1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH

&

HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI

ON THE 28

th

OF JANUARY, 2026

WRIT PETITION NO.33484 of 2025

MEENAKSHI KHARE AND ANOTHER

Versus

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH , THROUGH PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL TAX AND OTHERS

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appearance :

Shri Prakash Upadhyay – Senior Advocate with Shri Siddharth

Sharma, Shri Shubham Manchani, Shri Devendra Prajapati, Shri Mayank

Upadhyay, Shri Satyam Shukla and Shri Lavkush Rathore - Advocates for the

petitioners.

Shri Abhinav Shrivastava – Advocate for the respondent No.3/S.P.E.

Lokayukt.

Shri Yash Soni – Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reserved on      :  12/01/2026

Pronounced on : 28/01/2026

O R D E R

Per : Justice Vivek Kumar Singh

By way of this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India the petitioners take exception to the order dated 04.04.2005 passed

by respondent No.2 granting sanction under Sections 19(1)(b) and (c) of

2

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘PC Act, 1988’) to

prosecute the petitioner No.2 in connection with Crime No.238/2019 for

the offence registered under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the PC Act

read with Section 120-B of the IPC on the ground that the impugned order

is arbitrary, unreasonable and has been passed without due application of

mind and without consideration of the material facts, particularly the

substantiated income of the petitioner No.1.

2.Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the institution of

the present petition, are as under :-

(i)The petitioner No.2 was serving in the capacity of

Assistant Commissioner, Excise, Indore when the impugned

sanction was granted and at present, he is posted as Deputy

Commissioner, State Excise, Rewa. The genesis of the case

stems from a complaint dated 20.06.2018 lodged by one Kamta

Prasad, pursuant to which search operation was conducted by

respondent-Lokayukt at the petitioner’s known residential and

official premises on 15.10.2019.

(ii)The petitioner No.1, who is the spouse of petitioner No.2

hails from a distinguished legal background and has carried

forward the legacy of her family by taking up the noble

profession of advocacy and commenced her practice prior to her

marriage and was independently earning and duly filing regular

Income Tax Returns (in short, ‘ITR’) before her marriage.

(iii)During the course of enquiry, the Lokayukt compiled data

pertaining to the assets and expenditure of the petitioners vis-a-

vis from 04.09.1998 to 15.10.2019 (check period) and arrived at

3

a conclusion that petitioners income exceeded their known

sources of income by approximately 88.20%. Thereafter, on the

recommendation of Lokayukt, respondent No.2 granted

sanction to prosecute petitioner No.2 under Section 13(1)(b) and

13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 read with 120-B of the IPC.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner succinctly submits that petitioner

No.1 is a highly qualified law graduate and is from a distinguished legal

background and derive substantial income from her legal practice and from

other sources, which enable her to sustain herself and contribute to the

financial well being of her family and also consistently filing her Income

Tax Returns reflecting her professional earnings. He further submits that

the petitioner No.1 has purchased an agricultural land in the district Raisen

for farming and horticulture activity by utilizing the registered gifts

received from her parents, savings which she had made from income of

legal profession and bank loan and thereafter started the agricultural

activity from which she earned profits. The production, transportation and

sale of the agricultural produce was duly verified by the Investigating

Agency and no discrepancy was ever found in the balance sheet for the

agricultural produce. The true copies of Income Tax Returns have been

annexed herewith as Annexure P/2. It is also submitted that the

prosecution also admits that all the assets recovered during raid (movable

and immovable) were duly accounted in ITR of respective petitioners and

petitioner No.2 in compliance of Rule 19 of M.P. Civil Service (Conduct)

Rules, 1965 have made declaration to the department. However,

proceedings against the petitioners were initiated by arbitrarily rejecting

the total income of petitioner No.1 and including the assets and

expenditure of her in the account of petitioner No.2 and thereby treating

4

the income of petitioner No.2 to be nearly 88% more than his known

source of income. Therefore, the petitioners have challenged the said

approach on the ground that the agricultural income of petitioner No.1 has

wrongly been deducted as it is a legal income and it is duly disclosed

under the law both to the Income Tax authorities and the

employer/department of petitioner No.2.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioners has invited attention towards the

calculation of assets and expenditure of petitioners, which is as under :-

(a)Total net worth of petitioner nos.1 and 2 including expenditure is

Rs.10,71,71,106/-.

(b)Legal Income of petitioners as accepted by Investigation Agency is

Rs.5,69,05,492/-.

If agricultural income of petitioner No.1 (though accepted and duly

verified but not included in calculation) Rs.04,81,56,140/- is included in

the total income of petitioner Nos.1 and 2, it would be Rs.10,50,61,632/-.

The difference between Rs.10,71,71,106/- and Rs.04,81,56,140/- would be

Rs.05,90,14,966/-. Now, the difference between legally accepted income

i.e. Rs.5,69,05,492 and the amount after deducting Rs.05,90,14,966/-

which is the agricultural income of petitioner No.1, it would come to

Rs.21,09,474/- which is approx. 1.94% and cannot be treated to be

disproportionate, as is less than 10%.

5.Learned counsel for the petitioners is heavily relying upon the report

of Excise Commissioner (Annexure P/5) in which he while examining the

case putforth by Investigating Agency has dealt with this aspect in detail

and has opined that all the income and assets covered under investigation

are under due intimation of department and has found that Rs.37,97,522/-

5

has wrongly been deducted from income of petitioner No.1 from legal

profession and Rs.4,60,59,780/- has wrongly been deducted from the

income towards agriculture. Thus, the total income of petitioner No.1 and

2 is Rs.10,67,62,790/- against expenditure of Rs.10,03,76,664, therefore, it

was not a fit case for sanction. Learned counsel further submits that the

respondent No.2 ignored the recommendation made by the Commissioner

of Excise and overlooked the representation made by petitioner No. 2 and

granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner for the aforesaid charges vide

impugned order dated 04.04.2025 as the petitioner No.1 was not able to

give the details of her clients to whom she has rendered legal service to the

satisfaction of I.O., the income from legal practice which was around

37,00,000/- in check period has been negated and treated to be zero and

expenditure claimed to have made out of this income is included in the

expenditure of petitioner No.2.

6.Learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn attention of this

Court to Rule 6F of the Income Tax Rules, i.e. the lex speciali on the

subject of retaining receipt towards professional income for scrutiny. Rule

6F(5) recommends the retention period of books of accounts to six years

and the said books of account would in-fact, contain the details of services

rendered by petitioner No.1 to her clients in the form of invoices.

However, the Investigating Agencies as well as the sanctioning department

failed to take into account that the retention period of six years has elapsed

and the ITRs of petitioner No.1 are the only conclusive proof of her

earning from her professional job as an Advocate. The respondent in the

process of investigation have denied to recognize petitioner No.1’s

independent professional identity and treated her merely as a spouse of a

6

government servant. Therefore, the sanction order has been passed

mechanically without proper application of mind as it entirely fails to

specify which documents were forwarded along with the report of

Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt. Such lack of disclosure, reinforces

the petitioners’ contention that the impugned sanction order has been

passed in complete disregard to the statutory requirement of reasoned and

independent decision. Furthermore, it is evident from the impugned order

that although the sanctioning authority purports to disagree with the

detailed and reasoned recommendation of Excise Commissioner, no reason

whatsoever have been recorded for such disagreement. Therefore, the

impugned order is liable to be set aside.

7.To bolster his submission, learned counsel for the petitioners has

relied upon a recent landmark judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the

case of Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 2511 on the subject of grant of sanction by the sanctioning

authority, wherein it has been held as under :-

“12.The avowed object of sanctions being

granted before cognizance is to ensure that the

threat of criminal prosecution does not hang over

the heads of the officials in discharge of their

public duty. At the same time, it is not intended to

protect officers who have transgressed the

boundaries of their duty for some act/benefit

which otherwise would not be termed acceptable.

An aspect connected with this object, is that the

authority granting sanction does not do so

mechanically. This is a layer of protection

envisioned by this Section. In other words, when

allegations are made, it is not for the authorities

7

to grant sanction simply on the basis of the

allegations but it is also that they should examine

the materials placed by the investigating agency

and come to a prima facie satisfaction thereon,

about the officer having some or the other

involvement in the alleged offence/crime. In

Mansukhlal Vitthaldas Chauhan v. State of

Gujarat11, this Court held that the order of

granting or refusing sanction must show

application of mind. The relevant paragraphs

thereof are extracted hereunder:

“17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution.

The grant of sanction is not an idle

formality or an acrimonious exercise but a

solemn and sacrosanct act which affords

protection to government servants against

frivolous prosecutions. (See Mohd. Iqbal

Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 :

1979 SCC (Cri) 926 : AIR 1979 SC 677])

Sanction is a weapon to ensure

discouragement of frivolous and vexatious

prosecution and is a safeguard for the

innocent but not a shield for the guilty.

18. The validity of the sanction would,

therefore, depend upon the material placed

before the sanctioning authority and the fact

that all the relevant facts, material and

evidence have been considered by the

sanctioning authority. Consideration implies

application of mind. The order of sanction

must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning

authority had considered the evidence and

other material placed before it…”

19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends

on the applicability of mind by the

8

sanctioning authority to the facts of the case

as also the material and evidence collected

during investigation, it necessarily follows

that the sanctioning authority has to apply

its own independent mind for the generation

of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution

has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the

sanctioning authority should not be under

pressure from any quarter nor should any

external force be acting upon it to take a

decision one way or the other. Since the

discretion to grant or not to grant sanction

vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority,

its discretion should be shown to have not

been affected by any extraneous

consideration. If it is shown that the

sanctioning authority was unable to apply

its independent mind for any reason

whatsoever or was under an obligation or

compulsion or constraint to grant the

sanction, the order will be bad for the

reason that the discretion of the authority

“not to sanction” was taken away and it was

compelled to act mechanically to sanction

the prosecution.”

8.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that a

bare perusal of order of sanction indicates that the sanctioning authority

has applied its mind and had taken into consideration all the documents

and record which was seen during the course of investigation and has

independently taken a decision after perusing the same that the petitioner

No.2 is guilty of the offence which is alleged against him and the sanction

for prosecution was granted for the aforesaid offence or any other offences

9

which may be proved during the course of trial by the competent Court of

law. It is further submitted that it is trite that the order of sanction for

prosecution cannot be challenged at this stage by filing a writ petition as

observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Virender Kumar Tripathi (2009) 15 SCC 533; Central

Bureau of Investigation vs. Ashok Kumar Agrawal (2014) 14 SCC 295

and Paul Verghese vs. State of Kerala (2007) 14 SCC 783. Thus, the

State Government is competent to grant sanction for prosecution against

the accused in exercise of powers conferred under Article 166(2) and (3) of

the Constitution of India and as per the instruction issued in circular 15-

01/2014/1-10 dated 23.10.2024 by General Administration Department to

dispose of the matters relating to sanction for prosecution of government

servants, thus, the sanction has been granted in exercise of the same.

9.Learned counsel for the SPE-Lokayukt also opposed the arguments

advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and contended that the

adequacy of material placed before sanctioning authority cannot be gone

into at this stage and said position of law has been enunciated by this

Hon’ble Court in W.P. No.7818/2021 (Sabit Khan vs. State of M.P. and

others) wherein it has been observed that challenge to sanction order on

the ground that it suffers from non-consideration of relevant material is

required to be raised during the trial and established by leading the

evidence. In-fact, during investigation, petitioner No.1 was not able to

produce proper documents and her defence cannot be considered at this

stage. The sanction order is neither mechanical nor have been passed

without application of mind as during the check period, the income taken

into consideration includes, income from salary, agricultural income,

10

interest income and investment income. The total expenditure includes

purchase of immovable properties, investments and savings in bank

account. After due and proper investigation of all material aspect, it was

concluded that the petitioners were in possession of disproportionate assets

to the extent of 88.20%. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition filed

by the petitioners is wholly misconceived and without any substance and

the same is liable to be dismissed.

10.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

11.No other point was pressed by both the parties.

12.In the conspectus of facts and circumstances of the case and

considering the arguments advanced by the parties, it is apposite to refer

Section 19 of the P.C. Act, 1988 which reads as under :-

“19. Previous sanction necessary for

prosecution.—(1) No court shall take

cognizance of an offence punishable under

[Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been

committed by a public servant, except with the

previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in

the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013],—

(a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or

as the case may be, was at the time of

commission of the alleged offence employed] in

connection with the affairs of the Union and is

not removable from his office save by or with the

sanction of the Central Government, of that

Government;

(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or

as the case may be, was at the time of

commission of the alleged offence employed] in

connection with the affairs of a State and is not

11

removable from his office save by or with the

sanction of the State Government, of that

Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the

authority competent to remove him from his

office.

[Provided that no request can be made, by a

person other than a police officer or an officer of

an investigation agency or other law enforcement

authority, to the appropriate Government or

competent authority, as the case may be, for the

previous sanction of such Government or

authority for taking cognizance by the court of

any of the offences specified in this sub-section,

unless—

(i) such person has filed a complaint in a

competent court about the alleged offences for

which the public servant is sought to be

prosecuted; and

(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint

under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the

complainant to obtain the sanction for

prosecution against the public servant for further

proceeding:

Provided further that in the case of request from

the person other than a police officer or an officer

of an investigation agency or other law

enforcement authority, the appropriate

Government or competent authority shall not

accord sanction to prosecute a public servant

without providing an opportunity of being heard

to the concerned public servant:

Provided also that the appropriate Government or

any competent authority shall, after the receipt of

12

the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of

a public servant under this sub-section,

endeavour to convey the decision on such

proposal within a period of three months from

the date of its receipt:

Provided also that in case where, for the purpose

of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal

consultation is required, such period may, for the

reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by

a further period of one month:

Provided also that the Central Government may,

for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a

public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it

considers necessary.

Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section

(1), the expression “public servant” includes such

person—

(a) who has ceased to hold the office during

which the offence is alleged to have been

committed; or

(b) who has ceased to hold the office during

which the offence is alleged to have been

committed and is holding an office other than the

office during which the offence is alleged to have

been committed.]

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt

arises as to whether the previous sanction as

required under sub-section (1) should be given by

the Central Government or the State Government

or any other authority, such sanction shall be

given by that Government or authority which

would have been competent to remove the public

servant from his office at the time when the

offence was alleged to have been committed.

13

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a

Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a

Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of the absence of, or any error, omission

or irregularity in, the sanction required under

sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that

court, a failure of justice has in fact been

occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this

Act on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the sanction granted by the

authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,

omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure

of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this

Act on any other ground and no court shall

exercise the powers of revision in relation to any

interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial,

appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether

the absence of, or any error, omission or

irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or

resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have

regard to the fact whether the objection could and

should have been raised at any earlier stage in the

proceedings.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the authority to

grant sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes

reference to any requirement that the prosecution

shall be at the instance of a specified authority or

14

with the sanction of a specified person or any

requirement of a similar nature.”

13.Having regard to the aforesaid provision contained in Section 19 of

the said Act, it is imperative to refer to the pronouncement of Apex Court

on this point rendered in the case of Nanjappa vs. State of Karnataka,

(2015) 14 SCC 186 wherein the Court has very aptly dealt with the

intricacies of Section 19(1) as also Section 19(3) and (4) of the said Act as

to what stage, question of validity of sanction accorded under Section

19(1) could be raised and what are the powers of the Court in appeal,

confirmation or revision under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the said

Act and observed as follows :-

22.The legal position regarding the importance

of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit

equivocation. The statute forbids taking of

cognizance by the court against a public servant

except with the previous sanction of an authority

competent to grant such sanction in terms of

clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The

question regarding validity of such sanction can

be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The

competence of the court trying the accused so

much depends upon the existence of a valid

sanction. In case the sanction is found to be

invalid the court can discharge the accused

relegating the parties to a stage where the

competent authority may grant a fresh sanction

for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the

trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity

attached to the sanction order, the same shall be

deemed to be non est in the eyes of law and shall

15

not forbid a second trial for the same offences,

upon grant of a valid sanction for such

prosecution.

23. Having said that there are two aspects which

we must immediately advert to. The first relates

to the effect of sub-section (3) to Section 19,

which starts with a non obstante clause. Also

relevant to the same aspect would be Section 465

CrPC which we have extracted earlier.

23.1.It was argued on behalf of the State with

considerable tenacity worthy of a better cause,

that in terms of Section 19(3), any error, omission

or irregularity in the order sanctioning

prosecution of an accused was of no consequence

so long as there was no failure of justice resulting

from such error, omission or irregularity. It was

contended that in terms of Explanation to Section

4, “error includes competence of the authority to

grant sanction”. The argument is on the face of it

attractive but does not, in our opinion, stand

closer scrutiny.

23.2. A careful reading of sub-section (3) to

Section 19 would show that the same interdicts

reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or

order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground

that the sanction order suffers from an error,

omission or irregularity, unless of course the court

before whom such finding, sentence or order is

challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion

that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of

such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section

(3), in other words, simply forbids interference

with an order passed by the Special Judge in

appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on

the ground that the sanction is bad save and

16

except, in cases where the appellate or revisional

court finds that failure of justice has occurred by

such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub-

section (3) has no application to proceedings

before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an

order discharging the accused, if he is of the

opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution

of the accused had not been produced as required

under Section 19(1).

23.3. Sub-section (3), in our opinion, postulates a

prohibition against a higher court reversing an

order passed by the Special Judge on the ground

of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order

of sanction. It does not forbid a Special Judge

from passing an order at whatever stage of the

proceedings holding that the prosecution is not

maintainable for want of a valid order sanctioning

the same.

23.4. The language employed in sub-section (3)

is, in our opinion, clear and unambiguous. This is,

in our opinion, sufficiently evident even from the

language employed in sub-section (4) according

to which the appellate or the revisional court

shall, while examining whether the error,

omission or irregularity in the sanction had

occasioned in any failure of justice, have regard

to the fact whether the objection could and should

have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to

say, that a conjoint reading of sub-sections 19(3)

and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said

provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of

the order of sanction or the validity of the

proceedings including finding, sentence or order

passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision

17

before a higher court and not before the Special

Judge trying the accused.

23.5. The rationale underlying the provision

obviously is that if the trial has proceeded to

conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence,

the same should not be lightly interfered with by

the appellate or the revisional court simply

because there was some omission, error or

irregularity in the order sanctioning the

prosecution under Section 19(1). Failure of justice

is, what the appellate or revisional court would in

such cases look for. And while examining

whether any such failure had indeed taken place,

the Court concerned would also keep in mind

whether the objection touching the error,

omission or irregularity in the sanction could or

should have been raised at an earlier stage of the

proceedings meaning thereby whether the same

could and should have been raised at the trial

stage instead of being urged in appeal or

revision.”

14.Further, the Apex Court in one another decision rendered in the case

of State of Karnataka v. S. Subbegowda, (2023) 17 SCC 699 has

manifestly dealt with this point and held as under :-

“16.Having regard to the aforestated provisions

contained in Section 19 of the said Act, there

remains no shadow of doubt that the statute

forbids taking of cognizance by the court against

a public servant except with the previous sanction

of the Government/authority competent to grant

such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c)

to Section 19(1). It is also well settled proposition

of law that the question with regard to the validity

18

of such sanction should be raised at the earliest

stage of the proceedings, however could be raised

at the subsequent stage of the trial also. In our

opinion, the stages of proceedings at which an

accused could raise the issue with regard to the

validity of the sanction would be the stage when

the court takes cognizance of the offence, the

stage when the charge is to be framed by the court

or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e. at the

stage of final arguments in the trial. Such issue of

course, could be raised before the court in appeal,

revision or confirmation, however the powers of

such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and

sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.”

15.In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this Court is of the

considered view that validity of impugned sanction order can be

challenged at any stage and more appropriately, it should be raised at an

earlier stage of proceeding as has been done in the instant case.

16.An order granting or refusing sanction must be preceded by

application of mind on the part of appropriate authority on material placed

before it. While granting sanction, the authority can neither take into

consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an order on extraneous

considerations not germane for passing a statutory order.

17.In the present case, it is quite discernible that since the petitioner

No.1 has clearly justified the amount claimed as the income from her

professional work, the Income Tax Returns as well as income from farm,

receipt from respective Mandi justifying sales and the agricultural

equipment unearthed during the raid, all of it points towards only one

conclusion that if the professional and subsequent agricultural income of

19

petitioner No.1 is taken into account in that case, the sanctioning authority

ought not to have granted sanction and nipped the matter in the bud itself.

18.The expression “known sources of income” refers to such income as

is duly disclosed in accordance with Rule 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil

Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965, vis-a-vis Income Tax Returns have already

been filed. Income that has been formally intimated to the department

under the applicable service rules and substantiated through statutory tax

filings constitutes “known” and legitimate income in the eyes of law.

19.This Court derives strength from yet another recent decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Nirankar Nath Pandey

vs. State of U.P. and ors. (Criminal Appeal No.5009 of 2024) wherein

the Apex Court observed as under :-

9.We are of the view that the Appellant's

wife's income must be considered as well while

calculating the total income and assets. Both the

Appellant and his wife have filed the relevant

income tax returns in order to show their

respective incomes and assets. The Respondents

in their Counter-Affidavit have not denied these

income tax returns or alleged them to be forged

or fabricated. Therefore, when a public servant is

submitting his income tax returns, they should be

presumed to be true and correct. If you duly

consider the income tax returns of the Appellant

and his wife for the check period of the year

1996-2020, the total income is coming up to be

Rs.1,21,06,268/-(Rupees One Crore Twenty One

Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight

only) which is in fact more than the assets

amounting to Rs.1,16,02,669/- (Rupees One

20

Crore Sixteen Lakh Two Thousand Six Hundred

Sixty Nine only) which is said to be the

disproportionate assets in question under the

present FIR.

10.Further, we have considered that the check

period is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is

almost twenty five years. It must be taken into

account that over such a long period of time,

there is inflation and a natural progression in the

changing economy that affects the value of assets

such as property. This can understandably lead to

discrepancies in declaring the value of assets

over the years. Therefore, there should be a more

dynamic approach while considering an

individual's income and assets over the span of

two decades, such as in the present case. The

notion that the declared value of an asset such as

property or gold will remain static is flawed. This

has to be considered while examining an

individual's assets and income while making a

determination regarding disproportionate assets.

Such an examination needs to reflect such

adjustments and changes as is natural with the

progression of time.

11.We find it pertinent to note that in cases

such as these where disproportionate assets are

being dealt with, the amounts under scrutiny

cannot be looked at in the same manner as one

would do a Bank statement or daily ledger of

income and expenditure. The scrutiny process

cannot be as mechanical as that when you are

examining declared assets and the income of an

individual over such a long period of time. There

has to be a certain margin that is given while

making such an assessment as there are

21

invariably economical fluctuations that would

have taken place, especially over the course of

nearly twenty-five years. It is crucial to have a

nuanced appreciation of how time and economic

conditions affect asset value in such cases.

12.This Court has held in State of Haryana

vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 that when

allegations made in the first information report or

the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused, powers

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

could be exercised to prevent abuse of the

process of any court. We find that the present FIR

in question and the case against the Appellant is

covered under these findings in Bhajan Lal

(supra).

20.Taking note of the ratio decidendi of the aforesaid decision of Apex

Court, this Court is of the view that the Investigating Agency and the

sanctioning authority had wrongly denied to recognize petitioner No.1’s

independent professional identity and treated her merely a spouse of

government servant and inclusion of her income in the income of

petitioner No.2 is unreasonable and not a correct assessment of income of

petitioner No.2, as the sanctioning authority was required to apply its mind

to the entire material placed before him and on examination thereof, was

required to reach a conclusion fairly, objectively and consistent with public

interest as to whether or not in the facts and circumstances, sanction could

be accorded to prosecute the government servant.

21.As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, the writ

petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned sanction

22

order dated 04.04.2025 is set aside and the consequent proceedings

emanating from the sanction order are quashed.

22.Petition allowed.

23.No order as to costs.

(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH) (AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI)

JUDGE JUDGE

PK