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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 68-69 1999

PETITIONER:

MOHD.CHAMAN

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE (N.C.T.OF DELHI)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/12/2000

BENCH:

D.P.Mohapatro, K.T.Thomas

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

D.P. Mohapatra, J.

Mohd.Chaman, the accused in Sessions Case No.134 of

1996 (State Vs. Mohd. Chaman) has filed these appeals by

special leave challenging the judgment passed by the High

Court of Delhi in Murder Ref.No.5/97 and Crl. Appeal

No.305/97 confirming sentence of death passed against him by

the Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara, Delhi. This court,

by the order dated 22.1.99 granted leave confined to the

question of sentence and further directed execution of death

sentence be stayed during pendency of the appeal. Thus the

matter to be considered in the case relates to sentence

only. The question for determination is whether, on the

facts and in the circumstances appearing from the materials

on record the trial Court and the High Court were right in

imposing death sentence against the appellant. The answer

to this question depends on the finding whether the case can

be classified as a rarest of rare cases for imposition of

the maximum penalty of death. The facts of the case

relevant for the determination of the question may be stated

thus: The appellant Mohd.Chaman was aged thirty years at

the time of the incident and the victim girl Kumari Ritu

(deceased) was aged one and half years then. Bindu Shah

(PW-4), father of the deceased along with his wife

Smt.Lalita (PW-2) and two daughters Soni and Ritu used to

reside in House No.5416/6, Gali No.4, Shakti Gali, Amar

Mohalla, Raghupura, Gandhi Nagar. Bindu Shah was running a

tailoring factory near his house. The appellant was

residing in the same house in a room adjacent to the room of

Bindu Shah. On 10-4-95 at about 7.30 p.m. when Bindu Shah

was in his factory, Smt.Lalita left her two daughters in the

care of a neighbour and went out for marketing. On her

return Smt.Lalita did not find Ritu in the house. She made

a search in the locality nearby and sent her elder daughter

to call her brother Vidya Nand Sagar (PW-7). Vidya Nand

Sagar accompanied by Shankar (PW- 15) reached the house of

Smt.Lalita and made some search for Ritu but did not find

her. However, Smt.Lalita found the room of the appellant

half open and on peeping into it saw Ritu lying on the floor

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and the appellant present in the room. On seeing

Smt.Lalita, the appellant picked up Ritu from the floor in

her unconscious state and handed her over to Smt.Lalita. At

that time the mother found that Ritu was without

undergarment (kaccha) and was wearing a frock. She observed

several bleeding teeth bite marks on the cheek and other

parts of the body of Ritu. On her query about the condition

of Ritu the appellant told her to go away silently otherwise

she would also meet the same fate and the Police could do

nothing against him. Thereafter Smt.Lalita rushed to the

factory of her husband. The parents took Ritu to a doctor

who advised them to take her immediately to a hospital.

Then Ritu was taken to Surya Hospital where she was declared

brought dead by the doctor. In the meantime some people

who had collected at the place of occurrence, kept the

appellant under close guard till sub-inspector Magan Singh

(PW-16) of Gandhi Nagar Police Station reached the spot and

took control of the situation. Soon thereafter SHO,

N.S.Khan (PW-20) arrived at the scene of occurrence on

receiving information about the incident. The police

officers were told by the persons at the spot that the

appellant had raped and killed Ritu. SHO N.S.Khan took the

investigation. He noticed that there were teeth bite marks

on the breast, neck, abdomen and thighs of the deceased. He

also observed that private parts of the deceased were

swollen. He recorded the statement of Smt.Lalita, mother of

the deceased and that statement was treated as the FIR of

the case. Ex-PW 3/A, post-mortem report was prepared by

Dr.K.Goel (PW-3), who found the following external and

internal injuries on the body of Ritu:- External: 1.

Teeth bite marks in the form of two linear, semi-linear

marks with intermittently placed abrasions. These marks are

3.5 cm. long, placed 2.5 cm. apart with thejr concavity

facing each other over Rt. Cheek near Rt. angle of mouth.

2. Abrasion 1.7 x 0.6 cms. Over chin. 3. One oval

bruise having width of about 6 mm. With central pale area

with dimensions 4.5 x 4 cm. & an another same bruise of

same width overlapping lower point of previous one having

dimensions about 5 x 4 cm. Both are present over Rt. Side

of abdomen at upper part.

4. Oval bruise about 6.5 mm. Diameter c central pale

area c dimensions 5.5 cm. x 4.5 cm. c two small abrasion

marks at periphery each about 3 mm. Size at 4 & 5 O clock

position.

5. Small abrasions with bruising in the vaginal wall

at 4, 5 and 6 Oclock positions. Hymen is partially torn

admitting two fingers, small tear present over posterior

fornix. Small blood clots present over injured parts in the

vagina.

Internal: Head Scalp tissues, bones intact,

meninges and brain matter intact and NAD and pale.

Neck All structures are intact. No extra vasation

of blood.

Chest Rib cage intact. Heart and Lungs intact

and NAD.

Abdomen Rt.lobe of liver is badly lacerated with

vertical deep laceration. Large amount of blood and clots

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present in peritonial cavity and around liver.

Spleen and kidneys intact and pale.

Stomach contains small amount of semi-digested food

having no abnormal small and NAD.

Bowels Intact. Bladder and Rectum empty.

Pelvis Intact. Uterus empty and NAD.

Blood sample, vaginal swab, rectal swab, swam from

surrounding area of genitalia and swab from injury sides are

preserved sealed and handed over to the police.

OPINION:- All injuries were ante-mortem in nature.

Injury no.1 is love bite marks. Injury no.3 and 4 (pattern

bruises) are probably as a result of impact of some object

of the shape described in the injuries. Injuries to

genitalia are caused during sexual assault. Injury to the

liver is caused by application of blunt forch and is

sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.

Cause of death is haemorrhagic shock consequent to

liver injury.

Time since death is about 19 hours.

On completion of the investigation the charge-sheet

was submitted against the appellant of having committed the

offences of murder and rape punishable under Sections

302/376 of the Indian Penal Code. The case against the

appellant was based on circumstantial evidence only. The

circumstances which have emerged from testimony of the

relevant witnesses, like, PWs 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 19 and PW-

20 are the following: 1. On 10.4.1996 at 7.30 p.m.

Smt.Lalita, PW-2 left her two daughters, namely, Soni and

Ritu in the care of a neighbour and went out for marketing.

2. PW 10 and PW 15 saw the accused taking Ritu to his

room.

3. When at 7.45 p.m. on that very date Smt.Lalita

returned, she found Ritu missing.

4. Smt.Lalita sent her elder daughter Soni to fetch

her brother Vidya Nand Sagar, PW7.

5. A search for Ritu was made by Smt.Lalita and Vidya

Nand Sagar in the vicinity.

6. Smt.Lalita peeped into the room of the accused and

found Ritu lying on the floor and the accused present there.

7. On query made by Smt.Lalita, the accused handed

over the body of Ritu to her and when she made injuries

about the condition of the girl, the accused told her to go

away otherwise she would also meet the same fate and that

Police could not do anything against him.

8. Smt.Lalita took Ritu to her husband Bindu Shah,

who was working in his tailoring factory.

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9. Vidya Nand Sagar, PW 7 remained standing near the

door of the room of the accused, who remained in his room.

10. Several persons collected at the place of

occurrence and held the accused.

11. Bindu Shah, took Ritu to a neighbouring Doctor,

who told him to take her to a hospital.

12. Bindu Shah took Ritu to Surya Hospital where she

was declared brought dead at 8.15 p.m.

13. Bindu Shah along with his wife returned to the

place of occurrence with the dead body of Ritu.

14. PW 16 SI Magan Singh arrived at the place of

occurrence and found the accused in the custody of some

persons outside the room and that the persons were shouting

that the accused had raped Ritu inside his own room and had

killed her. He controlled the scene and took the accused in

his custody.

15. PW 20, N.S.Khan, SHO of the police station and

the IO of this case, on receiving information about this

case, reached the place of occurrence at 9.35 p.m. on that

very day and found a large crowd having gathered there and

shouting that the accused present there had committed rape

and murder of Ritu. He took the accused in custody and sent

him to the police station with police escort for safety.

16. PW 13, Dr.K.Goel, who performed the post-mortem

examination opined that the incident took place on 10.4.1995

around 7.45 p.m.

The learned trial Judge on appreciation of the

evidence in the case in the light of settled principles for

judging a case based on circumstantial evidence, held that

the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of

the accused and accordingly convicted him under Sections 302

and 376 IPC. Regarding the sentence the court considered

the relevant aspects of the case like the appellant being a

neighbour of the family of the deceased; that during the

temporary absence of the mother of the child (deceased) from

the house had taken over her (deceased) to his room where he

committed the barbaric act of rape on the innocent child

aged one and half years and in the process of committing

rape inflicted injuries on her liver which resulted in death

of the child. The learned trial Judge while sifting the

relevant materials on record referred to the principles laid

down by this Court in the case of Bachan Singh vs. State of

Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898, Machhi Singh & Ors. Vs. State of

Punjab (1983 (3) SCC 470), Kamta Tiwari v. State of MP

Vol.III (1996) CCR, SC page 141, Laxman Naik v. State of

Orissa, Vol.III (1994) SCC page 381, and came to the

conclusion that it is fit case in which the extreme penalty

of death should be awarded. The High Court on assessing the

evidence on record held that the trial Court rightly

convicted the accused of rape and murder of Kumari Ritu. On

the point of sentence the High Court observed, In the case

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before us a baby girl aged about one and half years, like a

growing bud of a flower, had been a prey to the lust of a

thirty years old man and had been killed in a most revolting

manner arousing intense and extreme indignation of the

community. It is an act of extreme depravity and arouses a

sense of revulsion in the mind of the common man. Such a

person is menace to the society. The facts of the case

persuade us to hold that this is a rarest of the rare cases

where the sentence of death is eminently desirable. The

High Court confirmed the death penalty against the

appellant.

The question that arises for consideration is whether

the accused in this case deserves the harshest punishment of

death. In this connection we can do no better than take

note of the observations and the formulations made by this

Court in Bachan Singh (supra). Therein a Constitution Bench

of this Court after an exhaustive discussion of the relevant

provisions like sections 299,300 and 302 of the IPC,

sections 235(2) and 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code,

and Articles 13,14,19(2) to (6) and 21 of the Constitution

held, inter alia, that the founding fathers recognised the

right of the State to deprive a person of his life or

personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and

reasonable procedure established by valid law; that there

are several other indications, also, in the Constitution

which show that the Constitution- makers were fully

cognizant of the existence of death penalty for murder and

certain other offences in the Indian Penal Code. This Court

further observed that the mention in the legislative list,

right of Governor and President to suspend, commute or remit

death sentence and right of appeal to the Supreme Court

under Article 134 show that death penalty or its execution

cannot be regarded as an unreasonable, cruel or unusual

punishment. Nor can it be said to defile "the dignity of

the individual" within the preamble to the Constitution. On

parity of reasoning, it cannot be said that death penalty

violates the basic structure of the Constitution.

Regarding the question of laying down standards and norms

restricting the area of imposition of death penalty, if by

"laying down standards", it is meant that 'murder' should be

categorised beforehand according to the degrees of its

culpability and all the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances should be exhaustively and rigidly enumerated

so as to exclude all free play of discretion, the argument

merits rejection. Such standardisation is well-nigh

impossible. Firstly, degree of culpability cannot be

measured in each case; secondly, criminal cases cannot be

categorised, there being infinite, unpredictable and

unforseeable variations; thirdly, on such categorization,

the sentencing process will cease to be judicial; and

fourthly, such standardisation or sentencing discretion is a

policy- matter belonging to the legislature beyond the

court's function.

In paragraphs 176-177 of the Judgment this Court

quoted with approval the following observations of Earl

Loreburn L.C. in Hyman V. Rose (1912 AC 623) :

"I desire in the first instance to point out that the

discretion given by the section is very wide... Now it

seems to me that when the Act is so expressed to provide a

wide discretion... it is not advisable to lay down any

rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do not doubt

that the rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the

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present case are useful maxims in general, and that in

general they reflect the point of view from which Judges

would regard an application for relief. But I think it

ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in

which any or all of them may be disregarded. If it were

otherwise, the free discretion given by the statute would be

fettered by limitations which have nowhere been enacted. It

is one thing to decide what is the true meaning of the

language contained in an Act of Parliament. It is quite a

different thing to place conditions upon a free discretion

entrusted by statute to the court where the conditions are

not based upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe,

I think, to say that the court must and will always insist

upon certain things when the Act does not require them, and

the facts of some unforeseen case may make the court wish it

had kept a free hand.

"Judges have to decide cases as they come before them,

mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of

their decisions. And it will be strange if, by employing

judicial artifices and techniques, we cut down the

discretion so wisely conferred upon the courts, by devising

a formula which will confine the power to grant anticipatory

bail within a strait-jacket. While laying down cast iron

rules in a matter like granting anticipatory bail, as the

High Court has done, it is apt to be overlooked that even

Judges can have but an imperfect awareness of the needs of

new situations. Life is never static and every situation

has to be assessed in the context of emerging concerns as

and when it arises. Therefore, even if we were to frame a

'code for the grant of anticipatory bail', which really is

the business of the legislature, it can at best furnish

broad guidelines and cannot compel blind adherence."

From what has been extracted above, it is clear that

this Court should not venture to formulate rigid standards

in an area in which the Legislature so warily treads. Only

broad guidelines consistent with the policy indicated by the

legislature in Section 354(3) can be laid down. Taking note

of the decision of the Supreme Court of the USA in Gregg v.

Georgia [ 428 US 153 = 49 L Ed 859] this Court observed :

"Critically examined, it is clear that the decisions

in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases demonstrate the

truth of what we have said earlier, that it is neither

practicable nor desirable to imprison the sentencing

discretion of a judge or jury in the strait-jacket of

exhaustive and rigid standards. Nevertheless, these

decisions do show that it is not impossible to lay down

broad guidelines as distinguished from iron-cased standards,

which will minimise the risk of arbitrary imposition of

death penalty for murder and some other offenses under the

Penal Code."

Then this Court proceeded to consider the question of

indicating the broad guidelines which should guide the Court

in the matter of sentencing a person convicted of murder

under section 302, Indian Penal Code. Making a cautious

approach, this Court observed :

"Before we embark on this task, it will be proper to

remind ourselves, against that "while we have an obligation

to ensure that the constitutional bounds are not

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overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as

legislatures."

Reiterating the principles laid down in Jagmohan vs.

State of U.P. [(1973) 1 SCC 207)] this Court held that:

the application of those principles is now to be guided by

the paramount beacons of legislative policy discernible from

Sections 354(3) and 235(2), namely : (1) The extreme

penalty can be inflicted only in gravest cases of extreme

culpability; (2)In making choice of the sentence, in

addition to the circumstances of the offence, due regard

must be paid to the circumstances of the offender also.

Noticing some of the aggravating circumstances this

Court observed that: pre-planned, calculated, cold-blooded

murder has always been regarded as one of an aggravated

kind. Some other aggravations were enumerated in para 202

of the Judgement.

After enumerating the circumstances, this Court added:

"Stated broadly, there can be no objection to the

acceptance of these indicators but as we have indicated

already, we would prefer not to fetter judicial discretion

by attempting to make an exhaustive enumeration one way or

the other."

Similarly some of the mitigating circumstances

suggested by the counsel appearing in the case were

enumerated in para 206 of the Judgement :

"Mitigating circumstances :- In the exercise of its

discretion in the above cases, the court shall take into

account the following circumstances:- (1) That the offence

was committed under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance. (2) The age of the accused. If the

accused is young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death.

(3) The probability that the accused would not commit

criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing

threat to society. (4) The probability that the accused can

be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence

prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions (3)

and (4) above. (5)That in the facts and circumstances of

the case the accused believed that he was morally justified

in committing the offence. (6) That the accused acted under

the duress or domination of another person. (7) That the

condition of the accused showed that he was mentally

defective and that the said defect impaired his capacity to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct.

This Court further observed that :

"We will do no more than to say that these are

undoubtedly relevant circumstances and must be given great

weight in the determination of sentence. Some of these

factors like extreme youth can instead be of compelling

importance. In several States of India, there are in force

special enactments, according to which a 'child', that is,

'a person who at the date of murder was less than 16 years

of age', cannot be tried, convicted and sentenced to death

or imprisonment for life for murder, nor dealt with

according to the same criminal procedure as an adult. The

special Acts provide for a reformatory procedure for such

juvenile offenders or children."

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The views of the majority of the judges were summed-up

as follows:

"There are numerous other circumstances justifying the

passing of the lighter sentence; as there are

countervailing circumstances of aggravation. "We cannot

obviously feed into a judicial computer all such situations

since they are astrological imponderables in an imperfect

and undulating society." Nonetheless, it cannot be

over-emphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating

factors in the area of death penalty must receive a liberal

and expansive construction by the courts in accord with the

sentencing policy writ large in Section 354(3). Judges

should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of murderers has

never been too good for them. Facts and figures, albeit

incomplete, furnished by the Union of India, show that in

the past, courts have inflicted the extreme penalty with

extreme infrequency-a fact which attests to the caution and

compassion which they have always brought to bear on the

exercise of their sentencing discretion in so grave a

matter. It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern

that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guide-lines

indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with

evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along

the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section

354(3), viz., that for persons convicted of murder, life

imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A

real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life

postulates resistance to taking a life through law's

instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the

rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is

unquestionably foreclosed."

In the case of Machhi Singh (Supra) three learned

Judges of this Court making an in-depth examination of the

principles laid down in Bachan Singh case (supra) observed

that between the protagonists of the 'an eye for an eye'

philosophy who demand 'death-for- death'; the 'Humanists'

on the other hand who press for the other extreme viz.,

'death-in-no- case'; a synthesis has emerged in Bachan

Singh case (supra) wherein the 'rarest-of-rare-cases'

formula for imposing death sentence in a murder case has

been evolved by this Court. This Court then took note of

the problems emerging for identification of the guidelines

spelt out in Bachan Singh case in order to determine whether

or not death sentence should be imposed. Discussing the

question of application of the rarest of rare case rule to

the facts of individual cases in the context of the relevant

guidelines this Court observed (at p.487-88): "The reasons

why the community as a whole does not endorse the humanistic

approach reflected in 'death sentence -in-no- case' doctrine

are not far to seek. In the first place, the very

humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of

'reverence for life' principle. When a member of the

community violates this very principle by killing another

member, the society may not feel itself bound by the

shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realized

that every member of the community is able to live with

safety without his or her own life being endangered because

of the protective arm of the community and on account of the

rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule

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of law and the fear of being brought to book operates as a

deterrent of those who have no scruples in killing others if

it suits their ends. Every member of the community owes a

debt to the community for this protection. When ingratitude

is shown instead of gratitude by 'killing' a member of the

community which protects the murderer himself from being

killed, or when the community feels that for the sake of

self-preservation the killer has to be killed, the community

may well withdraw the protection by sanctioning the death

penalty. But the community will not do so in every case.

It may do so 'in rarest of rare cases' when its collective

conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of

the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty

irrespective of their personal opinion as regards

desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The

community may entertain such a sentiment when the crime is

viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the manner of

commission of the crime, or the anti-social or abhorrent

nature of the crime, such as for instance:

I. Manner of Commission of murder

33. When the murder is committed in an extremely

brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner

so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the

community. For instance,

(i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with

the end in view to roast him alive in the house. (ii) when

the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or

cruelty in order to bring about his or her death.

(iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces

or his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner."

This Court in the background of the guidelines

indicated in Bachan Singh case (supra) formulated the

following propositions for application to the facts of each

case for determination of the question (at p.489):

(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be

inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.

(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the

circumstances of the 'offender' also require to be taken

into consideration along with the circumstances of the

'crime'.

(iii)Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence

is an exception. In other words death sentence must be

imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an

altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the

relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only

provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for

life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to

the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the

relevant circumstances.

(iv) A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the

mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage

and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating

and the mitigating circumstances before the option is

exercised.

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39. In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the

following questions may be asked and answered:

(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which

renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and

calls for a death sentence?

(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there

is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after

according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances

which speak in favour of the offender?"

The principles laid down in Bachan Singh case (supra)

and the formulations made in Machhi Singh case (supra) as

noted earlier have been applied by this Court in different

cases depending on the facts and circumstances thereof. In

the case of Nirmal Singh and ors. Vs. State of Haryana [JT

1999 (2) SC 225] this Court while confirming the death

sentence imposed on accused Dharam Pal, commuted such

sentence to life imprisonment of the co- accused, taking

note of the facts that the accused had no criminal

antecedents, no possibility of continued threat to society,

he was only accompanying his brother co-accused and gave

three blows to one deceased only after his brother had given

2-3 blows to deceased. No assault by him on other victims

who were killed by his brother; This Court, in the above

case held that his case is not of "rarest of rare" nature

and hence commuted death sentence to life imprisonment. A

Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in case of Anshad

and others vs. State of Karnataka [ 1984 (4) SCC 381]

observed (at p.389-90):

"The Courts must be alive to the legislative changes

introduced in 1973 through Section 354(3) Cr.PC. Death

sentence, being an exception to the general rule, should be

awarded in the "rarest of the rare cases" for 'special

reasons' to be recorded after balancing the aggravating and

the mitigating circumstances, in the facts and circumstances

of a given case. The number of persons murdered is a

consideration but that is not the only consideration for

imposing death penalty unless the case falls in the category

of "rarest of the rare cases". The courts must keep in view

the nature of the crime, the brutality with which it was

executed, the antecedents of the criminal, the weapons used

etc. It is neither possible nor desirable to catalogue all

such factors and they depend upon case to case.

This Court in the above case, preferred to adopt the

safer course and imposed the sentence of life imprisonment

on A-1 to A-3 for the offences under section 302/34 IPC and

set aside the sentence of death. Coming to the case in

hand, the crime committed is undoubtedly serious and heinous

and the conduct of the appellant is reprehensible. It

reveals a dirty and perverted mind of a human-being who has

no control over his carnal desires. Then the question is:

whether the case can be classified as of a 'rarest of rare

category justifying the severest punishment of death.

Testing the case on the touchstone of the guidelines laid

down in Bachan Singh (supra), Machhi Singh (supra) and other

decisions and balancing the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances emerging from the evidence on record, we are

not persuaded to accept that the case can be appropriately

called one of the 'rarest of rare cases deserving death

penalty. We find it difficult to hold that the appellant is

such a dangerous person that to spare his life will endanger

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the community. We are also not satisfied that the

circumstances of the crime are such that there is no

alternative but to impose death sentence even after

according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances

in favour of the offender. It is our considered view that

the case is one in which a humanist approach should be taken

in the matter of awarding punishment. Accordingly, the

capital sentence imposed against the appellant by the Courts

below is set aside, instead the appellant shall suffer

rigorous imprisonment for life. Subject to the above

modification of sentence, the appeals filed by the accused

are dismissed.