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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 2895 of 2025

With

IA No. CRAN 2 of 2025

CRAN 4 of 2026

Eraaya Lifespaces Limited & Ors.

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Anr.

For the petitioners : Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv.,

Ms. Manaswita Mukherjee

Mr. Pankaj Agarwal

Ms. Chmapa Pal

For the opposite party No.2 : Mr. Aman Lekhi

Mr. Anuj Singh

Mr. Soumya Nag

Mr. Aman Agarwal

Mr. Aditya Tiwari

Ms. Rupali Singh

For the State Mr. Suman De,

Mr. Kunal Ganguly

Heard on : 21.04.2026

Judgment on : 01.07.2026

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Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. Petitioners in this application have prayed for quashing of the

investigational proceeding being GR Case No. 3134 of 2025 under section

3(5)/336 (3)/338/340(2)/49/61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in

short BNS) presently pending before the Court of learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Murshidabad.

2. Petitioner no.1 is a public limited company and petitioner no. 2 to 4

and 7 to 8 are directors of the petitioner no.1, whereas the petitioner no.5 is

the Company Secretary and petitioner no.6 is the Chief Financial Officer (in

short CFO) of the petitioner no.1/company.

3. Berhampore Police Station Case no. 1057 of 2025 dated 17.05.2025

corresponding to aforesaid GR case no. 3134 of 2025, was registered on the

basis of a letter of complaint dated 28.02.2025, lodged by opposite party (in

short OP) No.2 herein against the present petitioners and two other accused

persons. The allegation levelled in the said letter of complaint interalia is as

follows:-

The OP no.2 herein is a shareholder in the petitioner no.1/company

namely Eraaya Lifespaces Ltd. (In short Eraaya) and the accused no.1 (who

is not the petitioner herein) is also a shareholder who filed a company

petition before the learned National Company Law Tribunal (in short NCLT),

New Delhi against the petitioner no.1/company and others on the basis of

forged documents prepared in conspiracy with the respondents/petitioners.

Accused no.1 filed company petition before the NCLT bearing company case

no. 11 of 2025 and secured a status quo order on 13.02.2025 by dint of the

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forged special power of Attorney (in short SPA). OP No.2 afterwards came to

know on scrutiny of the company petition that the accused no.1 has filed

said false petition on the basis of forged signatures/documents. It is alleged

in the letter of complaint that the notary stamp, signatures and attestation

in the SPA as attached to the petition filed by the accused no.1 are forged

and the signatures of the shareholders have been forged in the SPA in order

to bring the application filed by the accused no.1 within the ambit of section

244(1) of the Companies Act. Further allegation is about collusion between

one of the shareholder namely Sharad Bagga and the petitioner no.2 with

regard to breaches of the SEBI Act and regulations. It is also alleged that

petitioner no.5 had provided confidential company emails to the accused

no.1 thereby the directors of petitioner no.1 company acted hand in glove

with the accused no.1. The aforesaid false, forged and fabricated documents

have been utilized by the accused no.1 to deceive the shareholders of the

petitioner no.1/company. It is further alleged that as a result of this

dishonest mis representation, wrongful loss was caused to the shareholders

and thereby the petitioners and the other accused persons have committed

the offence of cheating by dishonestly inducing delivery of property. It is

further stated that the accused no.1 in collusion with the other accused

person including present petitioners have prepared aforesaid false

documents which attracts offence of forgery and also filed the same before

the learned NCLT, along with their company petition thereby they have also

committed the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating in collusion with

each other. It is also alleged that the above mentioned forged document i.e.

the special power of attorney have been created by the accused whereby

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valuable rights are intended to be created in favour of accused

no.1/company, which attract the definition of valuable security as defined in

section 2 (31) of BNS and therefore the accused persons have committed

offence of forgery of valuable security. Not only that the forged documents

have been used as genuine documents by the accused no.1 therefore, the

accused is also liable to be punished for committing offence of using as

genuine a forged document. It has been specifically alleged in the written

complaint that the accused persons including petitioners herein have

conspired to commit the said offences and thereby they are liable to be

punished under section 61 (2) of the BNS 2023. They are also hand in glove

with each other and are well aware of the fact that their acts are wrongful

acts/offences and their common intention has been clearly manifested,

which attracts section 3(5) of the BNS. It is also alleged that fraudulent

activities have been identified at Kolkata and has been duly substantiated at

the address of the shareholders. However, OP no.2 is the resident of

Murshidabad, Baharampore and since the issue here pertains to multi-

Jurisdictional, therefore, Baharampore Police Station has got the

jurisdiction under section 198(d) of the BNSS-2023 where the complaint has

been lodged

4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned

investigational proceeding, Mr. Ganguly learned counsel for the petitioners

interalia made three-fold arguments before this Court.

(i) No prima facie case is made out against the present petitioners

(ii) Baharampore police station has got no jurisdiction to continue

with the investigation

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(iii) Malafide nature of complaint has been made by the opposite party

no.2 against the petitioners herein with a view to harass the

petitioners.

5. In support of his contention that ‘the allegations made in the letter of

complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do

not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the

present petitioners’, Mr. Ganguly argued that as per allegation, petitioner

No.2 Bikash Garg and Sarad Bagga (one of the shareholders) are prior

associates and have been co-noticees in a SEBI Proceeding. Therefore, it is

alleged that there is collusion between accused no.1 and the present

petitioners. It is astonishing how a prior association between Bikash Garg

(petitioner no.2) and Sarad Kumar Bagga can lead to an inference that there

existed conspiracy between the accused no.1 and the petitioners or

pursuant to any such conspiracy the company petition was filed before the

NCLT New Delhi. Therefore, the allegation of conspiracy as levelled in the

present complaint is factually incorrect and legally untenable. Moreover said

Sarad Kumar Bagga is not the person who had filed the petition before the

NCLT. Said petition was filed by accused no.1, Sunil Agarwal, who is not the

petitioner herein. Therefore, the reasoning that as there was prior

relationship between Mr. Bagga and the petitioner no.2, so there is

conspiracy between the petitioners and the accused no.1, is inherently

flawed and cannot be accepted by any person of a reasonable and prudent

nature.

6. He further argued that the averments made in the letter of complaint

itself dispel the possibility of there being any conspiracy between the

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accused no.1 and the petitioners. In the first part of the letter of the

complaint it has been stated that Sarad Kumar Bagga’s signature has been

forged in the SPA. But in the second part of the complaint, OP no. 2 alleged

that Mr. Bagga is in collusion with the petitioner no.2 and therefore, the

other petitioners are also in collusion with the accused no.1.is fallacious and

devoid of any logic. If Mr. Bagga is in collusion with the petitioner no. 2 then

it is unclear as to why the signature of Sarad Kumar Bagga have been forged

in the SPA. Infact if Mr. Bagga is indeed an associate of the petitioner no.2

and the accused no.1 has acted pursuant to a criminal conspiracy with the

present petitioners then the accused no.1 would not have had to forge the

signature of Mr. Bagga at all because in that case Mr. Bagga would have

willingly and voluntarily signed the SPA.

7. Mr. Ganguly further argued that the opposite party no.2 herein has

alleged in the letter of complaint to substantiate the case of conspiracy that

the accused no.1 had obtained print outs of his own email correspondences

with the management of the petitioner no.1/company from the email

address of the petitioner no.5. Such an act can hardly be construed to be an

act of abetment or conspiracy as the documents in question are the email

correspondences of the accused no.1 himself. Those documents are not

secret or confidential documents and are available with the accused no.1.

The mere act of a shareholder i.e. accused no.1 having his own e-mails,

printed out from the petitioner no.5’s email address cannot be an act of

abetment or conspiracy.

8. Mr. Gangully strenuously argued that the criminal liability of

committing forgery as defined in section 336 (1) of BNS can be foisted only

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upon a person who has made the said false document in question with an

intention to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person. A bare

perusal of the contents of the letter of complaint reveals that the allegations

of forgery have been levelled exclusively against the accused no.1. Said

accused no.1, who is not the petitioner herein, is the person who filed the

company petition before the NCLT., wherein the OP no.2 has noted the

aforesaid irregularities. The petitioners herein are the Respondents in the

said company petition and they have not filed the company petition or the

documents therewith and as such no allegation of criminal misconduct can

be sustained as against the present petitioners.

9. Furthermore the condition precedent for an offence under section 338

and section 340 (2) of the BNS is forgery. Since the filing of the alleged

forged document have been undertaken by the accused no.1, the criminal

liability of committing forgery can therefore be foisted only upon a person

who has made the said false document in question with an intention to

cause damage or injury to the public or to any person. Therefore the

offences under section 338 and 340(2) of the BNS do not apply to the

petitioners. In the complaint, the OP no.2 has miserably failed to show any

collusion between the accused no. 1 and the petitioners herein nor he has

made any specific allegations or averments against the present petitioners

and as such no prima facie case has been made out against the petitioners

under any of the penal sections. He further argued that unless there are

specific instances of a close cohesion and collusion between all the accused

persons which formed the subject matter of the conspiracy, the OP No.2

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cannot be permitted to set into motion the course of law with a malafide

intent to harass the petitioners.

10. In support of his argument that Baharampore police station has got

no jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, Mr. Ganguly submits that

from the letter of complaint it transpires that the accused persons are all

residents of Delhi, the offence of forgery and criminal conspiracy if any, have

been committed in Delhi. The shareholder who came together and signed

the SPA in favour of the accused no.1 come from Delhi, Haryana Kolkata

and Gujarat. The OP No.2 is not sure of his own place of residence as at the

beginning of the FIR, he claims himself to be a resident of Berhampore but

thereafter he has claimed himself to be a resident of Kolkata. Therefore, he

submits that except the said purported residence of the OP No.2, at

Berhampore, present police station does not have the requisite jurisdiction

to investigate the offence alleged in the complaint. Therefore, after the

registration of FIR, the Officer-In-Charge Berhampore PS ought to have

forwarded the present FIR to the police station having jurisdiction. He

further alleged that the registration of the present FIR and continuance of

investigation thereon is not sustainable in law.

11. In support of his argument that the proceeding is malafide in nature

he submits that the OP no. 2 has made unholy nexus with the investigating

agency and started the criminal proceeding at Berhampore Police Station

which is a remote location and is situated at a considerable distance from

the nearest airport in Kolkata. Therefore, travelling to Berhampore for the

purpose of cooperating with the investigating agency would be extremely

difficult for the petitioners, who are all resident of Delhi. The choice of Police

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station of OP No.2 therefore, clearly demonstrate that the instant case has

been lodged with a malafide motive to wreak vengeance and cause

harassment upon the petitioners. The instant letter of complaint is

manifested with contradictions. The malafide motive of the opposite party

no.2 also manifested from the fact that if Sarad Kumar Bagga is a

conspirator in the instant case with the petitioner no.2, then there was no

requirement of forging a conspirator’s signature and this contradictory

statements raise grave suspicion about the genuineness of the allegation.

12. The malafide nature of allegation against the petitioners also

manifested from the fact that the matter is still pending before the NCLT,

New Delhi but till date the OP no. 2 has not filed any application before the

NCLT alleging therein that a collusive petition has been filed before it or that

forgery has been committed to file the SPA. There is no judicial finding by

the Forum that a collusive application has been filed by the parties. In the

absence of any judicial finding regarding the existence of a collusive

proceeding, the FIR is premature and the opposite parties attempt of Forum

hunting in respect of a cause of action which had allegedly arisen in New

Delhi also shows his malafideness. Though the OP no.2 in his written

argument has stated that CFO of the company had provided crucial

information to the accused no.1 and the same establishes the conspiracy

between the accused no.1 and the present petitioners, but such argument is

also not bonafide in view of the fact that such developments were made in

the written argument pursuant to the completion of the argument by all the

parties and furthermore such allegation did not even form part of the FIR.

There is no material in the FIR to even remotely suggest that CFO of the

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company had provided crucial information to the accused no.1 or provided

details of shareholders. Considering all these the petitioners have prayed for

quashing of the said proceeding.

13. Mr. Aman Lekhi learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite

party no.2/complainant argued that the petitioners in the instant

Application have not denied the offence of forgery or criminal conspiracy but

they have only stated that have no role in committing the offence. He

submits that the petitioner no. 5 herein supplied the information to accused

no.1 for filling of petition before the NCLT Delhi. Said fact is apparent from

the perusal of the company petition wherein print out taken from the

outlook ID of the Company Secretary of the petitioner no. 1/company is

mentioned. He further argued that the said Company Secretary/petitioner

no.5 had not acted for her personal interest alone but was doing the bidding

of the others in an illegal combination for an unlawful object. The petitioners

who are the directors and CFO of petitioner no.1/company, have not

disowned the company secretary but has not taken any action against her

rather filed the instant quashing petition jointly with petitioner no.5.

14. Mr. Lekhi, further argued that the details of the shareholder of the

company is not publicly available information and usually the disclosure of

the same is made only on 31

st March of each year in annual returns of the

company. It is further argued that the impleadment application filed by

accused no.1 was part of a conspiracy between him and the petitioners,

which was based upon forged and fabricated documents. In the

impleadment application, the shareholders have mentioned that they got the

knowledge of company petition when the said documents were served upon

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them. The shareholders have not disclosed how they were served the copy of

the company petition filed before the NCLT and it is also not mentioned

what triggered the shareholders to be impleaded as a party to the aforesaid

petition.

15. Mr. Lekhi, further argued that the conspiracy between the petitioners

and Mr. Agarwal is also apparent from the fact that the shareholders who

signed the SPA lacked prior combination between him and the shareholders.

There was no immediate trigger to file the said petition and there was no

means to obtain information about each other’s existence. Furthermore the

copy of email providing by the CFO of the company to Accused no. 1

providing crucial information to him as well as providing details of the

shareholders which otherwise are confidential documents, manifest that the

said petition was filed under a criminal conspiracy which needs proper

investigation.

16. He further argued, that the order dated 13.02.2025 passed by the

Hon’ble NCLT in the company petition filed by the accused no.1 is a

collusive order which has been obtained under a conspiracy hatched

between accused no.1 and the petitioners. Therefore, the offences mentioned

in the FIR requires proper investigation. Therefore, Mr. Lekhi prays for

dismissal of the instant Application.

Decision

17. It is not in dispute that accused no. 1 Sunil Agarwal (who is not the

petitioner herein) filed a company petition before Hon’ble NCLT under

section 241(1) and 244(1) of The Companies Act, seeking interalia for a

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declaration that the Offering Circular dated 23.08.2024 is null and void. He

also filed another company application bearing no. 28 of 2025 under section

11 of the Companies Act stating that he has been authorised by 103 share-

holders under a SPA to represent them. During investigation it reveals from

statement recorded under section 180 of BNSS that the SPA filed in support

of company petition and the company application though has been stated to

be notarized by notary advocate Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain but during

investigation Mr. Jain denied the execution of the said document in

question. One Mr. Sarad Bagga stated to have signed the Application at two

places in SPA, first in his individual capacity and second as Karta of Sarad

Bagga HUF. In the FIR it has been specially alleged that upon review of the

signature in SPA against both the names, there is apparently difference in

both the signatures which shows that forged signatures have been made to

justify the requirement under section 241 of the Companies Act. The

shareholders as part of the Memo of Parties are from different corners of

India and there is no document as to how and when there shareholders

came together and signed the SPA in support of accused no.1.

18. Now the allegations against the present petitioners in the FIR is that

one of the shareholder Mr. Bagga who has allegedly given SPA for filing of

the company petition is acting as puppet of petitioner no.2, one of the

directors of the company and key promoter of Eraaya. There are allegations

of share price manipulation on Mr. Bagga and the petitioner no.2 herein as

alleged vide show cause notice issued by SEBI on 13.02.2025. The said

show cause notice issued to petitioner no.2 and entities of the other

associated company and individuals raises allegations for orchestrating a

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manipulative scheme that induced unsuspecting investors to acquire

securities. The show cause notice alleges significant breaches of the SEBI

Act & allied Rules. It was alleged that the petitioner no.2 and Sarad Bagga

were engaged in manipulation of share trading, creation of misleading

appearances of trading etc. It is specifically alleged in the written complaint

that the accused persons, including the petitioners engaged in a concerted

conspiracy with a shared intent to undermine the rights of the investors.

This collective conspiracy led to the obtaining of a status quo order on

February 13, 2025 from the NCLT, New Delhi. It is further alleged that

despite numerous glaring faults in the company petition and related

applications, the accused company being respondent, consented to the

petition and the preliminary relief was obtained by the accused persons

which according to the complainant, clearly speaks that the accused

company and its directors were operating with dual motives engaging in

actions aimed at deceiving both the investors and the shareholders.

19. Further allegations against petitioner no.5 herein namely Basudha

Agarwal, company secretary, is about email correspondences between

accused no.1 and Managing Director/Company Secretary/Board of

Directors of Eraaya about certain questions regarding the impugned Offering

Circular dated 23.08.2024, the email address of the said company secretary

appears on the top of the page and the said email has been printed through

the email ID of said company secretary of Eraaya, who infact is an employee

of the company. It is alleged that disclosing of confidential information

clearly envisages that the petitioners in collusion with each other have

prepared and filed the forged petition. It is specifically alleged in the

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complaint that accused no.1 wrote an email dated 27.12.2024 putting up

certain queries in regard to the office circular dated 23.08.2024. However,

petitioner Basudha Agarwal fraudulently disclosed confidential information

to the sender of the email without confirming identity in collusion with the

other petitioners.

20. It is further alleged that said forged document has been created by the

accused persons in collusion with each others and have were used by them

to make unlawful gain and to make wrongful loss to the share holders,

thereby they have committed offence under section 318(4)/336(3) of the

BNS. It is further allged that the document is covered under the definition of

‘valuable security’ as defined in section 2(31) of BNS and hence it attract the

offence punishable under section 338 of the BNS. Since there was a

conspiracy, the other petitioners have committed offence under section 61(2)

of BNS for each and every omission and commission of the act complained

of, which was committed allegedly with the connivance of the petitioners and

other accused persons. Such offence could not have committed without their

knowledge and consent and they had been allegedly hand in glove with each

other. The petitioners allegedly have wilfully and intentionally aided each

other in their acts with respect to the offences and thereby they have abated

the offence complained of under section 45 and 49 of the BNS, 2023.

21. In the above backdrop the petitioners have not denied the offence of

forgery or criminal conspiracy but they have only stated that they have no

role in the commission of the offences.

22. Mr. Lekhi, learned Counsel for the opposite party no.2 specifically

argued that petitioner no.2 supplied information to the accused no.1 for

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filing up petition before the NCLT, Delhi. The details of the share-holders of

the company is not publicly available information. He also argued that the

conspiracy between the petitioners and accused no.1 is apparent from the

fact that the share-holders who signed the SPA locked prior combination

between him and the share-holders. Furthermore, the copy of the email

provided by the CFO of the Company to accused no.1 providing crucial

information to him as well as providing the details of the share-holders,

which otherwise are confidential documents, manifest that the said petition

was filed under a criminal conspiracy.

23. Mr. Lekhi’s further argument is that the conspiracy is also apparent

from the fact that the ultimate beneficiary of status quo order obtained in

the said petition is the petitioner no.1/company as the implication of the

status quo order is that the petitioner no.1 company neither has to pay

interest on the 120 million dollars, which it has raised by issuing FCCB nor

it has to convert those bonds. Further it is also not required to pledge the

shares. In fact he argued that there is no personal benefit of accused no.

no.1 or other share-holders who are party to the aforesaid petition but

ultimate beneficiary of order dated 13.02.2025 is the petitioner no.

1/company, who has got the company petitions filed under a criminal

conspiracy.

24. Therefore, from the conspectus of the aforesaid lengthy FIR, it cannot

be said that FIR does not disclose a prima facie commission of various

cognizable offences alleged by the complainant against the petitioner/alleged

conspirators. At this stage when investigation has only started and there are

only allegation and counter allegation, it is not possible for the court to

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anticipate the result of the investigation. It is settled law that while

considering such petition under section 528 BNSS, High Court is not

supposed to act as an investigating agency or to start adjudicating whether

allegation made in the complaint are false or truthful.

25. One must admit at this early stage of investigation that neither the

allegations levelled in the letter of complaint against the petitioners as stated

above are entirely absurd or improbable, nor it is a case where no prima

facie offence at all or no cognizable offence is made out. Mr. Ganguly

strenuously argued that if Sarad Kumar Bagga is indeed an associate of

petitioner no.2 and the accused no.1 has acted pursuant to a criminal

conspiracy with the present petitioners, then the accused no.1 would not

have had to forge the signature of Mr. Bagga at all and in that event Mr.

Bagga would have willingly and voluntarily signed the SPA and therefore it is

baseless to allege that the accused no.1 is in conspiracy with the petitioners

specially when the allegation is that the accused no.1 has forged the

signature of Mr. Bagga in order to file the petitions.

26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/S Neeharika infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.

Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2021) SCC Online SC

315 held that while exercising the power under section 482 Cr.P.C., the

High Court only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose

the commission of a cognizable offence and does not require to consider it

on merits whether the allegations make out cognizable offence. Merely

because FIR maker has taken a plea that Mr. Bagga was in collusion with

petitioner no.2 and therefore it is improbable that petitioners No.2along

with other petitioners in collusion with accused no. 1, have forged signature

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of Bagga, this court on the basis of such reasoning cannot give a finding at

this stage that the allegations against the petitioners in the present FIR are

completely absurd or improbable or that the FIR has been instituted against

petitioners with ulterior motives. The veracity and genuineness of the

allegations will have to be tested at the appropriate stages during the course

of trial and it would be improper to do the same at this stage as decided by

the Apex Court.

27. Mr. Gangully’s other limb of argument is that letter of complaint

miserably failed to establish criminal conspiracy between the accused no.1

and the petitioners herein and therefore the ofence of forgery has not been

made out aginast the petitioners as the fact remains that the petition has

been filed by accused no.1 by utilising purported forged SPA. His further

contention is that in case of forgery the primary liability lies with the person

who has committed the forgery or utilized the document or the signatures

but in this case the petitioners were the respondents in the said NCLT

proceeding and therefore it is absurd proposition that the purported forged

document was prepared or filed in collusion with the present petitioners

without their being any cogent evidence of the same or in the absence of any

judicial finding of collusion between the petitioner and the respondents by

the learned Tribunal.

28. It is settled law that at the stage when the High Court considers a

petition for quashing of criminal proceeding under section 482 of Cr.P.C.,

the allegations in the FIR must be read as they stand and it is only if on the

face of the allegations that no offence, as alleged has been made out against

the accused persons, that the court may be justified in exercising it’s

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jurisdiction to quash. The allegation of conspiracy made by the petitioners in

committing forgery with accused no.1 has been clearly described in the FIR.

It is equally settled law that FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopaedia.

Since investigation just started, the State should be given its due chance to

investigate and to collect evidence. If the petitioners story as stated in this

application is correct, then the police will conclude the investigation by a

closure report, otherwise a charge sheet would be filed and in that case, it

will be within the jurisdiction of the trial Court to adjudicate upon the truth

of the contents of the complaint.

29. Considering the allegations levelled in the FIR against the petitioners,

I am unable to say that the present case is covered under the guidelines laid

down by the Apex Court for quashing of FIRs in Bhajanlal’s Case, reported

in 1992 supp(1) SCC 335 and Neeharika Infrastructure PVt. Ltd.(supra)

as the allegations levelled in the FIR cannot be termed as absurd or

improbable.

30. Mr. Ganguly, has taken an alternative plea in his written notes of

argument that if materials suggest culpability of the petitioners no.5 herein,

this High Court may dismiss her prayer but such consequence, in the

absence of cogent material, cannot be visited on other petitioners. I do not

find much force in such argument to come to a conclusion that other

petitioners cannot have any role in the alleged conspiracy at this stage,

because that is the task entrusted upon investigating agency and High

Court is not supposed to usurp the jurisdiction of the police, since the two

organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one

ought not to tread over the other’s sphere. The investigating agency deserves

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a command to conclude the investigation and bring it to a logical conclusion

at an early date, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances of the case

and specially the fact that the investigation is already underway. Infact

considering the relevant principles governing quashment of FIR as laid down

by the Apex Court in Neeharika infrastructure case (supra) specially the

guidelines as stated in para 57 (iv(,(v),(vi),(vii) of the said decision, I am of

the view that it would be premature to quash the FIR at this stage. This is

also not the case where I have been persuaded to reach a conclusion that

the allegations are highly improbable or that such incident would not have

happened so as to direct quashing of the FIR.

31. Therefore, at the cost of repetition it can be said that when a

prosecution is asked to be quashed at the initial stage, the test to be applied

by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made has

prima facie established the offence. In Vinod Raghubanshi Vs. Ajay Arora

and Ors. reported in (2013) 10 SCC 581 Supreme Court reminded the

settled legal proposition in para 30 which may be profitably referred in this

context

30. It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for

quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not “kill a stillborn

child”, and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are

compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at

the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at

the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether

the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At

this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the

allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor

should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the

allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at

the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the

subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of

Section 216 CrPC. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is

subject to the order which would be passed by the trial court at a later stage.

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32. I have no hesitation to say that the entire facts at this stage are

incomplete and hazy as material particulars concerning evidence has not yet

been collected and produced before the Court and the issue involves as to

the fact and as to question of attracting essential ingredients of the offence

against the petitioners cannot be seen at this stage in its true perspective

without sufficient materials to be collected during investigation relating to

alleged conspiracy by the petitioners. Undoubtedly, High Court is not

expected to enquire into the merits of the allegation relating to conspiracy. It

is settled law that at this stage High Court ought not to be scrutinizing the

material in the manner in which the trial court would do in the course of

criminal trial after evidence is adduced. A detailed enquiry into the merits of

the allegations is not warranted at this stage and FIR is also not expected to

be an encyclopaedia, particularly in the matter of allegation involving forgery

in the course of judicial proceeding. It would be improper for the High Court

at this stage to analyse the case of complaint in the light of all probabilities

in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on

such premise arrive at a conclusion that the proceeding is to be quashed.

33. The allegation that forgery has been committed has not been denied.

The only contention is that some of the petitioners have no involvement in it.

However, there are specific allegations in the FIR alleging reasonable nexus

of committing forgery by accused no.1 with that of role played by petitioners

to make illegal gain by petitioner company.

34. Though Mr. Ganguly has cited some instances to substantiate his

claim that the proceeding is malafide one as stated above, but it is now well

settled in view of Lakhwant Singh Vs. Jasbir Singh and Ors . reported in

21

(2008 )14 SCC 661 that when an information is lodged at the police station

and an offence is registered, the malafide of the informant would be of

secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation

and evidence laid in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The

allegations of malafide against the informant are of no consequence and

cannot by themselves be the basis of the quashing the proceeding.

35. Mr. Ganguly has also attacked the impugned proceeding, stating that

the investigating officer designated by the officer in charge of Baharampore

police station does not have the territorial jurisdiction to enquire into the

offences alleged in the letter of complaint as no part of the offence has been

committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Baharampore police station

and that all the accused persons are residents of Delhi.

36. It is worthwhile to mention in this context that in the instant

Application, the petitioners have described complainant’s address at

Baharampore. However, it is no more res-integra that FIR cannot be

quashed merely because the place where offence committed is not within the

territorial jurisdiction of the concerned police officer to investigate the

offence. The words ‘irrespective of area where the offence is committed’ in

section 173 (1) of BNSS removes the bar to register offence even if offence is

committed outside its territorial jurisdiction.

37. In the case of Satvinder Kaur Vs. State (GNCT of Delhi) reported in

AIR 1999 SC 3596 the Apex Court held that the FIR cannot be quashed on

the ground that police station did not have territorial jurisdiction to

investigate the offence. Para 15 may be reproduced below:-

22

15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in

accepting the contention of the respondent that the investigating officer had no

jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the

offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at

Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when

seized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an

investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a

conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not

have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of

Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of

the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of

several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired

into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

Therefore, to say at the stage of investigation that the SHO, Police Station

Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face

of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo

that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he

has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely

overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent

2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.

38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar Vs.

State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in (2010) 1 SCC 1 reiterating the

principle laid down in Satvinder Kaur Case (supra ) had held that under

section 156 (2) of Cr.P.C. there is no bar on investigating agency continuing

with investigation for offence committed outside jurisdiction. Relevant

paragraphs of the judgment states as follows:-

24. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear that a police officer in charge

of a police station can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any

cognizable offence which a court having jurisdiction over such police station can

inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 156

ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the

same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not

empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings

clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable

offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under

Section 190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202

CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an

investigation on a complaint filed before him.

27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay High Court had

correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not

within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself from holding a

proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the

offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the

major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of

Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section

156 CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be questioned on the

ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. It was open to

the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC

23

without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is

undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate, a police officer empowered under

sub-section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially

exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view

that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter.

29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr

Syed's submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the

learned trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had

allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the

submission that it was for the investigating officer in the course of investigation

to decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or

not.

30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the

place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case

is that the stage of taking cognizance was yet to arrive. The investigating

agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before

the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it

had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an

investigation, it was improper on the part of the investigating agency to forward

its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the

alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of

Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the police station

concerned in Mumbai.

39. Even in the matter of State of AP Vs. Punati Ramulu and Ors.

reported in 1994 supp (1) SCC 590 Supreme Court had held that non

registration of complaint of cognizable offence due to lack of territorial

jurisdiction by the police, amounts to dereliction in duty. The relevant para

no. 4 is quoted below:-

4. The case as put forward by the prosecution was that PW 1 went to

Narasaraopet from the scene of the occurrence. He contacted PW 13 to draft

the report addressed to the Circle Inspector of Police. PW 1 was projected by

the prosecution as an eyewitness who is the nephew of the deceased and had

accompanied the deceased when the latter went to realise debts from the

villagers. On reaching the police station at Narasaraopet he was informed by

the constable on duty that the Circle Inspector, PW 22, had already received

information about the occurrence and had left for the village. The police

constable at the police station refused to record the complaint presented by

PW 1 on the ground that the said police station had no territorial jurisdiction

over the place of crime. It was certainly a dereliction of duty on the part of the

constable because any lack of territorial jurisdiction, could not have prevented

the constable from recording information about the cognizable offence and

forwarding the same to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in

which the crime was said to have been committed.

40. Moreover placing reliance upon the judgment of Satvinder Kaur

(supra) the ministry of Home Affairs vide its notification no. 15011

(35)/2013/-SC /ST-W dated 10.05.2013 has directed that the police officers

24

need to dispel with the fear that cases arising out of jurisdiction cannot be

investigated. Said notification is titled as ‘registration of FIR irrespective of

territorial jurisdiction and zero FIR’. In the notification it has also been made

clear that section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. contains an embargo that no

proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has

no territorial power to investigate the case.

41. In Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors .

reported in (1999) 8 SCC 686 it was held that the quashing of complaint on

the ground that the Magistrate has no territorial jurisdiction to take

cognizance of offence is erroneous and premature. The relevant paragraphs

may be quoted below:-

11. It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence

must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. Chapter

XIII of the Code relates to jurisdiction of the criminal courts “in enquiries and

trials”. That chapter contains provisions regarding the place where the enquiry

and trial are to take place. Section 177 says that:

“177. Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within

whose local jurisdiction it was committed.”

But Section 179 says that when an act is an offence by reason of anything

which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the place of

enquiry and trial can as well be in a court “within whose local jurisdiction such

thing has been done or such consequence has ensued”. It cannot be overlooked

that the said provisions do not trammel the powers of any court to take

cognizance of the offence. The power of the court to take cognizance of the

offence is laid in Section 190 of the Code. Sub-sections (1) and (2) read thus:

“190. (1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter, any Magistrate of the First

Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this

behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or

upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the Second

Class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within

his competence to enquire into or try.”

13. The only restriction contained in Section 190 is that the power to take

cognizance is “subject to the provisions of this chapter”. There are 9 sections in

Chapter XIV most of which contain one or other restriction imposed on the

power of a First Class Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence. But none

of them incorporates any curtailment on such powers in relation to territorial

25

barrier. In the corresponding provision in the old Code of Criminal Procedure

(1898) the commencing words were like these: “Except as hereinafter

provided….” Those words are now replaced by “Subject to the provisions of this

chapter….” Therefore, when there is nothing in Chapter XIV of the Code to

impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class taking cognizance of

the offence on the strength of any territorial reason it is impermissible to

deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognizance of an offence — of

course, in certain special enactments special provisions are incorporated for

restricting the power of taking cognizance of offences falling under such acts.

But such provisions are protected by non obstante clauses. Anyway that is a

different matter.

15. Unfortunately, the High Court, without considering any of the aforesaid

legal aspects rushed to the erroneous conclusion that the “Judicial Magistrate

of the First Class, Gandhidham has no power to take cognizance of the offences

alleged” merely because such offences could have been committed outside the

territorial limits of the State of Gujarat. Even otherwise, without being apprised

of the fuller conspectus a decision on the question of jurisdiction should not

have been taken by the High Court at a grossly premature stage as this.

42. In view of aforesaid discussion I have no other alternative but to

conclude that the allegations of committing offences mentioned in the FIR,

against the petitioners need to be properly investigated to unerth the truth.

Therefore, the present application seeking quashsment of proceeding is

devoid of merit and therefore it is liable to be dismissed.

43. Therefore, CRR 2895 of 2025 is dismissed.

44. Investigating agency will make every endeavour to conclude the

investigation at the earliest. Connected applications thus stands disposed

of.

Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given

to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)