2026 INSC 34 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8803 of 2021)

JAN DE NUL DREDGING INDIA

PVT. LTD. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

TUTICORIN PORT TRUST …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant-Jan De Nul Dredging India Private Limited

1

is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act,

1956 with an expertise in executing complex dredging

operations.

3. The respondent-Tuticorin Port Trust

2 is a statutory

authority constituted under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963.

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant-Dredging India’

2

Hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent-Port Trust’

2

It undertook a major dredging project titled “Deepening of

the Channel and Basin to Cater to 12.80 meter Draught

Vessels at Tuticorin Port”. In context with the above project

to enhance the navigational depth of the port to

accommodate larger sea vessels, the Port Trust on

15.07.2009 issued Notice Inviting Tender

3.

4. The appellant-Dredging India was one of the bidders. After

the evaluation of the bids, the contract was awarded to it. A

formal work order was issued to it on 28.10.2010.

Consequently, a License Agreement incorporating the

tender conditions was formally executed between the

parties on 27.12.2010 which involved the monetary value of

Rs.465,47,56,517/- (Rupees Four Hundred Sixty Five Crore

Forty Seven Lakhs Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred and

Seventeen only). It was stipulated that the work would be

completed within 14 months from the commencement i.e.

by 28.06.2012.

5. The equipment to be deployed for the execution of the

project under the License Agreement included one Cutter

3

In short ‘NIT’

3

Suction Dredger (CSD) with a cutter power of 3,000 HP or

more, three Self-Propelled Barges with hopper capacity of

16,000 cubic meters each, Floating/Submersible Pipelines

of 800-900 mm diameter and one Backhoe Dredger (BHD)

Jerommeke with a bucket capacity of 3 to 4 cubic meters

along with supporting and survey vessels.

6. Clause ‘C’ of the tender conditions which was part of the

NIT stipulated as under :-

“(C) Plant and Equipment – Dredgers

and ancillary equipments:

The intending Tenderers should own or hire

suitable plant and equipment if it is on

hiring, proof of availability of the plant and

equipment on lease/charter for the entire

duration of the work at short notice

specifically for this project shall also be

attached. It will be incumbent on the

intending Tenderers to describe fully the

equipment and plant which they propose to

utilize for completing the work within the

prescribed period. The choice of technology

and plant and equipment proposed to be

deployed will be left to the choice of the

intending tenderers, subject to satisfying

the Port Trust and the adequacy of the

proposed technology and plant and

equipment.

The Port Trust has assessed and average

daily output of 12000 cubic meters for the

scenario of deployment of Heavy Duty CSD

4

to complete the work within the specified

period of Fourteen Months for which the

following indicative plant & equipment could

be required.

1. Cutter Suction Dredger having cutter

power 3000 HP or more -1 No.

2. Self-propelled barges having hopper

capacity 1600 Cubic Meters - 3 Nos.

3. Sufficient length of Floating/Submersible

Pipe lines with and without ball joints 800

mm to 900 mm diameter.

4. Backhoe Dredger having bucket capacity

3 to 4 Cubic Meters - 1 No.

5. Supporting vessels

6. Survey Vessels etc.,

The tender document is open to firms/

companies/voluntary formed Joint

Ventures/ Consortia meeting all the

Minimum Eligibility Criteria as stipulated

herein above.”

7. In view of the above clause, it was open for the appellant-

Dredging India to deploy such equipment as may be

necessary for the dredging purposes including major/minor

dredgers. It was also free to deploy as many dredgers as may

be felt necessary by it, subject to satisfaction of the

respondent-Port Trust. It included one Backhoe Dredger

(BHD) having bucket capacity of 3 to 4 cubic meter.

8. The appellant-Dredging India commenced operations under

the aforesaid project on 28.12.2010. It deployed sufficient

5

equipment more than what was agreed upon in the License

Agreement, including two major Cutter Suction Dredger

(CSD) as well as a Backhoe Dredger (BHD). The dredging

work of the project was completed much ahead of schedule

on 30.08.2011 i.e. eight months before the stipulated

deadline.

9. Upon the completion of the work, a joint survey was

conducted by the respondent-Port Trust and the National

Institute of Oceanography, Goa. The work was found to

have been completed satisfactorily. Accordingly, the port

was commissioned at a new depth on 1 9.11.2011. A

Completion Certificate/Taking Over Certificate was issued

to the appellant-Dredging India on 02.04.2012 , much

before the deadline of 28.06.2012, for the completion of the

work.

10. The appellant-Dredging India submitted a final bill on

29.05.2012 but it was not settled in full. Consequently,

disputes arose between the parties relating to alleged non-

payment and under-payment of dues as raised under the

final bill.

6

11. In the above scenario, the appellant-Dredging India was left

with no option but to invoke the arbitration clause as

contained in the License Agreement. The dispute was

referred on 20.09.2012 to an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of

three members. The appellant-Dredging India raised as

many as eleven claims, one of which was Claim No.7

regarding idle time due to respondent-Port Trust’s failure to

provide possession of and access to site.

12. The Arbitral Tribunal dealt with all the eleven claims and

with the agreement of the parties decided Claim Nos.5, 6

and 7 together. The Arbitral Tribunal vide its award dated

18.10.2014 inter alia awarded an amount of

Rs.14,66,04,216/-(Rupees Fourteen Crore Sixty Six Lakh

Four Thousand Two Hundred and Sixteen only) to the

appellant-Dredging India in respect of Claim No.7 i.e.

regarding idling charges of Backhoe Dredger (BHD).

13. The aforesaid arbitral award was challenged by the

respondent- Port Trust before the Learned Single Judge of

the Madras High Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration

7

and Conciliation Act, 1996

4, by means of O.P.

No.152/2015. Though, the respondent-Port Trust assailed

the amounts awarded under Claim Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and

10 but at the time of hearing restricted its challenge only to

the amount awarded under Claim No.7 with regard to idling

charges for Backhoe Dredger (BHD).

14. The respondent-Port Trust contended before the Learned

Single Judge of the High Court that under Clause 38 of the

License Agreement, the idle time charges were to be paid

only in respect of idling of the major dredgers and that

Backhoe Dredger (BHD) did not fall in that category. The

Tribunal as such was not justified in accepting any claim in

respect of idling of the Backhoe Dredger (BHD).

15. The Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 10.09.2019

dismissed the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act

upholding the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal and that

Clause 38 of the License Agreement did not confine the

payment of idle time compensation in respect of major

dredgers only inasmuch as under Clause 51 of the License

4

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

8

Agreement, it was open for the appellant-Dredging India to

deploy dredgers without specifying whether major or minor

dredgers. The Learned Single Judge further noted that the

Tribunal had adequately considered the material on record

and had interpreted the relevant clauses in the proper

perspective and as such, there was no occasion for him to

interfere with the award in exercise of limited jurisdiction

under Section 34 of the Act.

16. Even after the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was upheld by

the Learned Single Judge of the High Court, the respondent-

Port Trust was not satisfied. It went in appeal under Section

37 of the Act before the Division Bench of the High Court by

means of OSA No.101/2020 . The appeal was restricted to

the claim made and awarded under Claim No.7.

17. It was argued that idle time compensation applicable in

respect of major dredgers, could not have been awarded in

respect of a minor dredger i.e. Backhoe Dredger (BHD). It

was also contended that the Arbitral Tribu nal had

erroneously awarded idle time charges for a non-major

dredger. The Backhoe Dredger (BHD) was not a major

9

dredger therefore no idle time compensation could have

been claimed or awarded if it had remained idle for any

reason.

18. The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment and

order dated 15.03.2021 allowed the appeal of the

respondent-Port Trust and directed for the deletion of the

claim awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal as upheld by the

Learned Single Judge of the High Court in respect of Claim

No.7 i.e. idle charges for the Backhoe Dredger (BHD).

19. The aforesaid judgment and order of the Division Bench,

passed in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act,

has been assailed by the appellant-Dredging India in this

appeal.

20. Shri Chander U. Singh, learned senior counsel for the

appellant-Dredging India, at the threshold argued that the

scope of Section 37 of the Act is very limited and cannot

extend beyond the ambit of Section 34 of the Act. Therefore,

the Division Bench of the High Court manifestly erred in law

in disturbing the judgment and order of the Learned Single

Judge of the High Court upholding the arbitral award. Since

10

the arbitral award had interpreted the various clauses of the

License Agreement and had recorded a definite finding

thereon in passing the award and as it was found that there

was no scope for interference with it under Section 34 of the

Act, the Appellate Court ought not to have varied or reversed

the same. The interpretation of the clauses of the License

Agreement, as made by the Arbitral Tribunal had to be

accepted and that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to

interpret those clauses in a different manner.

21. In defence, Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for

the respondent-Port Trust, argued that the Division Bench

had rightly set aside the arbitral award in respect of Claim

No.7 as the claim of the appellant-Dredging India for the

delay in handing over the site was under Clauses 41.1 and

41.2 of the License Agreement and, therefore, the Tribunal

could not have awarded compensation under Clause 51.1

which deals with the interruption of work due to port traffic

etc. Secondly, the Arbitral Tribunal could not have relied

upon Claim Nos.5 and 6 which were based on delays due to

traffic in and outside port channel to award any

11

compensation under Claim No.7 which was independent

and the delay was not on account of port traffic. The award

of the claim by the Arbitral Tribunal for Claim No.7 was

patently illegal. The claim for compensation due to idling of

the Backhoe Dredger (BHD) which was admittedly a minor

dredger, was not covered under Clause 38 which only

provided for the compensation for the idling of the major

dredgers.

22. Apart from other things, the broad question which falls for

our consideration is whether the Division Bench in exercise

of powers under Section 37 of the Act was justified to

interfere with the judgment and order of the Learned Single

Judge passed under Section 34 of the Act upholding the

award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

23. The ancillary issues which may arise are: whether the

Backhoe Dredger (BHD) can be categorized as a minor

dredger or is a major dredger; or whether deployment of a

minor dredger was not stipulated under the License

Agreement; and whether on the conjoint reading of Clauses

38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1, the appellant-Dredging India is

12

entitled to any compensation for the idling of the said

Backhoe Dredger (BHD).

24. The primary object of the Act is to provide speedy and

inexpensive mode of resolution of disputes through the

process of arbitration with the minimum intervention of the

law courts. In this context, it would be beneficial to refer

and quote Section 5 of the Act which reads as under:-

“5. Extent of judicial intervention -

Notwithstanding anything contained in any

other law for the time being in force, in matters

governed by this Part, no judicial authority

shall intervene except where so provided in this

Part.”

25. The above Section 5 of the Act contemplates that in matters

of arbitration governed by Part-I i.e. in relation to domestic

arbitration, minimum intervention of the judicial authority

is acceptable unless it is otherwise provided under Part-I of

the Act. In other words, in order to speed up the remedial

measures under the Act in relation to domestic arbitration,

there has to be minimum intervention of the court and, if

necessary, it has to be only in strict compliance with the

provisions of the Act.

13

26. The Act provides for the challenge of the arbitral award

before the court on limited grounds as contemplated by

Section 34 of the Act i.e. where one of the party was under

some incapacity; or where the arbitration agreement itself

was not valid; or the parties were not given proper notice of

the appointment of an arbitrator or the arbitral proceedings;

or was unable, for some reason, to present his case before

the Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal; or if the arbitral award

deals with the dispute not contemplated or falling within the

terms of the arbitration or deals with the matters beyond

the scope of the arbitration; or where the constitution of the

Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with arbitration

agreement; and, or where the court finds the subject matter

of the arbitral dispute was incapable of settlement by

arbitration or the arbitral award is in conflict with the public

policy of India.

27. In short, apart from the above grounds, the arbitral award

is not open for challenge under Section 34 of the Act on any

other ground. So, the intervention of the court is limited.

Therefore, technicalities apart, the main ground for

14

challenge of the arbitral award in the instant case, which

survives is that of the award being in conflict with the public

policy of India i.e. whether it is in contravention with the

fundamental policy of India or is in conflict with the most

basic notions of morality or justice.

28. In the case at hand, a challenge to the award of the Arbitral

Tribunal before the Learned Single Judge of the High Court

would reveal that it was confined to Claim No.7 and that too

on the merits of the same and not on the ground of violation

of the public policy of India or that it is against the basic

notions of morality or justice.

29. The Arbitral Tribunal, in making the award, has interpreted

the various clauses of the License Agreement so as to hold

that the appellant-Dredging India is entitled for appropriate

compensation with regard to idling of its Backhoe Dredger

(BHD) for want of non -supply of site within time.

Apparently, the challenge to the award of the Arbitral

Tribunal was neither on any of the grounds enumerated

under Section 34, nor even on the ground that the award of

15

the Claim No.7 is against the fundamental policy of India or

the basic notions of morality or justice.

30. That being the position, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal

was not liable to be disturbed under Section 34 of the Act

and was rightly not disturbed. It is settled in law that the

appellate powers under Section 37 are limited to the scope

of Section 34 and cannot exceed beyond it. Certainly,

therefore, if an award is not liable to be disturbed under

Section 34 of the Act, the same could not have been

interfered with in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the

Act.

31. In MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited

5, this Court has

very succinctly laid down the powers of Appellate Court

under the Act. It held as under :-

“14. As far as interference with an order

made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is

concerned, it cannot be disputed that such

interference under Section 37 cannot travel

beyond the restrictions laid down under

Section 34. In other words, the court cannot

undertake an independent assessment of

the merits of the award, and must only

ascertain that the exercise of power by the

5

(2019) 4 SCC 163

16

court under Section 34 has not exceeded the

scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that

in case an arbitral award has been

confirmed by the court under Section 34 and

by the court in an appeal under Section 37,

this Court must be extremely cautious and

slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”

32. In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge

Project

6, a three-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court has

extensively dealt with the jurisprudence around Sections

34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. This Court has held that:

“18. At the outset, we may state that the

jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of

the Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC

Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.

7, is akin to the

jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of

the Act. Scope of interference by a court in

an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in

examining an order, setting aside or

refusing to set aside an award, is restricted

and subject to the same grounds as the

challenge under Section 34 of the Act.

19. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction

under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act

is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction.

It is well-settled that courts ought not to

interfere with the arbitral award in a casual

6

(2023) 9 SCC 85

7

(2019) 4 SCC 163

17

and cavalier manner. The mere possibility

of an alternative view on facts or

interpretation of the contract does not entitle

courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral

Tribunal.”

33. In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman

Rice Mills

8, this Hon’ble Court, while examining the scope

of Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, has held

that:

“20. In view of the above position in law on

the subject, the scope of the intervention of

the court in arbitral matters is virtually

prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that

the interference is confined only to the

extent envisaged under Section 34 of the

Act. The appellate power of Section 37 of the

Act is limited within the domain of Section

34 of the Act. It is exercisable only to find

out if the court, exercising power under

Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its

limits as prescribed thereunder or has

exceeded or failed to exercise the power so

conferred. The Appellate Court has no

authority of law to consider the matter in

dispute before the arbitral tribunal on

merits so as to find out as to whether the

decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or

wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if it

is sitting in an ordinary court of appeal. It is

8

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632

18

only where the court exercising power

under Section 34 has failed to exercise its

jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has

travelled beyond its jurisdiction that the

appellate court can step in and set aside the

order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its

power is more akin to that superintendence

as is vested in civil courts while exercising

revisionary powers. The arbitral award is

not liable to be interfered unless a case for

interference as set out in the earlier part of

the decision, is made out. It cannot be

disturbed only for the reason that instead of

the view taken by the arbitral tribunal, the

other view which is also a possible view is

a better view according to the appellate

court.

21. It must also be remembered that

proceedings under Section 34 of the Act are

summary in nature and are not like a full-

fledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the

scope of Section 37 of the Act is much more

summary in nature and not like an ordinary

civil appeal. The award as such cannot be

touched unless it is contrary to the

substantive provision of law; any provision

of the Act or the terms of the agreement.”

19

34. In UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal

Pradesh

9, a three judges Bench of this Court observed as

under:-

“The jurisdiction conferred on the courts

under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is

fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope

of an appeal under Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of the

Appellate Court in examining an order,

setting aside or refusing to set aside an

order, is all the more circumscribed.”

35. In a recent case of Bombay Slum Redevelopment

Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain

Bhojwani

10, a Bench of this Court, of which one of us

(P. Mithal, J.) was a member, had held that the jurisdiction

of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section

37 of the Act against the judgment in a petition under

Section 34 of the Act is more constrained than the

jurisdiction of the court dealing with a petition under

Section 34 of the Act.

36. The gist of the aforesaid decisions is that the jurisdiction of

the court under Section 37 of the Act is akin to the

9

(2022) 4 SCC 116

10

(2024) 7 SCC 218

20

jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act, and,

therefore, the scope of interference by the court in appeal

under Section 37 cannot go beyond the grounds on which

challenge can be made to the award under Section 34 of the

Act. Moreover, the courts exercising powers under Sections

34 and 37, do not act as a normal court, and therefore,

ought not to interfere with the arbitral award on a mere

possibility of an alternative view.

37. In other words, the scope of interference of the court with

the arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely

barred. The powers of the Appellate Court are even more

restricted than the powers conferred by Section 34 of the

Act. The appellate power under Section 37 of the Act is

exercisable only to find out if the court exercising power

under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as

prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise

the power so conferred. The Appellate Court exercising

powers under Section 37 of the Act has no authority of law

to consider the matter in dispute before the Arbitral

Tribunal on merits so as to hold as to whether the award of

21

the Arbitral Tribunal is right or wrong. The Appellate Court

in exercise of such power cannot sit as an ordinary court of

appeal and reappraise the evidence to record a contrary

finding. The award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be

touched by the court unless it is contrary to the substantive

provision of law or any provision of the Act or the terms of

the agreement.

38. Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, the award of the Arbitral

Tribunal is not contrary to any substantive provision of law

or any provision of the Act. Yet, it has been disturbed by

the Appellate Court, apparently by giving a different

interpretation of the clauses of the License Agreement

which jurisdiction was not vested in it. Ordinarily, the

interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal, as affirmed by

the court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act

ought to have been accepted.

39. In regard to the contention that the arbitral award was

contrary to the terms of the Licence Agreement, it would be

trite to state that due and proper interpretation of the

various clauses of the Licence Agreement was given by the

22

Arbitral Tribunal and the same also had the approval of the

Learned Single Judge by his judgment passed in exercise of

powers under Section 34 of the Act and as such the

Appellate Court could not have given a different

interpretation to the said clauses. The Appellate Court was

actually bound by the interpretation of the clauses of the

Licence Agreement as given by the Arbitral Tribunal and

accepted by the Court under Section 34.

40. In National Highways Authority of India v. M/s

Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.

11 a Bench of this

Court, speaking through Justice Oka, of which one of us

(Shri P. Mithal, J.) was also a member held as under:

“There cannot be any dispute that as far as

the construction of the terms of a contract is

concerned, it is for the Arbitral Tribunal to

adjudicate upon. If, after considering the

material on record, the Arbitral Tribunal takes

a particular view on the interpretation of the

contract, the Court under Section 34 does not

sit in appeal over the findings of the

arbitrator.”

In view of the aforesaid decision, if the interpretation

given by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be disturbed under

11

2024 INSC 388

23

Section 34 of the Act, the same cannot also be disturbed by

exercising powers under Section 37 of the Act.

41. Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the

respondent-Port Trust, had cited Ssangyong Engineering

and Construction Company Limited vs. National

Highways Authority of India (NHAI)

12, to contend that

when there is patent illegality in the award, the same could

always be corrected in appeal under Section 37 of the Act.

A close reading of the above decision would reveal that in

order to apply the same, first, it has to be established that

there is a patent illegality on the face of the award; secondly,

mere contravention of substantive laws of India by itself is

no longer a ground available to set aside the award; and if

the Arbitrator gives no reason for an award, it would

amount to patent illegality. In the present case, no patent

illegality on the face of the award stands established. The

Arbitral Award is a speaking award with findings and

interpretations based upon reasons. Moreover, there is

apparently no violation of the fundamental policy of any

12

(2019) 15 SCC 131

24

Indian law or the basic notions of morality and justice to

enable the courts to interfere with the award.

42. Insofar as the merits of the case or other ancillary points

arising in the matter as referred to above, it would be

relevant to refer to Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 as well as Clause

51.1 of the License Agreement. The aforesaid clauses are

being reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of convenience :-

“Clause 38- STOPPAGE OF WORKS

The Contractor may be instructed to stop

the works from time to time due to security

reasons, moving ships, or any other

reasons as per the instructions of the Port

Authorities.

The Contractor shall furnish idle time

charges for the major dredgers proposed to

be deployed by him in the BOQ. The rate for

idle time charges, quoted by the lowest

Bidder, will be finalized taking into account

the lowest idle time charges quoted by the

other Bidders.

Clause 41.1- POSSESSION OF SITE AND

ACCESS THERETO

Save in so far as the Contract may

prescribe:

a) the extent of portions of the Site of which

the Contractor is to be given possession

from time to time and

25

b) the order in which the Works shall be

executed as may be mutually agreed on

and as per the programme,

c) so much of the Site, and

d) such access as, in accordance with the

Contract, is to be provided by the Employer

as may be required to enable the Contractor

to commence and proceed with the

execution of the Works in accordance with

the programme referred to in Clause 44.1, if

any, and otherwise in accordance with such

reasonable proposals as the Contractor

shall, by notice to the Engineer. The

Engineer will, from time to time as the Work

proceeds, give to the Contractor possession

of such further portions of the Site as may

be required to enable the Contractor to

proceed with the execution of the Works

with due dispatch in accordance with such

programme or proposals, as the case may

be.

Clause 41.2- FAILURE TO GIVE

POSSESSION

If the Contractor suffers delay and/or

incurs costs from failure on the part of the

Employer to give possession in accordance

with the terms of Sub-Clause 41.1, the

Engineer shall, after due consultation with

the Employer and Contractor, determine

any extension of time to which the

Contractor is entitled under Clause 43.1,

and the amount of such costs which shall

be added to the Contract Price and shall

notify the Contractor accordingly.

26

Clause 51.1- INTERRUPTIONS TO WORK

The Contractor shall allow in his rates for

any loss of working time due to weather,

surveying, positioning of craft, shifting of

dredger/equipment during maintenance.

Idle time of the dredger/equipment

exceeding a continuous period of 4 (four)

hours due to interruption caused by Port

traffic, berthing, unberthing, or shifting of

vessels and other operations in the Harbour

basin and Approach Channel, excluding the

specified times under Sub -Clause 6.0

Section III shipping operations (i.e., from

07.00 hours t o 14.00 hours) as

instructed/agreed by the Engineer, shall be

paid for at the quoted rates included in the

Bill of Quantities, subject to the Engineer

being notified by the Contractor within 12

hours on each occasion of such

interruptions. The idle time for such

payment shall be reckoned as the total time

in one continuous interruption minus 2

hours. Berthing programme of vessels will

be provided every day after berthing

meeting at 12.00 hours or when ETAs are

made available to Port by shipping

agencies.

Notice will be given approximately 1 hour

before the sailing of vessels, and the

Contractor shall contact the Port Marine

Department for any information in this

regard. No claim whatsoever for additional

payments on account of the specified

interruption will be entertained.”

27

43. The aforesaid Clause 38 though speaks about stoppage of

work and about idle time charges for the major dredger

deployed by the contractor i.e. the appellant-Dredging

India, but it nowhere prohibits the appellant-Dredging

India to claim compensation in respect of any other

equipment including Backhoe Dredger, if it remains idle.

The aforesaid Clause 38 cannot be read so as to mean that

since it provides for idle time charges for major dredgers,

compensation in respect of other equipment or

minor/special dredgers is not permissible.

44. Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 provide for the consequences of

failure on part of the respondent-Port Trust to give

possession of the site in time including extension of time

and costs. However, this does not ipso facto mean that idle

time compensation would not be admissible if the site is not

made available for any other reason covered under the

terms of the License Agreement.

45. The aforesaid Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 cannot be read in

isolation. If we read the aforesaid clauses of the Licence

Agreement conjointly with Clause 51.1, it would be evident

28

that idle time charges or compensation are available even if

any equipment is kept idle on account of delay or non-

providing of the site for operation within time. In view of

Clause 51.1, the argument that since the Claim No. 7 was

virtually under Clauses 41.1 and 41.2, the Arbitral

Tribunal could not have awarded claim under Clause 51.1

is misconceived, inasmuch as it is settled in law that if the

power to grant a relief is available under the Act or the

terms and conditions of the Licence Agreement, it is

immaterial as to under which clause the same is claimed.

46. In the instant case, the power to award compensation for

idle time of the equipment including Backhoe Dredger is

traceable to Clause 51.1 of the Lease Agreement and

therefore the Arbitral Tribunal was not wrong in

interpreting the clauses so as to make an award in favour

of the appellant-Dredging India under Claim No. 7. In such

a situation, the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal

is apparently a plausible view and was rightly not disturbed

by the Learned Single Judge in exercise of power under

Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, in appeal under Section 37

29

of the Act, the said reasoning could not have been disturbed

so as to permit a different view. The interpretation given by

the Arbitral Tribunal had to be accepted by the Appellate

Court.

47. In paragraph 15 of Larsen Air Conditioning and

Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors.

13, this

Court observed that the limited and extremely

circumscribed jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of

the Act, permits the court to interfere with an award, sans

the grounds of patent illegality but if an arbitrator

construes a term of a contract in a reasonable manner, it

will not mean that the award can be set aside on that

ground.

48. In the case at hand, the Arbitral Award contains logical

reasons in construing the various clauses of the License

Agreement and the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal had

been accepted by the court under Section 34 of the Act as

a reasonable and a possible view. Therefore, in the light of

above referred decision of Larsen Air Conditioning

13

(2023) 15 SCC 472

30

(supra), the Arbitral Award could not have been set aside

even if there was a possible second view regarding the

interpretation of the clauses of the License Agreement.

49. In the light of the above discussion, the ancillary issues,

whether the Backhoe Dredger (BHD) is a minor or a major

dredger or whether it could have been deployed for the

project work, pales into insignificance. The License

Agreement permits deployment of Backhoe Dredger (BHD)

without specifying whether it is a minor or a major dredger.

Moreover, as discussed earlier, it was open for the

appellant-Dredging India to deploy the equipment as may

be felt necessary by it, and, therefore, the deployment of the

Backhoe Dredger (BHD) was not contrary to any terms of

the License Agreement.

50. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, we are of

the opinion that the Appellate Court manifestly erred in law

in interfering with the judgment and order of the Learned

Single Judge of the High Court passed under Section 34 of

the Act so as to disturb the arbitral award in respect of

Claim No.7.

31

51. Before parting, we consider it proper to note that the Act is

a special enactment which aims to resolve

contractual/commercial disputes through arbitration with

the minimum intervention of the court, if not without the

intervention of the court. In the event, the courts are

allowed to step in at every stage and the arbitral awards are

subjected to challenge before the courts in hierarchy before

court of first instance, through regular appeals and finally

by means of SLP/Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court, it

would obviate/frustrate and defeat the very purpose of the

Act. It is therefore, necessary to accept the arbitral award if

it is not patently illegal or does not fall within the scope of

intervention under Section 34 of the Act. The appeal thereof

has a much narrower scope of intervention particularly

when the arbitral award has been upheld under Section 34

of the Act. The appellate jurisdiction acquires little

significance only when the arbitral award has been

erroneously upheld or set aside by the court in exercise of

its power under Section 34 of the Act as discussed earlier,

32

but has no authority of law to consider the matter which

was before the Arbitral Tribunal on merits.

52. In the light of the above discussion, in our opinion, the

impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2021 passed by

the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 37 of

the Act is unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside.

53. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

...................………………………….. J.

(PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 07, 2026.