2026 INSC 1048 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.____________ of 2026)

[Diary No. 56431 of 2025]

NAVAL KISHORE & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. This is a criminal appeal challenging the judgment and order

dated 12.12.2022 passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA-D-759-DB-2014, whereby

the criminal appeal preferred by the appellants, along with

the co-accused Ashok Kumar (accused No. 1), came to be

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dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence passed by the learned Trial Court were affirmed.

3.1. The Trial Court, vide judgment dated 26.04.2014,

convicted all the three accused for the offence punishable

under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”). By a

separate order dated 28.04.2014, the accused were

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and were directed

“to remain in prison till rest of their life”, apart from payment

of fine of Rs.2,500/- each and, in default thereof, to undergo

simple imprisonment for one year.

4. The brief facts of the prosecution case are as follows:

4.1. Pinki @ Simran (hereinafter referred to as “ the

deceased”) was married to Ashok Kumar (accused No. 1) and

two daughters, Divya (8 years old) and Pooja (5 years old),

were born out of wedlock.

4.2. On 25.12.2009, Vijay Kumar, father of the deceased,

went to meet her at her matrimonial home. On 26.12.2009,

Pinki, alongwith her daughters and Ashok Kumar, came to

the residence of Vijay Kumar at Ludhiana in connection with

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an upcoming family wedding. On 27.12.2009, at about 7

p.m., Pinki and her daughters left the house stating that they

were going to purchase some eatables. When they did not

return, a search was undertaken by the family members. On

28.12.2009, at about 8:30 a.m., Vijay Kumar, accompanied

by Ashok Kumar, found the dead bodies of Pinki and her two

minor daughters near the railway tracks at Sandhu Nagar,

Ludhiana. The deceased persons had sustained injuries

caused by sharp-edged weapons.

4.3. Thereafter, Vijay Kumar got his statement recorded

before the police, which formed the basis of FIR No. 271 of

2009 dated 28.12.2009 registered at Police Station Haibowal,

Ludhiana, for the offence punishable under Section 302 read

with Section 34 IPC against unknown persons.

4.4. During investigation, various articles were recovered

from the place of occurrence, including a blood-stained

weapon, a liquor bottle, glass tumblers and foot track

moulds. The prosecution also relied upon forensic material,

including the hair recovered from the closed fist of the

deceased Pinki.

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4.5. On 30.12.2009, Ashok Kumar was produced before the

police by Mohalla Pradhan Jaspal Singh (PW-6) and was

arrested. During investigation, pursuant to the disclosure

statement made by him, a blood-stained jacket and the

weapon of offence were recovered. Based on the statement of

Ashok Kumar, Jyoti Kumar (accused No.2 - brother of Ashok

Kumar) and Naval Kishore (accused No.3 - friend of Ashok

Kumar), were arrested at Ludhiana Railway Station on

31.12.2009.

4.6. During the investigation, on the basis of the disclosure

statements of the appellants - Jyoti Kumar and Naval

Kishore, their respective blood-stained jackets and gold

earrings belonging to the deceased Pinki were recovered.

4.7. The prosecution relied, inter alia, upon the testimony of

PW-4 Darshan Singh, who stated that on 27.12.2009 at

about 7 p.m., he had seen Jyoti Kumar and Naval Kishore

consuming liquor near the railway lines and thereafter saw

Pinki and her daughters proceeding towards the railway line,

with Ashok Kumar following them. The prosecution also

relied upon the testimony of PW-6 Jaspal Singh regarding the

extra-judicial confessions made by the accused and deposed

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that the accused had disclosed the conspiracy to eliminate

Pinki and her daughters, because Ashok Kumar suspected

the character of Pinki and doubted the paternity of the

children. Ashok Kumar further planned to claim insurance

money of Rs.1-2 lakhs, out of which Naval Kishore was

promised Rs.50,000 for assisting in the crime. The

prosecution rested its case on the forensic evidence,

including the finger impressions on the recovered glass

tumblers and the DNA evidence confirming that the hair

recovered from the hand of the deceased Pinki belonged to

Jyoti Kumar.

5. The accused were tried for the offence punishable under

Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court

examined 17 prosecution witnesses and 6 defence witnesses.

Vide the judgment dated 26.04.2014, the Trial Court

convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section

34 IPC and vide a separate order dated 28.04.2014, the

accused were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and

were directed “to remain in prison till rest of their life”, apart

from payment of fine of Rs.2,500/- each and, in default

thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.

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6. The accused preferred a criminal appeal before the High

Court, being CRA-D-759-DB-2014. The High Court thereafter

examined the prosecution evidence, including the last-seen

circumstance, the extra-judicial confession, the recoveries

from the disclosure statements, the forensic evidence and

other circumstances forming part of the prosecution case.

Vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2022, the High Court

dismissed the criminal appeal and affirmed the conviction

and sentence imposed upon the accused by the Trial Court.

6.1. At this stage, it is relevant to observe that the High Court

in paragraph 1 of the impugned judgment noted as under:

“1. The instant appeal is directed against the impugned

verdict, as made on 26.4.2014, upon Sessions Case No. 20 of

3.8.2010, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Ludhiana. Through the above said verdict, the learned trial

Judge concerned, convicted all the accused, for the

commission of offences punishable, under Section(s) 302 read

with Section 34 of the IPC. Moreover, through a separate

sentencing order, drawn on 28.4.2014, the learned trial Judge

concerned, sentenced the convicts to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for life, for an offence punishable under Section

302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, besides also imposed,

upon the convicts sentence of fine, comprised in a sum of Rs.

2500/- each, and, in default of payment of fine amount, he

sentenced the convicts to undergo simple imprisonment for a

period of one year.”

6.2. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear that while affirming

the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court, the

High Court did not take into consideration the specific

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direction issued by the Trial Court that the accused shall

“remain in prison till rest of their life” and thus, the said

direction, which is part of the sentence of rigorous

imprisonment for life imposed upon the accused, was not

examined by the High Court while passing the impugned

judgment dated 12.12.2022.

7. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellants (accused

Nos. 2 and 3) filed the present appeal before this Court.

8. When the matter came before this Court on 10.11.2025, after

hearing learned counsel for the appellants, this Court

recorded its considered view that the judgment of conviction

did not warrant interference. However, this Court noted that

the sentence imposed by the Trial Court, namely, the accused

“to remain in prison till rest of their life”, required

examination. Thereafter, on 26.05.2026, this Court, for the

limited purpose of examining the sentence, directed the State

to place on record a report from the Jail Superintendent

concerning the conduct of the appellants in prison and any

other useful information.

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9. Ms. Sampa Sengupta Ray, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellants submitted that although the

conviction is not being challenged in the present proceedings,

the direction that the appellants shall remain imprisoned for

the rest of their natural lives is legally unsustainable and

warrants interference by this Court.

9.1. It is submitted that Section 302 IPC provides for death

or imprisonment for life as punishments for the offence of

murder and that the Trial Court went beyond the statutory

punishment by directing the appellants to remain imprisoned

for the rest of their lives. Thus, the question of sentence

requires independent consideration by this Court.

9.2. It is further submitted that the appellants have

undergone a substantial period of incarceration and have

maintained satisfactory conduct during their imprisonment.

9.3. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellants prayed that

the sentence be appropriately modified and having regard to

the period already undergone and the conduct of the

appellants, the appellants be released from jail.

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10. Per contra, Mr. Vivek Jain, learned Additional Advocate

General and Mr. Siddhant Sharma, learned counsel,

appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab-respondent

submitted that the offence involved the brutal murder of

three persons, including two minor children.

10.1. It is contended that the gravity of the offence, the

manner in which the victims were killed and the impact of

the crime upon the family and society, warrant no

interference by this Court in the sentence imposed upon the

appellants by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court,

that is, the appellants to remain incarcerated for the

remainder of their natural lives.

10.2. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondent-State

prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have

perused the material available on record.

12. In view of the order dated 10.11.2025, the conviction of the

appellants is not required to be reconsidered and thus, the

following questions concerning the sentence of the appellants

arise for our consideration :

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A. Whether the Trial Court was competent to direct, while

imposing the punishment of imprisonment for life under

Section 302 IPC, that the appellants shall remain in

prison for the remainder of their lives?

B. If the answer to Question (A) is in the negative, what

sentence is to be imposed upon the appellants?

13. Section 302 IPC is reproduced as under, for convenience:

“302. Punishment for murder.— Whoever commits murder

shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and

shall also be liable to fine.”

14. Section 302 IPC prescribes two punishments for the offence

of murder, namely, (i) death or (ii) imprisonment for life, apart

from fine. However, significantly Section 302 IPC does not

expressly provide that imprisonment for life shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of convict,

unlike certain other provisions of the IPC which expressly

provide for such a consequence.

15. It is well settled that, as per Section 53 read with Section 45

of the IPC, imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the

remainder of the natural life of the convict. At the same time,

such sentence is subject to the statutory powers of remission

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and commutation vested in the appropriate Government

under Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) and the

constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the

Constitution of India.

16. In the present case, the distinction between an ordinary

sentence of imprisonment for life and a special category

sentence directing that the convict shall not be released for

the remainder of his natural life by excluding the statutory

remission regime, is to be considered. Therefore, the question

that falls for our consideration is whether a Court of Session,

while imposing a sentence under Section 302 IPC, is

competent to issue a direction that the convict shall remain

imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, thereby

excluding or curtailing the statutory powers of remission and

commutation vested in the appropriate Government.

17. This Court in the decision of Swamy Shraddananda (2) v.

State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, evolved a special

category of sentence as a measure to bridge the gap between

the punishment of death and ordinary life imprisonment. The

underlying consideration was that in a case falling short of

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the “rarest of the rare” threshold for capital punishment,

ordinary life imprisonment subject to remission might

nevertheless be grossly inadequate and thus, the special

category was evolved in exceptional cases where life

imprisonment without the possibility of remission was

considered necessary. This Court observed as under:

“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different

angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence

may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly

disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to

this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial

court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find,

as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the

rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant

in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having

regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel

that a sentence of life imprisonment subject to remission

normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly

disproportionate and inadequate. What then should the Court

do? If the Court's option is limited only to two punishments,

one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes,

of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court may

feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death

penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far

more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand

the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully

belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years'

imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the

Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily

because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years'

imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.”

18. The aforesaid issue was thereafter considered by the

Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias

Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1. The Constitution Bench affirmed

the validity of such special category sentencing, however,

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made it clear that the power to impose a special category

punishment providing for a specified period of incarceration

or imprisonment till the end of the life of convict, as an

alternative to death penalty, could be exercised only by the

Constitutional Courts, i.e. the Supreme Court and the High

Courts. It has been observed as under:

“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the

Penal Code for any modified punishment within the

punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified

offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the

event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by

any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power

to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific

term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an

alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High

Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior

court.

106. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down

in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v.

State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)

113] that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for

a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond

application of remission is well founded and we answer the

said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in

agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in

Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana,

(2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] that the deprival

of remission power of the appropriate Government by

awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any

remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law

and we specifically overrule the same.”

19. The important question as to the authority competent to

impose such a special category sentence was recently again

considered by this Court in Kiran v. State of Karnataka,

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 2863 . In that case also, the Sessions

Court had imposed life imprisonment with a direction that

the sentence would operate till the end of the natural life of

the accused. After considering Swamy Shraddananda (2)

(supra) and V. Sriharan alias Murugan (supra), this Court

held that although life imprisonment denotes imprisonment

for the remainder of the life of convict, the statutory powers

of remission and commutation cannot be curtailed by a

Sessions Court and thus, the power to impose a special

category sentence of life imprisonment without remission

belongs to the Constitutional Courts and not to the Sessions

Court. This Court further held that the power to grant

remission and commutation under Sections 432 to 435 of the

Cr.P.C. cannot be curtailed by the Sessions Court and a

direction by the Sessions Court that imprisonment for life

shall continue till the end of the natural life of the convict is

in conflict with the statutory scheme. Accordingly, in that

case, the sentence imposed by the Trial Court was modified

to imprisonment for life simpliciter. The relevant paragraph

reads as under:

“15. Going by the decisions cited, it has to be held that life

imprisonment awarded would be for the rest of the life, the

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power to grant remission and commutation under Sections

432 to 435 Cr. P.C. cannot be curtailed by the Sessions Court,

when the remission as provided under the Constitution was

declared to be not permissible of interference by the

Constitutional Courts. The power of alternate sentencing to

cover the hiatus between 14 years and death, cannot be

applied by the Sessions Courts. Hence, the sentence of life

imprisonment cannot be directed to be till the end of natural

life, by the Sessions Court which direction would be in conflict

with the provisions of the Cr. P.C. The power of remission or

commutation conferred on the State cannot be taken away

and the sentence as awarded by the trial court and confirmed

by the High Court for the offence under Section 302 of the

Penal Code, 1860

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is confirmed as imprisonment for life.”

20. The appellants have placed reliance upon Ravinder Singh v.

State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 2 SCC 323, to urge for the

commutation of sentence of the appellants, wherein the

Sessions Court had directed the convict to undergo 20 years

of imprisonment without remission, affirmed by the High

Court, this Court declined to reduce the period of

imprisonment. However, this Court categorically held that

the Sessions Court lacked the power to impose a special

category sentence. The relevant paragraph reads as under:

“23. The above observations manifest the applicability of the

same principle in cases where the maximum punishment

prescribed by law is imprisonment for life with nothing

further. Even in such cases, it would be a parody of justice to

allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the benefit of

remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and

cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 years.

We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the law laid

down in Swamy Shraddananda [Swamy Shraddananda (2)

v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)

113] and V. Sriharan[Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7

SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] with regard to special category

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sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing

a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and

this Court, even in cases where the maximum punishment,

permissible in law and duly imposed, is life imprisonment

with nothing further. We must, however, hasten to add that

exercise of such power must be restricted to grave cases,

where allowing the convict sentenced to life imprisonment to

seek release after a 14-year-term would tantamount to

trivialising the very punishment imposed on such convict.

Needless to state, cogent reasons have to be recorded for

exercising such power on the facts of a given case and such

power must not be exercised casually or for the mere asking.”

21. The appellants have further relied upon Navas alias

Mulanavas v. State of Kerala , (2024) 14 SCC 82, for

commutation of sentence. In this case, the High Court, while

imposing a special category of life imprisonment, directed the

appellant to undergo imprisonment for a period of 30 years

without remission, which period was subsequently modified

by this Court to 25 years. However, it is relevant to note that

Navas (supra) does not support the proposition that such a

sentencing power is available to the Sessions Court. This

Court further observed the manner in which the appropriate

sentence is to be determined and the relevant observations

are reproduced as under:

“76. A survey of the 27 cases discussed above indicates that

while in five cases, the maximum of imprisonment till the rest

of the life is given; in nine cases, the period of imprisonment

without remission was 30 years; in six cases, the period was

20 years (in Ramraj [Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010)

1 SCC 573 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 842] , this Court had imposed

a sentence of 20 years including remission); in four cases, it

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was 25 years; in another set of two cases, it was 35 years

and in one case, it was 21 years.

77. What is clear is that courts, while applying Swamy

Shraddananda [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of

Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] , have

predominantly in cases arising out of a wide array of facts,

keeping the relevant circumstances applicable to the

respective cases fixed the range between 20 years and 35

years and in few cases have imposed imprisonment for the

rest of the life. So much for statistics. Let us examine how the

judgments guide us in terms of discerning any principle.

78. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove shows

that the fundamental underpinning is the principle of

proportionality. The aggravating and mitigating

circumstances which the Court considers while deciding

commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have

a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory

imprisonment without remission, too. As a judicially trained

mind pores and ponders over the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances and in cases where they decide to commute the

death penalty they would by then have a reasonable idea as

to what would be the appropriate period of sentence to be

imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda [Swamy

Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767

: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] principle too. Matters are not cut and

dried and nicely weighed here to formulate a uniform

principle. That is where the experience of the judicially trained

mind comes in as pointed out in V. Sriharan [Union of India v.

V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] .

79. Illustratively, in the process of arriving at the number of

years as the most appropriate for the case at hand, which the

convict will have to undergo before which the remission

powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors that the

courts bear in mind are:

(a) the number of deceased who are victims of that crime and

their age and gender;

(b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if any;

(c) the motive for which the offence was committed;

(d) whether the offence was committed when the convict was

on bail in another case;

(e) the premeditated nature of the offence;

(f) the relationship between the offender and the victim;

(g) the abuse of trust if any;

(h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if

released, would be a menace to the society.

Some of the positive factors have been:

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(1) age of the convict;

(2) the probability of reformation of convict;

(3) the convict not being a professional killer;

(4) the socio-economic condition of the accused;

(5) the composition of the family of the accused; and

(6) conduct expressing remorse.”

22. At this stage, we consider it appropriate to examine the

legislative developments subsequent to the decision in V.

Sriharan alias Murugan (supra). The Criminal Law

(Amendment) Act, 2018, was enacted against the backdrop of

grave sexual offences against women and children and

sought to substantially enhance the punishment prescribed

for certain aggravated forms of rape. The Parliament, inter

alia, introduced Sections 376AB, 376DA and 376DB into the

IPC and in each of these provisions, expressly provided that

the punishment of imprisonment for life “shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life”.

During the Parliamentary Debate on the Criminal Law

(Amendment) Bill, 2018, it was pointed out that the Bill

defined life imprisonment as imprisonment for the natural life

of convict and unlike the ordinary remission regime

applicable to life imprisonment, such a sentence would not

contemplate release merely on account of good behaviour.

Therefore, it is evident that when the Parliament intended the

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expression “imprisonment for life” to mean imprisonment for

the remainder of the natural life of convict, it used specific

and unambiguous language to that effect.

23. We are of the considered view that this legislative choice is of

considerable significance when Section 302 IPC is examined,

as Section 302 IPC has not been amended in the similar

terms and continues to provide that whoever commits

murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for

life, and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, the legislative intent

to use such express language in those provisions, while

retaining Section 302 IPC in its existing form, cannot be

disregarded while interpreting the scope of the sentencing

power under Section 302 IPC. Therefore, it would be

impermissible to read into Section 302 IPC, a punishment,

which the Parliament has expressly incorporated in other

penal provisions and in doing so, the Sessions Court would

be supplementing the punishment prescribed by the

legislature.

24. This position is fortified by the Constitution Bench decision

in V. Sriharan (supra), wherein this Court emphasised that

prescribing punishments is essentially a legislative function

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and that the Courts must operate within the punishment

prescribed by the legislature and while the Constitutional

Courts may, in appropriate cases, mould a sentence within

the permissible limits of the punishment prescribed, the

exercise of such power is circumscribed by the constitutional

and statutory scheme.

25. In light of the decisions considered hereinabove, we are of the

view that there is no doubt that the Trial Court was

competent to impose the punishment of imprisonment for life

upon the appellants for the offence under Section 302 read

with Section 34 IPC, however, at the same time, the Trial

Court was not competent to impose a special category

sentence that the appellants “to remain in prison till rest of

their life”, which in substance and effect, excludes the

statutory power of remission or commutation. Therefore, the

High Court, while affirming the sentence imposed by the Trial

Court, did not examine the competence of the Trial Court to

impose such a sentence and thus, to that extent, the

impugned judgment requires interference of this Court.

26. Having held that the direction issued by the Trial Court that

the appellants shall “remain in prison till rest of their life”

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cannot be sustained, the next question that arises for our

consideration is as to the sentence to be imposed upon the

appellants having regard to the facts and circumstances of

the present case.

27. As noted hereinabove, the power to impose a special category

of sentence, whereby a convict is required to undergo

imprisonment for a specified period beyond the ordinary

remission or commutation regime, is vested only in the

Constitutional Courts. In this regard, paragraph 79 of Navas

(supra), reproduced hereinabove, is relevant, wherein this

Court provides for the sentencing principles and

considerations that guide the exercise of such power and it is

held that the power is to be exercised sparingly and upon a

holistic consideration of the facts and circumstances of each

case, including the nature and gravity of the offence, the

circumstances in which the offence was committed, the role

attributable to the accused, the period of incarceration

already undergone, the conduct of the convict while in

custody and the prospects of rehabilitation of the convict.

28. We are of the view that the offence in the present case involves

the premeditated murder of three persons, including two

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minor children, which aggravates the seriousness of the

offence. Further, the manner in which the offence was

committed, i.e. by inflicting injuries on their throats and

other body parts by sharp-edged weapons, is also a

circumstance which cannot be lost sight of while determining

the appropriate sentence.

29. At the same time, sentencing is not an exercise which can be

determined solely by the nature of the crime. We are of the

view that the Court must balance the circumstances of the

offence with the circumstances of the accused and thus, the

sentence must be proportionate to the crime while also

preserving the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of

the accused, wherever the circumstances of the case permit.

30. In the present case, the appellants have undergone a

substantial period of incarceration. The custody certificates

placed on record show that, as on 08.07.2026, Naval Kishore

had undergone an actual period of custody of 12 years, 5

months and 20 days, including the period of custody

undergone as an undertrial, whereas Jyoti Kumar had

undergone an actual period of custody of 11 years, 6 months

and 9 days.

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31. Furthermore, the conduct of the appellants during their

incarceration is also a relevant consideration. We have

perused the conduct certificates issued in respect of both the

appellants, which were called for by this Court vide order

dated 26.05.2026. The certificates indicate that the conduct

of both the appellants has remained satisfactory. They have

maintained good discipline, complied with the prison rules

and regulations and their behaviour towards the prison staff

and fellow inmates has also been found to be satisfactory.

32. Therefore, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the fact

that three persons were killed including two minor children,

the respective roles attributed to the appellants, the

substantial period of incarceration already undergone by

them, their satisfactory conduct during custody and the fact

that the present proceedings are confined to the question of

sentence, the ordinary imprisonment for life subject to the

statutory remission or commutation regime would not

adequately meet the ends of justice, whereas, imprisonment

for the remainder of the natural life of the appellants would

be disproportionate in the circumstances of the present case.

In our considered view, the ends of justice would be

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adequately met by altering the sentence of the appellants

awarded by the Trial Court, i.e. rigorous imprisonment for life

and “to remain in prison till rest of their life”, to the sentence

of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 25 years, without

any statutory remission.

33. In view of the above discussion, Question (A) is answered in

the negative. The Trial Court was competent to impose the

punishment of imprisonment for life upon the appellants

under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, however, it was

not competent to direct that the appellants shall “remain in

prison till rest of their life”. Accordingly, Question (B) is

answered and while exercising our powers as a Constitutional

Court, we alter the sentence of the appellants from rigorous

imprisonment for life with the direction that they shall

“remain in prison till rest of their life” to the sentence of

rigorous imprisonment for a period of 25 years without the

benefit of statutory remission. At this stage, it is required to

be observed that as on 08.07.2026, appellant No.1 had

already undergone a period of custody of 12 years, 5 months

and 20 days and appellant No.2 had already undergone a

period of custody of 11 years, 6 months and 9 days.

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25

34. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants under Section

302 read with Section 34 of the IPC is affirmed. However, the

sentence imposed upon the appellants by the Trial Court,

which was affirmed by the High Court, is modified to the

extent indicated above. The direction requiring the appellants

“to remain in prison till the rest of their life” is hereby set

aside and in substitution thereof, both the appellants are

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of

25 years, without the benefit of any statutory remission.

35. For the aforesaid reasons, the present appeal is allowed in

part.

36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…...........................J.

(ARAVIND KUMAR)

…...........................J.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI

SEPTEMBER 24, 2026