1

2026:CGHC:889-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

C RA No. 2137 of 2024

1 - Mohammad Mansoor S/o Mohammad Rasool Aged About 21 Years R/o

Parapa Naka Geedam Road Gurugovind, Ward No. 36 Jagdalpur, Police

Station- Parapa, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Narayan Dhruv S/o Munnalal Dhruv Aged About 19 Years R/o Kalipur

Awaspara Jagdalpur, Police Station- Parapa, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh.

... appellants(s)

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S.- Farasgaon, District : Kondagaon,

Chhattisgarh ..Respondent(s)

For appellants No.1 /Mohammad Mansoor :Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate.

For appellants No. 2/Narayan Dhruv :Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan,

Advocate.

For Respondent/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A.

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shr i Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge .

07.01.2026

1.Heard Ms. Sareena Khan, learned counsel for the appellants No. 1

and Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, learned counsel for appellants No. 2. Also

heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned G.A., appearing for the

respondent/State.

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2.In pursuance of notice issued to victim, Today, father of the victim

appeared before this Court through DLSA Kondagaon and raised

objection in releasing the appellants on bail.

3.This criminal appeal preferred under Section 415(2) of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is directed against the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

22.10.2024, passed by the learned Additional Session Judge FTSC

(POCSO Act 2012) Kondgagaon District Kodgagaon (C.G.) in Special

Session Case No. 62/2022, whereby the appellants has been convicted

and sentenced as under:

appellant No. 1

Conviction

Sentence

Section 363 of the Indian Penal

Code (for short, ‘IPC’)

Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’)

for 5 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

Section 366A of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

Section 376(3) of the IPC R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

Section 4(2) of POCSO R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

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appellant No. 2

Conviction

Sentence

Section 212 of the Indian Penal

Code (for short, ‘IPC’)

Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’)

for 3 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

Section 17 of POCSO R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in

default of payment of fine, 01 month

Additional R.I.

Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

4.Brief facts of the case are that, on 19.02.2022, the father (PW-2) of

the victim, lodged a written complaint (Ex.P-08) at the Farasgaon Police

Station mentioning therein that on 13.09.2022, the prosecutrix, who is the

daughter of the complainant, left her house in the morning as usual to go

to school. At that time, the prosecutrix informed her friends that she was

going to school on a motorcycle with her maternal uncle, Mohammad

Mansoor, and that she would return before the school bell rang. After

stating so, she left with the said person. On the same day, the class

teacher of the school telephonically informed the mother of one of the

prosecutrix’s friends that the prosecutrix had not attended school that day

and requested her to inform the parents of the prosecutrix. Pursuant

thereto, the mother of the prosecutrix’s friend informed the mother of the

prosecutrix over the phone, whereupon it came to light that the prosecutrix

had not reached school. Subsequently, upon making inquiries, it was

revealed that the accused Mohammad Mansoor, who had come to

Farsgaon about one and a half months earlier, had taken the prosecutrix

with him on a motorcycle. When the father of the prosecutrix contacted his

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brother-in-law, Mohammad Mansoor, he admitted that he had taken the

prosecutrix with him on the motorcycle. From the aforesaid facts and

circumstances, it is evident that the accused Mohammad Mansoor, by

inducing and alluring the prosecutrix, abducted her and took her away

from the lawful guardianship of her parents. Based upon the said report,

FIR (Ex.P/08) was registered against the appellantss for offence

punishable under Sections 363 of Indian Penal Code. During

investigation, On 22.09.2022, the abducted minor girl was recovered in

the presence of witnesses Sakshi Devendra Mahavir (PW-13) and Dhan

Shyam Yadav (PW-14), and a recovery panchnama (Ex. P-01) was

prepared. Thereafter, the statement of the prosecutrix was recorded,

wherein she stated that on 19.09.2022, the accused Mohammad

Mansoor, by inducing and alluring her on the pretext of marriage,

abducted her and took her to Jagdalpur to the house of his friend Narayan

Dhruv, where both of them stayed for one night. During that night, the

accused established physical relations with her, and prior thereto also, the

accused had established physical relations with her at Farsgaon. On the

basis of the statement of the prosecutrix, offences under Sections 366,

376(3), 376(2)(d) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 were added

against the accused Mohammad Mansoor and taken up for investigation.

Further, since the accused Narayan Dhruv had provided shelter to his

friend Mohammad Mansoor and the prosecutrix at his house and had

assisted them in reaching Jagdalpur Railway Station, offences under

Sections 212 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code were added against him.

On the same date, i.e., 22.09.2022, for the purpose of obtaining transit

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remand of the accused and the prosecutrix, a letter (Ex. P-32) was

submitted to the Court of the A.C.J.M., Kharagpur. The transit remand

order sheets passed by the A.C.J.M. Court, Kharagpur are Ex. P-33 and

Ex. P-34. The prosecutrix and the accused were taken into custody at the

spot, and inspection memos (Ex. P-35 and Ex. P-36) were prepared

accordingly.

5.Learned trial Court framed charges for the offences punishable

under Sections 363, 366A & 376(2)(<) of IPC and Section 6 of the

POCSO Act read over and explained to the accused Mohammad

Mansoor, who abjured his guilt and Sections 212 of IPC and Section 17 of

the POCSO Act read over and explained to the accused Narayan Dhurv,

who abjured his guilt.

6.In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as

many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 48 documents in support of case of

the prosecution. The appellantss have neither examined any witness in

their defence nor exhibited any document.

7.After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence

produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the

appellants and sentenced him as mentioned in paragraph 02 of this

judgment. Hence this appeal.

8.Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the

prosecution have failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There

are material omission and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution

witnesses. The prosecution has failed to produce the cogent and legally

admissible evidence with respect to age of the victim to hold that on the

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date of incident she was minor. The author of the School Admission and

Discharge Register have not been examined and the basis on which the

date of birth of the victim is recorded in the said school register have also

not been proved. No any Kotwar register, birth certificate have been

produced by the prosecution for determination of the actual age of the

victim.

9.He would further submit that the victim was having love affair with

the appellants and she herself eloped with him on her own sweet will and

resided with him for about one month in Jagdalpur and she has not made

any complaint to anyone while going with the appellants by Bus or Train.

She has not raised any alarm while she has been taken by the appellants

and also while staying with him and making physical relation with him. The

evidence of the victim does not inspire the confidence and therefore no

offences under IPC and POCSO Act are made out against the appellants

and he is entitled for acquittal.

10.On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposed the submissions

of learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the offences

committed by the appellants were heinous in nature and thus, the trial

Court had rightly convicted him. He submitted that the trial Court had

considered all the arguments made by the appellants and there was

sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of

incident which is proved by the admission – discharge register which

contains the date of birth of the victim as 19.09.2009. The evidence of the

victim need not be required for any corroboration and on the sole

testimony of the victim the conviction can be made. Therefore, there is no

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illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court and the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence needs no

interference.

11.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their

rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original

records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully

as well.

12.With regard to the age of the victim, the prosecution has mainly

relied upon the admission – discharge register (Ex.P/12), which is seized

by the Police and as per the admission – discharge register, the date of

birth of the victim is 11.08.2004, which is sought to be proved by the PW-

3. PW-3 in his deposition has stated that the police had seized School

Admission and Discharge register with respect to date of birth of the

victim vide seizure memo Ex.P/13 and according to which the date of birth

of the victim is recorded as 19.09.2009. In the school register the victim

was admitted in Class -KG-1 on 20.06.2012. In cross-examination, she

has admitted that the endorsement with respect to date of birth of the

victim in the said school register is not in his handwriting. He did not know

as to who had taken her to the school for her admission. He also did not

know as to on what basis her date of birth has been recorded in the said

school register

13.The victim (PW-1), in her deposition before the learned trial Court

stated that The prosecutrix (PW-01) deposed that she is acquainted with

the accused Mohammad Mansoor and Narayan Dhruv. She stated

that in the same year, accused Mohammad Mansoor had come to her

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village and stayed at his brother-in-law’s house, during which time she

came to know him. She further stated that she stayed for one day with

accused Mansoor at the house of accused Narayan Dhruv, and since then

she has known Narayan Dhruv as well. She deposed that after the

accused Mansoor left his brother-in-law’s house, he used to tell her

friends that he loved her and liked her, though she herself never had any

such conversation with him. She further stated that on the day of her

birthday, while she was going to school with three of her friends, she met

the accused Mansoor on the way. The accused asked her to accompany

him on his motorcycle for a ride, which she initially refused. Thereupon,

the accused threatened that if she did not go with him, he would come

under a vehicle. Being frightened by the threat, she accompanied him on

his motorcycle, and he took her to Ghumar Dam. She further deposed that

after receiving a phone call from his brother-in-law, the accused took her

to the house of accused Narayan Dhruv and kept her there for one day in

the same room. At the said place, accused Mansoor established physical

relations with her once. On the next day, the accused took her to a railway

station (the name of which she does not know), made her board a train

going towards West Bengal, and took her along with him. After reaching

West Bengal, she informed her parents telephonically that she was with

the accused. The prosecutrix was declared hostile, and upon being cross-

examined by the Special Public Prosecutor, she admitted that the

accused Mohammad Mansoor, on the false promise of marriage, induced

and allured her and forcibly established physical relations with her.

However, in the medical examination done by Dr. Jyoti Kange (PW-09) no

injuries were found on her body. Even the father (PW-2) or any other

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witness have not stated anything that she had sustained any injuries

which goes to suggest that such statements were an afterthought. Even

the FSL report as well as MLC report were found to be negative. Doctor

has also stated that no definite opinion could be given with regard to any

forceful sexual intercourse.

14.Father of the victim (PW-2) has stated in his deposition that The

father of the prosecutrix (PW-02) deposed that he knows and can identify

the accused Mansoor and Narayan Dhruv. He does not remember the

date of birth of the prosecutrix. He stated that the prosecutrix is his

daughter. About one week after lodging the complaint, the police informed

him telephonically that the prosecutrix had been traced at Kharagpur,

West Bengal. Two days after receiving the said information, the police

brought the prosecutrix and the accused to Police Station Farsgaon, and

upon being informed thereof, he went to the said police station to meet his

daughter. He further stated that he did not make any inquiry from the

prosecutrix at that time, nor did the prosecutrix narrate anything to him.

The witness was declared hostile by the Special Public Prosecutor, and

upon being put leading questions, he denied having stated before the

police that his wife had informed him that upon inquiry, the prosecutrix

disclosed that the accused Mansoor had induced and allured her on the

promise of marriage and had taken her from Farsgaon on a motorcycle.

However, the witness admitted that the accused had taken the prosecutrix

to the house of accused Narayan Dhruv and that during the night, the

accused forcibly established physical relations with her.

15.Dr. Jyoti Kange (PW-09): She is the doctor who had examined the

victim on 24.09.2022. She stated that she found the victim physically and

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mentally fit and was of average built. There were no injuries on the body.

She had prepared two slides from the vaginal secretion and handed over

to the Police for chemical examination. She has further stated that no

definite opinion could be given with regard to forceful sexual intercourse.

16.Dr. Rajat Kumar Pandey(PW-06), who has examined the accused,

had stated that on general examination he found that the accused was

normal and his mental condition was also normal. His secondary sexual

characteristics were fully developed. Chremastic reflex was present, there

was no injury on his body and smegma was absent. According to his

opinion, the accused was capable to commit sexual intercourse. The

report given him is Ex.P/16

17.Dr. KamalKant Shori (PW-10), has stated in his deposition thatOn

29.09.2022, the prosecutrix was produced before the witness at District

Hospital, Kondagaon by Woman Constable No. 218, Samari of Police

Station Farsgaon for the purpose of age determination. Upon conducting

X-ray examination of the prosecutrix’s shoulder, elbow, hand, hip, knee,

and foot, the following findings were recorded: The upper end of the

humerus was found to be fused with the shaft, the usual age of such

fusion being 16–17 years. The lower end of the humerus was found to be

fused, the usual age of fusion being 13–14 years. The lower ends of the

radius and ulna were found to be fused, the usual age of fusion being 16–

17 years. The metacarpal bones of the fingers were found to be fused, the

usual age of fusion being 15–16 years. The iliac crest was present but not

fused; the usual age of appearance being around 14 years and the usual

age of fusion being 18–19 years. The calcaneal epiphysis was found to be

fused with the calcaneum, the usual age of fusion being 15–16 years.

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Based on the aforesaid radiological findings, the witness opined that, as

per the X-ray report, the age of the prosecutrix was between 15 and 17

years. The examination report issued by the witness has been exhibited

as Ex. P-24. In the cross-examination of this witness, no material

contradiction or evidence was elicited to discredit the fact that the

ossification test of the prosecutrix had been conducted by the witness.

During cross-examination, he stated that it is true that diet and climate

have an effect on the development of bones. It is true that for this reason

there is a difference of two years in the ossification report.

18.Regarding the ossification report, it should only be considered as

evidence of age if no other documentary evidence is available. It should

be noted the ossification report provided an estimated age that may have

margin of error of upto 02 years. In this case, the certified copy of the

admission register (Ex.P/12) clearly states the victim's birth date as

19.09.2009, indicating she was approximately 15-16 years old at the time

of the incident. But, when the victim was enrolled in school, the parents

did not provide her birth certificate or any other document related to her

birth in the present case.

19.After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and

evidence available on record, the age of the victim is stated to be 15-17

years by the victim herself and her father. However, fact of the matter

remains that the admission/discharge register presented before the

learned trial Court was with regard to Class KG-1 in which the victim had

taken admission. Even the basis of entry of date of birth as 19.09.2009

has not been proved.

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20.Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)

Act, 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age. The same

reads as under:

“94. Presumption and determination of age.— (1)

Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board,

based on the appearance of the person brought

before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other

than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said

person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall

record such observation stating the age of the child as

nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under

section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without

waiting for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has

reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the

person brought before it is a child or not, the

Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall

undertake the process of age determination, by

seeking evidence by obtaining—

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the

matriculation or equivalent certificate from the

concerned examination Board, if available; and in the

absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a

municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age

shall be determined by an ossification test or any

other latest medical age determination test conducted

on the orders of the Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted

on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be

completed within fifteen days from the date of such

order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board

to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for

the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age

of that person.”

21.In the case in hand, only the date of birth mentioned in the

admission/discharge register of the KG-1 Class has been produced which

cannot be said to be a conclusive proof because what was the basis of

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mentioning the date of birth in that certificate is also not known. Neither

any Kotwar Register nor the birth certificate from any competent authority

has been produced so as to arrive at a conclusion that the victim was a

minor on the date of incident. As such, the finding arrived at by the learned

trial Court that the victim was a minor on the date of incident is incorrect

and the benefit of the same ought to have been given to the appellants.

22.Further, the learned trial Court has also overlooked the fact that the

victim remained with the appellants at his friend’s home in Jagdalpur for

about 09 days without making any hue and cry. In her deposition, she has

clearly stated that she has never made any complaint nor informed to

anyone that she was being kept there forcefully. The conduct of the victim

herself goes to suggest that it is a case of elopement and not kidnapping.

23.The victim was examined by Dr. Jyoti Kange (PW-9) who after

examining externally, in her report has stated that axillary hair were

present, breast developed according to age and pubic hair was also

present. On internal examination, she found vulva vagina healthy, hymen

was ruptured, no signs of struggle present, no injury or any blood stain

was present around vagina, breast, thighs or an parts of the body. She

had prepared two vaginal smear and was handed over to the Police

constable to send it to the FSL for further investigation and examination.

24.Even the prosecution has not explained as to how the victim was

taken from one place to another and by which means. Unless the victim

would have voluntarily agreed to accompany the appellant- Mohammad

Mansoor, it was quite difficult for the appellant Mohammad Mansoor to

drag/take away the victim along with him to another place Although the

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prosecutrix (PW-01) stated that she was taken by the main accused

Mansoor to the house of accused Narayan Dhruv and that she stayed

there in the same room where physical relations were established by

Mansoor, she did not attribute any overt act, inducement, or participation

to accused Narayan Dhruv in the commission of the alleged offence. Her

testimony is limited to the extent that the house belonged to Narayan

Dhruv.

25.From the conduct of the victim herself, it appears to be a case of

elopement. Even the FSL as well as MLC report does not support the

case of the prosecution as neither semen nor human sperm was found on

the undergarments or the vaginal slides.

26.In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC

263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 23 has observed as under:

“23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to

determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we

are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision

should be the basis for determining age, even for a

child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is

hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority

is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and

a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our

considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate

to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the

age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of

determining age conclusively, has been expressed in

sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the

aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained,

by adopting the first available basis, out of a number

of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme

of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in

a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an

option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest

rated option available, would conclusively determine

the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),

matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the

concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case,

the said certificate is available, no other evidence can

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be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said

certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the

date of birth entered, in the school first attended by

the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is

available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to

be treated as final and conclusive, and no other

material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of

such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth

certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal

authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a

certificate is available, then no other material

whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for

determining the age of the child concerned, as the

said certificate would conclusively determine the age

of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the

aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination

of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical

opinion.”

27.When the FSL report also does not confirm commission of any

sexual offence as no semen or human sperm has been found on the

articles mentioned above, and the conduct of the victim herself who never

made any attempt for her rescue, the prosecution has failed to prove its

case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant- Mohammad

Mansoor.

28.In Alamelu & Another v. State, represented by Inspector of

Police, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 385, where the facts and

circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court observed as under:

“51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan

{AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not

the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In

the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the

Court observed as follows:-

“The rule, which according to the cases has

hardened into one of law, is not that

corroboration is essential before there can be a

conviction but that the necessity of corroboration,

as a matter of prudence, except where the

circumstances make it safe to dispense with it,

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must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The

only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must

be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as

the case may be and be understood and

appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of

practice that there must, in every case, be

corroboration before a conviction can be allowed

to stand.”

52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been

reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments

subsequently. These observations leave no manner of

doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole,

uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does

not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities

which render it unworthy of credence.

xxx xxx xxx

54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that

Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house

and told him that he had married her. They had come

to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This

witness categorically stated that he thought that they

were newly married couple. He had made them stay

in door no. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under

his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police

inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this

witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by

threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according

to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid

premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying

with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She

did not even complain to this witness or any other

residents in the locality. Her behavior of not

complaining to anybody at any of the stages after

being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural.

55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to

complain or to run away, but she made no such effort.

It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing

some known persons near the car, after her alleged

abduction. She did not make any complaint at the

residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti.

Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives

allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives

apparently took no steps at the time when

mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by

Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a

car was available. She made no complaint when she

was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru

Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there

was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police

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station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at

the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been

married. The above behaviour would not be natural

for a girl who had been compelled to marry and

subjected to illicit sexual intercourse.

56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered

opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove

beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with

which the appellants had been charged. It appears

that the entire prosecution story has been concocted

for reasons best known to the prosecution.”

29.In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the judgment passed by the learned trial Court needs

interference.

30.So far as Appellant Mohammad Mansoor is concerned, upon an

overall and careful appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this

Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused

Mohammad Mansoor beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the

prosecutrix (PW-01), which forms the support of the prosecution case, is

inconsistent and vacillating on material particulars. She was declared

hostile and, even after being confronted by the Special Public Prosecutor,

her evidence does not provide a cogent, reliable, and unambiguous

account sufficient to sustain conviction. The alleged inducement,

abduction, and sexual assault are not proved in a manner consistent with

the statutory ingredients of the offences charged. The evidence of the

parents of the prosecutrix is largely derivative and hearsay, and does not

independently corroborate the prosecution version. Though the medical

evidence indicates the age range of the prosecutrix, it does not

conclusively establish forcible sexual assault attributable to the accused

in the manner alleged. There is also absence of independent

corroborative evidence, despite the alleged movements across public

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places and inter-State travel, which further weakens the prosecution case.

Consequently, the accused Mohammad Mansoor is entitled to the

benefit of doubt and is hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against

him.

31.So far as the appellant- Narayan Dhruv is concerned, upon careful

appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the

prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused Narayan Dhruv

beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecutrix (PW-01)

merely indicates that she was taken by the main accused Mansoor to the

house of Narayan Dhruv and stayed there for a day. No overt act, active

participation, instigation, or facilitation has been attributed to Narayan

Dhruv in her testimony. The prosecutrix has not stated that Narayan

Dhruv was present at the time of the alleged incident, nor that he had any

prior knowledge of the offence or shared a common intention with the

main accused. Likewise, the testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix

(PW-04) is purely hearsay in nature insofar as Narayan Dhruv is

concerned and does not assign any specific role to him. There is also no

independent or corroborative evidence to prove that Narayan Dhruv

knowingly harboured the prosecutrix with the intention of facilitating the

commission of the offence. In the absence of cogent and convincing

evidence satisfying the ingredients of Sections 212 IPC and 17 of

POCSO, the benefit of doubt necessarily accrues to accused Narayan

Dhruv. Accordingly, accused Narayan Dhruv is entitled to acquittal from

all the charges levelled against him.

32.For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 22.10.2024 passed in Session

19

Case No. 62/2022 is set aside. The appellants stand acquitted of all the

charges levelled against them.

33.The appellant Mohammad Mansoor is reported to be in jail since

22.09.2022. The appellant Narayan Dhruv is reported to be in jail since

22.10.2024. They be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

34.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C., the

appellants-Mohammad Mansoor and Narayan Dhruv are directed to

furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties each

in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for

a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing

of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of

leave, the aforesaid appellants, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

35.Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a

copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary

information and compliance.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Jyoti