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MADRAS BAR ASSOCIATION Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

  Supreme Court Of India Writ Petition Civil /1072/2013
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Case Background

The petitioner, Madras Bar Association, filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (Nclat), along with ...

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Page 1 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1072 OF 2013

MADRAS BAR ASSOCIATION .....PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

This writ petition filed by the petitioner, namely, the Madras Bar

Association, is sequel to the earlier proceedings which culminated in the

judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of

India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association

1

(hereinafter

referred to as the '2010 judgment'). In the earlier round of litigation, the

petitioner had challenged the constitutional validity of creation of

National Company Law Tribunal ('NCLT' for short) and National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal ('NCLAT' for short), along with certain

other provisions pertaining thereto which were incorporated by the

Legislature in Parts 1B and 1C of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter

referred to as the 'Act, 1956') by Companies (Second Amendment) Act,

1

(2010) 11 SCC 1

Page 2 2

2002.

2)Writ petition, in this behalf, was filed by the petitioner in the High Court

of Madras which culminated into the judgment dated 30.03.2004. The

High Court held that creation of NCLT and vesting the powers hitherto

exercised by the High Court and the Company Law Board ('CLB' for

short) in the said Tribunal was not unconstitutional. However, at the

same time, the High Court pointed out certain defects in various

provisions of Part 1B and Part 1C of the Act, 1956 and, in particular, in

Sections 10FD(3)(f)(g)(h), 10FE, 10FF, 10FL(2), 10FR(3), 10FT.

Declaring that those provisions as existed offended the basic

Constitutional scheme of separation of powers, it was held that unless

these provisions are appropriately amended by removing the defects

which were also specifically spelled out, it would be unconstitutional to

constitute NCLT and NCLAT to exercise the jurisdiction which is being

exercised by the High Court or the CLB. The petitioner felt aggrieved by

that part of the judgment vide which establishments of NCLT and NCLAT

was held to be Constitutional. On the other hand, Union of India felt

dissatisfied with the other part of the judgment whereby aforesaid

provisions contained in Parts 1B and 1C of the Act, 1956 were perceived

as suffering from various legal and Constitutional infirmities. Thus, both

Union of India as well as the petitioner filed appeals against that

judgment of the Madras High Court. Those appeals were decided by the

Page 3 3

Constitution Bench, as mentioned above.

3)The Constitution Bench vide the said judgment put its stamp of approval

insofar as Constitutional validity of NCLT and NCLAT is concerned. It

also undertook the exercise of going through the aforesaid provisions

contained in Parts 1B and 1C of the Act, 1956 and in substantial

measure agreed with the Madras High Court finding various defects in

these provisions. These defects were listed by the Court in para 120 of

the judgment which reads as under:

“120. We may tabulate the corrections required to set

right the defects in Parts I-B and I-C of the Act:

(i) Only Judges and advocates can be

considered for appointment as judicial members of

the Tribunal. Only High Court Judges, or Judges who

have served in the rank of a District Judge for at least

five years or a person who has practiced as a Lawyer

for ten years can be considered for appointment as a

Judicial Member. Persons who have held a

Group A or equivalent post under the Central or

State Government with experience in the Indian

Company Law Service (Legal Branch) and Indian Legal

Service (Grade-1) cannot be considered for

appointment as judicial members as provided in

sub-section 2(c) and (d) of Section 10FD. The

expertise in Company Law service or Indian Legal

service will at best enable them to be considered for

appointment as technical members.

(ii) As the NCLT takes over the functions of

High Court, the members should as nearly as

possible have the same position and status as High

Court Judges. This can be achieved, not by giving the

salary and perks of a High Court Judge to the members,

but by ensuring that persons who are as nearly equal in

rank, experience or competence to High Court Judges

are appointed as members. Therefore, only officers

who are holding the ranks of Secretaries or

Additional Secretaries alone can be considered

Page 4 4

for appointment as Technical members of the National

Company Law Tribunal. Clauses (c) and (d) of

sub-section (2) and Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section

(3) of section 10FD which provide for persons with 15

years experience in Group A post or persons holding the

post of Joint Secretary or equivalent post in Central

or State Government, being qualified for

appointment as Members of Tribunal is invalid.

(iii) A “technical member” presupposes an experience in

the field to which the Tribunal relates. A member of the

Indian Company Law Service who has worked with

Accounts Branch or officers in other departments who

might have incidentally dealt with some aspect of

company law cannot be considered as “experts”

qualified to be appointed as technical members.

Therefore clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) are not

valid.”

(iv) A `Technical Member' presupposes an

experience in the field to which the Tribunal relates.

A member of Indian Company Law Service who has

worked with Accounts Branch or officers in

other departments who might have incidentally dealt

with some aspect of Company Law cannot be

considered as `experts' qualified to be appointed

as Technical Members. Therefore Clauses (a) and (b)

of sub-section (3) are not valid. (v) The first part of

clause (f) of sub-section (3) providing that any person

having special knowledge or professional experience of

15 years in science, technology, economics, banking,

industry could be considered to be persons with

expertise in company law, for being appointed as

Technical Members in Company Law Tribunal, is invalid.

(v) Persons having ability, integrity, standing and special

knowledge and professional experience of not less than

fifteen years in industrial finance, industrial

management, industrial reconstruction, investment and

accountancy, may however be considered as persons

having expertise in rehabilitation/revival of companies

and therefore, eligible for being considered for

appointment as technical members.

(vi) In regard to category of persons referred in

clause (g) of sub-section (3) at least five years

experience should be specified.

Page 5 5

(vii) Only clauses (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), and latter part of

clause (f) in sub-section (3) of section 10-FD and officers

of civil services of the rank of the Secretary or

Additional Secretary in Indian Company Law Service

and Indian Legal Service can be considered for

purposes of appointment as technical members of the

Tribunal.

(viii) Instead of a five-member Selection Committee with

Chief Justice of India (or his nominee) as Chairperson

and two Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance and

Company Affairs and the Secretary in the Ministry of

Labour and Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice

as members mentioned in section 10FX, the Selection

Committee should broadly be on the following lines:

(a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee -

Chairperson (with a casting vote);

(b) A senior Judge of the Supreme Court or Chief

Justice of High Court – Member;

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and

Company Affairs - Member; and

(d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice -

Member.

(ix) The term of office of three years shall be changed to

a term of seven or five years subject to eligibility for

appointment for one more term. This is because

considerable time is required to achieve expertise in the

concerned field. A term of three years is very

short and by the time the members achieve the

required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term

will be over. Further the said term of three years with the

retirement age of 65 years is perceived as having

been tailor-made for persons who have retired

or shortly to retire and encourages these

Tribunals to be treated as post-retirement

havens. If these Tribunals are to function

effectively and efficiently they should be able to attract

younger members who will have a reasonable period of

service.

(x) The second proviso to Section 10FE

enabling the President and members to retain

lien with their parent cadre/ministry/department

Page 6 6

while holding office as President or Members will

not be conducive for the independence of

members. Any person appointed as members

should be prepared to totally disassociate himself from

the Executive. The lien cannot therefore exceed a

period of one year.

(xi) To maintain independence and security in service,

sub-section (3) of section 10FJ and Section 10FV

should provide that suspension of the

President/Chairman or member of a Tribunal can

be only with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of

India.

(xii) The administrative support for all Tribunals

should be from the Ministry of Law & Justice. Neither

the Tribunals nor its members shall seek or be

provided with facilities from the respective

sponsoring or parent Ministries or concerned

Department.

(xiii) Two-Member Benches of the Tribunal should

always have a judicial member. Whenever any

larger or special benches are constituted, the

number of Technical Members shall not exceed the

Judicial Members.”

4)On the basis of the aforesaid, partly allowing the appeals, the same

were disposed of in the following terms:

“57. We therefore dispose of these appeals, partly

allowing them, as follows:

(i) We uphold the decision of the High Court that the

creation of National Company Law Tribunal and National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal and vesting in them, the

powers and jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in

regard to company law matters, are not unconstitutional.

(ii) We declare that Parts 1B and 1C of the Act as

presently structured, are unconstitutional for the reasons

stated in the preceding para. However, Parts IB and IC

of the Act, may be made operational by making

suitable amendments, as indicated above, in addition to

what the Union Government has already agreed in

Page 7 7

pursuance of the impugned order of the High Court.”

5)Though the verdict came in the year 2010, upholding the creation of

NCLT and NCLAT, these two bodies could not be created and made

functional immediately thereafter and the matter got stuck in imbroglio of

one kind or the other. It is not necessary to trace out those factors as

some of those are the subject matter of Writ Petition No.267/2012 which

writ petition is also filed by this very petitioner and is pending

consideration. Said writ petition was listed before this Bench along with

the present writ petition and arguments to some extent were heard in

petition as well. However, since the issues raised in the said petition

necessitate further response from the Union of India, with the consent of

the parties, it was deemed proper to defer the hearing in that petition,

awaiting the response. Insofar as the present writ petition is concerned,

though somewhat connected with writ petition No.267/2012, prayers

made in this writ petition are entirely different and there was no handicap

or obstruction in proceeding with the hearing of the instant writ petition.

For this reason, the arguments were finally heard in this case.

6)Adverting to the present writ petition, it so happened that the Parliament

has passed new company law in the form of Indian Companies Act, 2013

(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 2013') which replaces the earlier Act,

1956. In this Act, again substantive provisions have been made with

regard to the establishment of NCLT and NCLAT. It is obvious that with

Page 8 8

the constitution of NCLT and NCLAT, the provisions relating to the

structure and constitution of NCLT and NCLAT, the provisions relating to

qualifications for appointment of President/Chairperson and Members

(judicial as well as technical) of both NCLT and NCLAT, and also

provisions relating to the constitution of the Selection Committee for

selection of the said Members have also been incorporated in the Act,

2013. These are analogous to Section 10FD, 10FE, 10FF, 10FL, 10FR

and 10FT which were introduced in the Act, 1956 by Companies

(Amendment) Act, 2002. The cause for filing the present petition by the

petitioner is the allegation of the petitioner that notwithstanding various

directions given in 2010 judgment, the new provisions in the Act, 2013

are almost on the same lines as were incorporated in the Act, 1956 and,

therefore, these provisions suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality as

well on the application of the ratio in 2010 judgment. It is, thus,

emphasized by the petitioner that these provisions which are contained

in Sections 408, 409, 411(3), 412, 413, 425, 431 and 434 of the Act,

2013 are ultra vires the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and,

therefore, warrant to be struck down as unconstitutional. The precise

prayer contained in the writ petition reads as under:

“(i) a WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION more particularly in

the nature of WRIT OF DECLARATION declaring that the

provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Companies Act, 2013,

more particularly Sections 408, 409, 411(3), 412, 413, 425,

431 and 434 of the Act as ultra vires the provisions of

Article 14 of the Constitution and accordingly striking down

the said provisions as unconstitutional;

Page 9 9

(ii) Pass any order or such further order or orders as may

be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of

the present case."

7)Before we proceed further, we would like to set down the aforesaid

provisions of the Act, 2013 along with Section 2(4), Section 2(90) and

Section 407 which contained certain definitions that are relevant in the

context of controversy raised in the present petition:

“2(4) “Appellate Tribunal” means the National Company

Law Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 410;

“2(90) “Tribunal” means the National Company Law

Tribunal constituted under section 408;

407. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise

requires,—

(a) “Chairperson” means the Chairperson of the

Appellate Tribunal;

(b) “Judicial Member” means a member of the Tribunal

or the Appellate Tribunal appointed as such and

includes the President or the Chairperson, as the case

may be;

(c) “Member” means a member, whether Judicial or

Technical of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal and

includes the President or the Chairperson, as the case

may be;

(d) “President” means the President of the Tribunal;

(e) “Technical Member” means a member of the Tribunal

or the Appellate Tribunal appointed as such.

408. Constitution of National Company Law

Tribunal

The Central Government shall, by notification,

constitute, with effect from such date as may be

Page 10 10

specified therein, a Tribunal to be known as the

National Company Law Tribunal consisting of a

President and such number of Judicial and Technical

members, as the Central Government may deem

necessary, to be appointed by it by notification, to

exercise and discharge such powers and functions as

are, or may be, conferred on it by or under this Act or

any other law for the time being in force.

409. Qualification of President and Members of

Tribunal

(1) The President shall be a person who is or has been

a Judge of a High Court for five years.

(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a

Judicial Member unless he—

(a) is, or has been, a judge of a High Court; or

(b) is, or has been, a District Judge for at least five

years; or

(c) has, for at least ten years been an advocate of a

court.

Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c), in

computing the period during which a person has been

an advocate of a court, there shall be included any

period during which the person has held judicial office

or the office of a member of a tribunal or any post,

under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge

of law after he become an advocate.

(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a

Technical Member unless he -

(a) has, for at least fifteen years been a member of the

Indian Corporate Law Service or Indian Legal Service

out of which at least three years shall be in the pay

scale of Joint Secretary to the Government of India or

Page 11 11

equivalent or above in that service; or

(b) is, or has been, in practice as a chartered

accountant for at least fifteen years; or

(c) is, or has been, in practice as a cost accountant for

at least fifteen years; or

(d) is, or has been, in practice as a company secretary

for at least fifteen years; or

(e) is a person of proven ability, integrity and standing

having special knowledge and experience, of not less

than fifteen years, in law, industrial finance, industrial

management or administration, industrial

reconstruction, investment, accountancy, labour

matters, or such other disciplines related to

management, conduct of affairs, revival, rehabilitation

and winding up of companies; or

(f) is, or has been, for at least five years, a presiding

officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal

constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

410. Constitution of Appellate Tribunal

The Central Government shall, by notification,

constitute, with effect from such date as may be

specified therein, an Appellate Tribunal to be known as

the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

consisting of a chairperson and such number of Judicial

and Technical Members, not exceeding eleven, as the

Central Government may deem fit, to be appointed by it

by notification, for hearing appeals against the orders of

the Tribunal.

411. Qualifications of chairperson and Members of

Appellate Tribunal

(1) The chairperson shall be a person who is or has

Page 12 12

been a Judge of the Supreme Court or the Chief

Justice of a High Court.

(2) A Judicial Member shall be a person who is or has

been a Judge of a High Court or is a Judicial Member

of the Tribunal for five years.

(3) A Technical Member shall be a person of proven

ability, integrity and standing having special knowledge

and experience, of not less than twenty-five years, in

law, industrial finance, industrial management or

administration, industrial reconstruction, investment,

accountancy, labour matters, or such other disciplines

related to management, conduct of affairs, revival,

rehabilitation and winding up of companies.

412. Selection of Members of Tribunal and

Appellate Tribunal

(1) The President of the Tribunal and the chairperson

and Judicial Members of the Appellate Tribunal, shall

be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of

India.

(2) The Members of the Tribunal and the Technical

Members of the Appellate Tribunal shall be appointed

on the recommendation of a Selection Committee

consisting of—

(a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee—

Chairperson;

(b) a senior Judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief

Justice of High Court—Member;

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs—

Member;

(d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice—

Member; and

(e) Secretary in the Department of Financial Services

Page 13 13

in the Ministry of Finance—Member.

(3) The Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs shall

be the Convener of the Selection Committee.

(4) The Selection Committee shall determine its

procedure for recommending persons under

sub-section (2).

(5) No appointment of the Members of the Tribunal or

the Appellate Tribunal shall be invalid merely by

reason of any vacancy or any defect in the

constitution of the Selection Committee.

413. Term of office of President, chairperson and

other Members

(1) The President and every other Member of the

Tribunal shall hold office as such for a term of five

years from the date on which he enters upon his

office, but shall be eligible for re-appointment for

another term of five years.

(2) A Member of the Tribunal shall hold office as such

until he attains,—

(a) in the case of the President, the age of

sixty-seven years;

(b) in the case of any other Member, the age of

sixty-five years:

Provided that a person who has not completed

fifty years of age shall not be eligible for appointment

as Member:

Provided further that the Member may retain his

lien with his parent cadre or Ministry or Department,

as the case may be, while holding office as such for a

period not exceeding one year.

(3) The chairperson or a Member of the Appellate

Page 14 14

Tribunal shall hold office as such for a term of five

years from the date on which he enters upon his

office, but shall be eligible for re-appointment for

anonther term of five years.

(4) A Member of the Appellate Tribunal shall hold

office as such until he attains,—

(a) in the case of the Chairperson, the age of

seventy years;

(b) in the case of any other Member, the age of

sixty-seven years:

Provided that a person who has not completed

fifty years of age shall not be eligible for appointment

as Member:

Provided further that the Member may retain his

lien with his parent cadre or Ministry or Department,

as the case may be, while holding office as such for a

period not exceeding one year.

414. Salary, allowances and other terms and

conditions of service of Members

The salary, allowances and other terms and

conditions of service of the Members of the Tribunal

and the Appellate Tribunal shall be such as may be

prescribed:

Provided that neither the salary and allowances

nor the other terms and conditions of service of the

Members shall be varied to their disadvantage after

their appointment.

425. Power to punish for contempt

The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have

the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect

of contempt of themselves as the High Court has and

Page 15 15

may exercise, for this purpose, the powers under the

provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,

which shall have the effect subject to modifications

that—

(a) the reference therein to a High Court shall be

construed as including a reference to the Tribunal

and the Appellate Tribunal; and

(b) the reference to Advocate-General in section 15

of the said Act shall be construed as a reference to

such Law Officers as the Central Government may,

specify in this behalf.”

8)In the prayer clause, constitutional validity of Sections 415, 418, 424,

426, 431 and 434 have also been questioned. At the time of hearing, no

arguments were addressed by Mr. Datar, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner on the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, in respect of these

provisions, we are eschewing our discussion.

9)On the reading of the aforesaid provisions and having regard to the

arguments advanced at the Bar, we can conveniently categorise the

challenge in three compartments, as under:

(i) Challenge to the validity of the constitution of NCT and NCLAT;

(ii) Challenge to the prescription of qualifications including term of their

office and salary allowances etc. of President and Members of the NCLT

and as well as Chairman and Members of the NCLAT;

(iii) Challenge to the structure of the Selection Committee for

appointment of President/Members of the NCLT and Chairperson/

Page 16 16

Members of the NCLAT.

Incidental issues pertaining to the power given to these bodies to

punish for contempt as mentioned in Section 425 and giving power to

Central Government to constitute the Benches are also raised by the

petitioner.

As would be discussed hereinafter, all these issues stand covered

by Madras Bar Association (supra) and answer to these questions is

available therein. In fact, after detailed discussion on each issue, the

Court pronounced the verdict. Therefore, while doing a diagnostic of

sorts of the issues raised, we shall be administering the treatment that is

prescribed in that judgment.

ISSUE NO.1

Re. : Constitutional validity of NCT and NCLAT

Section 408 of the Act, 2013 deals with the constitution of NCLT.

By virtue of this Section, Central Government is empowered to issue

notification for constituting a Tribunal to be known as 'National Company

Law Tribunal'. This Tribunal would consist of President and such

number of Judicial and Technical members, as the Central Government

may deem necessary, to be appointed by it. By Notification dated

12.09.2013, the Central Government has constituted the NCLT.

Likewise, Section 410 of the Act, 2013 arms the Central Government

with power to constitute NCLAT by notification. This NCLAT is also to

consist of a Chairman and such number of Judicial and Technical

Page 17 17

Members, not exceeding eleven, as the Central Government may deem

fit, to be appointed by it by notification. By the aforesaid Notification

dated 12.09.2013, NCLAT has also been constituted by the Central

Government.

10)It is pertinent to point out that in the prayer clause, though challenge is

laid to the vires of Section 408, it conspicuously omits Section 410 and,

thus, in essence, there is no challenge to the constitution of NCLAT

insofar as relief claimed is concerned. Moreover, as pointed out above,

the entire writ petition takes umbrage under the Constitution Bench

judgment in 2010 judgment. However, at the time of arguments, Mr.

Datar primarily challenged the Constitutional validity of NCLAT without

making any serious efforts to challenge the constitution of NCLT. As far

as NCLT is concerned, he almost conceded that validity thereof stands

upheld in 2010 judgment and there is not much to argue. In respect of

NCLAT, though he conceded that validity thereof is also upheld in the

aforesaid judgment, his endeavour was to demonstrate that there is no

discussion in the entire judgment insofar as NCLAT is concerned and,

therefore, conclusion which is mentioned in the said judgment at the

end, should not be treated as binding or to be taken as having decided

this issue. His submission was that in view of the subsequent

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Madras Bar Association v.

Page 18 18

Union of India

2

, wherein establishment of National Tax Tribunal has

been held to be unconstitutional, Section 410 should also be meted out

the same treatment for the reasons recorded in the said judgment

pertaining to National Tax Tribunal. It is difficult to digest this argument

for various reasons, which we record in the discussion hereafter.

11)First of all the creation of Constitution of NCLAT has been specifically

upheld in 2010 judgment. It cannot be denied that this very petitioner

had specifically questioned the Constitutional validity of NCLAT in the

earlier writ petition and even advanced the arguments on this very issue.

This fact is specifically noted in the said judgment. The provision

pertaining to the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal i.e. Section 10FR

of the Companies Act, 1956 was duly taken note of. Challenge was laid

to the establishments of NCLT as well as NCLAT on the ground that the

Parliament had resorted to tribunalisation by taking away the powers

from the normal courts which was essentially a judicial function and this

move of the Legislature impinged upon the impartiality, fairness and

reasonableness of the decision making which was the hallmark of

judiciary and essentially a judicial function. Argument went to the extent

that it amounted to negating the Rule of Law and trampling of the

Doctrine of Separation of Powers which was the basic feature of the

Constitution of India. What we are emphasising is that the petitions

2

(2014) 10 SCC 1

Page 19 19

spearheaded the attack on the constitutional validity of both NCLT as

well as NCLAT on these common grounds. The Court specifically went

into the gamut of all those arguments raised and emphatically repelled

the same.

12)The Court specifically rejected the contention that transferring judicial

function, traditionally performed by the Courts, to the Tribunals offended

the basic structure of the Constitution and summarised the position in

this behalf as under:

“We may summarize the position as follows:

(a) A legislature can enact a law transferring the

jurisdiction exercised by courts in regard to any

specified subject (other than those which are vested in

courts by express provisions of the Constitution) to any

tribunal.

(b) All courts are tribunals. Any tribunal to which

any existing jurisdiction of courts is transferred should

also be a Judicial Tribunal. This means that such

Tribunal should have as members, persons of a

rank, capacity and status as nearly as possible

equal to the rank, status and capacity of the court

which was till then dealing with such matters and the

members of the Tribunal should have the

independence and security of tenure associated with

Judicial Tribunals.

(c) Whenever there is need for `Tribunals', there is no

presumption that there should be technical members in

the Tribunals. When any jurisdiction is shifted from

courts to Tribunals, on the ground of pendency and

delay in courts, and the jurisdiction so transferred does

not involve any technical aspects requiring the

assistance of experts, the Tribunals should normally

have only judicial members. Only where the exercise of

jurisdiction involves inquiry and decisions into technical

or special aspects, where presence of technical

members will be useful and necessary, Tribunals

Page 20 20

should have technical members. Indiscriminate

appointment of technical members in all Tribunals will

dilute and adversely affect the independence of the

Judiciary.

(d) The Legislature can re-organize the jurisdictions of

Judicial Tribunals. For example, it can provide that a

specified category of cases tried by a higher court can

be tried by a lower court or vice versa (A standard

example is the variation of pecuniary limits of courts).

Similarly while constituting Tribunals, the Legislature

can prescribe the qualifications/ eligibility criteria. The

same is however subject to Judicial Review. If the court

in exercise of judicial review is of the view that such

tribunalisation would adversely affect the independence

of judiciary or the standards of judiciary, the court

may interfere to preserve the independence and

standards of judiciary. Such an exercise will be part of

the checks and balances measures to maintain the

separation of powers and to prevent any

encroachment, intentional or unintentional, by either the

legislature or by the executive.”

13)Thereafter, the Constitution Bench categorically dealt with the

Constitutional validity of NCLT and NCLAT under the caption “Whether

the constitution of NCLT and NCLAT under Parts 1B & 1C of Companies

Act are valid”, and embarked upon the detailed discussion on this topic.

It becomes manifest from the above that the question of validity of

NCLAT was directly and squarely in issue. Various facets of the

challenge laid to the validity of these two fora were thoroughly thrashed

out. No doubt, most of the discussion contained in paras 107 to 119

refers to NCLT. However, on an insight into the said discussion

contained in these paragraphs, would eloquently bear it out that it is

inclusive of NCLAT as well. In para 121 of the judgment, which is

Page 21 21

already extracted above, the Court specifically affirmed the decision of

the High Court which held that creation of NCLT and NCLAT was not

unconstitutional. In view of this, it is not open to the petitioner even to

argue this issue as it clearly operate as res judicata.

14)Frankly, Mr. Datar was conscious of the aforesaid limitation. He still

ventured to attack the setting up of NCLAT on the ground that insofar as

this appellate forum is concerned, there are no reasons given in the said

judgment and thereafter this aspect has been dealt with in more details

in the NTT judgment wherein formation of National Tax Tribunal has

been held to be unconstitutional. This adventurism on the part of the

petitioner is totally unfounded. In the first instance, as mentioned above,

insofar as NCLAT is concerned, its validity has already been upheld and

this issue cannot be reopened. Judgment in the case of 2010 judgment

is of a Constitution Bench and that judgment of a co-ordinate Bench

binds this Bench as well.

15)Secondly, reading of the Constitution Bench judgment in the matter of

National Tax Tribunal would manifest that not only 2010 judgment was

taken note of but followed as well. The Court spelled out the

distinguishing features between NCLT/NCLAT on the one hand and NTT

on the other hand in arriving at a different conclusion.

16)Thirdly, the NTT was a matter where power of judicial review hitherto

Page 22 22

exercised by the High Court in deciding the pure substantial question of

law was sought to be taken away to be vested in NTT which was held to

be impermissible. In the instant case, there is no such situation. On the

contrary, NCLT is the first forum in the hierarchy of quasi-judicial fora set

up in the Act, 2013. The NCLT, thus, would not only deal with question

of law in a given case coming before it but would be called upon to

thrash out the factual disputes/aspects as well. In this scenario, NCLAT

which is the first appellate forum provided under the Act, 2013 to

examine the validity of the orders passed by NCLT, will have to revisit

the factual as well as legal issues. Therefore, situation is not akin to

NTT. Jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is mentioned in Section 410

itself which stipulates that NCLAT shall be constituted 'for hearing

appeals against the orders of the Tribunal'. This jurisdiction is not

circumscribed by any limitations of any nature whatsoever and the

implication thereof is that appeal would lie both on the questions of facts

as well as questions of law. Likewise, under sub-section (4) of Section

421, which provision deals with 'appeal from orders of Tribunal', it is

provided that the NCLAT, after giving reasonable opportunity of being

heard, 'pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, forming, modifying or set

aside the order appealed against'. It is thereafter further appeal is

provided from the order of the NCLAT to the Supreme Court under

Section 423 of the Act, 2013. Here, the scope of the appeal to the

Page 23 23

Supreme Court is restricted only 'to question of law arising out of such

order'.

17)Fourthly, it is not unknown rather a common feature/practice to provide

one appellate forum wherever an enactment is a complete Code for

providing judicial remedies. Providing one right to appeal before an

appellate forum is a well accepted norm which is perceived as a healthy

tradition.

18)For all these reasons, we hold that there is no merit in this issue.

ISSUE NO.2

19)Qualifications of President and Members of NCLT are mentioned in

Section 409 of the Act, 2013 and that of Chairperson and Members of

NCLAT are stipulated in Section 411 of the Act, 2013. The petitioner has

no quarrel about the qualifications mentioned for the President and

Judicial Members of the Tribunal as well as Chairperson and Judicial

Members of the Appellate Tribunal. However, it is argued that insofar as

technical Members of NCLT/NCLAT are concerned, the provision is

almost the same which was inserted by way of an amendment in the Act,

1956 and challenge to those provisions was specifically upheld finding

fault therewith. In order to appreciate this argument, we show the

comparative provisions contained in Act, 1956 as well as in the Act,

2013:

Page 24 24

ACT 1956 ACT 2013

(1) 10-FD (3) (a) (b) (c) and (d)(1) Section 409 (3)

(3) A person shall not be

qualified for appointment as

Technical Member unless he-

(3) A person shall not be

qualified for appointment as a

Technical Member unless he-

(a) has held for at least fifteen

years a Group 'A' post or an

equivalent post under the

Central Government or a State

Government [including at least

three years of service as a

Member of the Indian Company

Law Service (Accounts Branch)

in Senior Administrative Grade in

that Service]; or

(a) has, for at least fifteen years

been a member of the Indian

Corporate Law Service or Indian

Legal Service out of which at

least three years shall be in the

pay scale of Joint Secretary to

the Government of India or

equivalent or above in that

service; or

(b) is, or has been, a Joint

Secretary to the Government of

India under the Central Staffing

Scheme, or any other post under

the Central Government or a

State Government carrying a

scale of pay which is not less

than that of a Joint Secretary to

the Government of India for at

least five years and has

adequate knowledge of, and

experience in, dealing with

problems relating to company

law; or

(b) is, or has been, in practice

as a chartered accountant for at

least fifteen years; or

(c) is, or has been, for at least

fifteen years in practice as a

chartered accountant under the

Chartered Accountants Act,

1949 (38 of 1949); or

(c) is, or has been, in practice as

a cost accountant for at least

fifteen years; or

(d) is, or has been, for at least

fifteen years in practice as a

cost accountant under, the Costs

(d) is, or has been, in practice

as a company secretary for at

least fifteen years; or

Page 25 25

and Works Accountants Act,

1959 (23 of 1959); or

(e) is a person of proven ability,

integrity and standing having

special knowledge and

experience, of not less than

fifteen years, in law, industrial

finance, industrial management

or administration, industrial

reconstruction, investment,

accountancy, labour matters, or

such other disciplines related to

management, conduct of affairs,

revival, rehabilitation and

winding up of companies; or

(f) is, or has been, for at least

five years, a presiding officer of

a Labour Court, Tribunal or

National Tribunal constituted

under the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947.

(2) 10-FR (2) Section 411(3)

10FR. Constitution of Appellate

Tribunal: (1) The Central

Government shall, by notification

in the Official Gazette,

constitute with effect from such

date as may be specified therein,

an Appellate Tribunal to be

called the "National Company

Law Appellate Tribunal"

consisting of a Chairperson

and not more than two

Members, to be appointed by

that Government, for hearing

appeals against the orders of the

Tribunal under this Act.

411(3) A Technical Member shall

be a person of proven ability,

integrity and standing having

special knowledge and

experience, of not less than

twenty-five years, in law,

industrial finance, industrial

management or administration,

industrial reconstruction,

investment, accountancy, labour

matters, or such other

disciplines related to

management, conduct of affairs,

revival, rehabilitation and

winding up of companies.

(2) The Chairperson of the

Appellate Tribunal shall be a

Page 26 26

person who has been a Judge of

the Supreme Court or the Chief

Justice of a High Court.

(3) A Member of the Appellate

Tribunal shall be a person of

ability, integrity and standing

having special knowledge of,

and professional experience of

not less than twenty-five years

in, science, technology,

economics, banking, industry,

law, matters relating to labour,

industrial finance, industrial

management, industrial

reconstruction, administration,

investment, accountancy,

marketing or any other

matter, the special knowledge of,

or professional experience in

which, would be in the opinion of

the Central Government useful

to the Appellate Tribunal.

20)It was pointed out that in the 2010 judgment, the Constitution Bench

took the view that since the NCLT would now be undertaking the work

which is being performed, inter alia, by High Court, the technical

Members of the NCLT/NCLAT should be selected from amongst only

those officers who hold rank of Secretaries or Additional Secretaries and

have technical expertise. These aspects are discussed by the Court in

the following paragraphs:

“108. The legislature is presumed not to legislate

contrary to the rule of law and therefore know that

where disputes are to be adjudicated by a Judicial Body

other than Courts, its standards should approximately be

the same as to what is expected of main stream

Judiciary. Rule of law can be meaningful only if there is

an independent and impartial judiciary to render

Page 27 27

justice. An independent judiciary can exist only when

persons with competence, ability and independence

with impeccable character man the judicial

institutions. When the legislature proposes to substitute

a Tribunal in place of the High Court to exercise the

jurisdiction which the High Court is exercising, it goes

without saying that the standards expected from the

Judicial Members of the Tribunal and standards applied

for appointing such members, should be as nearly as

possible as applicable to High Court Judges, which are

apart from a basic degree in law, rich experience

in the practice of law, independent outlook,

integrity, character and good reputation. It is also implied

that only men of standing who have special

expertise in the field to which the Tribunal

relates, will be eligible for appointment as

Technical members. Therefore, only persons with a

judicial background, that is, those who have been or

are Judges of the High Court and lawyers with

the prescribed experience, who are eligible for

appointment as High Court Judges, can be considered

for appointment of Judicial Members.

109. A lifetime of experience in administration may

make a member of the civil services a good and able

administrator, but not a necessarily good, able and

impartial adjudicator with a judicial temperament capable

of rendering decisions which have to (i) inform the

parties about the reasons for the decision; (ii)

demonstrate fairness and correctness of the

decision and absence of arbitrariness; and (iii)

ensure that justice is not only done, but also

seem to be done.

xx xx xx

111. As far as the technical members are concerned, the

officer should be of at least Secretary Level officer

with known competence and integrity. Reducing the

standards, or qualifications for appointment will result in

loss of confidence in the Tribunals. We hasten to add that

our intention is not to say that the persons of Joint

Secretary level are not competent. Even persons of

Under Secretary level may be competent to discharge

the functions. There may be brilliant and competent

people even working as Section Officers or Upper

Division Clerks but that does not mean that they can be

appointed as Members. Competence is different

Page 28 28

from experience, maturity and status required for

the post. As, for example, for the post of a Judge of the

High Court, 10 years' practice as an Advocate is

prescribed. There may be Advocates who even with

4 or 5 years' experience, may be more brilliant than

Advocates with 10 years' standing. Still, it is not

competence alone but various other factors which

make a person suitable. Therefore, when the

legislature substitutes the Judges of the High

Court with Members of the Tribunal, the standards

applicable should be as nearly as equal in the case of

High Court Judges. That means only Secretary Level

officers (that is those who were Secretaries or Additional

Secretaries) with specialized knowledge and skills can be

appointed as Technical Members of the tribunal.

xx xx xx

118. Parts IC and ID of the Companies Act proposes to

shift the company matters from the courts to

Tribunals, where a `Judicial Member' and a

`Technical Member' will decide the disputes. If the

members are selected as contemplated in section

10FD, there is every likelihood of most of the

members, including the so called `Judicial Members' not

having any judicial experience or company law

experience and such members being required to deal

with and decide complex issues of fact and law. Whether

the Tribunals should have only judicial members or

a combination of judicial and technical members

is for the Legislature to decide. But if there

should be technical members, they should be persons

with expertise in company law or allied subjects and

mere experience in civil service cannot be

treated as Technical Expertise in company law.

The candidates falling under sub-section 2(c) and

(d) and sub-sections 3(a) and (b) of section 10FD have

no experience or expertise in deciding company matters.

119. There is an erroneous assumption that

company law matters require certain specialized skills

which are lacking in Judges. There is also an

equally erroneous assumption that members of the

civil services, (either a Group-A officer or Joint

Secretary level civil servant who had never handled any

company disputes) will have the judicial

experience or expertise in company law to be

appointed either as Judicial Member or Technical

Page 29 29

Member. Nor can persons having experience of

fifteen years in science, technology, medicines,

banking, industry can be termed as experts in

Company Law for being appointed as Technical

Members. The practice of having experts as

Technical Members is suited to areas which

require the assistance of professional experts,

qualified in medicine, engineering, and architecture

etc. Lastly, we may refer to the lack of security of tenure.

The short term of three years, the provision for routine

suspension pending enquiry and the lack of any kind

of immunity, are aspects which require to be

considered and remedied.”

21)On the basis of the aforesaid discussions, parts 1C and 1D of the Act,

1956 as they existed were treated as invalid and in order to bring these

provisions within the realm of Constitutionality, the Court pointed out the

corrections which were required to be made to remove those anamolies.

Para 120 of the judgment is most relevant to answer the issue at hand

and, therefore, we reproduce the said para in its entirety:

“120. We may tabulate the corrections required to set

right the defects in Parts IB and IC of the Act :

(i) Only Judges and Advocates can be

considered for appointment as Judicial Members of

the Tribunal. Only the High Court Judges, or Judges

who have served in the rank of a District Judge for at

least five years or a person who has practiced as a

Lawyer for ten years can be considered for appointment

as a Judicial Member. Persons who have held

a Group A or equivalent post under the Central

or State Government with experience in the Indian

Company Law Service (Legal Branch) and Indian Legal

Service (Grade-1) cannot be considered for

appointment as judicial members as provided in

sub-section 2(c) and (d) of Section 10FD. The

expertise in Company Law service or Indian Legal

service will at best enable them to be considered for

appointment as technical members.

Page 30 30

(ii) As NCLT takes over the functions of High

Court, the members should as nearly as possible

have the same position and status as High Court

Judges. This can be achieved, not by giving the salary

and perks of a High Court Judge to the members, but by

ensuring that persons who are as nearly equal in rank,

experience or competence to High Court Judges are

appointed as members. Therefore, only officers

who are holding the ranks of Secretaries or

Additional Secretaries alone can be considered

for appointment as Technical members of the National

Company Law Tribunal. Clauses (c) and (d) of

sub-section (2) and Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section

(3) of section 10FD which provide for persons with 15

years experience in Group A post or persons holding the

post of Joint Secretary or equivalent post in Central

or State Government, being qualified for

appointment as Members of Tribunal is invalid.

(iii) A `Technical Member' presupposes an

experience in the field to which the Tribunal relates.

A member of Indian Company Law Service who has

worked with Accounts Branch or officers in

other departments who might have incidentally dealt

with some aspect of Company Law cannot be

considered as `experts' qualified to be appointed

as Technical Members. Therefore Clauses (a) and (b)

of sub-section (3) are not valid.

(iv) The first part of clause (f) of sub-section (3) providing

that any person having special knowledge or

professional experience of 20 years in science,

technology, economics, banking, industry could be

considered to be persons with expertise in company law,

for being appointed as Technical Members in Company

Law Tribunal, is invalid.

(v) Persons having ability, integrity, standing and special

knowledge and professional experience of not less

than fifteen years in industrial finance, industrial

management, industrial reconstruction, investment

and accountancy, may however be considered as

persons having expertise in rehabilitation/ revival of

companies and therefore, eligible for being

considered for appointment as Technical Members.

(vi) In regard to category of persons referred in clause

(g) of sub-section (3) at least five years experience

Page 31 31

should be specified.

(vii) Only Clauses (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), and later part of

clause (f) in sub-section (3) of section 10FD and officers

of civil services of the rank of the Secretary or

Additional Secretary in Indian Company Law

Service and Indian Legal Service can be

considered for purposes of appointment as

Technical Members of the Tribunal.

(viii) Instead of a five-member Selection Committee with

Chief Justice of India (or his nominee) as Chairperson

and two Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance and

Company Affairs and the Secretary in the Ministry of

Labour and Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice

as members mentioned in section 10FX, the Selection

Committee should broadly be on the following lines:

(a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee - Chairperson

(with a casting vote);

(b) A senior Judge of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice

of High Court – Member;

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Company

Affairs - Member; and

(d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice -

Member.

(ix) The term of office of three years shall be changed to

a term of seven or five years subject to eligibility for

appointment for one more term. This is because

considerable time is required to achieve expertise in the

concerned field. A term of three years is very

short and by the time the members achieve the

required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term

will be over. Further the said term of three years with the

retirement age of 65 years is perceived as having

been tailor-made for persons who have retired

or shortly to retire and encourages these

Tribunals to be treated as post-retirement

havens. If these Tribunals are to function

effectively and efficiently they should be able to attract

younger members who will have a reasonable period of

service.

(x) The second proviso to Section 10FE

Page 32 32

enabling the President and members to retain

lien with their parent cadre/ ministry/department

while holding office as President or Members will

not be conducive for the independence of

members. Any person appointed as members

should be prepared to totally disassociate himself from

the Executive. The lien cannot therefore exceed a

period of one year.

(xi) To maintain independence and security in service,

sub-section (3) of section 10FJ and Section 10FV

should provide that suspension of the

President/Chairman or member of a Tribunal can

be only with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of

India.

(xii) The administrative support for all Tribunals

should be from the Ministry of Law & Justice. Neither

the Tribunals nor its members shall seek or be

provided with facilities from the respective

sponsoring or parent Ministries or concerned

Department.

(xiii) Two-Member Benches of the Tribunal should

always have a judicial member. Whenever any

larger or special benches are constituted, the

number of Technical Members shall not exceed the

Judicial Members.”

22)What gets revealed from the reading of para 120, particularly, sub-para

(ii) thereof that only officers who are holding the ranks of Secretaries or

Additional Secretaries alone are to be considered for appointment as

technical Members of NCLT. Provisions contained in clauses (c) and (d)

of sub-section (2) and Clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section

10FD which made Joint Secretaries with certain experience as eligible,

were specifically declared as invalid. Notwithstanding the same, Section

409(3) of the Act, 2013 again makes Joint Secretary to the Government

Page 33 33

of India or equivalent officer eligible for appointment, if he has 15 years

experience as member of Indian Corporate Law Service or Indian Legal

Service, out of which at least 3 years experience in the pay scale of Joint

Secretary. This is clearly in the teeth of dicta pronounced in 2010

judgment.

23)In the counter affidavit, the respondents have endeavored to justify this

provision by stating that this variation was made in view of the lack of

available officers at Additional Secretary level in Indian Companies Law

Service. It is further mentioned that functionally the levels of Additional

Secretary and Joint Secretary are similar. These officers have

knowledge of specific issues concerning operations and working of

companies and their expertise in company law which is expected to

benefit NCLT. Such an explanation is not legally sustainable, having

regard to the clear mandate of 2010 judgment.

We would like to point out that apart from giving other reasons for

limiting the consideration for such posts to Secretary and Additional

Secretary, there was one very compelling factor in the mind of the Court

viz. gradual erosion of independence of judiciary, which was perceived

as a matter of concern. This aspect was demonstrated with specific

examples in certain enactments depicting gradual dilution of the

standards and qualifications prescribed for persons to decide cases

which were earlier being decided by the High Court. We, thus, deem it

Page 34 34

apposite to reproduce that discussion which provides a complete answer

to the aforesaid argument taken by the respondents. The said

discussion, contained in para 112, with its sub-paras, reads as under:

“112. What is a matter of concern is the gradual erosion

of the independence of the judiciary, and shrinking of

the space occupied by the Judiciary and gradual

increase in the number of persons belonging to

the civil service discharging functions and

exercising jurisdiction which was previously

exercised by the High Court. There is also a gradual

dilution of the standards and qualification prescribed for

persons to decide cases which were earlier being

decided by the High Courts. Let us take stock.

112.1 To start with, apart from jurisdiction relating to

appeals and revisions in civil, criminal and tax

matters (and original civil jurisdiction in some

High Courts). The High Courts were exercising original

jurisdiction in two important areas; one was writ

jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 (including

original jurisdiction in service matters) and the

other was in respect to company matters.

112.2 After constitution of Administrative Tribunals

under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the

jurisdiction in regard to original jurisdiction

relating to service matters was shifted from

High Courts to Administrative Tribunals. Section 6 of

the said Act deals with qualifications for appointment as

Chairman, and it is evident therefrom that the Chairman

has to be a High Court Judge either a sitting or a former

Judge. For judicial member the qualification was that

he should be a judge of a High Court or is qualified to

be a Judge of the High Court (i.e. an advocate of the

High Court with ten years practice or a holder of

a judicial office for ten years) or a person who

held the post of Secretary, Govt. of India in the

Department of Legal Affairs or in the Legislative

Department or Member Secretary, Law Commission of

India for a period of two years; or an Additional

Secretary to Government of India in the

Department of Legal Affairs or Legislative

Department for a period of five years.

Page 35 35

112.3 For being appointed as Administrative Member,

the qualification was that the candidate should

have served as Secretary to the Government of

India or any other post of the Central or State

Government carrying the scale of pay which is not

less than as of a Secretary of Government of India for

atleast two years, or should have held the post of

Additional Secretary to the Government of India

or any other post of Central or State Government

carrying the scale of pay which is not less than that of

an Additional Secretary to the Government of India at

least for a period of five years. In other words, matters

that were decided by the High Courts could be decided

by a Tribunal whose members could be two Secretary

level officers with two years experience or even

two Additional Secretary level officers with five

years experience. This was the first dilution.

112.4 The members were provided a term of

office of five years and could hold office till 65

years and the salary and other perquisites of these

members were made the same as that of High Court

Judges. This itself gave room for a comment that these

posts were virtually created as sinecure for members

of the executive to extend their period of

service by five years from 60 to 65 at a higher pay

applicable to High Court Judges. Quite a few members

of the executive thus became members of the

"Tribunals exercising judicial functions".

112.5 We may next refer to Information

Technology Act, 2000 which provided for

establishment of Cyber Appellate Tribunal with a

single member. Section 50 of that Act provided that a

person who is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a

Judge of a High Court, or a person who is, or has

been, a member of the India Legal Service and is

holding or has held a post in Grade I of that service for

at least three years could be appointed as the Presiding

Officer. That is, the requirement of even a Secretary

level officer is gone. Any member of Indian Legal

Service holding a Grade-I Post for three years

can be a substitute for a High Court Judge.

112.6 The next dilution is by insertion of

Chapters 1B in the Companies Act, 1956 with

effect from 1.4.2003 providing for constitution of a

National Company Law Tribunal with a President and a

Page 36 36

large number of Judicial and Technical Members (as

many as 62). There is a further dilution in

the qualifications for members of National Company

Law Tribunal which is a substitute for the High

Court, for hearing winding up matters and

other matters which were earlier heard by High Court. A

member need not even be a Secretary or Addl.

Secretary Level Officer. All Joint Secretary level

civil servants (that are working under Government of

India or holding a post under the Central and State

Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less

than that of the Joint Secretary to the Government of

India) for a period of five years are eligible. Further, any

person who has held a Group-A post for 15 years

(which means anyone belonging to Indian P&T

Accounts & Finance Service, Indian Audit and

Accounts Service, Indian Customs & Central

Excise Service, Indian Defence Accounts Service,

Indian Revenue Service, Indian Ordnances

Factories Service, Indian Postal Service, Indian Civil

Accounts Service, Indian Railway Traffic Service,

Indian Railway Accounts Service, Indian Railway

Personal Service, Indian Defence Estates Service,

Indian Information Service, Indian Trade Services, or

other Central or State Service) with three years'

of service as a member of Indian Company

Law Service (Account) Branch, or who has

`dealt' with any problems relating to Company Law

can become a Member. This means that the cases

which were being decided by the Judges of the High

Court can be decided by two-members of the civil

services - Joint Secretary level officers or officers

holding Group `A' posts or equivalent posts for

15 years, can now discharge the functions of High

Court. This again has given room for comment that

qualifications prescribed are tailor made to provide

sinecure for a large number of Joint Secretary level

officers or officers holding Group `A' posts to serve up

to 65 years in Tribunals exercising judicial functions.

112.7 The dilution of standards may not end here. The

proposed Companies Bill, 2008 contemplates that any

member of Indian Legal Service or Indian Company

Law Service (Legal Branch) with only ten years

service, out of which three years should be in the pay

scale of Joint Secretary, is qualified to be appointed as

a Judicial Member. The speed at which the

qualifications for appointment as Members is being

Page 37 37

diluted is, to say the least, a matter of great concern for

the independence of the Judiciary.”

24)Having regard to the aforesaid clear and categorical dicta in 2010

judgment, tinkering therewith would evidently have the potential of

compromising with standards which 2010 judgment sought to achieve,

nay, so zealously sought to secure. Thus, we hold that Section 409(3)(a)

and (c) are invalid as these provisions suffer from same vice. Likewise,

Section 411(3) as worded, providing for qualifications of technical

Members, is also held to be invalid. For appointment of technical

Members to the NCLT, directions contained in sub-para (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

of para 120 of 2010 judgment will have to be scrupulously followed and

these corrections are required to be made in Section 409(3) to set right

the defects contained therein. We order accordingly, while disposing of

issue No.2.

ISSUE NO.3

25)This issue pertains to the constitution of Selection Committee for

selecting the Members of NCLT and NCLAT. Provision in this respect is

contained in Section 412 of the Act, 2013. Sub-section (2) thereof

provides for the Selection Committee consisting of:

(a)Chief Justice of India or his nominee-Chairperson;

(b)a senior Judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief Justice of High Court—

Member;

Page 38 38

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs—Member;

(d)Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice—Member; and (e) Secretary

in the Department of Financial Services in the Ministry of Finance—

Member.

Provision in this behalf which was contained in Section 10FX, validity

thereof was questioned in 2010 judgment, was to the following effect:

“10FX. Selection Committee: (1) The Chairperson

and Members of the Appellate Tribunal and

President and Members of the Tribunal shall be

appointed by the Central Government on the

recommendations of a Selection Committee consisting of:

(a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee Chairperson;

(b) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and

Member; Company Affairs

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Labour Member;

(d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice

(Department of Legal Affairs or Legislative

Department) Member;

(e) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Company

Affairs (Department of Company Affairs) Member.

(2) The Joint Secretary in the Ministry or Department of

the Central Government dealing with this Act shall be the

Convenor of the Selection Committee.”

26)The aforesaid structure of the Selection Committee was found fault with

by the Constitution Bench in 2010 judgment. The Court specifically

remarked that instead of 5 members Selection Committee, it should be 4

members Selection Committee and even the composition of such a

Selection Committee was mandated in Direction No.(viii) of para 120 and

Page 39 39

this sub-para we reproduce once again hereinbelow:

“(viii) Instead of a five-member Selection Committee with

Chief Justice of India (or his nominee) as Chairperson and

two Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance and Company

Affairs and the Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and

Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice as members

mentioned in section 10FX, the Selection Committee

should broadly be on the following lines:

(a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee - Chairperson

(with a casting vote);

(b) A senior Judge of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice

of High Court – Member;

(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Company

Affairs - Member; and

(d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice –

Member.”

27)Notwithstanding the above, there is a deviation in the composition of

Selection Committee that is prescribed under Section 412 (2) of the Act,

2013. The deviations are as under:

(i) Though the Chief Justice of India or his nominee is to act as

Chairperson, he is not given the power of a casting vote. It is because of

the reason that instead of four member Committee, the composition of

Committee in the impugned provision is that of five members.

(ii)This Court had suggested one Member who could be either

Secretary in the Ministry of Finance or in Company Affairs (we may point

out that the word “and” contained in Clause (c) of sub-para (viii) of para

120 seems to be typographical mistake and has to be read as “or”, as

otherwise it won't make any sense).

Page 40 40

(iii)Now, from both the Ministries, namely from the Ministry of

Corporate Affairs as well as Ministry of Finance, one Member each is

included. Effect of this composition is to make it a five members

Selection Committee which was not found to be valid in 2010 judgment.

Reason is simple, out of these five Members, three are from the

administrative branch/bureaucracy as against two from judiciary which

will result in predominant say of the members belonging to the

administrative branch, is situation that was specifically diverted from.

The composition of Selection Committee contained in Section 412(2) of

the Act, 2013 is sought to be justified by the respondents by arguing that

the recommended composition in the 2010 judgment was in broad

terms. It is argued that in view of subsuming of BIFR and AAIFR which

are in the administrative jurisdiction of Department of Financial Services,

Secretary DFS has been included. No casting vote has been provided

for the Chairman as over the period of time the selection processes in

such committees have crystallized in a manner that the

recommendations have been unanimous and there is no instance of

voting in such committees in Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Moreover

other similar statutory bodies/tribunals also do not provide for 'casting

vote' to Chairperson of Selection Committee. Further, the Committee will

be deciding its own modalities as provided in the Act. The following

argument is also raised to justify this provision: (i) Robust and healthy

Page 41 41

practices have evolved in deliberations of Selection Committees. Till

now there is no known case of any material disagreement in such

committees. (ii) The intention is to man the Selection Committee with

persons of relevant experience and knowledge.

28)We are of the opinion that this again does not constitute any valid or

legal justification having regard to the fact that this very issue stands

concluded by the 2010 judgment which is now a binding precedent and,

thus, binds the respondent equally. The prime consideration in the mind

of the Bench was that it is the Chairperson, viz. Chief Justice of India, or

his nominee who is to be given the final say in the matter of selection

with right to have a casting vote. That is the ratio of the judgment and

reasons for providing such a composition are not far to seek. In the face

of the all pervading prescript available on this very issue in the form of a

binding precedent, there is no scope for any relaxation as sought to be

achieved through the impugned provision and we find it to be

incompatible with the mandatory dicta of 2010 judgment. Therefore, we

hold that provisions of Section 412(2) of the Act, 2013 are not valid and

direction is issued to remove the defect by bringing this provision in

accord with sub-para (viii) of para 120 of 2010 judgment.

29)We now deal with some other issues raised in the petition. It was feebly

argued by Mr. Datar that power to punish for contempt as given to the

NCLT and NCLAT under Section 425 of the Act is not healthy and should

Page 42 42

be done away with. It was also argued that power given to the Central

Government to constitute the Benches is again impermissible as such

power should rest with President, NCLT or Chairman, NCLAT. However,

we hardly find any legal strength in these arguments. We have to keep

in mind that these provisions are contained in a statute enacted by the

Parliament and the petitioner could not point out as to how such

provisions are unconstitutional.

30)The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is to allow this writ petition partly,

in the manner mentioned above.

31)Before we part, we must mention that the affidavit dated 07.05.2015 is

filed on behalf of the respondents mentioning therein the steps that have

been taken till date towards setting up of NCLT and NCLAT. It is pointed

out that the approval for creation of one post of Chairperson and five

posts of Members of NCLAT as well as one post of President and 62

posts of Members of NCLT and two posts of Registrar one each for

NCLT and NCLAT and one post of Secretary, NCLT was obtained and

the approval was also obtained for creation of 246 posts of supporting

staff of NCLT and NCLAT. It is also mentioned that following draft Rules

have already been prepared in consultation with the Legislative

Department, Ministry of Law: (i) NCLAT (Salaries, Allowances and other

terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and other Members)

Rules, 2014, (ii) NCLT (Salary, Allowances and other Terms and

Page 43 43

Conditions of Service of President and other Members) Rules, 2013.

Draft Recruitment Rules for the supporting staff were also prepared in

consultation with Legislative Department, Ministry of Law. It is further

mentioned that draft Rules with regard to manner of functioning of

NCLT/NCLAT etc. were prepared in order to place them before the

Chairperson/President of NCLAT/NCLT on their appointment for

finalization as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. These

Rules cover provisions with regard to manner of functioning of

NCLT/NCLAT; manner in which applications for various approvals shall

be made by applicants and approved; and specific procedural

requirements with regard to applications/matters relating to

compromises/arrangements/ amalgamations; prevention of oppression

and mismanagement; revival and rehabilitation of sick companies;

winding up and other miscellaneous requirements. Space for Principal

Bench and other Benches of NCLT, including a special Bench at Delhi to

deal with transferred cases of BIFR and AAIFR had also been identified.

Process initiated for renting space in some locations, which was

discontinued in view of the pending petition, can be restarted at a short

notice. Budget heads have been created for meeting the expenditure for

NCLT and NCLAT. Allocated funds for 2014-2015 had to be surrendered

in view of the delay in settling up the Tribunals.

32)From the aforesaid, it seems the only step which is left to make NCLT

Page 44 44

and NCLAT functional is to appoint President and Members of NCLT and

Chairperson and Members of NCLAT.

33)Since, the functioning of NCLT and NCLAT has not started so far and its

high time that these Tribunals start functioning now, we hope that the

respondents shall take remedial measures as per the directions

contained in this judgment at the earliest, so that the NCLT & NCLAT are

adequately manned and start functioning in near future.

34)Writ petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid manner.

.............................................CJI.

(H.L. DATTU)

.............................................J.

(A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J.

(ARUN MISHRA)

.............................................J.

(ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

.............................................J.

(AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 14, 2015.

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