LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 1 of 23

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: 10.02.2026

% Judgment Delivered on: 29.05.2026

+ LPA 283/2022

KRITENDRA SHARMA .....Appellant

Versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND OTHERS .....Respondents

AND

+ LPA 422/2022 & CM APPL. 30955-56/2022

DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION AND ANR .....Appellants

Versus

CHAIRMAN ARYA GIRLS SENIOR SECONDARY

SCHOOL .....Respondent

Advocates who appeared in these cases

Mr. Anuj Dhir, Advocate for Appellant in LPA 283/2022 and R2 in

LPA 422/2022

Ms. Latika Chaudhary, Advocate for GNCTD.

Mr. Ashish K. Dixit, CGSC with Mr. Umar Hashmi, Advocate for

UoI.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 2 of 23

JUDGMENT

TEJAS KARIA, J

1.These Letters Patent Appeals arise from the Judgment and Order

dated 24.01.2022 (“Impugned Judgment”) passed in W.P.(C) No.

6257/2011 (“Writ Petition”), which had been instituted by the Chairman,

Arya Girls Secondary School, New Delhi (“School”), arrayed as Respondent

No. 3 in LPA No. 283/2022 and Respondent No. 1 in LPA No. 422/2022.

2.The Writ Petition was filed assailing the Order dated 13.05.2011

(“Order”) passed by the Delhi School Tribunal (“Tribunal”), whereby the

Appeal preferred by Mr. Kritendra Sharma (“Mr. Sharma”), who is the

Appellant in LPA No. 283/2022, against the dismissal order dated

12.02.1995 (“Dismissal Order”) issued by the School, was allowed in

accordance with the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (“DSER”). By the

Order, the Tribunal set aside the Dismissal Order and directed the

reinstatement of Mr. Sharma, while leaving the issue of back-wages to be

determined by the School within a period of three months.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3.The brief facts leading to filing of present Appeals are as under:

3.1Mr. Sharma was appointed to the post of Upper Division Clerk

(“UDC”) on probation for a period of one year on 31.07.1993,

pursuant to an advertisement issued for filling the said post and

joined on 03.08.1993. The probationary period was extendable

at the discretion of the Appointing Authority.

3.2The School directed Mr. Sharma to produce the originals of his

Class 10 and Class 12 certificates as well as his graduation

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 3 of 23

degree; however, the said originals were not furnished.

Thereafter, according to the School, Mr. Sharma remained

absent from the School with effect from 12.01.1995 without

obtaining permission from the Management. The School issued

memorandum dated 16.01.1995 and 01.02.1995 calling upon

him to resume duties and furnish the original certificates and

degree. A telegram dated 24.01.1995 was also sent requiring

him to report for duty no later than 27.01.1995.

3.3As the School received complaints alleging cheating by Mr.

Sharma, a letter dated 02.02.1995 was issued directing him to

report for duty, failing which disciplinary action was to be

initiated.

3.4Mr. Sharma did not respond and/or furnish the documents

sought by the School, and in view of the allegations of cheating,

the Management Committee of the School, in its meeting held

on 12.01.1995, resolved to extend his probation by a further

period of one year.

3.5The School decided to verify the authenticity of the documents

furnished by Mr. Sharma in relation to his educational

qualifications. Accordingly, the School requested Chaudhary

Charan Singh University, Meerut to verify the genuineness of

the graduation degree submitted by him. A separate

communication was also addressed to the Principal, Bihari Lal

Inter College, Dankaur, Bulandshahr, seeking verification of his

school certificates.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 4 of 23

3.6Videletter dated 31.01.1995, the Principal, Bihari Lal Inter

College informed the School that Mr. Sharma’s certificates and

marksheet appeared doubtful and requested that the originals be

forwarded for verification. Thereafter,videletter dated

03.02.1995, the Deputy Registrar, Chaudhary Charan Singh

University confirmed, upon verification from the confidential

section records and charts of the University, that the B.Sc.

degree (Parts I, II and III) forwarded by the School was forged.

3.7The School issued a Show Cause Notice dated 04.02.1995

directing Mr. Sharma to produce the originals of all relevant

documents and to submit his written defence, if any, failing

which it would be presumed that he had no defence to offer. As

no response was received, the Management Committee of the

School, in its meeting held on 14.02.1995, resolved to dismiss

Mr. Sharma from service. The dismissal order was passed on

the same day and communicated to him by registered A.D. post.

3.8The School also lodged a complaint against Mr. Sharma on

14.02.1995, pursuant to which First Information Report No.

47/1995 (“FIR”) was registered at Police Station Karol Bagh

under Sections 420/467/468/471 of the IPC, alleging cheating,

forgery, and use of forged documents with intent to mislead the

School. Mr. Sharma was arrested on 17.02.1995 and was

subsequently released on bail.

3.9Mr. Sharma preferred an appeal before the learned Tribunal,

being Appeal No. 39/2003, assailing the Dismissal Order.Vide

order dated 27.02.2009, the learned Tribunal dismissed the

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 5 of 23

appeal as barred by limitation. The said order was challenged

by Mr. Sharma before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 12023/2009,

andvideorder dated 28.01.2010, this Court set aside the

Tribunal’s order dated 27.02.2009 and remanded the matter for

fresh adjudication after affording the parties an opportunity of

hearing in accordance with law.

3.10Videthe subsequent order passed by the learned Tribunal, the

Dismissal Order was set aside, the School was directed to

reinstate Mr. Sharma, and the issue of back-wages was left to

the Management Committee of the School for determination

within a period of three months.

3.11The said order was challenged by the School by way of the

Writ Petition. At the time of issuance of the Dismissal Order,

the School was an aided private 10+2 girls’ school administered

by its duly constituted Management Committee. Owing to

mismanagement, the then Management was removed and the

School was taken over by the Directorate of Education (“DoE”)

on 19.07.2017 during the pendency of the Writ Petition, which

had been instituted by the erstwhile Management. Upon taking

over the School, the DoE moved an application before the

learned Single Judge seeking permission to prosecute the Writ

Petition as petitioner in place of the erstwhile Management. The

said application was allowedvideorder dated 19.08.2019, and

the DoE was permitted to represent the petitioner in the Writ

Petition.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 6 of 23

3.12The learned Single Judge,videthe Impugned Judgment,

dismissed the Writ Petition and modified the Tribunal’s order

by awarding compensation of ₹5,00,000/- to Mr. Sharma in lieu

of reinstatement and back-wages, along with further

compensation of ₹10,00,000/- on account of the mental agony

and trauma suffered by him due to the dismissal, the stigma

associated with incarceration, and the prolonged civil and

criminal litigation spanning 26 years.

3.13Aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment, Mr. Sharma and the

DoE have preferred LPA No. 283/2022 and LPA No. 422/2022,

respectively.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF MR. SHARMA

4.The learned Counsel for Mr. Sharma submitted that:

4.1.The learned Single Judge was not justified in denying

reinstatement once it had been held that the Dismissal Order

was illegal and liable to be set aside. By denying reinstatement

and back-wages and awarding compensation in lieu thereof, the

learned Single Judge committed error both in law and on facts.

4.2.Since the Dismissal Order was held to beper seillegal and

stigmatic in nature, the denial of reinstatement was violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch as Mr.

Sharma’s conduct stood vindicated before both the learned

Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, he could not be deprived

of the consequential benefits lawfully flowing from the setting

aside of the Dismissal Order.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 7 of 23

4.3.The learned Single Judge relied upon the decisions ofMadhya

Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748, and

Mehboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, (2008) 1

SCC 575, however, failed to consider the later decision of the

Supreme Court inDeepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324, wherein it was

held that, in cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement with

continuity of service and back-wages is the normal rule. In the

absence of any finding reflecting adversely on the conduct of

Mr. Sharma to justify denial of reinstatement, the Impugned

Judgment was liable to be set aside to that extent.

4.4.The learned Single Judge, having upheld the finding of the

learned Tribunal that the School had acted in gross violation of

the principles of natural justice, with the effect of victimising

the employee, ought not to have interfered with the direction for

payment of full back-wages.

4.5.The suffering occasioned by the impugned action was not

confined to Mr. Sharma alone, but extended to his family as

well, and that such deprivation could not be adequately

compensated in monetary terms, as recognised inDeepali

Gundu Surwase(supra). Reinstatement with full back-wages

was therefore stated to be the only just and appropriate relief. It

was also urged that such relief was necessary to restore Mr.

Sharma’s reputation and integrity, which had been unlawfully

tarnished by the conduct of the School.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 8 of 23

4.6.Mr. Sharma had been appointed as a UDC, a post of a

secretarial nature not involving specialised technical skill, and,

therefore, no prejudice would be caused in the discharge of his

duties merely by reason of the lapse of approximately 26 years.

Mr. Sharma was also entitled to pensionary benefits under the

Old Pension Scheme, and that the denial of reinstatement under

the Impugned Judgment effectively deprived him of a source of

livelihood upon retirement.

4.7.Mr. Sharma had not crossed the age of superannuation and still

had more than twelve years of service remaining. Accordingly,

once the dismissal had been declared illegal and unjustified,

reinstatement was stated to be the relief that ought to follow in

the ordinary course.

4.8.The entire controversy arose because Mr. Sharma had married

the niece of the Chairman of the School against his wishes.

According to Mr. Sharma, it was for this reason that the FIR

came to be lodged alleging fabrication of fake and forged

educational certificates, although, in fact, the original

certificates had been taken by the School authorities at the time

of his recruitment as UDC and were in the custody of the

Managing Committee of the School.

4.9.The Dismissal Order had been issued without holding any

enquiry, despite containing allegations that Mr. Sharma’s

certificates / documents were fake and forged.

4.10.After issuance of the Dismissal Order, the School soughtex

post factoapproval from the DoE on 16.03.2025, which,

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 9 of 23

according to Mr. Sharma, was impermissible in law and

contrary to the DSER.

4.11.Mr. Sharma received a copy of the Dismissal Order only in the

year 2003, when his wife sought the same under the Right to

Information Act, 2005. Thereafter, he approached the learned

Tribunal by filing Appeal No. 39/2003, which came to be

dismissed as barred by limitationvideorder dated 27.02.2009.

However, this Court, by order dated 28.01.2010 passed in

W.P.(C) No. 12023/2009, remanded the appeal to the learned

Tribunal for adjudication on merits, following which the Order

dated 13.05.2011 was passed setting aside the Dismissal Order

and directing reinstatement of Mr. Sharma in service, while

leaving the issue of back-wages to be decided by the School. It

was further pointed out that the DoE did not challenge the said

Order of the learned Tribunal, whereas the School filed the Writ

Petition. It was also submitted that, despite there being no

approval of the DoE for extension of probation, the learned

Single Judge nevertheless decided the issue of deemed

confirmation against Mr. Sharma. At the same time, the

Dismissal Order was held to be stigmatic and was also found to

be bad in law for want of prior approval from the DoE, in terms

of the decisions of this Court inMeena Oberoi v. Cambridge

Foundation School, 265 (2019) DLT 401, andRaj Kumar v.

Directorate of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541.

4.12.Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment was liable to be set aside

to the extent that it modified the Order of the learned Tribunal

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 10 of 23

by denying reinstatement, and that the School ought to be

directed to reinstate Mr. Sharma to the post of UDC with all

consequential benefits.

5.In view of the above, it is prayed that LPA No. 283/2022 be allowed

and LPA No. 422/2022 be dismissed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DoE

6.The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of DoE submitted that:

6.1.The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the

appointment of Mr. Sharma was secured based on forged and

fabricated documents and therefore it was void ab initio and he

cannot claim protection under the provision of Delhi School

Education Act, 1973 (“DSE Act”). It is the settled law that an

appointment secured on the basis of forged certificates is no

appointment in the eyes of law as the person cannot claim right

to the post meant for a deserving candidate cannot be usurped

by playing a fraud and producing false certificate.

6.2.The principles of natural justice were complied with by the

School before dismissing Mr. Sharma from the services.

Number of opportunities were given to Mr. Sharma to file his

reply to several memos as well as the show cause notice which

Mr. Sharma fail to avail.

6.3.The learned Single Judge erred in law while granting

₹10,00,000/- towards compensation on account of mental agony

and trauma suffered by him since he obtained the employment

on the basis of forged certificate and then chose not to respond

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 11 of 23

to the memos and the Show Cause Notice issued by the School

calling upon him to submit his original certificates and to give

response to the Show Cause Notice. The DoE is a State and

public exchequer cannot be burdened with ₹15,00,000/- for no

fault of DoE.

6.4.Even after the Dismissal Order was passed in the year 1995,

Mr. Sharma chose not to challenge his Dismissal Order for a

long period of eight years. The learned Single Judge failed to

appreciate the fact that Mr. Sharma was sitting at home till

2003 without either challenging the Dismissal Order or making

any representation against the same before DoE.

6.5.The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that Mr. Sharma

was on probation when he was removed from the services as he

had worked for only two years and the appointment was

obtained by him on the basis of forged certificates.

7.In view of the above, it was prayed that the Impugned Judgment be

set aside by allowing LPA No. 422/2022 and dismissing LPA No. 283/2022.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

8.We have heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the

material available on record.

9.The challenge to the Impugned Judgment in the present Appeals

raises the following questions:

(i)Whether Mr. Sharma had obtained the employment with the School

based on the forged and fabricated documents;

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 12 of 23

(ii)Whether the Dismissal Order was passed without following principles

of natural justice;

(iii)Whether the extension of probation or Dismissal Order passed without

prior approval of DoE were valid;

(iv)Whether the compensation of ₹5,00,000/- in lieu of reinstatement and

back-wages and ₹10,00,000/- on account of mental agony and trauma

suffered by Mr. Sharma awardedvideImpugned Judgment by

modifying the Order passed by the learned Tribunal was justified.

Allegation regarding forgery by Mr. Sharma

10.The only allegation levelled against Mr. Sharma was that he had

secured employment on the basis of forged and fabricated educational

certificates. Mr. Sharma, however, has consistently maintained that he did

not commit any forgery and that all original certificates had been submitted

to the School at the time of his appointment and remained in the custody of

the Management Committee of the School.

11.It is further the case of Mr. Sharma that the controversy leading to his

termination arose on account of his marriage to the niece of the Chairman of

the School and only because of this reason, his services were terminated

without the holding of any enquiry, on the allegation that the

certificates/documents furnished by him were fake or forged.

12.Mr. Sharma has also placed reliance upon the judgment dated

19.09.2017 passed by the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate-01 (Central),

Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (“Trial Court”), in the criminal proceedings

arising out of the FIR lodged by the School. By the said judgment, the

learned Trial Court held that no case had been established against Mr.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 13 of 23

Sharma beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted him of the

offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC. The said

judgment further records that the FIR was registered on the very day on

which Mr. Sharma solemnised his marriage.

13.Mr. Sharma had contended before the learned Trial Court that he was

a science graduate from Magadh University and that the allegedly forged

documents pertained to Meerut University and had been fabricated by the

Management of the School. During cross-examination before the learned

Trial Court, the witness from Meerut University admitted that Mr. Sharma

had never claimed the impugned documents to be his own, as he was, in

fact, a graduate of Magadh University. In view thereof, the learned Trial

Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond

reasonable doubt and acquitted Mr. Sharma.

14.Further, from the correspondence exchanged by the School, it appears

that the documents forwarded to Chaudhary Charan Singh University,

Meerut for verification, and which were subsequently reported to be forged,

had been sent by the School itself. There is no material on record to indicate

that the said documents had, in fact, been supplied by Mr. Sharma. On the

contrary, the duplicate marksheet obtained from Magadh University clearly

reflects that Mr. Sharma was a graduate of Magadh University and not of

Meerut University.

15.In these circumstances, the allegation of the School that Mr. Sharma

had secured employment on the basis of forged and fabricated documents

does not appear to be substantiated. The learned Tribunal, in its Order,

observed that the School had not conducted any departmental enquiry into

the alleged misconduct of submission of false certificates and, on that basis,

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 14 of 23

concluded that the Dismissal Order was wholly illegal and contrary to the

statutory provisions. The learned Single Judge has upheld the said finding.

16.Accordingly, we are of the view that the School has failed to establish

that Mr. Sharma committed forgery by submitting fake certificates, as

alleged in the Dismissal Order. We therefore hold that the Dismissal Order

was passed without adherence to due process of law and in violation of the

principles of natural justice.

Failure to follow principles of natural justice:

17.The Dismissal Order dated 14.02.1995 records that no reply had been

received from Mr. Sharma to the Show Cause Notice dated 04.02.1995

issued by the School. The said Order further proceeds on the basis that the

Show Cause Notice had been served at the last available address of Mr.

Sharma and, on that premise, concludes that he had cheated the School

authorities, warranting dismissal from service with immediate effect.

18.Mr. Sharma has contended that he never received the Show Cause

Notice dated 04.02.1995.

19.The Dismissal Order proceeds on the allegation that Mr. Sharma had

cheated the School authorities, yet no departmental enquiry was conducted,

nor were any particulars furnished as to the manner in which such alleged

cheating had been committed. The dismissal from service being one of the

major penalties contemplated under Rule 117 of DESE. Rule 120 of DSER

mandates that no such major penalty may be imposed except after holding a

domestic enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. The

Dismissal Order was thus passed in clear departure from the procedure

established under the DSER.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 15 of 23

20.Accordingly, the learned Tribunal held the Dismissal Order to be

wholly illegal and contrary to the provisions of the DSER. The learned

Single Judge, in the Impugned Judgment, has affirmed the said conclusion.

21.The Dismissal Order being both punitive and stigmatic in nature, the

School was under a clear obligation to hold an enquiry affording Mr.

Sharma an opportunity to enter his defence and to lead evidence in support

thereof. In any event, the School was required to establish the allegations

levelled against him by adducing oral and documentary evidence in the

course of a domestic enquiry, particularly to demonstrate that the documents

alleged to be forged had in fact been furnished by Mr. Sharma. Instead, the

entire disciplinary process was by-passed and a cryptic Dismissal Order

came to be issued.

22.In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the

Dismissal Order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice

and in contravention of the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,

1973 and the DSER, inasmuch as no enquiry was held and no effective

opportunity of hearing was afforded to Mr. Sharma.

Requirement to seek prior approval of DoE before extension of

probation / Dismissal Order

23.Admittedly, Mr. Sharma was appointed on probation for a period of

one year, which expired in August 1994. In the absence of any formal

extension of probation by the School, and there being no prior approval

obtained from the DoE as contemplated under the proviso to Rule 105(1) of

the DSER, the consequence under Rule 105(2) of the DSER was deemed

confirmation. Accordingly, the contention of the School that Mr. Sharma

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 16 of 23

continued to remain on probation at the time of issuance of the Dismissal

Order is without merit.

24.Furthermore, in terms of Rule 120(2) of the DSER, the School was

required to obtain prior approval of the DoE before imposing the penalty of

dismissal. The learned Tribunal correctly found that the failure to obtain

such prior approval constituted a grave illegality, particularly since the

DSER does not contemplate the grant ofex post factoapproval in cases

involving the imposition of a major penalty such as termination. The

Dismissal Order was, therefore, rightly held to be unsustainable in law and

was consequently set aside.

25.The learned Single Judge has affirmed the finding of the learned

Tribunal with respect to the mandatory requirement of prior approval from

the DoE before termination.

26.We concur with the findings recorded in the Impugned Judgment,

inasmuch as the provisions of the DSER are clear and the facts of the

present case unequivocally demonstrate that the approval of the DoE was

obtained only after issuance of the Dismissal Order, which was contrary to

the mandatory scheme of the DSER requiring prior approval.

27.We, therefore, hold that the Dismissal Order was passed in

contravention of the provisions of the DSER, and accordingly uphold the

concurrent findings recorded by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single

Judge for setting aside the Dismissal Order.

Modification of the Order by Impugned Judgment:

28.Both Mr. Sharma, in LPA No. 283/2022, and the DoE, in LPA No.

422/2022, have assailed the Impugned Judgment on the ground that the

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 17 of 23

learned Single Judge modified the Order passed by the learned Tribunal. In

the Impugned Judgment, after upholding the setting aside of the Dismissal

Order, the learned Single Judge held as follows:

“46. Amongst the myriad nuances of this case, the next issue that

arises for consideration is the relief that can be granted to

Respondent No.2, once this Court has upheld the view of the

Tribunal that the dismissal was wrongful in the eyes of law. Tribunal

has granted the relief of reinstatement to Respondent No.2 and

learned counsel for Respondent No.2 had strenuously urged that this

part of the order be also upheld. Ordinarily, where termination of

an employee is held to be wrongful and illegal, relief of

reinstatement is granted by the Courts, with back-wages. However,

it has been held by the Supreme Court in several judgments that

reinstatement without back-wages or with full or part back-wages, is

not an absolute rule of thumb and each case would have to be

viewed on its own facts and circumstances. InMadhya Pradesh

Administration vs. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748, the Supreme

Court held that reinstatement may not always be an automatic

consequence of the Court declaring the termination to be illegal. In

Mehboob Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, (2008) 1 SCC

575, the same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court and

certain factors were carved out for determining the relief in such

cases, which are as follow:-

“7. The Factors which are relevant for determining the same,

inter alia, are:

(i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if

any, had been complied with;

(ii) the period he had worked;

(iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and

(iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date

of termination or passing of the award.”

47. From the aforesaid judgments, it is crystal clear that while an

employee should not be penalised for the illegal actions of an

employer or even for the delay in the adjudicatory mechanism,

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 18 of 23

however, the Courts must take into account certain factors, both

mitigating and aggravating, such as length of service, existence of

vacancy and nature of employment, etc. while determining the relief

of reinstatement. Applying the above principles and the exposition of

law on the aspect of relief to Respondent No.2, looking at the length

of period for which he had worked in the School, passage of over 26

years from the date of dismissal and that he was a probationer, in

my considered view, reinstatement will not be an appropriate relief

and to this extent, the order of the Tribunal cannot be upheld.

48. At the same time, this Court cannot shut its eyes to the fact

that Respondent No.2 has been fighting for his rights for a long

period of nearly three decades and that too, not by choice or as a

luxury, but on account of the action of the School Authorities in

dismissing him, without inquiry and additionally embroiling him in a

criminal case. The chronology of dates and events shows that owing

to the order of dismissal, which was approved by the Director of

Education in 2003, Respondent No.2 filed an appeal before the

Tribunal in the year 2003, which was dismissed as barred by time

on 27.02.2009. The order was challenged before this Court in

W.P.(C) 12023/2009 and the Court remanded the matter back to the

Tribunal to hear the appeal, on merits. The Tribunal allowed the

appeal on 13.05.2011, which was challenged by the School, by way

of the present writ petition. Respondent No.2 has been contesting the

writ petition since 2011. Additionally, Respondent No.2 was

constrained to defend the criminal case, pursuant to an FIR

registered at the behest of the School Authorities, in the year 1995.

The Trial Court delivered its judgment on 19.09.2017. It is evident

that Respondent No.2 has not only suffered the mental agony and

trauma of dismissal from service for over 26 years, with the

attending stigma, but has also undergone a phase of prolonged

litigation, both civil and criminal. Relevant would it be to note that

the civil litigation, impugning the dismissal order, resulted in an

order by the Tribunal, in favour of Respondent No.2, which has been

upheld by this Court, in the earlier part of this judgment. Insofar as

the criminal case is concerned, as aforementioned, the Trial Court

has acquitted Respondent No.2 and it bears repetition to state that

the Court has held that the possibility of fabrication by the School

Authorities cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the stand of Respondent

No.2 that he was innocent and not guilty of forgery, cheating or

fabrication, stands vindicated.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 19 of 23

49. Ex-consequenti, compensation of Rs.5 Lakhs is granted in

favour of Respondent No.2, in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages

and the order of the Tribunal is accordingly modified. This Court is

of the view that Respondent No.2 has been treated unfairly and has

suffered mental agony and trauma, besides the social stigma

attached to a dismissal order and incarceration pursuant to the FIR.

He was forced into litigation by the wrongful acts of the School and

contested the cases, both civil and criminal, for several years,

incurring expenses. It would be a travesty of justice, if this Court, in

an equity jurisdiction, does not compensate Respondent No.2, as the

relief of compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is

wholly inadequate, in the facts of the present case. Accordingly, it is

directed that Petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs.10 Lakhs towards

compensation to Respondent No.2, on account of mental agony and

trauma suffered by him due to the penalty of dismissal, stigma

attached to incarceration and prolonged litigation for over 26 years,

both civil and criminal.

50. The compensation awarded by this Court, as aforementioned,

shall be paid by the Petitioner to Respondent No.2, within a period

of four weeks from today. In case, the amounts are not released by

the Petitioner, within the time stipulated by the Court, the amounts

shall carry simple interest at the rate of 8% p.a. till the actual

payment.

51. Looking at the mental and physical suffering undergone by

Respondent No.2 on account of the prolonged litigation, finding of

the learned Trial Court in the criminal case, especially the

possibility of false implication, it would be unfair to permit the

Petitioner to hold an inquiry at this stage and subject Respondent

No.2 to another protracted litigation. In this view of the matter, the

direction of the Tribunal granting liberty to the School to proceed

against Respondent No. 2, is set aside.

52. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed, modifying the

impugned order of the Tribunal passed on 13.05.2011, as above. All

pending applications are accordingly dismissed.”

29.The aforesaid observations and findings of the learned Single Judge

are founded on the circumstances prevailing as on the date of the Impugned

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 20 of 23

Judgment, upon due consideration of factors such as the length of service,

the existence of a vacancy, and the nature of employment while determining

the appropriateness of reinstatement as a relief. The learned Single Judge

took into account the fact that Mr. Sharma had served for only about two

years during the period 1993–1995, as well as the lapse of more than 26

years from the date of dismissal and, accordingly, concluded that

reinstatement would not constitute an appropriate relief. On that basis, the

Order of the learned Tribunal directing reinstatement of Mr. Sharma was

modified by awarding a lump sum compensation of ₹5,00,000/- in lieu of

reinstatement and back-wages.

30.The learned Single Judge also awarded compensation of ₹10,00,000/-

on account of the mental agony and trauma suffered by Mr. Sharma as a

consequence of the penalty of dismissal, the attendant stigma, and the

prolonged litigation spanning 26 years.

31.Mr. Sharma contended that the relief granted under the Impugned

Judgment is contrary to law inasmuch as, once both the learned Tribunal and

the learned Single Judge had held the Dismissal Order to be illegal and had

set the same aside, the natural consequence was to direct reinstatement with

full back-wages and all consequential benefits.

32.The DoE submitted that the direction to pay an aggregate

compensation of ₹15,00,000/- is excessive and that the DoE, being a State

instrumentality, ought not to be burdened with such liability in the absence

of any fault attributable to it. It was urged that the public exchequer cannot

be penalised for no act or omission on the part of the DoE.

33.Having considered the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge

for modifying the operative portion of the Order passed by the learned

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 21 of 23

Tribunal by substituting the relief of reinstatement and back-wages with a

lump sum compensation of ₹15,00,000/-, we are of the view that more than

thirty (30) years have elapsed since the dismissal of Mr. Sharma by the

School. Mr. Sharma has alleged that his dismissal was occasioned by his

marriage to the niece of the Chairman of the School, and it is also a matter

of record that the School was thereafter taken over by the DoE in the year

2017. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge moulded the relief

granted by the learned Tribunal by substituting reinstatement with back-

wages with lump sum monetary compensation in favour of Mr. Sharma. In

our view, such modification is justified in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the present case.

34.The contention of Mr. Sharma that reinstatement was the only relief

available upon the Dismissal Order being set aside cannot be accepted. The

fact remains that Mr. Sharma approached the learned Tribunal only in the

year 2003, although his services had been terminated in the year 1995. This

delay assumes significance, particularly in light of his own case that the

termination was connected with his marriage to the niece of the Chairman of

the School and that an FIR had been lodged against him on the very same

date, pursuant to which he was arrested and subsequently released on bail. In

these circumstances, the plea that he became aware of the Dismissal Order

only in the year 2003, when his wife sought the same under the RTI, does

not inspire confidence. It is, therefore, evident that Mr. Sharma also

contributed to the delay in seeking redressal against the Dismissal Order,

having initiated the appellate proceedings only in 2003, which were first

dismissed on limitation and, thereafter, remanded by this Court for

adjudication on merits.

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 22 of 23

35.Further, the direction in the Order passed by the learned Tribunal to

constitute the Management Committee of the School for determining the

back-wages is no longer capable of implementation in view of the

subsequent takeover of the School by the DoE. In these circumstances, it

would be more appropriate for Mr. Sharma to receive a lump sum amount in

lieu of reinstatement and back-wages. Additionally, reinstatement to the

same post of UDC after a gap of nearly thirty (30) years would be

impracticable for both Mr. Sharma and the School, particularly when there is

no material on record indicating the nature of Mr. Sharma’s engagement or

employment during the intervening period.

36.The contention of the DoE that it cannot be directed to pay the sum of

₹15,00,000/- on the ground that no fault is attributable to it also cannot be

accepted. Upon taking over the School, the DoE became liable for the acts

and omissions of the erstwhile management of the School. In any event, the

lump sum compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge under the

Impugned Judgment is demonstrably more beneficial to the DoE than a

direction for payment of the back-wages together with interest thereon.

Accordingly, the DoE can have no valid grievance with respect to the

direction to pay compensation with interest to Mr. Sharma, as contained in

the Impugned Judgment.

CONCLUSION

37.In view of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the Impugned

Judgment, insofar as it upholds the Order of the learned Tribunal setting

aside the Dismissal Order and modifies the relief by awarding compensation

of ₹15,00,000/- together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum until

LPA 283/2022 & LPA 422/2022 Page 23 of 23

actual payment, in lieu of reinstatement, back-wages, and on account of the

mental agony and trauma suffered by the Appellant in LPA No. 283/2022,

warrants no interference.

38.Accordingly, LPA No. 283/2022 and LPA No. 422/2022 are

dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of. There shall be no

order as to costs.

TEJAS KARIA, J

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ

MAY 29, 2026

gsr / ap