-WP-17668-2024.DOC

Arun Sankpal

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 17668 OF 2024

Mohan Gangaram Narang,

Age 82 Years, Occupation Not Known,

Residing at A-1/62/2, A1 Type Apartment

Owners Association, Sector 21, Turbhe, Navi

Mumbai – 400 706. Currently residing at

Room No. 03, Old Barrack, T-105, Gandhi

Market, Near B.M.C. School, Chembur

Camp,

Chembur, Mumbai.

...Petitioner

Versus

1) City and Industrial Development

Corporation Ltd (CIDCO)

Through Its Chief Managing Director,

Having its Corporate Of�ce at Nirmal

Building

No.2, Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400 021.

2) City and Industrial Development

Corporation Ltd, (CIDCO),

Through, its Estate Manager,

Having its of�ce at CIDCO Bhavan,

C.B.D. Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400 614.

3) The Secretary,

A-1 Type Apartment Owners Association,

Phase-I B-Row, Sector-21, Turbhe,

Navi Mumbai- 400 705.

4) Rajaram Ramdeo Jaiswar,

An Adult, Occupation – Retired,

Residing at NL-1B, L.I.G. 12/07, Shatkar

Apartment Owners Association,

Sector -10, Nerul, Navi Mumbai – 400 706.

1/27

SANTOSH

SUBHASH

KULKARNI

Digitally signed

by SANTOSH

SUBHASH

KULKARNI

Date: 2026.02.26

22:09:05 +0530

-WP-17668-2024.DOC

5) Vivek Rajesh Agarwal,

An Adult, Occupation – Not Known,

Residing at JN-1/44/A, Flat No. A-3,

Sector – 09, Near Shabri Hotel,

Sector -15, Vashi, Navi Mumbai – 400 703. …Respondents

Mr. Harshad Rajeshirke, with Nikhil Rajeshirke, Saurabh

Rajeshirke and Tejasvi Salvi, for the Petitioner.

Mr. Soham Bhalerao, i/b DSK Legal, for Respondent No.1-

CIDCO.

Mr. Nilesh S Bagade, for Respondent No.4.

Mr. Rajaram Jaiswar, for Respondent No.7.

CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON :3

rd

DECEMBER 2025

PRONOUNCED ON :26

th

FEBRUARY, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of

the learned Counsel for the parties heard �nally.

2.This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

assails the legality, propriety and correctness of an order dated

12

th

September 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Thane,

on an Application (Exhibit 19) in RCS No. 240 of 2023, whereby

the said Application preferred by the Petitioner-Plaintiff for a

judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”), came to be rejected.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details the background facts can

be stated as under:

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3.1For the sake of convenience and clarity the parties are

hereinter referred to in the capacity in which they are arrayed in

the Suit.

3.2The Plaintiff is the original allottee of a tenement, bearing

No. A-1/62/2, Sector 21, Turbhe, Navi Mumbai (“the suit

premises”), developed by CIDCO (D1). The Plaintiff has been in

lawful possession and occupation of the suit premises.

Occupants of the building formed a society, A-1 Type Apartment

Owners Association (D3).

3.3The Plaintiff asserts, Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 with intent to

defraud the Plaintiff, prepared false and forged documents.

Defendant No. 3- society on the basis of such false and forged

documents, issued a NOC for registration of the Deed of

Apartment. On the basis of such forged document and NOC,

Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 applied to CIDCO (D1) for registration of

the Deed of Apartment. Somebody impersonated the Plain tiff

and a false and forged Deed of Apartment dated 10

th

October

2016, was got executed and registered. On the strength of the

said Deed of Apartment dated 10

th

October 2016, Defendant Nos.

4 and 5 executed another forged Conveyance Deed date d 30

th

November 2016, by making somebody impersonate Plaintiff

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before the Registrar of Assurances. Under the said Conveyanc

Deed the suit premises was fradulently transferred in favour of

Defendant No.4. The Deed of Apartment and the Convey ance

Deed are thus not binding upon the Plaintiff.

3.4As the fraud was unearthed, the CIDCO (D1) revoked the

NOC and permission to sell. Vide letter dated 14

th

February

2017, the CIDCO (D1) noted that an impersonator has forged all

the ID proof documents, and deceived all the Authorit ies.

CIDCO (D1) thus cancelled the instruments which were

registered with the Registrar. However, the Plaintiff was advised

that the since the documents have been registered, the same

could be cancelled only through the orders of the comp etent

Civil Court.

3.5The Plaintiff has thus instituted a suit seeking a

declaration that Deed of Apartment dated 10

th

October 2016

and 30

th

November 2016 in respect of the suit premises are

false, fabricated and bad-in-law and null and voide, and those

Deeds of Apartment are not binding upon the Plaintiff and the

consequential relief of injunction.

3.6Defendant No. 4, in whose favour the Deed of

Apartment/Conveyance Deed dated 30

th

November 2016 has

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been executed, has appeared before the Court and contested the

suit by �ling Written Statement.

3.7The Plaintiff took out an Application for a decree on

admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code, asserting

inter

alia

that the suit has proceeded ex parte against rest of the

Defendants. Only Defendant No. 4 has professed to contest the

suit by �ling Written Statement. In the said Writ Statement,

Defendant No. 4, has, however, made clear and categ orical

admissions, especially in paragraph 22(j) and (m) of the Written

Statement to the effect that the Plaintiff is the real owner of the

suit property and Defendant No. 4 had purchased the s uit

property from an impersonator of the Plaintiff. In view of such

clear and explicit admissions, there was no propriety in

proceeding further with the suit and, thus, a decree o n

admission be passed.

3.8Defendant No. 4 resisted the Application.

3.9After hearing the parties and appraisal of the contentions

in the Written Statement, which allegedly contain admission of

the claim of the Plaintiff, the learned Civil Judge was persuaded

to reject the Application. The learned Civil Judge was of the view

that to pass a decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of

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the Code, the admission must be clear, unambiguous an d

unconditional. In the case at hand, in the opinion of the Civil

Judge, there was no clear admission of the Plaintiff’s claim by

Defendant No. 4 in his Written Statement.

3.10The contention that Defendant No. 4 was deceived by an

impersonator, was referable to the knowledge which the

Defendant gained after enquiry. The Plaintiff has made

allegations against the Defendant No.4 that Defendant No. 4

has forged the documents, and there was no admission in

relation to the said contention. Thus, a decree on admission

cannot be passed.

4.I have heard Mr. Harshad Rajeshirke, the learned Counsel

for the Petitioner, and Nilesh S. Bagade, the learned Counsel for

Respondent No. 4 and Mr. Soham Bhalerao, the learned

Counsel for CIDCO (R1). With the assistance of the lear ned

Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on

record, especially the pleadings of the parties.

5.Mr. Rajeshirke, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner,

submitted that the learned Civil Judge committed a manif est

error in declining to pass a decree on admission by taking an

erroneous view that there was no clear, unambiguous a nd

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unconditional admission. Taking the Court through the

contentions in the Written Statement, especially paragraph 22

(j) and 22(m), Mr Rajeshirke would urge that, the contentions in

the Written Statement constitute an unequivocal admission by

Defendant No.4. The learned Civil Judge was not at all justi�ed

in brushing aside the admission in pleadings, which stand on a

higher footing.

6.The refusal to exercise the discretion to pass a decree on

admission in the circumstances of the case caused prejudice to

the Plaintiff, who is above 80 years of age. No fruitful purpose

would be served by proceeding with the suit, in the face of such

clear and explicit admission. The learned Civil Judge did not

keep in view the object of the provision which empowers the

Court to pass a decree on admission, urged Mr. Rajeshirke.

7.Mr Rajeshirke would submit that the attendant

circumstances also substantiate the claim of the Plaintiff.

Defendant No.3-society has withdrawn the NOC by addressing a

communication dated 19

th

December 2016. The society was

deceived into issuing the NOC by tendering false and forged

documents. Secondly, the instrument of Deed of

Apartment/Conveyance, squarely militates against the bona �de

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of the claim of Defendant No.4. Emphasis was laid on the fact

that under the Conveyance Deed dated 30

th

November 2016,

Defendant No. 4 had allegedly paid the consideration of Rs.10

Lakhs, somewhere in the year 1998 towards full and �nal sale

price. This recital in the Conveyance Deed regarding th e

payment of consideration prior to 18 years, indicates the falsity

of the claim of Defendant No.4 that he was a bona �de

purchaser for value without notice and thus a victim of fraud

allegedly played by the impersonator of the Plaintiff.

8.In opposition to this Mr. Bagade, the learned Counsel for

the Respondent No.4 stoutly supported the impugned or der. It

was contended that in the Written Statement, Defendant No. 4

has nowhere admitted that the Plaintiff is the real owner of the

suit premises and the instrument in question are forged. What

the Defendant No.4 has contended is that Defendant Nos. 1 and

2 had apprised him about the allegations of the Plaintiff .

Therefore, the contentions in paragraph 22(j) and (m) of the

Written Statement, which are referable to someone else’ s

knowledge and understanding, cannot be considered as

admission, by the Defendant No.4.

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9. On the contrary, Mr Bagade would urge, Defendant No.4

has categorically denied the case set up by the Plaintiff. In

substance, there was no clear admission, and the contentions in

the Written Statement especially paragraph 22(j) and (m) were

based on narration of facts by other persons. It was further

submitted that, whether Defendant No. 4 has been deceived by

the Plaintiff or the alleged impersonator is required to b e

adjudicated at the trial. Therefore, the impugned order does not

warrant any interference in exercise of the supervisor y

jurisdiction.

10.To appreciate the aforesaid submissions in a correct

perspective, at the threshold, it may be apposite to extract the

contentions in paragraphs 22(j) and 22(m) of the written

statement �led by the defendant No.4, which the plaintiff claims

contain the admissions on the strength of which a decree can be

passed. They read as under:

“22(j) When the Defendant No.4 tried to enquire with the

of�cials of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 about the suit premises,

he came to know that the Plaintiff approached the Defendant

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and requested for the cancellation of Deed of

Apartments/Conveyance Deed, dated 10/10/2016 and

30/11/2016. Further the Defendant No. 4 also came to kn ow

that the person from whom he purchased the suit prem ises is

not the real owner of the suit premises and the Plaintiff is the

Real Owner of the suit premises. He also came to know that the

Plaintiff is the real Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang and the one

from whom he purchased The Suit Premises is impersonat or of

Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang.

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22(m) The Defendant No. 4 is an old aged person and paid

the amount of Total Consideration out of his retirement money

and savings. He suffered huge �nancial losses from the said

transaction and he is getting punished for no fault on his part.

The Defendant No.4 acted in good faith throughout the

transaction and been cheated/deceived by the Defendant No. 5

and the impersonator of Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang. Th e

Defendant No. 4 is the victim of the negligence of the Plaintiff

and the Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3.”

11.It would be immediately necessary to note the reasons

which dissuaded the learned Civil Judge from exercising th e

discretion to pass a decree on the basis of aforesaid purported

admissions. The learned Civil Judge was of the view that there

was no clear admission. Secondly, on the basis of the fact that

the defendant came to know about the real owner of the suit

property and an impersonator of the plaintiff sold the suit

property, an inference of admission cannot be drawn and suit

decreed. Thirdly, the plaintiff has made various allegations

against defendant No.4 including that, defendant No.4 h as

forged the instruments and, thus, it would be appropriate not to

exercise the discretion as those issues need to be adjudicated on

the basis of evidence.

12.Whether the aforesaid approach of the learned Civil Judge

is justi�ed? Or, the discretion not to pass the decree on

admission requires correction?

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13.Before exploring an answer to the aforesaid question, the

contours of the power to pass a judgment on admission deserve

to be kept in view. Order XII Rule 6 of the Code reads as under:

“Order XII Rule 6. Judgment on admissions.—

(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in th e

pleading or otherwise; whether orally or in writing, the Court

may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any

party or of its own motion and without waiting for the

determination of any other question-between the parties, make

such order or give such judgment as it may think �t, having

regard to such admissions.

(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1)

a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment

and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was

pronounced.”

14.The text of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Order XII, on its plain

reading, makes it abundantly clear that, the legislature has

designedly conferred jurisdiction on the Court to pass a

judgment on admission. The phraseology underscores that the

source of admission is not of material signi�cance. Firstly, the

admissions can be found either in the pleadings or otherwise.

Secondly, the insistence for admission being in writing is done

away with. The admission may be oral or in writing. Thirdly, the

stage of the suit does not matter. The Code expressly empowers

the Court to pass judgment on admission at any stage of the

suit. The said aspect is further reinforced by the words

“without

waiting for the determination of any other question between the

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parties”. Fourthly, the party, in whose favour the admission is

made, need not apply. The Court, on its own motion, can pass a

judgment on admission if it comes to the conclusion that the

claim or part of the claim of one party is admitted by the other.

Lastly, the exercise of the said power is undoubtedly

discretionary. But, in view of the wide ambit and unhinged

nature of the powers conferred on the Court to pass a judgment

on admission, the Court may not be justi�ed in refusing the

relief where a case falls within the four corners of the said

provision. The Court is required to be alive to the object of the

provisions namely to give an expeditious relief to a party when

its claim is admitted by the adversary.

15.A pro�table reference, in this context, can be made to the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Singh

Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of India & Ors.

1

, wherein the

object of the aforesaid rule was expounded and the approach

expected of the Court was delineated, in the following words :

“12 As to the object of the Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say

anything more than what the legislature itself has said when

the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and

reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that

where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a

judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted

claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a

speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which

according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is

entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of

1 (2000) 7 SCC 120

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this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy

judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission

entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also

wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of

which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to

succeed.”

(emphasis supplied)

16.The aforesaid pronouncement was followed by the

Supreme Court in the case of Karam Kapahi & Others Vs. Lal

Chand Public Charitable Trust

2

. The Supreme Court traced the

historical backdrop of the said provision, including the

amendment introduced therein by the Amendment Act, 19 76,

pursuant to the recommendations of the Law Commission, and

instructively enunciated the true nature and import of the said

provision. The observations of the Court are as under :

“37, The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the

plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either

party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about `which

there is no controversy' [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the

Master of Rolls, in Thorp versus Holdsworth in (1876) 3

Chancery Division 637 at 640].

38. In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6

was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Prior to

amendment the Rule read thus:-

"6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any

stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made,

either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for

such judgment or order as upon such admission he may

be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any

other question between the parties and the Court may

upon such application make such order or give such

judgment, as the Court may think just."

39. In the 54

th

Law Commission Report, an amendment was

suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on

the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear

that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of

2 (2010) 4 SCC 753

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justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering

judges to use it `ex debito justitial, a Latin term, meaning a debt

of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in

an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other

party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal r ight.

However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of

pronouncing judgment.

40. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order

12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule

6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is

limited to admission by `pleading or otherwise in writing' but in

Order 12 Rule 6 the expression `or otherwise' is much wider in

view of the words used therein namely: `admission of

fact.........either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or

in writing'.

41. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Cour t

held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts

and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and

others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and another, (2005) 11

SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8)]. Admissions in answer to

interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's

commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177].

42. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd., v. United

Bank of India and others, (2000) 7 SCC 120, this Court, while

construing this provision, held that the Court should not

unduly narrow down its application as the object is to enable a

party to obtain speedy judgment.

43. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant,

Uttam Singh Duggal, that:

(a) Admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be

those which are made in the pleadings.

(b) The admissions would in any case have to be read

along with the �rst proviso to Order 8 Rule 5 (1) of the

Code and the Court may call upon the party relying on

such admission to prove its case independently.

(c) The expression `either in pleadings or otherwise'

should be interpreted ejusdem generis. [See para 11,

pages 126-127 of the report]

Almost similar contentions have been raised on behalf of

the Club. In Uttam Singh (supra) those contentions were

rejected and this Court opined no effort should be made

to narrow down the ambit of Order 12 Rule 6.

44. In Uttam Singh (supra) this Court made a distinction

between a suit just between the parties and a suit relating to

Speci�c Relief Act where a declaration of status is given which

not only binds the parties but also binds generations. T he

Court held such a declaration may be given merely on

admission (para 16, page 128 of the report). But in a situation

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like the present one where the controversy is between the

parties on an admission of non-payment of rent, judgment can

be rendered on admission by Court.

45. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code has been very lucidly

discussed and succinctly interpreted in a Division Bench

judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shikharchand v.

Bari Bai reported in AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 75. Justice G.P.

Singh (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment

explained the aforesaid rule, if we may say so, very

authoritatively at page 79 of the report. His Lordship held : (AIR

para 19)

“... I will only add a few words of my own. Rule 6 of Order

12 of the Code of civil Procedure corresponds to Rule 5 of

Order 32 of the Supreme Court Rules (English), now rule

3 of Order 27, and is almost identically worded (see

Annual Practice 1965 edition Part I. p. 569). The Supreme

Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen

(1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was �led for ejectment,

mesne pro�ts and damages on the ground of breach of

covenant against sub-letting.

Lessee's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors in

which fact of breach of covenant was admitted and a case

was sought to be made out for relief against forfeiture.

This letter was used as an admission under rule 5 and as

there was no substance in the plea of relief against

forfeiture, the suit was decreed for ejectment under that

rule. Sargant, J. rejected the argument that the rule is

con�ned to admissions made in pleadings or under rules

1 to 4 in the same order (same as ours) and said:

"The rule applies wherever there is a clear admission of

facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party

making it to succeed."

Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same

construction as was put upon the corresponding English

rule by Sargent, J. The words "either on the pleadings or

otherwise" in rule 6 enable us not only to see the

admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 of the

same order but also admissions made elsewhere during

the trial."

46. This Court expresses its approval of the aforesaid

interpretation of Order 12 Rule 6 by Justice G.P. Singh (as His

Lordship then was). Mulla in his commentary on the Code has

also relied on ratio in Shikharchand (supra) for explaining these

provisions.

47. ……..

48. However, the provision under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code

is enabling, discretionary and permissive and is neither

mandatory nor it is peremptory since the word "may" has been

used. But in the given situation, as in the instant case, the said

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provision can be applied in rendering the judgment.”

(emphasis supplied)

17.It would be contextually relevant to note that the primary

requirement of there being a clear and unambiguous admission

by one party is a jurisdictional condition for the Court to

exercise the discretion under the aforesaid rule. This aspect was

highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jeevan Diesels

and Electricals Limited Vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr.

3

wherein, the Supreme Court underscored the necessity of

applying the principles in Karam Kapahi and Ors. V/s. Lal

Chand Public Charitable Trust

4

to the facts of the given case.

Paragraph No.10 reads as under :

“10. The learned counsel for the respondents-

plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this Court in

Karam Kapahi & Others vs. M/s. Lal Chand

Public Charitable Trust & Another reported in

2010 (3) SCALE 569 and contended that in view

of the principles laid down in that case, this

Court may af�rm the judgment of the High Court

in the instant case. This Court is unable to

accept the aforesaid contention. In Karam Kapahi

(supra) a Bench of this Court analyzed the

principles of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code and

held that in the facts of that case there was clear

3 (2010) 6 SCC 601

4 (2010) 4 SCC 753

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admission on the part of the lessee about non-

payment of lease rent. The said admission was

made by the lessee in several proceedings apart

from its pleading in the suit. In view of such clear

admission, the Court applied the principles of

Order 12 Rule 6 in the case of Karam Kapahi

(supra). The principles of law laid down in Karam

Kapahi (supra) can be followed in this case only if

there is a clear and unequivocal admission of the

case of the plaintiff by the appellant. Whether or

not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by

one party of the case of the other party is

essentially a question of fact and the decision of

this question depends on the facts of the case.

This question, namely, whether there is a clear

admission or not cannot be decided on the basis

of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though

the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be

unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the

instant case in view of totally different fact

situation.”

18.In the case of Himani Alloys Limited vs. Tata Steel

Limited

5

, the Supreme Court emphasise the discretionary

nature of the jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6. The

enunciation of law in paragraph 11 of the said judgment is

instructive and, thus, extracted below:

“11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission”

contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission

5 (2011) 15 SCC 273.

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should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate

act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by

it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither

mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court , on

examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its

judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on

admission is a judgment without trial which permanently

denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an app eal on

merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous

and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be

exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest

the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when

there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. (See also

Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [2000

(7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable

Trust [2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals

Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601

]. There is no

such admission in this case.”

19.In the case of S. M. Asif vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj

6

, a

three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court again postulated that

the words, “may” and “make such order or give such judgment

as it may think �t” implied in Order XII Rule 6, show that the

power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and canno t be

claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a

matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court.

Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the

root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the

discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an

enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in

delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of

the claim admitted by one of the parties.

6 (2015) 9 SCC 287.

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20.The aforesaid being the nature of the discretionary

jurisdiction conferred on the Court, the purported admissions

in the written statement are required to be appreciated . In

addition to the contentions in paragraph 22(j) and 22(m)

(extracted above), the contentions in paragraph 22(k) and 22(l)

also deserve to be noted. They reads as under:

“(k) It was very much shocking and surprising for the

Defendant No.04) that he was been cheated/deceased

by the Defendant No.05) and the impersonator of MR.

MOHAN GANGARAM NARANG. The Defendant No.04)

has acted in good faith and suffered the loss of Lakhs of

Rupees. Further he also came to know that the

Defendant No. 01) & 02) sealed The Suit Premises.

(l) There is a negligence on the part of the Plaintiff

and also on the part of the Defendant No. 01) 02) & 03),

It is really not digestible that someone has sold The Suit

Premises of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff is not aware

about it. Even the Defendant No. 01), 02) & 03) gave

their No Objection Certi�cates (N. O. C) and later

withdrawing/cancelling it. It was the duty of the

Defendant No. 01), 02) & 03) to check and con�rm the

identity of the Owner of The Suit Premises before

issuing their No Objection Certi�cates (N. 0. C.) for any

such transaction. The same is not possible without the

involvement of the Of�cials/ Members of the Defendant

No. 01), 02) & 03) in cheating/ deceiving the Defendant

No. 04) and hence the detail investigation to that effect

is necessary. Later the Defendant No.01), 02) & 03)

cancelled their No Objection Certi�cates (N.O.C) without

considering the grievances of the Defendant No.04).”

21.Do these contentions constitute clear, unequivocal and

unambiguous admissions?

22.From the perusal of the contentions in paragraph 22(j) of

the written statement, it becomes evident that they are in three

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parts. First, the defendant No.4 made inquiries with the

of�cials of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and thereupon he came to

know that the plaintiff approached the defendant Nos.1 to 3 and

requested for the cancellation of the instruments. In the second

part, the defendant No.4 contends he also came to know that

the persons from whom the defendant No.4 purchased the suit

�at was not the real owner thereof and the plaintiff was the real

owner. Thirdly, the defendant No.4 came to know tha t the

plaintiff is the real Mohan Gangaram Narang and the one from

whom he purchased the suit premises was an impersonator.

23.In paragraph 22(k) the defendant No.4 reiterates that “he

has been cheated/deceived by the defendant No.5 and the

impersonator of Mr. Mohan Gangaram Narang”. The defen dant

No.4 acted in good faith and suffered loss of lakhs of rupees.

24.In paragraph 22(l) the defendant No.4 has attributed

negligence to the of�cials of defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 and

contends that the transaction was not possible without the

involvement of the of�cials/members of the defendant Nos.1, 2

and 3 in cheating/deceiving the defendant No.4 and, therefore,

a detailed investigation was necessary.

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25.If these contentions in paragraph 22(j), (k), (l) and (m) are

read in juxtaposition with each other, it becomes explicitly clear

that the thrust of the defence of defendant No.4 is that he was

deceived by defendant No.5 and the impersonator of Mr. Mohan

Gangaram Narang. It is imperative to note the contention that

the defendant No.4 has been deceived by defendant No .5 and

the impersonator of Mohan Gangaram Narang is not a so litary

statement. The said contention �nds mention in paragraphs

22(k), 22(l) and 22(m).

26.Defendant No.4 has indeed claimed that he came to know

that the person from whom he purchased the suit �at is not the

real owner and the plaintiff is the real owner of the suit

premises and that the plaintiff is the real Mr. Mohan Gangaram

Narang and one from whom he purchased the suit �at was the

impersonator of the plaintiff. The submission on behalf of the

defendant No.4 – respondent No.4 that the aforesaid statements

are based on the knowledge of the defendant No.4 wh ich he

gathered from the inquiries with the of�cials of defendant Nos.1

and 2, is required to be appreciated in the light of the fact that

there is no speci�c denial in the written statement that the

plaintiff had not known the defendant Nos.4 and 5; there was

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no transaction between the plaintiff and defendant No.4 and the

defendant No.4 has not paid any consideration to the plaintiff.

27.Thus, the endeavour of Mr. Bagade to salvage the position

by canvassing a submission that the aforesaid statement in

regard to the plaintiff being the real owner of the suit �at and

the person who professed to sell the suit �at to the defendant

No.4 was an impersonator was based on the knowledge o f the

defendant No.4 and not a statement of fact, cannot be acceded

to. In addition to aforesaid categorical statements, the defendant

No.4 repetitively contends that he had been deceived b y

defendant No.5 and the impersonator of the plaintiff.

Undoubtedly, the defendant No.4 claims to have acted in good

faith and suffered the �nancial loss in the alleged fraudulent

transaction. However, that would, at best, furnish a cause of

action for the defendant No.4 to proceed against the defendant

No.5 and the alleged impersonator of the plaintiff.

28.In the case of Rajiv Ghosh Vs. Satya Narayan Jaiswal

7

, the

Supreme Court enunciated that the words, “or otherwise ” are

wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in the

pleading or

de hors the pleadings. The observations in

paragraphs 35 to 37 of the said judgment read as under:

7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 751

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“35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include all

cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the

pleadings. Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that

the words “or otherwise” without the words “in writing” used in

Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon oral or

verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re, (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The

Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the position cle ar

stating that such admissions may be “in the pleading or

otherwise” and “whether orally or in writing”. Thus, after the

amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not con�ned to Rule

1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such

admissions may be express or implied (constructive); may be in

writing or oral; or may be before the institution of the suit,

after the suit is brought or during the pendency of

proceedings.

36. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly

laid down the following interpretation of the provision of O. 12,

R. 6, CPC, in the decision of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood

and Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB) : (2000 AIHC 1990):

“Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to the

Court. Under this rule the Court may at any stage of the

suit either on the application of any party or of its own

motion and without determination of any other question

between the parties can make such order giving such

judgment as it may think �t on the basis of admission of a

fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally or

in writing”.

37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the aforesaid

context came to be interpreted by the High Court. Considering

the expression the Court interpreted the said word by stating

that it permits the Court to pass judgment on the basis of the

statement made by the parties not only on the pleadings but

also

de hors the pleadings i.e. either in any document or even

in the statement recorded in the Court. If one of the parties'

statement is recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, the same is also a statement which elucidates

matters in controversy. Any admission in such statemen t is

relevant not only for the purpose of �nding out the real dispute

between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not

any dispute or controversy exists between the parties.

Admission if any is made by a party in the statement recorded,

would be conclusive against him and the Court can proceed to

pass judgment on the basis of the admission made therein.”

29.The Supreme Court has thus emphasised that the

admissions need not be express. The admissions can be implied

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or constructive. In the instant case, repetitive assertions of

Defendant No.4 that Defendant No.5 and the impersona tor of

the Plaintiff have deceived Defendant No.4 are impregnated with

an implied admission that there was no transaction as suc h

with the Plaintiff. The contentions in para 22(j) to 22(m) of the

Written Statement (extracted above), coupled with absence of

speci�c denial of the averments in the plaint that the Plaintiff

had not known Defendant No.4, there was no transact ion

whatsoever between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 and the

latter had not paid any consideration to the Plaintiff,

cumulatively constitute an admission that there was no

transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 and the

instruments in question have not been executed by the Plaintiff

in favour of Defendant No.4.

30.The recitals in the Deed of Conveyance dated 30 November

2016 that Defendant No.4 had paid the consideration of Rs.10

Lakhs to the vendor somewhere in the year 1998 , further

underscores the fact that there was no transaction o f

whatsoever nature between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4.

The attendant circumstances also cannot be lost sight of. Upon

unearthing of the alleged fraud, the Society (D3) has cancelled

the NOC vide communication dated 19 December 2016 and

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CIDCO (D1) has cancelled the Deed of Apartment dated 10

October 2016. FIR was also directed to be lodged against the

suspects and pursuant thereto, FIR No.114 of 2017 h as been

registered.

31.In the light of the aforesaid developments, if the

admissions in the Written Statement are considered, then it

becomes explicitly clear that the trial of the suit to the extent of

cancellation of the instruments in question is wholly

unwarranted. On the basis of the admissions, a judgment to

the effect that the instruments are void as there was no

transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 can be

legitimately passed.

32.It is true, there are allegations of forgery qua Defendant

No.4 as well in the plaint. However, those allegations need not

detain the Court from passing a judgment on admission as

Defendant No.4 clearly admits that there was no trans action

between Defendant No.4 and Plaintiff and Defendant No.4 has

been deceived by Defendant No.5 and the impersonator of the

Plaintiff. It would be suf�ce to clarify that this judgment on

admission would not bear upon the guilt of the accused in the

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event the prosecution is initiated in pursuance of FIR No.114 of

2017.

33.For the foregoing reasons, this Court is persuaded to

partly allow the Petition and pass a decree on admission to the

extent of cancellation of the instruments under Section 31 of the

Speci�c Reliefs Act, 1963.

34.Hence, the following order :

: O R D E R :

(i)The petition, thus, stands partly allowed.

(ii)The impugned order stands quashed and set aside.

(iii)The application for judgment on admission stands partly

allowed.

(iv)There shall be a decree on admission to the effect that the

Deed of Apartment dated 10

th

October, 2016 and the Deed

of Apartment/Conveyance dated 30

th

November, 2016 are

void and do not bind the plaintiff and those instruments

are ordered to be delivered up and cancelled.

(v)The trial Court shall forward a copy of this decree to the

Registrar of Assurance in whose of�ce the above

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instruments have been registered and the concerned

Registrar shall make a note on the copies of the

instruments contained in his books the fact of

cancellation of the aforesaid instruments.

(vi)It is, however, clari�ed that this judgment and decree on

admission shall have no bearing on the guilt of the

accused in the event prosecution is initiated in relation to

subject transactions and the concerned Court shall

decide the said criminal case on its own merits and in

accordance with law, without being in�uenced by any of

the observations in this judgment.

(vii)No costs.

(viii)Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

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