As per case facts, M/s United Air Express, the petitioner, submitted a bid for outsourcing services to the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL). Their bid was rejected as technically ...
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 4210 of 2026
M/s United Air Express, a partnership firm, through its partner, Mr.
Dinesh Kumar Sonthalia, aged about 54 years, son of Mr. Hari Shankar
Sonthalia, having his office at 12, Diagonal Road, Bistupur PO & PS –
Bistupur, Town – Jamshedpur, District – East Singhbhum.
... Petitioner
Versus
1. Steel Authority of India Limited, a public sector undertaking,
through its Chairman, having his office at Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi
Road, PO & PS – Lodhi Road, New Delhi.
2. The Chief Executive Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant, a unit of Steel
Authority of India Limited, having his office at Bokaro Steel Plant,
PO & PS – Bokaro Steel City, District - Bokaro Steel City;
3. The General Manager, Contract Cell Works, Bokaro Steel Plant,
having his office at Paryavaran Bhawan, PO & PS – Bokaro Steel
City, Bokaro Steel City;
4. The Deputy General Manager, Contract Cell Works, Bokaro Steel
Plant, having his office at Paryavaran Bhawan, PO & PS – Bokaro
Steel City, Bokaro Steel City;
5. The Assistant General Manager, Contract Cell Works, Bokaro Steel
Plant, having his office at Paryavaran Bhawan, PO & PS – Bokaro
Steel City, Bokaro Steel City.
6. FSNL Private Limited, a private limited company registered under
the Companies Act, 2013, through its Director, having its registered
office at FSNL Bhawan, Equipment Chowk, Central Avenue, PO &
PS – Bhilai, District – Bhilai, Chhattisgarh – 490001.
... Respondents
---------
CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
---------
For the Petitioner: Mr Amit Kumar Das, Senior Advocate
Mr Rahul Lamba, Advocate
Mr Anish Kamal, Advocate
Ms Kanu Priya, Advocate
For Resp. Nos.1-5: Mr Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr Shresth Gautam, Advocate
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Mr. Padmanav Shahdeo, Advocate
Mr Himanshu Harsh, Advocate
For Resp. No.6: Mr Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
Mr Prince Kumar, Advocate
Mr Jay Prakash, Advocate
---------
Reserved on: 31.08.2026 Pronounced on: 02/09/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Rule. The rule is made returnable immediately at the request and
with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.
3. The petitioner, by instituting the instant petition, seeks the
following reliefs:-
(a) Setting aside the decision of the Respondent No.1
Company (Annexure 8) whereby the bid offer of the
petitioner has been rejected as technically not eligible
with respect to the Bid Invitation No.
W06/4010034183/7000020135 dated 04.11.2025 issued
by the Respondent No.1 Company for its Bokaro Steel
Plant;
(b) Also setting aside the decision of the Respondent No.1
Company, as contained in emails dated 26.03.2026
(Annexure 7), 21.03.2026 (Annexure 5) and 11.03.2026
(Annexure 3) of the Respondent No.1 Company,
whereby the bid offer of the petitioner has been
adjudged as technically not eligible;
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(c) Setting aside the outcome of the reverse auction
conducted by the Respondent No.1 Company pursuant
to the said bid invitation;
(d) Direction upon the respondents to conduct a fresh
reverse auction, permitting the petitioner to participate
in such reverse auction.
4. The above reliefs are sought in the context of a Bid Invitation
dated 04.11.2025, read with the modification/corrigendum dated
06.12.2025, issued by the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL),
the 1
st
respondent to this petition, seeking bids for the work/job
title “Comprehensive Outsourcing Services – MRD”.
5. The petitioner, along with others, submitted its bid offer. However,
by email dated 11.03.2026, the 1
st
respondent adjudged the
petitioner as technically ineligible and called upon the petitioner to
furnish experience of excavation of slag pits and processing of slag
in a single work order after self-attestation.
6. The petitioner responded to the email. However, the 1
st
respondent,
by yet another email dated 21.03.2026, declared the petitioner as
technically ineligible on the ground that the submitted work order
does not comply with the similar work criteria as detailed in BI
and the experience of excavation of slag pits and processing of slag
in a single work order with self-attestation.
7. The petitioner, vide letter dated 23.03.2026, submitted a work
completion certificate dated 16.03.2026 issued by Tata Steel
Limited to clarify the issue raised by the 1
st
respondent. Despite
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this, the 1
st
respondent, by yet another email dated 26.03.2026,
maintained that the petitioner was technically ineligible. Further,
on 31.03.2026, the 1
st
respondent rejected the petitioner’s bid offer,
holding that the petitioner was technically ineligible.
8. Post rejection of the petitioner’s bid offer, a reverse auction was
held on 01.04.2026 in which the 6
th
respondent was declared as L1.
Hence, the present petition seeks the above-referred reliefs.
9. Mr A.K. Das, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner,
submitted that the reason disclosed for holding the petitioner
technically ineligible was that the petitioner does not have the
required experience in a single work order. He submitted that the
bid nowhere requires having such experience in one single work
order. The work experience certificates submitted by the petitioner
indisputably show that the petitioner had the required work
experience through two work orders which were a part of a single
work executed by the petitioner for Tata Steel Limited. Thus, the
impugned decision to hold the petitioner technically ineligible was
ex facie arbitrary and unreasonable. He relied on Kimberley Club
Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishna Utpadan Mandi Parishad and Others,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2323, to support this contention.
10. Mr A.K. Das, without prejudice to the above contention, submitted
that the petitioner was eligible even going by the single work order
given, Work Order No. 3000139124/102, through which the
petitioner had done excavation of slag from the slag pit and its
processing. The value of the work in the said work order was Rs.
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55,18,77,901.95, which was much more than the required value
under the Bid Invitation. He therefore submitted that the decision
to hold the petitioner technically ineligible was vitiated by non-
application of mind, ignoring the experience certificate on record
and, otherwise, arbitrary and unreasonable.
11. Mr A.K. Das submitted that the 1
st
respondent has plants at
Burnpur, Durgapur and Bokaro. He submitted that the 1st
respondent invited Bid Invitations with similar experience
requirements for the said three plants. Based on the experience
certificate furnished by the petitioner in respect of the present Bid
Invitation, the 1st respondent adjudged the petitioner as technically
eligible for the plants at Burnpur, Durgapur and Bokaro. He
therefore submitted that the 1
st
respondent, which is a ‘State’ under
Article 12 of the Constitution, acted discriminatorily and has
treated the petitioner unequally when it comes to consideration of
the petitioner’s eligibility status in the present matter. He
submitted that such discrimination violates Article 14 of the
Constitution. He relied on Banshidhar Construction Private
Limited v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Others, (2024) 10
SCC 273, to support this contention.
12. Mr A.K. Das finally submitted that the interpretation now
suggested by the 1
st
respondent in its returns is contrary to the
plain reading of the terms and conditions of the Bid Invitation. He
submitted that the interpretation now suggested is belied by the
corrigendum/modification in the eligibility criteria dated
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06.12.2025 by specifically excluding the expression “hot” from the
original terms in the Bid Invitation dated 04.11.2025.
13. Based on the above, Mr Das submitted that the eligibility criteria
in the subject Bid Invitation could never be interpreted as requiring
the bidder to have experience in the excavation of hot slag or slag
from hot slag pits as was now sought to be contended. He
submitted that the modification in the eligibility criteria was made
only because the scope of the work in the Bid Invitation was not to
excavate hot slag but to excavate slag only after the same was
cooled. Accordingly, Mr Das submitted that there was legal mala
fides in the non-consideration of the petitioner’s bid offer after
holding the petitioner as technically ineligible.
14. For all the above reasons, Mr Das submitted that this petition may
be allowed, the adjudging of the 6
th
respondent be set aside, and
the petitioner be allowed to participate in the reverse bidding
process as contemplated under the Bid Invitation.
15. Mr Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent, at the
outset, submitted that the scope for interference in such matters is
extremely limited, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
cases of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651;
Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML, (2016) 8 SCC 622;
Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8
SCC 216; and Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metrol
Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818.
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16. Mr Sinha submitted that the eligibility criteria, which included
completion of similar works, were clearly set out in the Bid
Invitation. Further, the expression “similar nature of work” was
also clearly defined. He submitted that the competent committee,
comprising experts, fairly considered the petitioner's case and,
based on documents such as the experience certificates produced
by the petitioner, adjudged the petitioner technically ineligible for
not fulfilling the prescribed eligibility criteria. This was after
affording the petitioner a suitable opportunity to clarify the matter
and produce evidence. He submitted that this decision was most
reasonable and arrived at after adopting a transparent and fair
process.
17. Mr Sinha submitted that there were no allegations of mala fides or
favouritism. He submitted that mere use of such words in some
places of the petition cannot be construed as proper pleadings to
raise a serious plea of mala fides or extraneous consideration. In
the absence of such pleadings and such charge, Mr Sinha
submitted that this Court may not interfere with the decision of
experts arrived at in a fair and reasonable manner.
18. Mr Sinha submitted that the terms of the Bid Invitation required
the bidder to have completed similar works each costing a
particular amount. The expression “similar work” was further
clarified as follows: for each work order, the required experience
was in excavation/extraction/digging of slag metal from
running/operating slag pits of a steel melting shop and processing
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the same in an operating steel plant. From the replies and the
certificates produced by the petitioner herein, it was apparent that
the petitioner did not meet such eligibility criteria. He submitted
that if the petitioner really believed that it fulfilled the eligibility
criteria based upon a single work or single work order, there was
no necessity of the petitioner producing two independent work
orders to showcase its eligibility.
19. Mr Sinha submitted that the eligibility criteria in the bid invites
concerning other plants of the 1
st
respondent could not be said to
be identical or similar to the eligibility criteria prescribed in the
present Bid Invitation. He submitted that there is no question of
any discrimination involved.
20. Mr Sinha submitted that the petitioner, along with a supplementary
affidavit filed in these proceedings without even seeking a leave of
this Court, has purported to bring on record an additional
experience certificate or a clarification from Tata Steel Limited
with regard to the experience certificate already furnished. He
submitted that such a certificate does not advance the petitioner's
case. In any event, such certificates or explanations in
supplementary affidavits after this matter was partly argued
indicate that the experience certificates and other evidence on
record were by no means sufficient to indicate the petitioner's
satisfaction of the eligibility criteria.
21. Mr Sinha submitted that the decision as well as the decision-
making process in this case was fair and transparent. No case of
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any factual mala fides or extraneous considerations has been
pleaded or made out. Given the limited scope of interference in
such matters, Mr Sinha submitted that this petition ought to be
dismissed.
22. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
23. The Bid Invitation in the present matter was for “Digging,
Evacuation of Slag/Scrap/Debris from //slag pits and various bays
of SMS, Transportation of slag, Muck, debris to material recovery
plant and segregation and processing of scrap to chargeable size
and transport to magnetic yard of SMS.”
24. The eligibility criteria for the bidders were set out in Annexure–VI
of the Bid Invitation. Since in this matter we are concerned with
the clauses dealing with “UNIFORM TECHNICAL ELIGIBILITY”
and “Similar Nature of Work”, the relevant extracts are transcribed
below for the convenience of reference:-
“B. UNIFORM TECHNICAL ELIGIBLITY.
Experience of having successfully completed or substantially
completed similar work by the bidder during last seven (07) years
ending last day of month previous to the one in which tender is
issued should be either of the following:
i) Three similar completed works each costing not less than the
amount equal to 40% of Reference Value: (Rs.
23,59,46,195.32)
OR
ii) Two similar completed works each costing not less than the
amount equal to 50% of the Reference Value: (Rs.
29,49,32,744.148)
OR
iii) One similar completed work costing not less than the amount
equal to 80% of the Reference Value. (Rs. 47,18,92,390.66)
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C. Similar Nature of Work.
“Experience of Excavation of Slag, Metal from hot slag pits &
Processing of the same in a operating integrated Steel Plant
having atleast 2.5 MT annual capacity, where processing means
separation of slag and metal and its sizing, screening,
extraction/excavation/ crushing/ separate etc.”
25. The above eligibility criteria were modified on 06.12.2025,
providing for the following:-
i) Three similar completed works each costing not less than the
amount equal to 30% of Reference Value; (Rs.
17,69,59,646.49)
OR
ii) Two similar completed works each costing not less than the
amount equal to 37.5% of the Reference Value; (Rs.
22,11,99,558.11)
OR
iii) One similar completed work costing not less than the amount
equal to 60% of the Reference Value. (Rs. 35,39,19,292.98)
26. The petitioner submitted its bid along with a work experience
certificate issued by Tata Steel. The certificate referred to the two
work orders issued in 2018 and 2021, thereby prima facie
indicating that they pertain to two separate works. The 1
st
Respondent’s case is that the petitioner was attempting to club the
work experience of these two works and pass it off as a single
work, only to somehow project a case of meeting the prescribed
eligibility criteria.
27. Therefore, by email dated 11.03.2026, the 1st respondent informed
the petitioner that it had been adjudged “Technically Not Eligible”
after evaluation. However, the petitioner’s bid offer was not
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immediately rejected; instead, the petitioner was given an
opportunity to clarify or submit additional documents online
within seven days of the email being issued.
28. Further, the petitioner was informed of the following technical
reasons for which the petitioner was adjudged as technically not
eligible: -
“Technical reasons:
1. Submitted Work Order do not comply with the similar
nature of work criteria as detailed in the BI. Submit
experience of excavation of Slag Pit and processing of Slag
in a single Work order with self attested.
2. You have not submitted document(s) in compliance with the
Para-D of the eligibility criteria as detailed in the BI.
Submit the same (Declaration of site visit not submitted)”
29. The petitioner responded to the above-referred email dated
11.03.2026 on 18.03.2026. The petitioner enclosed a completion
certificate from Tata Steel by citing the same as “composite in
nature”, wherein “the overall scope covers the entire scope of
work of excavation of slag pits and processing of slag etc.” It was
explained that, “The said work was operationally executed through
two different interlinked work orders, details of which are as
below:
1. Mechanised Feeding of Slag at MRP
Work Order No.: 3000139124/102
Value: ₹55,18,77,901.95 (Excl. GST)”
30. The Petitioner’s clarification dated 18.03.2026 proceeded to offer
the following justification: -
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“Justification:
Both the above work orders are part of a single integrated project
under the same department and collectively fulfill the requirement of
scope and clarification of your queries.
Hence, the submitted completion certificate substantiates compliance
with the similar nature of work criteria as specified in the bid.
Attachments:
Self-attested certificate from Tata Steel confirming both work orders
are part of a single work.
Self-attested Completion Certificate
Copies of both duly signed Work Orders.”
31. The petitioner, by way of “response to”, further went on to explain
that it has submitted Work Order No. 3000139124 dated
01.08.2021 for “Mechanised Feeding of Slag at MRP” having a
value of Rs. 55,18,77,901.95 (Excl. GST). The petitioner explained
that the scope of this work includes excavation of slag from slag
pits and processing of slag in MRP, along with screening,
handling, and transportation, etc., through mechanised means,
which complies with the required criteria.
32. After considering the petitioner’s clarification dated 18.03.2026
and the documents provided along with it, the Evaluation
Committee of the 1
st
respondent apparently did not agree with the
petitioner's contention that it fulfilled the eligibility criteria based
on the documents originally submitted or additionally provided on
18.03.2026.
33. Therefore, by email dated 21.03.2026, the 1
st
respondent informed
the petitioner that it was adjudged technically not eligible for the
following technical reasons:-
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“Technical reasons:
1. Submitted Work Order do not comply with the similar
nature of work criteria as detailed in the BI. Experience
of excavation of Slag Pit and processing of Slag in a
single Work Order with self attestation not submitted.”
34. By the above-referred email dated 21.03.2026, the petitioner was
given once again further opportunity to clarify the position by
24.03.2026. The petitioner availed of this opportunity vide letter
dated 23.03.2026, maintaining that the experience certificate
submitted by the petitioner related only to one work which was
divided into two work orders, much above the values prescribed in
the Bid Invitation documents. The petitioner attempted to make a
distinction between “one similar completed work” and “one
similar work order” and tried to argue that upon a conjoint reading
of the two work orders and treating them to be a part of one
composite work, the petitioner fulfilled the technical eligibility
criteria as prescribed in the Bid Invitation.
35. Again, after considering the petitioner’s repeated assertions, the
Evaluation Committee concluded that the petitioner was
technically not eligible. This was informed to the petitioner vide
email dated 26
th
March 2026. The technical reason for holding the
petitioner as technically not eligible was stated as follows:-
“Technical reasons:
1. Submitted Work Order do not comply with the similar
nature of work criteria as detailed in the BI. Experience
of excavation of Slag Pit and processing of Slag in single
Work order not submitted.”
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36. Again, vide email dated 26.03.2026, the petitioner was given a
further opportunity to clarify the matter by 28.03.2026. There is no
record of the petitioner further clarifying the matter. Finally, on
31.03.2026, the 1
st
respondent rejected the petitioner’s bid on the
ground that the petitioner was found technically ineligible.
37. From the above chronology of events, at least the charge of lack of
transparency or of a fair decision-making process fails. The
petitioner was informed of the precise reasons the committee was
troubled by the petitioner’s technical eligibility claims and the
petitioner was granted no fewer than three opportunities to clarify
or explain the matter and even to produce additional documents.
The record shows that the petitioner availed of such opportunities.
38. The committee may not have ultimately agreed with the
petitioner’s clarifications or been satisfied with the additional
material produced. But merely because the evaluation committee,
after duly considering the matter and the additional material
produced, did not agree with the petitioner's clarifications or was
not satisfied with the additional material produced, we cannot hold
that there was any lack of transparency or fairness in the decision-
making process.
39. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular (supra),
the principles of judicial review apply to the exercise of
contractual powers by Government Bodies to prevent arbitrariness
or favouritism. The right to choose cannot be an arbitrary power
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unless such power is exercised for any collateral purpose or is
actuated by mala fides.
40. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that judicial review is
primarily concerned with the decision-making process itself, not
the merits of the decision on which the application for judicial
review is based. It is different from an appeal. The court cannot
substitute its own decision. Apart from the fact that the court is
hardly equipped to do so, it would not be desirable either. Where
the selection or rejection is arbitrary, certainly the court would
interfere. However, it is not the function of a judge to act as a
superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster
substituting its judgment for that of the administrator.
41. In Tata Cellular (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained
that the court’s duty is to confine itself to the question of
legality. Its concern should be: (i) Whether a decision-making
authority exceeded its powers? (ii)Committed an error of law, (iii)
committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, (iv) reached a
decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached, or (v)
abused its powers.
42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further explained that in such matters,
the scope of judicial review must broadly extend to determining
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Further, in all
such cases, the test to be adopted is that a court should, “consider
whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which
requires its intervention".
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43. The principles deducible in such matters are as follows:
(i) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(ii) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely
reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(iii) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own
decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may
be fallible.
(iv) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the
realm of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or
award the contract is reached by process of negotiations
through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions
are made qualitatively by experts.
(v) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant
for an administrative body functioning in an administrative
sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the
decision must not only be tested by the application of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its
other facts pointed out above) but must be free from
arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
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(vi) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative
burden on the administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure.
44. As noted earlier, several opportunities were granted to the
petitioner to clarify the issue of eligibility, and the clarifications,
along with the additional documents submitted by the petitioner,
were duly considered by the Evaluation Committee, thereby
defeating any charge of lack of transparency or fairness in the
decision-making process. The fact that the petitioner’s
clarifications or explanations may not have been accepted by the
decision makers is not a ground to conclude that there was any
unfairness or unreasonableness or arbitrariness involved in the
decision-making process leading to the decision of declaring the
petitioner as technically ineligible.
45. Even on the merits, given the limited scope of interference in
judicial review proceedings, it is difficult to hold that the impugned
decision is so wrong in nature and degree as to require the court’s
intervention, or that the impugned decision is such that no
responsible authority acting in a responsible manner and in
accordance with the relevant law could ever have reached it.
46. In the eligibility criteria, whether contained in the Original Bid
Invitation or the Modified Bid Invitation, there was consistent
reference to completion of works “each costing” not less than the
amounts specified for the similar completed works. The expression
“similar nature of work” was also adequately defined. The
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documents submitted by the petitioner in respect of the eligibility
criteria, at least prima facie, did not refer to any single work but
rather to the two works completed by the petitioner under two
distinct work orders dated 04.05.2018 and 01.08.2021.
47. The contention that this relates to a single work executed under
two work orders cannot be accepted at face value. Similarly, the
contention regarding the scope or perceived scope of the works,
and whether omitting the word “hot” from the modified eligibility
criteria resulted in any significant alteration to the scope of the
works or the prescribed eligibility criteria, is a question best
addressed by the Evaluation Committee rather than a court of law,
which has neither the expertise in such matters nor is it expected to
sit in appeal over the decisions of such Evaluators and Evaluation
Committees.
48. The record shows that each time the petitioner came out with some
different explanations and grounds in support of its claim of
eligibility. In the petition, an attempt is made to draw out a
distinction between “works” and “work orders”. No such serious
distinction appears to have been drawn in the numerous
explanations offered by the petitioner when given an opportunity
to do so. Instead, the attempt was to insist that the Tata Steel
Project’s experience related only to a single work which was to be
executed through two distinct and separate work orders issued on
04.05.2018 and 01.08.2021.
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49. By filing a supplementary affidavit before this Court after the
arguments were partly concluded, and without even seeking the
leave of this Court, a certificate dated 28.08.2026 was sought to be
placed on record. This certificate, issued post hoc, purports to
explain that the two work orders were running concurrently and
pertained to a single work order that was not provided at the
tendering stage.
50. The argument based on one of the two work orders produced by
the petitioner in support of the petitioner’s contention about
fulfilling the eligibility criteria also cannot be accepted. If the
petitioner was indeed confident of such an argument, we fail to
understand why the petitioner produced more than one work order
over a period of three years.
51. Post facto explanations furnished by the issuer of the experience
certificate also cannot be ordinarily considered. The fact that such
explanations were sought to be produced on record after the matter
was argued substantially and that too, without the leave of this
Court, suggests some attempt to pass off the two works as parts of,
or as the same work. The theory that the two work orders were
running concurrently, though belatedly introduced, does not
explain why the two work orders were issued in 2018 and 2021,
i.e. almost three years apart.
52. The certificate produced along with a supplementary affidavit also
refers to this position not being clarified at the tendering stage.
Given this situation, we can hardly fault the decision of the 1
st
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respondent or its Evaluation Committee in holding the petitioner
technically ineligible. In any event, as we have stated, the fact that
we might have a different opinion is hardly a ground to substitute
our opinion for that of the decision maker.
53. These post facto explanations and contradictory stands adopted by
the petitioner are sufficient to hold that no case is made out to
interfere with the decision of the Experts comprising the
Evaluation Committee in declaring the petitioner as technically
ineligible. The 1
st
respondent or its Evaluation Committee is
expected to reach a fair decision by following a fair process. This
Court is not expected to sit in appeal over such a decision, unless
any case of mala fide or extraneous consideration is properly
pleaded and established.
54. Thus, even if some allowance is made for the primarily semantic
argument of a single work and a single work order, the
committee’s conclusion that the petitioner was technically
ineligible, given the time gap between the two work orders and the
scope of the works, can hardly be condemned as perverse, illegal
or irrational warranting judicial review.
55. In Tata Cellular (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained
that, when exercising judicial review, the court is mainly
concerned with the lawfulness of the decision, not its soundness.
Normally, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is
reached through a process of negotiations across several tiers.
More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 21 of 26
experts. The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision
is permitted, it would substitute its own decision, without the
necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible.
56. In Michigan Rubber (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
explained that the court's interference is not warranted unless the
tendering authority's action is mala fide and a misuse of statutory
powers. The court should not interfere merely because it feels
other terms in the tender would have been fairer, wiser, or more
logical. The main issue to be adjudicated in a tender matter is
whether the process adopted or the decision made is mala fide or
intended to favour someone, or whether the process adopted or the
decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say
that the decision is such that no responsible authority acting in a
responsible manner and in accordance with the relevant law could
have ever reached.
57. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that even in interpreting tender conditions, interference
is permissible if the decision is arbitrary or irrational, or such that
no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with
law could have reached it. Further, perversity of the decision-
making process or the decision, not merely a faulty or erroneous
decision, is a ground for interference by the courts. Constitutional
Courts are expected to exercise restraint in interfering with
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 22 of 26
administrative decisions and ought not to substitute their view for
that of the administrative authority.
58. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a mere disagreement with
the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative
authority is no reason for a Constitutional Court to interfere.
Constitutional Courts must defer to the authority’s understanding
and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide
intent or perversity in the understanding or appreciation, or in the
application of the terms of the tender conditions. A different
interpretation given by the authority, which is not acceptable to the
court, is no ground for a Constitutional Court to interfere with the
authority’s interpretation unless it is proved to be perverse or mala
fide or intended to favour a particular bidder.
59. By applying the above principles, we are satisfied that the
impugned decision in this matter cannot be said to be vitiated by
illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. The decision-
making process by which such decision was reached was fair and
transparent, consistent with the rules of natural justice. There are
neither any pleadings nor any materials to infer mala fides or abuse
of power.
60. This is not a case where the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to make good its claim about fulfilling the prescribed
eligibility criteria. The clarification and the materials furnished by
the petitioner were duly considered. The decision can certainly not
be styled as so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 23 of 26
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind
to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The decision is
also not such that no authority properly directing itself on the
relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it.
61. The decision in Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. (supra) cited by Mr
Das holds that the terms of an NIT must be clear and
unambiguous. It also reiterates that the court exercising judicial
review does not sit in appeal over the tendering authority's decision
to disqualify a bidder. Only in cases where such decision is de hors
the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary, would the court
exercise power of judicial review and set aside such a decision.
62. In the present case, there was no complaint that the terms of the
Bid Invitation were unclear or ambiguous. The decision reached by
the 1
st
respondent or its Evaluation Committee cannot be said to be
de hors the terms of the NIT or patently arbitrary. At the highest,
this is a case of interpretation of the terms of the bid invite and
determining whether, based on the material originally and
additionally produced, the petitioner could be regarded as
technically eligible. Once a decision is reached in a fair and
transparent manner and such decision is not perverse [ as opposed
to it being merely erroneous] or irrational, the scope to interfere in
the exercise of judicial review is indeed limited.
63. As held in Afcons Infrastructure (supra), the Constitutional
Courts must also defer to the tendering authorities' understanding
and appreciation of the tender documents, or to their interpretation
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 24 of 26
of the terms, unless there is mala fides or perversity in the
understanding or appreciation, or in the application, of the terms of
the tender conditions. Even if the authority's interpretation may not
be acceptable to the courts, the Constitutional Courts must not
interfere with it unless it is established that it is perverse, mala
fide, or intended to favour a particular bidder.
64. The argument about discrimination also cannot be accepted in the
light of the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is
difficult, at least on a prima facie basis, to hold that the eligibility
conditions in the Bid Invitations for three other plants of the 1
st
respondent were the same as the eligibility criteria prescribed for
the present Bid Invitation. Secondly, it is difficult to accept that the
scope of the works and all the plants were identical and similar, as
was argued on behalf of the petitioner.
65. In any event, the petitioner cannot expect the Court to scrutinise
and interpret the terms and conditions and the experience
certificates of other bid invitations, comparing them with the
present bid invitation with a fine-toothed comb. A prima facie
examination is all that is warranted, particularly after the decision-
makers have evaluated the matters thoroughly and no case of mala
fides or favouritism has been pleaded or established.
66. Ultimately, these are matters which have been considered by the
Evaluation Committee of the 1
st
respondent, and unless it is
established that there was any infirmity in the decision-making
process or that the decision was perverse as opposed to merely
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 25 of 26
erroneous, there is no scope to interfere. In fact, in such matters,
this Court is prohibited from acting as a superboard or with the
zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster, substituting its judgment for that
of the administrator.
67. In Banshidhar Construction (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that Constitutional Courts, when exercising judicial review,
cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract entered by
the public body or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on
the scope of any such enquiry. At the same time, the courts can
examine whether the decision-making process was reasonable,
rational, or arbitrary, and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
68. In this case, the petitioner invites us to examine the terms of the
Bid Invitation documents and to adopt the petitioner's
interpretation, in preference to the interpretation adopted by the 1
st
respondent and its Tender Evaluation Committee. Such an
invitation, if accepted, would run counter to the law laid down in
Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra). That case holds that the
constitutional Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of
the terms and conditions in the NIT.
69. For all the above reasons, we are satisfied that the impugned
decision is not perverse and is not actuated by any mala fide,
discrimination or undue favouritism. No case is made out for
interference with the impugned decision, having regard to the
limited scope of judicial review in such matters.
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:26463-DB
Page 26 of 26
70. The petition is, thus, liable to be dismissed and is hereby
dismissed, without any order for costs. IAs, if any, pending in this
petition will not survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
September 02, 2026
A.F.R.
Manoj/Cp.2
Uploaded on 02.09.2026
The Jharkhand High Court's recent decision in W.P. (C) No. 4210 of 2026 provides crucial clarity on the judicial review of technical eligibility criteria for tenders. This significant ruling, along with many other pivotal judgments, is meticulously cataloged and available for in-depth analysis on CaseOn.in, offering legal professionals and students comprehensive access to the latest legal developments.
At the heart of this case was the petitioner's challenge against the rejection of their bid by Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) on the grounds of technical ineligibility. The core legal question revolved around whether the respondent's decision to disqualify the petitioner, particularly concerning the interpretation of "similar work" and "single work order" in the tender document, was arbitrary, unreasonable, or mala fide, thereby warranting judicial intervention.
The High Court reiterated the well-established legal principles governing judicial review in contractual matters, primarily drawing from several landmark Supreme Court judgments. Key among these are:
Emphasizing judicial restraint, this case established that courts review the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision itself. Intervention is warranted only for arbitrariness, favouritism, illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, or abuse of power. The court is not a "superboard" to substitute its judgment for that of the administrator.
Reinforced the limited scope of judicial review, stressing that courts should not interfere merely because a different tender term might seem fairer.
Held that court interference is justified only when the tendering authority acts mala fide or misuses statutory powers, or if the decision is so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority could have reached it.
Affirmed that even in interpreting tender conditions, courts defer to the authority's understanding unless it's perverse, mala fide, or intended to favor a specific bidder. It distinguishes between a faulty/erroneous decision and a perverse one.
Underlined that Constitutional Courts cannot delve into the minute details of contract terms but must ensure the decision-making process is reasonable, rational, and not arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The bid invitation, issued by SAIL (Respondent No. 1) for its Bokaro Steel Plant, was for "Comprehensive Outsourcing Services – MRD," involving the excavation, transportation, and processing of slag/scrap/debris. The eligibility criteria stipulated specific experience requirements for "similar works" based on their cost. These criteria were later modified, including changes to reference values.
The petitioner, M/s United Air Express, submitted its bid along with a work experience certificate from Tata Steel, referencing two separate work orders from 2018 and 2021. SAIL's Evaluation Committee deemed the petitioner technically ineligible, stating that the submitted work orders did not comply with the "similar nature of work" criteria requiring experience in "excavation of Slag Pit and processing of Slag in a single Work order with self attested." The petitioner was given multiple opportunities (three, in fact) to clarify and provide additional documentation.
Mr. A.K. Das, senior advocate for the petitioner, contended that:
Mr. Indrajit Sinha, representing SAIL, argued that:
The High Court meticulously reviewed the sequence of events and the arguments. It noted that the petitioner was indeed given multiple chances to explain their eligibility. The court emphasized that its role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the expert committee or to sit in appeal over their decision.
Addressing the 'single work order' versus 'single integrated project' argument, the court found the petitioner's explanations inconsistent and belated. The post hoc certificate, introduced without court leave after arguments had commenced, was also viewed skeptically, especially given the significant time gap (three years) between the two work orders. The court stated that the evaluation committee's conclusion, considering the time gap and scope, could not be deemed perverse, illegal, or irrational.
Regarding the discrimination claim, the court found it difficult to accept prima facie that the eligibility conditions and scope of work for other plants were identical to the present bid. The court stressed it could not scrutinize and interpret every detail of multiple tender documents with a "fine-toothed comb."
For legal professionals seeking rapid comprehension, CaseOn.in offers concise 2-minute audio briefs that distill the essence of rulings like these, providing crucial insights into the court's reasoning and the application of tender law principles. These briefs are invaluable for busy practitioners needing quick, accurate summaries.
Ultimately, the court found no evidence of mala fides, arbitrariness, or procedural impropriety. The decision-making process was fair and transparent, even if the petitioner disagreed with the outcome. The court reiterated that a mere disagreement with an administrative decision or its interpretation is not grounds for intervention unless it is perverse or intended to favor a particular bidder.
Based on its analysis, the Jharkhand High Court concluded that the impugned decision of SAIL to declare the petitioner technically ineligible was neither perverse nor actuated by mala fides, discrimination, or undue favouritism. The court found no compelling reason to interfere with the expert committee's decision, especially given the limited scope of judicial review in such contractual matters.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding SAIL's rejection of the petitioner's bid.
This judgment serves as a powerful reminder of the principles of judicial restraint in reviewing tender processes. For lawyers advising clients on public procurement, it underscores:
For law students, it's an excellent case study on the application of administrative law principles, particularly the Wednesbury unreasonableness test and the constraints of judicial oversight in contractual disputes involving state instrumentalities.
All information provided in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should not rely solely on this content for making legal decisions. Consultation with a qualified legal professional is strongly recommended for specific legal concerns.
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