( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Criminal Revision No. 34 of 2024.

Reserved on: 24.02.2026.

Decided on: 05 March, 2026.

Nikka Ram .... Petitioner.

Versus

Padam Nath (since deceased) through his Lrs. & Anr.

...Respondents.

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner: Mr Pritam Singh Chandel,

Advocate.

For the Respondents: None for the LR-Kehar Chand

Mr Ajit Sharma, Dy. A.G., for

respondent No.2.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

The present revision petition is directed against

the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,

Mandi (learned Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal No.

1

Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

111/2023/20-22 on 15.12.2023 vide which the judgment of

conviction dated 02.07.2022 and the order of sentence dated

21.07.2022 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1

st

Class,

Karsog (learned trial Court) in Criminal Case No. 50 of 2017

were upheld. (The parties hereafter shall be referred to by the

same status as they held before the learned trial Court for the

sake of convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

revision petition are that the complainant filed a complaint

before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of

the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N I Act”). It was

asserted that the accused was working as an insurance agent

of Oriental Insurance Company. He insured the

complainant’s vehicle bearing registration No. HP-65-2607;

however, he reduced the insurance value of the vehicle from

₹ 9,00,000/- to ₹ 80,000/-. The complainant had paid the full

amount to the accused, and the accused failed to insure the

3  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

vehicle for its full value. The vehicle met with an accident. The

accused promised to pay ₹ 1,00,000/- to compensate the

complainant and issued a cheque to discharge his liability.

The complainant presented the cheque at Punjab National

Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement

“insufficient funds”. The complainant issued a notice to the

accused asking him to repay the money within 15 days from

the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served

upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the

amount. Hence, a complaint was filed to take action against

the accused.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. When the

accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him, to

which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove

his complaint.

4  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

5. Accused in his statement recorded under Section

313 of the Cr.P.C. admitted that he was working as an

insurance agent and he had insured the complainant’s bus

bearing registration No. HP-65-2607. He stated that the

amount might have been reduced from ₹ 9,00,000/-

to ₹ 80,000/- due to a typing mistake. He admitted that he

had entered into a compromise with the complainant to

compensate him, but claimed that the complainant had not

agreed to the compromise. He claimed that the complainant

had snatched the cheque from him, and he had reported the

matter to the police and the bank. He did not remember

whether the cheque was signed by him. He admitted that he

had received the notice. He stated that he was not liable to

pay ₹ 1,00,000/-. He examined HHC Ravinder Kumar (DW-1),

Smt. Rekha Sharma (DW-2), Mahender Lal Sharma (DW-3),

himself (DW-4) and Kaul Ram (DW-5) to prove his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused

admitted his signature on the cheque, and a presumption

5  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

arose that the cheque was issued in discharge of the

debt/liability. The burden shifted upon the accused to rebut

the presumption. The accused failed to rebut the

presumption. Mere registration of the report with the police

is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Accused admitted

his liability to pay ₹ 1,00,000/- in his statement recorded

under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. This admission corroborated

the complainant’s stand. The cheque was dishonoured with

an endorsement “insufficient funds”. The accused admitted

the receipt of notice. All the ingredients of the commission of

an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N I Act were

duly satisfied; hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the

accused for the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 138 of the N I Act and sentenced him to undergo

simple imprisonment for six months and pay compensation

of ₹ 1,50,000/-.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction

and the order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court,

6  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge-1, Mandi. Learned

Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the

learned Trial Court that the issuance of the cheque was not

disputed. The cheque was given to the complainant by the

accused as per the compromise to compensate him (the

complainant) for the loss caused by the error of the accused.

The defence taken by the accused that he had no subsisting

liability to pay the amount to the complainant was not

probable. The cheque was dishonoured with an

endorsement “insufficient funds”. Notice was duly served

upon the accused, and he had not repaid the money. All the

ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied.

Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. There

was no error in the judgment and order; hence, the appeal

was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order

passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the

7  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

present petition asserting that the learned Courts below

failed to properly appreciate the material on record. There

was no proper service of notice upon the accused. The

vehicle was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company,

and the accused, being an agent, was not liable to pay any

money to the complainant. The cheque was issued without

any consideration. The complainant did not raise any

objection after the receipt of the policy, which falsifies the

plea taken by him that the amount was reduced by the

accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision

be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the

learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Pritam Singh Chandel, learned

counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy

Advocate General for the respondent/State.

10. None had appeared on behalf of the legal

representative of the complainant on the date of the hearing,

and none could be heard on his behalf.

8  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

11. Mr Pritam Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in

appreciating the material on record. The complainant had

failed to prove the existence of any debt/liability. The vehicle

was insured by the Oriental Insurance Company, and the

accused, being an agent, had no liability to pay compensation

to the complainant. The version of the accused that the

complainant had snatched the cheque was duly proved by

defence evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present

revision petition be allowed and the impugned judgments

and order be set aside.

12. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,

has submitted that the dispute is between the private parties

and the State has nothing to say in the matter.

13. I have given considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the

records carefully.

9  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a

revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only

rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It

was observed at page 207-

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions,

at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are

concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two

courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and

evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal

revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise

the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope

of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section

397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”)

vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,

sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the

regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court.

The object of the provision is to set right a patent

defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to

be a well-founded error which is to be determined on

the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that

while considering the same, the Revisional Court does

not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the

case to reverse those findings.

10  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court

under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the

power to call for and examine records of an inferior

court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the

legality and regularities of any proceeding or order

made in a case. The object of this provision is to set

right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law

or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of

this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit

Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4

SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of

Section 397 has been considered and succinctly

explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with

the power to call for and examine the records of

an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying

itself as to the legality and regularity of any

proceedings or order made in a case. The object

of this provision is to set right a patent defect or

an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a

well-founded error, and it may not be

appropriate for the court to scrutinise the

orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token

of careful consideration and appear to be in

accordance with law. If one looks into the

various judgments of this Court, it emerges that

11  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where

the decisions under challenge are grossly

erroneous, there is no compliance with the

provisions of law, the finding recorded is based

on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or

judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or

perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but

are merely indicative. Each case would have to

be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the

revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a

very limited one and cannot be exercised in a

routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is

that it should not be against an interim or

interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in

mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction

itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where

the Court is dealing with the question as to

whether the charge has been framed properly

and in accordance with law in a given case, it

may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of

its revisional jurisdiction unless the case

substantially falls within the categories

aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a

much-advanced stage in the proceedings under

CrPC.”

16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018)

8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018

SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court

12  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in

the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope

of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for

exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court.

In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan

Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275],

while considering the scope of the revisional

jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down

the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court

can call for and examine the record of any

proceedings to satisfy itself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,

sentence or order. In other words, the

jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction

exercised by the High Court for correcting a

miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional

power cannot be equated with the power of an

appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily,

therefore, it would not be appropriate for the

High Court to reappreciate the evidence and

come to its conclusion on the same when the

evidence has already been appreciated by the

Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in

appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to

the notice of the High Court which would

otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of

justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment

of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint,

13  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

we have no hesitation in concluding that the

High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in

interfering with the conviction of the respondent

by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to

and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this

Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray

Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)

19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise

of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the

order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly

unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely

on the ground that another view is possible. The

following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate

is perverse or the view taken by the court is

wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material or there is

palpable misreading of records, the Revisional

Court is not justified in setting aside the order,

merely because another view is possible. The

Revisional Court is not meant to act as an

appellate court. The whole purpose of the

revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in

the court to do justice in accordance with the

principles of criminal jurisprudence. The

revisional power of the court under Sections 397

to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an

appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose

decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be

perverse or untenable in law or is grossly

erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where

14  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

the decision is based on no material or where

the material facts are wholly ignored or where

the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or

capriciously, the courts may not interfere with

the decision in exercise of their revisional

jurisdiction.”

17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC

(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at

page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal

Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the

absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual

findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse

and re-interpret the evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC

457, it is a well-established principle of law that the

Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong

order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the

absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the

first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

19. The ingredients of an offence punishable under

Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa

Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: -

“5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8

SCC 300, this Court enlisted the components,

aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which

would make the offence under Section 138 of the

Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque

by a person on an account maintained by him with

a banker, for payment to another person from out

of that account for discharge in whole/in part of

any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque

by the payee or the holder in due course to the

bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the

drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the

credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the

banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv)

giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque

within 15 days of the receipt of information by the

payee from the bank regarding the return of the

cheque as unpaid demanding payment of the

cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to

make payment to the payee or the holder in due

course of the cheque, of the amount covered by

the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the

notice.”

16  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

20. Accused admitted while appearing as DW-4 that

the cheque (Ex.CW1/A) contained his signature inside the

circle “A”, and it was issued for ₹ 1,00,000/-. It was laid down

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v.

Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that

when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque

are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque

was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: -

“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and

considering the fact that the accused has admitted the

issuance of the cheques and his signature on the

cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for

the second time after the earlier cheques were

dishonoured and that even according to the accused

some amount was due and payable, there is a

presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there

exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course,

such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut

the presumption, the accused was required to lead

evidence that the full amount due and payable to the

complainant had been paid. In the present case, no

such evidence has been led by the accused. The story

put forward by the accused that the cheques were

given by way of security is not believable in the

absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption,

and more particularly, the cheque in question was

17  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

issued for the second time after the earlier cheques

were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below

have materially erred in not properly appreciating and

considering the presumption in favour of the

complainant that there exists a legally enforceable

debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It

appears that both the learned trial court as well as the

High Court have committed an error in shifting the

burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or

liability, without appreciating the presumption under

Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section

139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause

and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has

been admitted and even the signature on the cheque

has been admitted, there is always a presumption in

favour of the complainant that there exists legally

enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the

accused to rebut such presumption by leading

evidence.”

21. It was laid down in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath

Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:

“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable

instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while

Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a

cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt

or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,

meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by

raising a probable defence.”

22. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore

S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

18  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,

PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI

ACT ARISE

15. In the present case, the cheque in question has

admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-

Accused. This Court is of the view that once the

execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption

under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in

question was drawn for consideration and the

presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the

holder of the cheque received the said cheque in

discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability

arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention

that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench

in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,

(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge

Bench in Rangappa (supra).

16. This Court is further of the view that by creating

this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of

cheques as a mode of payment in commercial

transactions.

17. Needless to mention that the presumption

contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is

rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that

the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other

liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See:

Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].

23. Thus, learned Courts below had rightly held that a

presumption would apply that the cheque was issued for

consideration to discharge the debt/liability.

19  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

24. The accused admitted in his cross-examination

that he used to get the complainant’s vehicle insured for

many years. He stated in his statement recorded under

Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that he had insured the

complainant’s vehicle bearing registration No. HP-65-2607.

He stated that the amount might have been reduced from

₹ 9,00,000/- to ₹ 80,000/- due to a typing mistake. He

admitted that he had agreed to compensate the complainant

by paying him ₹ 1,00,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh,

(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421

that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused

recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at

page 742:

“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can

constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is

administered to the accused, the statements made by

the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is

why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not

20  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

render himself liable to punishment if he gives false

answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:

“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may

be taken into consideration in such inquiry or

trial, and put in evidence for or against him in

any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other

offence which such answers may tend to show

he has committed.”

Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to

his examination under Section 313 can be taken into

consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is

clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.

Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4)

permits that it may be taken into consideration in the

said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B.

Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri

LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat

Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933:

AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an

accused under Section 313 examination can be used

for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a

prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab

(1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that

if the accused confesses to the commission of the

offence with which he is charged, the Court may,

relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him.

To state the exact language in which the three-Judge

bench answered the question, it would be

advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations

at pages 684-685:

“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is

21  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

material, the Court may at any stage of the

enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the

prosecution have been examined and before the

accused is called upon for his defence shall put

questions to the accused person for the purpose

of enabling him to explain any circumstance

appearing in the evidence against him.

Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be

directed to those matters on which evidence has

been led for the prosecution to ascertain from

the accused his version or explanation, if any, of

the incident which forms the subject-matter of

the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3),

the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken

into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If

the accused person in his examination under

Section 342 confesses to the commission of the

offence charged against him the court may, relying

upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if

he does not confess and in explaining

circumstance appearing in the evidence against

him sets up his own version and seeks to explain

his conduct pleading that he has committed no

offence, the statement of the accused can only

be taken into consideration in its entirety.”

(emphasis supplied)

Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-

section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it

now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso

added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where

the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his

examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed

with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old

22  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3)

corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the

change necessitated on account of the abolition of the

jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we

are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old

sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations

apply with equal force.”

25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri)

1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by

the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend

credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such

statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was

observed at page 244:

27. The statement made in defence by the accused

under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to

lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution,

but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the

sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is

almost settled that the statement under Section 313

CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or

in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory

part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to

be false on the basis of the evidence led by the

prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969)

1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23)

23  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the

statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently

improbable but is contradicted by the other

evidence. According to this statement, the injury

that the appellant received was caused by the

appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of

Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the

victim. This was contradicted by the statement of

the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the

effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle

with a herdsman. The injury found on his body

when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-

1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of

these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding

which led to his washing his clothes and having a

bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and

the washing of the bloodstains being so

considerable as to attract the attention of Ram

Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the

cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one

as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his

books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes.

More than that, the knife which was discovered on

his person was found to have been stained with

blood according to the report of the Chemical

Examiner. According to the post-mortem report,

this knife could have been the cause of the injuries

on the victim. In circumstances like these, there

being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part

of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the

High Court had acted rightly in accepting the

inculpatory part and piercing the same with the

other evidence to come to the conclusion that the

24  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

appellant was the person responsible for the crime.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of

Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012

SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., insofar as it supports the prosecution’s

case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It

was observed at page 275: -

“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to

put material evidence to the accused under Section

313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of

recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC

is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the

circumstances appearing against him as well as to put

forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But

once he does not avail this opportunity, then

consequences in law must follow. Where the accused

takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement

made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports

the case of the prosecution, can be used against him

for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he

faces the consequences in law.”

27. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.

State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014

SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the

25  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be

used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution

witnesses. It was held at page 761: -

24. We are of the view that, under Section 313

statement, if the accused admits that, from the

evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained

severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and

his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313

statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in

State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC

700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is

administered to the accused, the statement made by

the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be

evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course,

shall not render himself liable to punishment merely

on the basis of answers given while he was being

examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section

(4) says that the answers given by the accused in

response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC

can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or

trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of

Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953

Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the

accused under Section 313 examination can be used

for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by

the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of

Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court

held that when the accused confesses to the

commission of the offence with which he is charged,

26  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

the court may rely upon the confession and proceed

to convict him.

25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10

SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244,

para 27)

“27. The statement made in defence by the

accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be

taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led

by the prosecution, but only a part of such

statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be

made the sole basis of his conviction.”

In this connection, reference may also be made to the

judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v.

Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri)

1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam

(2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766 . The

abovementioned decisions would indicate that the

statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for

the admission of his guilt or confession as such

cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused

guilty, the reason being he is not making the

statement on oath, but all the same the confession or

admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence

since the same lends credence to the evidence led by

the prosecution.

26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given

by the accused while examining him under Section

313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW

13 and hence the offences levelled against the

appellant stand proved and the trial court and the

High Court have rightly found him guilty for the

offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with

Section 34 IPC.”

27  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

28. The answers given by the accused in his statement

recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. corroborate the

complainant’s version.

29. Smt. Rekha Sharma (DW-2) admitted in her cross-

examination that the complainant's vehicle was insured with

Oriental Insurance Company and the complainant had agreed

not to file any case regarding the compensation. She

admitted that the cheque was handedover by the accused to

the complainant in her presence to compensate the

complainant for the loss of the insurance. Sh. Mahender Lal

Sharma (DW-3) stated in his examination-in-chief that the

complainant had agreed not to file any claim against the

company. He admitted in his cross-examination that an

agreement was executed regarding the claim of the vehicle.

The accused made a report (Ex.DW1/A) to the police, stating

that he had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant, but

the complainant refused to acknowledge the compromise,

and he (the complainant) should be directed to return the

28  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

cheque. Thus, the evidence on record proved that the

accused had agreed to compensate the complainant for his

loss, and the complainant had agreed not to sue the

insurance company.

30. It was submitted that the accused was an agent of

the insurance company, and he was not liable to pay any

money to the complainant. This submission will not help the

accused. The insured value of the vehicle was reduced by the

accused, which caused loss to the complainant. The accused

agreed to compensate the complainant for the loss caused by

his act. Therefore, the agreement between the complainant

and the accused was independent of the insurance

agreement between the complainant and the insurance

company. Hence, the plea that the accused was not liable to

pay anything to the complainant is not acceptable.

31. The accused claimed that the complainant had

snatched the cheque from him. This claim cannot be

accepted. The report (Ex. DW-1/A) nowhere mentions that the

29  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

complainant had snatched the cheque from the accused;

rather, it mentions that the cheque was given to the accused

pursuant to the compromise. Hence, the plea that the

complainant had snatched the cheque from the accused was

rightly rejected by the learned Courts below.

32. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly

held that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption

attached to the cheque that it was issued for consideration in

discharge of the liability, and there is no infirmity in the

findings recorded by the learned Courts below.

33. Kaul Ram (DW-5) admitted in his cross-

examination that the cheque was dishonoured with an

endorsement “insufficient funds” vide memo (Ex. CW1/B).

Therefore, it was duly proved that the cheque was

dishonoured because of insufficient funds.

34. Accused Nikka Ram (DW-4) admitted in his cross-

examination that the complainant had served notice

(Ex.CW2/B) upon him. He voluntarily stated that he had issued

30  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

a reply. Thus, the service of the notice was not disputed, and

the plea that the notice was not served upon the accused is

not acceptable.

35. The accused did not claim that any money was

paid to the complainant after receipt of notice.

36. Hence, it was duly proved that the accused had

issued the cheque for the discharge of his liability, which was

dishonoured, and the accused has failed to discharge his

liability despite the service of the notice. Hence, all the

ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable

under Section 138 of the N I Act were duly satisfied, and there

is no infirmity in the judgment convicting the accused for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of

the N I Act.

37. The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to

undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay

compensation of ₹1,50,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC

31  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 138 that the penal provisions of Section 138 of NI

Act is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:

“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable

instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and

promote the use of negotiable instruments, including

cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision

of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is

intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of

negotiable instruments such as cheques without

serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the

issuance of the same.”

38. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the

punishment, the sentence of six months cannot be said to be

excessive.

39. Learned trial Court awarded compensation of

₹1,50,000/- on 21.07.2022. The cheque was issued on

10.12.2016. Thus, the compensation was awarded after a

lapse of 5 ½ years. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283:

(2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75

32  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque

amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It

was observed at page 291: -

“19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on

behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the

settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA

is not only punitive but also compensatory and

restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single

window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a

cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the

cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs

to be a consistent approach towards awarding

compensation, and unless there exist special

circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines

up to twice the cheque amount along with simple

interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC

260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri)

520]”

40. The cheque was issued for ₹ 1,00,000/- and

compensation of ₹1,50,000/-. It means that only ₹50,000/-

was awarded towards interest and litigation expenses, which

cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference

from this Court.

41. No other point was urged.

33  ( 2026:HHC:5594 ) 

42. In view of the above, the present revision petition

fails, and the same is dismissed, so are the pending

applications, if any.

43. Records be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

05 March, 2026.

(jai)