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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.A No.1328 of 2024

In the matter of an appeal under Clasue-10 of the Letter

Patent of Patna High Court read with Article-4 the

Orissa High Court Rules, 1948 from a common order

dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Single Judge in W.P.(C)

No.24199 of 2022.

----

Odisha Public Service

Commission, Cuttack & another

….

Appellants

-versus-

Dr. Sanjay Kumar Panda &

another

….

Respondents

W.A No.1330 of 2024

Odisha Public Service

Commission, Cuttack & another

….

Appellants

-versus-

Dr. Anil Kumar Sahu & another ….

Respondents

Advocates Appeared in this case

For Appellant - Mr. A. Behera, Advocate

For Respondents - Mr. U.K. Samal, (For

Respondent No.1)

Mr. Saroj Kumar Jee, AGA

(For Respondent No.2)

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---

CORAM :

MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD

MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing: 09.02.2026

Date of Judgment: 25.02.2026

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------

Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. These two Writ Appeals are taken up together as they

arise out of a common judgment dated 23.02.2024 passed by

the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 24199 of 2022 and

W.P.(C) No. 24195 of 2022, which were heard analogously

and disposed of by a common order. The Odisha Public

Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “OPSC”),

through its officials being the Appellants herein, lay a

challenge to the said judgment whereby the learned Single

Judge, while allowing the writ petitions, directed the

Appellants to recommend the names of the writ petitioners

for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon (Group-A),

Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre pursuant to

Advertisement dated 17.03.2018, within a period of two

months from the date of communication of the judgment.

2. The factual matrix of the case giving rise to the present

Writ Appeals is that on the basis of a requisition issued by

the Health and Family Welfare Department, the OPSC

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issued Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18 dated 17.03.2018

inviting online applications for recruitment to 198 posts of

Dental Surgeon (Group-A), Junior in the Odisha Medical

Service (Dental) Cadre under the Health and Family Welfare

Department. The category-wise vacancy position was

notified as follows:

UR – 126 (38-W),

SC – 29 (08-W), and

ST – 43 (13-W);

Totalling 198 posts.

The advertisement prescribed the method of selection

as 30% weightage for career marking and 70% weightage for

the written examination to be conducted by OPSC. The

written examination carried 200 marks comprising 200

multiple choice questions (MCQs), with no negative

marking for incorrect answers. The qualifying marks were

fixed at 50% for UR and SEBC candidates, 45% for PwD

candidates and 40% for SC/ST candidates. Pursuant to the

said advertisement, the Respondents along with other

eligible candidates submitted their online applications

within the stipulated period and paid the prescribed

examination fee of Rs.300/-. Admit cards were issued and

the written examination was conducted on 06.05.2018.

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Thereafter, OPSC published a notice shortlisting 193

candidates, including the Respondents, for verification of

documents. The Respondents appeared for such verification,

and their documents were found to be in order. It was,

however, specifically stipulated that candidature was purely

provisional and subject to fulfilment of all conditions of the

advertisement. Subsequently, vide Notice dated 09.08.2018,

OPSC recommended 171 candidates in order of merit for

appointment to the post in question. The names of the

Respondents did not find place in the final list. Pursuant to

directions of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 13249 of 2018, OPSC

published on 18.08.2018 the marks secured by each

candidate in the written examination along with the

category-wise cut-off marks. The cut-off for UR (Male) was

189.558; SC – 131.673; ST – 120.740; UR (Female) – 188.366;

SC (Female) – 129.904; ST (Female) – 125.027; and PH –

146.835. On 20.08.2018, OPSC also published the Answer

Key to the written examination.

Upon publication of the Answer Key, certain

candidates, including the Respondents, alleged that several

answers were incorrect. According to them, 15 answers in

the published key were erroneous. Representations were

submitted along with standard textbooks and reference

materials seeking correction of the answer key and re-

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evaluation of answer scripts. A batch of writ petitions,

including W.P.(C) (OAC) No. 2542 of 2018 and connected

matters, was filed before this Court. Pursuant to directions

issued therein, OPSC constituted an Expert Committee,

which submitted its report on 05.10.2018. The Expert

Committee identified 14 answers in the original key as

incorrect and provided corrected answers with standard

references.

In the meantime, two candidates under the UR

(Female) and UR (Male) categories, namely Dr. Sriprada

Dash and Dr. Debashish Sahoo, who had secured 188.108

and 187.934 marks respectively under the earlier merit list,

were recommended and appointed vide appointment letter

dated 09.03.2019. In compliance with subsequent orders

passed by this Court, OPSC revisited the merit list on the

basis of the corrected answer key as per the Expert

Committee (Report dated 05.10.2018). Upon such revision,

the cut-off marks for UR (Male) stood revised to 192.558. On

revision, only Dr. Suman Tripathy was found eligible for

recommendation. The present Respondents were found to

have secured 192.002 marks and 191.210 marks respectively,

both being below the revised cut -off of 192.558.

Consequently, their names were not recommended to the

Government. Aggrieved by non-recommendation despite

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correction of the answer key, the Respondents approached

this Court by filing W.P.(C) Nos. 24195 of 2022 and 24199 of

2022, inter alia, praying for the following substantive relief:-

“c) Issue Rule Nisi in calling upon the opposite

parties as to why the letter dtd. 17.2.2022 under

Annexure-4 and letter dtd. 30.7.2022 under

annexure-8 shall not be quashed and the Key

answers prepared by the Odisha Public Service

Commission (Opp.party no.2 and 3) for the written

test examination conducted on 06.05.2018 for the

recruitment for the post of Dental Surgeon in

Group-A (Junior) of Odisha Medical Services

(Dental Cadre under Health and Family Welfare

Department) shall not be corrected as per the report

of the Expert Committee, the answer scripts of the

petitioner shall not be re-evaluated and the

petitioner's name shall not be recommended to the

Government for appointment as Dental Surgeon in

Group-A (Junior) as per the advertisement no. 15 of

2017-18 published by Odisha Public Service

Commission and the State Govt. Shall not be

directed for appointment of the petitioner as Dental

Surgeon in Group-A (Junior) as per the

advertisement no.l5 of 2017-18.”

3. The Appellants having appeared before the learned

Single Judge challenged the contentions raised by the

Respondents and justified their action to be in accordance

with the Rules of the OPSC and the terms and conditions of

the advertisement. The learned Single Judge having assessed

the contentions of the Parties raised before it, favoured the

Respondents and disposed of the Writ Application with the

following directions: -

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49. In view of the aforesaid analysis of facts as well

as legal position, this Court is of the considered

view that the impugned rejection order holding

that the petitioners are found not eligible while

considering the case of Dr. Suman Tripathy for

appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon in

Group-A (Junior) OMS (Dental Cadre) vide the

order dated 30.07.2022, under Annexure-8 to the

writ application, is hereby quashed. Further, the

Opposite Party-OPSC is directed to recommend the

two petitioners as they have secured more than

cutoff mark. On such recommendation, the

Opposite Party No.1 shall do well to appoint the

Petitioner in the post of Dental Surgeon in Group-A

(Junior) OMS (Dental Cadre) pursuant to the

advertisement under Annexure-1 within a period

of two months from the date of communication of a

copy of this judgment. The appointment of the Dr.

Suman Tripathy, shall stand as she has secured

more mark than the cutoff mark. While appointing

the Petitioners, the Opposite Parties shall give

seniority at par with their batch mates, however,

the Petitioners shall not claim any back wages/

salary or other service benefits as they have not

worked for such period.

4. The Appellants, represented through the Secretary and

Chairman of the OPSC are assailing the impugned judgment

of learned Single Judge on the following grounds: –

i. That the direction issued by the learned Single

Judge to recommend the names of the Respondents to

the Government for appointment to the post of

Dental Surgeon (Group -A), pursuant to

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Advertisement No. 15 of 2017–18, is contrary to law

and unsustainable in the facts of the case.

ii. That the learned Single Judge erred in holding

that the OPSC lacked competence to revise the cut-off

marks after publication of the initial merit list,

particularly when such revision was necessitated by

correction of erroneous answer keys based on the

report of the Expert Committee.

iii. That the learned Single Judge failed to

appreciate that the Respondents had secured 192.002

and 191.210 marks respectively, which are below the

revised cut-off mark of 192.558 for the UR (Male)

category, and therefore were not entitled to

recommendation. It is further contended that

pursuant to the revised merit list, there were four

other candidates who stood higher in merit but had

neither sought re-evaluation nor approached this

Court, and that the impugned direction granting

appointment to the Respondents overlooks this

material aspect, thereby rendering the order legally

untenable.

5. The Respondents, on the other hand, represented

through their respective counsel, vehemently oppose the

grounds urged by the Appellants and contended that the

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learned Single Judge is justified in allowing the writ

petitions directing the Appellants to recommend their

names for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon

(Group-A), Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre

pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017-18. It is contended

that once the Expert Committee found material errors in the

original answer key and the merit list stood revisited

pursuant to judicial directions, the Respondents could not be

denied consideration in accordance with the corrected

evaluation. According to them, the action of the OPSC in

revising the cut-off score after publication of the earlier

merit list, while simultaneously permitting appointments of

candidates who had secured lesser marks, is arbitrary and

violative of the principles of equality under Articles 14 and

16 of the Constitution. It is further submitted that the

learned Single Judge has merely restored fairness to the

selection process and no interference is warranted in appeal.

6. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the

materials placed on record, proceeded on the premise that

once the initial merit list was published and

recommendations were made on the basis of the cut-off

marks declared therein, the OPSC could not subsequently

revise the cut-off to the detriment of the writ petitioners. The

learned Single Judge held that such upward revision, after

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conclusion of the selection process and recommendation of

candidates, amounted to altering the selection criteria

midway thereby “changing the rule of game”, which is

impermissible in law. Taking note of the fact that certain

candidates who had secured marks lower than the writ

petitioners were appointed, the learned Single Judge found

the action of the OPSC to be arbitrary and discriminatory. On

such reasoning, the writ petitions were allowed with a

direction to the OPSC to recommend the names of the

petitioners for appointment to the post of Dental Surgeon

(Group-A), Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre

pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017–18.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective

parties and upon perusal of the memorandum of appeal

along with the materials annexed thereto, the questions that

arise for consideration before us in the present appeals may

be delineated as follows: –

i. Whether revision of the cut -off marks

consequent upon correction of erroneous answer keys

amounts to a change in the “rules of the game” so as

to vitiate the selection process?

ii. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified

in directing recommendation of the Respondents

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despite their failure to secure the revised cut-off

marks?

iii. Whether, in the facts of the present case,

particularly in view of the appointment of certain

candidates securing lesser marks, the Respondents

are entitled to any equitable or moulded relief?

8. Keeping in view of the factual backdrop, the rival

submissions and the reasons assigned by the learned Single

Judge, it becomes necessary to advert first to the governing

legal principles and thereafter examine their application to

the present case.

9. The doctrine that the “rules of the game” cannot be

altered after commencement of the recruitment process is a

settled principle of service jurisprudence. The Constitution

Bench of the Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors.

vs. Rajasthan High Court and Ors., 2024 Live Law (SC) 864

has authoritatively delineated the contours of this principle.

Relevant paragraph is as follows:

“42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the

following terms:

(1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance

of the advertisement calling for applications and ends

with filling up of vacancies;

(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select

List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment

process, cannot be changed midway through the

recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit,

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or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the

extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is

permissible under the extant Rules or the

advertisement, the change would have to meet the

requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and

satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;

(3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down

good law and is not in conflict with the decision in

Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). Subash Chander

Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed

from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra)

deals with the right to be placed in the Select List. The

two cases therefore deal with altogether different

issues;

(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may

devise appropriate procedure for bringing the

recruitment process to its logical end provided the

procedure so adopted is transparent, non -

discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus

to the object sought to be achieved.

(5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on

the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and

eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-

existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill

in the gaps;

(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible

right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality

for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the

vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its

instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment

to a person within the zone of consideration in the

select list.”

10. Similarly, in the book Services Under the State,

authored by M. Rama Jois, while dealing with recruitment

jurisprudence, it is observed as follows:

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“Subsequent change of qualification - no ground for

invalidating an earlier appointment: A person is entitled

to be appointed if he possesses the qualification

prescribed in the rules of recruitment at the time

when the recruitment takes place. When a person

who is eligible for recruitment under the rules in force

is recruited to the service under the state, his

appointment cannot be invalidated on the basis of

change in the new recruitment rules.

1

His eligibility

would be tested on the basis of the qualification as

they stood prior to the change.

2

Subsequent derecognition - no effect: The qualification of

a person for being recruited is with reference to the

date on which he is selected and appointed.

Therefore, when the qualification prescribed for

recruitment was a diploma in the concerned subject

and the qualification possessed by an appointee had

been recognised as equivalent to the diploma by the

competent authority, termination of service on the

ground that the said qualification was subsequently

derecognised is illegal.

3

Relaxation of qualification: The recruitment in deviation

of the published qualifications amounts to arbitrary

exercise of power hit by articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution.

4

Usually, rules regulating recruitment

empower the designated authority to relax the

qualification prescribed for recruitment to the post.

Such relaxation can be made only in public interest

and having due regard to the special qualifications,

experience or competence of a particular individual.

A general relaxation of the qualification invoking

such power is wholly without authority of law.

5

Also

no relaxation can be made where persons possessing

qualification as advertised are available and have

1

J J. Murlidhar v. State ofAP, SLR 1971 (1) AP 523.

2

Gopal Krushna Rath v. M. A. A. Baig, (dead) by LRS, AIR 1999 SC 209.

3

Miss Rashmi v. State of Punjab, SLR 1983 (1) P & 3.

4

See Shri Kuldip Chand v. Union of India. 1970 SLR 406 (Del).

5

I.S. Goel v. State ofHaryana, SLR 1983 (1) P& H 763.

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submitted their applications

6

or where no relaxation

clause is mentioned in the advertisement.

7

Relaxation,

however, does not mean doing away with the criteria

altogether.

8

”

…

At pp. 461: “No right for appointment: (a) The mere

inclusion in the list of selected candidates does not

create a right in a person included in the list to get

himself appointed irrespective of the existence of

vacancies.

9

Further in spite of the availability of

vacancies, it is open to the appointing authority to

appoint out of the list of selected candidates such

number of persons according to its requirement.

10

A

person included in the list has no right to compel the

appointing authority to appoint all the persons

included in the list. However, it has been held that the

candidates enlisted do enjoy some right in terms of

principles of legitimate expectation.

11

”

At pp. 466: “Appointing authority has no power to

reassess the suitability of selected candidate: When the

law governing the selection and appointment to any

post under the State provides for the constitution of a

selection committee or board of appointment and the

appointing authority is required to make

appointments in accordance with the

recommendations made by such committee or board,

the appointing authority cannot make a reassessment

of the suitability of the candidates for appointment

and deny appointment to a selected candidate on the

ground that in its view he is not suitable for

6

Swaran Lata v. Union of India. (1979) 3 SCC 165.

7

Virendra Nath Gupta v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1990 SC 1148; Shianda Hasan v.

State of UP. AIR 1990 SC 1381.

8

K. Shekar v. Indiramma, AIR 2002 SC 1230.

9

Also see. Union of India v. Kali Dass Batish, Decided on Jan. 5, 2006; Shankarasan

Dash, ibid.

10

Also see, State of UP v. Om Prakash. (2006) 6 SCC 474; Batiarani Gramlya Bank v.

Pallab Kumar, (2004) 9 SCC 100; N. Mohanan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 189.

11

R. S. Mittal v. Union of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 230.

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appointment. The decision regarding suitability in

such a case is exclusively within the power of the

selecting authority. The appointing authority,

however, has the power to decline to make

appointment if it finds that the selected candidate

does not possess the prescribed qualification or

suffers from disqualification or that any mandatory

procedure required to be followed in advertising the

post or making the selection had not been

followed.

12

”

11. In light of the settled legal position and the reasoning

adopted by the learned Single Judge, we now proceed to

examine the issues arising for determination in the present

appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the revision of cut-off marks pursuant to

correction of answer keys amounts to a change in the “Rules

of the Game”?

12. The foundational question is whether the act of

revising the cut-off marks after re-evaluation of fifteen

incorrect answer keys constitutes an impermissible alteration

of recruitment norms midstream.

13. The governing constitutional position has been

authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra). The

Court held that the doctrine that the “rules of the game”

12

Dr. A. V. Venkata Ratnam v. Chancellor, University of Mysore, ILR 1981(l)Kar630:

SLR 1981 (2) 486; S. Virupakshaiah v. Chancellor, Bangalore University, ILR 1981 (1)

Kar 1068.

Page 16 of 26

cannot be changed after commencement of the selection

process is rooted in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Recruitment begins with the issuance of advertisement and

ordinarily the eligibility criteria, method of selection, and

standards prescribed therein cannot be altered thereafter.

However, the Court clarified that the doctrine is not absolute.

A modification may be permissible if founded upon a

compelling public interest and if it satisfies the tests of

transparency, non-arbitrariness, and rational nexus with the

object sought to be achieved. The distinction, therefore, is

between the Alteration of recruitment norms (such as

eligibility, qualifications, or method of selection); and

Rectification of errors in implementation of those norms.

14. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the

advertisement prescribed the eligibility conditions and the

method of selection. The written examination was conducted

in terms thereof. Upon objections raised by the candidates,

an expert committee examined the answer keys. Fifteen

answer keys were found demonstrably erroneous. Re-

evaluation was conducted uniformly for all candidates. The

revised cut-off for Male (UR) category shifted from 189.558 to

192.558 as a mathematical consequence.

15. Admittedly, there was no alteration in eligibility, no

introduction of a new stage of selection, and no change in the

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evaluation scheme. What changed was the accuracy of

assessment. The shift in cut-off marks was derivative and

consequential, not normative. A candidate cannot claim a

vested right in an erroneous answer key or in a merit

position founded upon incorrect evaluation. Correction of

demonstrable mistakes is an incident of maintaining

institutional integrity. A re-evaluation uniformly applied to

all candidates preserves, rather than subverts, Article 14.

Accordingly, the revision of cut-off marks in the present case

cannot be characterised as a change in the “rules of the

game.”

Issue (ii): Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in

directing recommendation of the Respondents despite their

failure to secure the revised cut-off marks?

16. Once it is established that the revised cut-off marks

were lawfully determined, the legal consequence is

inevitable. Admittedly, upon re-evaluation, the Respondents

did not secure marks equal to or above the revised cut-off.

Their claim rests upon the earlier cut-off fixed prior to

correction of answer keys.

17. It is settled law that inclusion in a select list or securing

marks above a cut-off does not confer an indefeasible right to

appointment. The Constitution Bench in Tej Prakash Pathak

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(supra) reiterated that even where vacancies exist, a

candidate has no enforceable right to be appointed unless the

governing rules so mandate. The State must respect merit

order, but the mere fact of shortlisting or provisional

qualification does not create a vested entitlement. The

revised merit list alone represents the legally sustainable

evaluation outcome. Once the correction of answer keys is

upheld as valid, the earlier merit position loses juridical

significance. The Respondents cannot predicate a right upon

a superseded and erroneous evaluation framework.

18. Judicial review in matters of recruitment is

circumscribed. Courts do not substitute their assessment for

that of expert bodies, particularly in academic or evaluative

domains, unless the process is vitiated by illegality, mala

fides, or arbitrariness. In the present case, the correction was

based on expert opinion and applied uniformly.

Issue (iii): Whether the admitted recommendation of less

meritorious candidates during pendency of proceedings

vitiates the process and attracts the doctrine of legitimate

expectation?

19. On record, the Appellants have admitted that during

pendency of proceedings, certain candidates who had

secured marks below even the pre-revised cut-off were

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recommended and appointed. Two such names, namely Dr.

Sriprada Dash and Dr. Debashish Sahoo, were specifically

referred to, having secured 188.108 and 187.934 respectively.

This development introduces a constitutional dimension

distinct from the issue of revised cut-off.

20. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, as observed by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sivanandan C T and Others

vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, AIRONLINE 2017 SC

609 is grounded in the principles of good administration, as

follows:

“43. The underlying basis for the application of the

doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and

evolved to include the principles of good

administration. Since citizens repose their trust in the

state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to

legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its

assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent,

transparent, and predictable manner. The principles

of good administration require that the decisions of

public authorities must withstand the test of

consistency transparency, and predictability to avoid

being regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of

Article 14.

44. From the above discussion, it is evident that the

doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is

entrenched in Indian administrative law subject to the

limitations on its applicability in given factual

situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence

is keeping in line with the developments in the

common law. The doctrine of substantive legitimate

expectation can be successfully invoked by

individuals to claim substantive benefits or

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entitlements based on an existing promise or practice

of a public authority. However, it is important to

clarify that the doctrine of legitimate expectation

cannot serve as an independent basis for judicial

review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such

a limitation is now well recognized in Indian

jurisprudence considering the fact that a legitimate

expectation is not a legal right. It is merely an

expectation to avail a benefit or relief based on an

existing promise or practice. Although the decision by

a public authority to deny legitimate expectation may

be termed as arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the

validity of the decision itself can only be questioned

on established principles of equality and non-

arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an

individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based

on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to

establish: (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and (ii)

that the denial of the legitimate expectation led to the

violation of Article 14.”

21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that state action must

exhibit consistency, transparency, and predictability. While

legitimate expectation is not a legal right in itself, denial

thereof must withstand scrutiny under Article 14. An

individual invoking the doctrine must establish the

legitimacy of the expectation; and that denial thereof resulted

in violation of Article 14.

22. In the present case, the Respondents participated in a

recruitment process where a uniform advertisement was

issued; Cut-off marks were notified; and the process was

subjected to judicial scrutiny. During such scrutiny,

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candidates below the benchmark were recommended. While

it is correct that Article 14 does not mandate negative

equality, illegality cannot be perpetuated merely because it

has been committed in another case, the situation here stands

on a different footing. The alleged irregularity occurred

within the same recruitment cycle and during the pendency

of adjudication. The action was neither explained as an

exceptional policy decision nor justified on any rational

criteria.

23. Such selective recommendation undermines

transparency and predictability in public recruitment. The

State, as a model employer, is constitutionally obligated to

adhere to uniform standards. Any deviation must be justified

on objective grounds. No such justification is forthcoming. At

the same time, the Court cannot unsettle appointments

already made, particularly when third-party rights have

crystallised. The balance between institutional integrity and

individual equity must therefore be carefully calibrated.

24. In these peculiar circumstances, the Respondents

cannot claim appointment as of right on the basis of the

revised merit list. Yet, the admitted selective

recommendation of less meritorious candidates during

pendency of proceedings introduces arbitrariness in

implementation. The exclusion of the Respondents, when

Page 22 of 26

others similarly or less placed were accommodated, offends

the constitutional mandate of non-arbitrariness.

25. The appropriate course is not to invalidate the entire

selection nor to disturb existing appointments, but to mould

relief in a manner that restores parity without unsettling

settled rights.

26. Further, in the aforesaid context, it is apposite to

observe that revision of answer keys is a remedial measure

undertaken to rectify demonstrable errors and does not

amount to an arbitrary alteration of the recruitment Rules.

Where the initial key answer is found to be incorrect, the

authority is under an obligation to correct the same, even if

such correction logically results in a change in the cut-off

marks.

27. In a catena of decisions, the Courts have held that

where the object of the selection process is to identify the

most meritorious candidates, correction of erroneous answer

keys to ensure preparation of an accurate merit list does not

offend the doctrine that the “rules of the game” cannot be

altered midstream. The determinative consideration is that

any revision in marks or cut-off must be uniformly applied to

all candidates without discrimination. It is no longer res

integra that a candidate cannot claim a vested right in an

erroneous answer key or in a cut-off mark derived from a

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flawed evaluation. Where objections are raised and the

authority, upon expert scrutiny, corrects the answer key, a

consequential adjustment of cut-off marks to reflect the

corrected evaluation is legally permissible, provided such

action is undertaken to ensure fairness and not to arbitrarily

favour or disfavor any individual candidate.

28. In essence, the Courts have consistently drawn a

distinction between altering recruitment criteria and

correcting mistakes in evaluation. If an answer key is

demonstrably wrong, re-evaluation on the basis of the correct

key becomes necessary to preserve the integrity of the

selection process. Consequently, a resultant shift in the cut-

off marks is merely a mathematical consequence of such

correction and cannot be construed as an impermissible

change in the recruitment criteria or as a modification of the

“rules of the game.”

Conclusion

29. In view of the discussions and observations made

hereinabove, we respectfully disagree with the learned Single

Judge in holding that the revised cut-off marks resorted to by

the Appellants pursuant to the re-evaluation of the answer

keys amounted to a change in the “rules of the game” and in

Page 24 of 26

declaring the action of the Appellants to be arbitrary on that

count.

30. Interestingly, however, it is borne out from the record,

as admitted by the Appellants, that while the matter was

under judicial scrutiny, the Appellants hastily recommended

the names of certain candidates who had secured marks

below the cut-off fixed prior to re-evaluation. Two such

names appearing on record are Dr. Sriprada Dash and Dr.

Debashish Sahoo, who secured 188.108 and 187.934 marks

respectively. This demonstrates that candidates less

meritorious than the Respondents were also recommended

for appointment against the advertised posts. This is indeed

disturbing. We do not hesitate to observe that such action on

the part of the Appellants reflects a closed-door exercise

which has the effect of frustrating a fair recruitment process

by resorting to a backdoor method of selection. Such a course

is impermissible in service jurisprudence and cannot be

countenanced under any circumstances.

31. This is a fit case where the matter requires to be

reopened for the purpose of fixing responsibility upon the

erring officials and for recovery of exemplary costs, which

we quantify at Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only), in an

appropriate enquiry to be conducted under the supervision

of the Chief Secretary of the State.

Page 25 of 26

32. Admittedly, the Respondents did not secure the

revised cut-off marks so as to be eligible for recommendation

after re-evaluation. It has been stated at the Bar that almost

all candidates pursuant to Advertisement No. 15 of 2017/18

have been accommodated, barring the present Respondents.

It is also evident that such accommodation includes

candidates who had secured marks lower than the notified

cut-off, both prior to and even after its revision. The

Respondents are educationally qualified and otherwise fulfil

the eligibility criteria for appointment to the advertised post.

33. While strict adherence to the Rules is the governing

norm, Courts, in rare and peculiar circumstances, have

intervened to prevent manifest injustice where candidates,

owing to compelling circumstances, could not be

accommodated despite successfully participating in a duly

notified recruitment process. In the present case, the

Respondents had legitimately aspired for appointment,

having secured the cut-off marks initially fixed by the

Appellants. It was only on account of the subsequent re-

evaluation of answer keys and consequential revision of cut-

off marks that they stood excluded from selection.

34. In these circumstances, and without disturbing the

appointments already made, since such appointees have

accrued rights to the posts, we are inclined to direct the

Page 26 of 26

Appellants to accommodate the two Respondents against

existing vacancies in the post of Dental Surgeon (Group-A),

Junior, Odisha Medical Service (Dental) Cadre. Such

accommodation shall, however, operate prospectively.

With the above observations, these Writ Appeals

stand disposed of, cost being made easy.

A copy of this judgment shall be forthwith

communicated to the Chief Secretary of the State for ensuring

compliance with the directions contained hereinabove, at

Paragraph 31, at the earliest.

(Chittaranjan Dash)

Judge

I, Agree.

(Dixit Krishna Shripad)

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

The 25

th

Day of February, 2026/ Bijay