induced by the accused person to go

from a place or to do any act with an intent that such girl may be

knowing that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit

intercourse by another person. As such, the prosecution has failed

to prove the ingredients of offence under Section 366 of the IPC.

20.So far as the age of victim is concerned, the documentary

evidence including oral evidence regarding the date of birth of the

victim (PW-3) being 10/11/2006, copy of Dakhil Kharij Register

(Ex.P-12) and Aadhar Card (Ex.P26C) are present on record in an

irrefutable manner, which there is no reason to disbelieve. Hence,

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the age of the victim (PW-3) is proved to be around 15 years 10

months and 03 days and if consent was given for sexual

intercourse on the date of incident, it does not amount to an

offence under the POCSO Act.

21. In the matter of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu

& Kashmir and others

2

, the Supreme Court has held that a

judicial notice can be taken that the margin of error in age

ascertained by Radiological examination is two years on either

side. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:-

“9. Detenu was arrested and detained on Oct. 18,

1981. The report by the expert is dated May 3, 1982,

that is nearly seven months after the date of

detention. Growing in age day by day is an

involuntary process and the anatomical changes in

the structure of the body continuously occur. Even on

normal calculation, if seven months are deducted

from the approximate age opined by the expert, in

Oct., 1981 detenu was around 17 years of age,

consequently the statement made in the petition

turns out to be wholly true. However, it is notorious

and one can take judicial notice that the margin of

error in age ascertained by radiological examination

is two years on either side. Undoubtedly, therefore,

the detenu was a young school going boy. It equally

appears that there was some upheavel in the

educational institutions. This young school going boy

may be enthusiastic about the students’ rights and on

two different dates he marginally crossed the bounds

of law. It passes comprehension to believe that he

2AIR 1982 SC 1297

13

can be visited with drastic measure of preventive

detention. One cannot treat young people, may be

immature, may be even slightly misdirected, may be

a little more enthusiastic, with a sledge hammer. In

our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this

case the detention order was wholly unwarranted

and deserved to be quashed.”

22.In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and

circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme

Court observed as under:

“51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan

{AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not

the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the

aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court

observed as follows:-

"The rule, which according to the cases has

hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration

is essential before there can be a conviction but

that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of

prudence, except where the circumstances make it

safe to dispense with it, must be present to the

mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this

rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the

judge or the jury as the case may be and be

understood and appreciated by him or them. There

is no rule of practice that there must, in every case,

be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed

to stand."

52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been

reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments

subsequently. These observations leave no manner of

doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole,

uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does

not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities

which render it unworthy of credence.

xxx xxx xxx

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54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that

Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house

and told him that he had married her. They had come

to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This

witness categorically stated that he thought that they

were newly married couple. He had made them stay in

Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his

responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police

inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this

witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by

threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to

the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid

premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying

with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did

not even complain to this witness or any other

residents in the locality. Her behavior of not

complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being

allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural.

55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to

complain or to run away, but she made no such effort.

It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing

some known persons near the car, after her alleged

abduction. She did not make any complaint at the

residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti.

Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives

allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives

apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra

was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No

one sent for police help even though a car was

available. She made no complaint when she was taken

to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and

stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when

Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of

the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police

Station that they had already been married. The above

behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been

compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual

intercourse.

56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered

opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the

appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire

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prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best

known to the prosecution.”

23.In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of

Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has

held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very

much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong

for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:-

“16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of

the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to

18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the

offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not

be made out.

17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of

Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an

occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for

consideration in the present case. This Court has

observed thus:

“7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting

away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian

is an essential ingredient of the offence of

kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with

enticement but what we have to find out is whether

the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking”

out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri.

We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left

by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K.

Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful

keeping of the former but then the question remains

as to what is it which the appellant did that

constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the

deposition of Savitri from which an inference could

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be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at

the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In

fact she candidly admits that on the morning of

October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant

to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to

that place and finding him waiting in the car got into

that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that

she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it

was the appellant himself who drove the car to

Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places.

Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to

marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the

appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and

got the agreement of marriage registered there

(thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them

man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything

like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl

leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came

from her side. The appellant, by complying with her

wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to

have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful

guardian. After the registration of the agreement both

the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and

visited different places. There is no suggestion in

Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had

attained the age of discretion and was on the verge

of attaining majority that she was made by the

appellant to accompany him by administering any

threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her

accompanying the appellant all along is quite

consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of

the appellant in which the desire of accompanying

him wherever he went was course implicit. In these

circumstances we find nothing from which an

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inference could be drawn that the appellant had

been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping

of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the

law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back

to her father's house or even of telling her not to

accompany him. She was not a child of tender years

who was unable to think for herself but, as already

stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and

was capable of knowing what was good and what

was bad for her…….”

18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to

the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between

16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of

understanding as to what was right and wrong for her.

19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be

clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the

appellant herein, travelled to various places and also

resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.”

24.The victim (PW-3) in her statement recorded under Section 164

CrPC has deposed that her brother gave his mobile phone her to

use. At that time, she received a call on her mobile number from

an unknown number. The caller introduced himself as xxx (the

accused. After a brief conversation, she disconnected the call.

However, the accused continued to call her repeatedly. Initially,

she did not answer his calls, but later she started talking to him.

The accused told her that he liked her, and she also said that she

liked him. On 12.09.2022, the accused called her, and during the

conversation, she told him that they should elope and get married.

He agreed to marry her. The next day, without informing her

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family, she went with the accused to Raipur for marriage. From

Raipur, they boarded a bus and went to Hyderabad, and from

there, via Vijayawada, they reached Agrapalli. There, the accused

kept her in a rented house. They lived together there as husband

and wife, and they also had physical relations. She further

admitted that she went with accused of her own free will.

However, the victim (PW-3), in her Court statement has deposed

that she was in regular telephonic contact with the appellant

through an unknown number. She further stated while she was

going to school, the accused stopped her bicyle and took her by

bus up to Mungeli, and she thereafter proceeded along with him

to Raipur and from Raipur, both the appellant and the victim

travelled together to Hyderabad, where they stayed for a day.

Thereafter, they again travelled together from Hyderabad to

Vijayawada, and subsequently to Agrapalli, where they resided

together in a room for a period of about one month and

established physical relations during the said period.

25.The scrutiny of entire evidence goes to show that there is no

evidence on record that at any point of time the appellant solicited

or persuaded the victim to leave her home forcefully. On the other

hand, it is clearly established that the victim was in regular

telephonic contact with the appellant through an unknown

number. She had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and

travelled with him by bus up to Mungeli, and thereafter proceeded

along with him to Raipur and from Raipur, both the appellant and

19

the victim travelled together to Hyderabad, where they stayed for

a day. Thereafter, they again travelled together from Hyderabad to

Vijayawada, and subsequently to Agrapalli, where they resided

together in a room for a period of about one month and during the

said period, the victim remained in the company of the appellant

without any resistance or complaint and voluntarily established

physical relations with him. This continuous and voluntary

companionship, as borne out from the victim’s own version,

clearly indicates absence of force, inducement, or coercion on the

part of the appellant.

26.Applying the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in

the above-stated judgment (supra) to the facts of the present case

and considering the opinion of Medical Officer (PW-5) and her

report Ex.P-16 and FSL report Ex.P-29 coupled with the testimony

of the victim herself creates a serious lacuna in the prosecution

story, the benefit of which should be granted to the appellant. On

the basis of material available on record and evidence collected

by the prosecution, it cannot be held that the prosecution has

been able to bring home the offences under Sections 363, 366 of

the IPC and Sections 6 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable

doubt as evidence brought on record is not sufficient to bring

home the offences against the appellant / accused herein.

27.As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis, the

criminal appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 16.10.2023 passed by the

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Special Judge (F.T.S.C.) POCSO Act, Mungeli, District- Mungeli

(C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 76/2022 is hereby set aside.

The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges levelled

against him. He is in jail since 17.10.2022. He shall be set at

liberty forthwith if no longer required in any other criminal case.

28.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed

forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45

prescribed in the Code of Criminal Proceure of sum of Rs.25,000/-

with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court

concerend which shall be effective for a period of six months

along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special

Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave,

the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

29.Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted

to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information

and compliance.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Chandra