2026 INSC 1054 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 203 OF 2015

PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB ....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment and

order dated 12.09.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter)

dismissing the criminal appeal filed by the appellant and

affirming the judgment and order dated 01.06.2012 passed by

the learned Sessions Judge, Ludhiana convicting the appellant

under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861 (‘IPC’ for

short) and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment

(RI) for a period of 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000.00 with

a default stipulation.

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2. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.

3. According to the prosecution, the prosecutrix PW-1

is the daughter of Ranjit Singh, PW-2. At the relevant point of

time, she was studying in class VIII in the Government High

School, Manjit Nagar, Ludhiana.

3.1. On 19.06.2009 at around 07:30 PM, PW-1 left her

house to buy some kirana articles from the neighbourhood

shop. On her way, she was accosted by the appellant who told

her that he wanted her to meet his daughter Nancy. As Nancy

was a friend of PW-1, she agreed to the proposal. Appellant

made her sit in his Maruti car where two boys were already

sitting.

3.2. Appellant took PW-1 in the vehicle to the LIG Flats,

Ludhiana. From there, the said two boys came back in the car.

3.3. According to PW-1, the appellant kept her in the flat

for two days where he had sexual intercourse with her against

her will. On 22.06.2009, appellant took PW-1 to Malerkotla on

his scooter where he kept her confined in a room in an

abandoned factory. According to PW-1, there also appellant had

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sexual intercourse with her against her will. When she objected,

appellant threatened to kill her.

3.4. On 25.06.2009, the appellant came back to Ludhiana

with PW-1 on train. From the railway station, appellant took

PW-1 through Railway Colony No. 5 on foot. There they were

intercepted by PW-2 (father of PW-1) and police officials. Though

the appellant tried to flee, the police officials overpowered and

apprehended him.

3.5. Thereafter, FIR No. 142/2009 was registered before

Ludhiana Division No. 5 police station under Sections 363,

366A and 376 IPC.

4. On completion of investigation, police filed charge-

sheet against the appellant under Sections 366 and 376 IPC.

5. In the trial, prosecution examined 11 witnesses

whereafter statement of the appellant as the accused was

recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (Cr.P.C.).

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6. At the end of the trial, learned Sessions Judge

Ludhiana came to the conclusion that the prosecution had

failed to prove the charge under Section 366 IPC. Accordingly,

appellant was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted of

the charge framed under Section 366 IPC. In so far the charge

under Section 376 IPC is concerned, learned Sessions Judge

held that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused (appellant herein) had sexual

intercourse with PW-1 against her will. Hence the accused-

appellant was held guilty of committing an offence under

Section 376 IPC.

6.1. Vide the judgment and order dated 01.06.2012,

learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Section

376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for a period of 10

years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000.00 with a default stipulation.

7. As noted supra, appellant assailed his conviction and

sentence before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2009-SB

of 2012. Vide the judgment and order dated 12.09.2013, the

High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction

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and sentence of the appellant passed by the learned Sessions

Judge.

8. This Court issued notice on the special leave petition

as well as on the prayer for bail on 28.02.2014. By the

subsequent order dated 30.01.2015, leave was granted and

taking note of the fact that appellant had already undergone

incarceration for almost 6 years out of the total period of 10

years, he was ordered to be released on bail.

9. Mr. Rajiv Kataria, learned counsel for the appellant

submits that both the trial court and the High Court failed to

appreciate that appellant was falsely implicated because there

were existing civil dispute(s) between the parties. PW-2 i.e.

father of PW-1 had borrowed Rs.1,50,000.00 from the appellant

but did not return the same. When the appellant insisted for

return of the money, he was threatened that he would be

implicated in some criminal case.

9.1. Appellant was a tenant of the premises belonging to

one Major Singh, who is a close relative of PW-2. When PW-2

wanted to distance himself from Major Singh by saying that he

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was not his relative, his own sister, PW-3 Sarabjit Kaur,

admitted in evidence that Major Singh is a relative. There is a

civil suit going on between the appellant and Major Singh over

the tenanted premises. Therefore, appellant has been falsely

implicated in the criminal case by PW-2.

9.2. Learned Sessions Judge had returned clear findings

that the prosecutrix PW-1 was a major during the period when

the alleged incident had occurred and that it was neither a case

of kidnapping nor abduction. Therefore, appellant was

acquitted of the charge under Section 366 IPC. This finding of

the learned Sessions Judge has neither been challenged by the

informant nor by the State. It has thus attained finality.

9.3. When the trial court accepted the contention

advanced on behalf of the defence that the prosecutrix was with

the appellant firstly at the LIG Flats in Ludhiana for two days

from 19.06.2009 till 22.06.2009, then proceeded to Malerkotla

on scooter and stayed there upto 25.06.2009 without the

prosecutrix raising any hue and cry or alarm, learned Sessions

Judge went completely wrong in drawing adverse inference of

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commission of rape by the appellant on the prosecutrix on the

same set of evidence. That apart, during the train journey on

25.06.2009 from Malerkotla to Ludhiana also, the prosecutrix

did not raise any alarm. In such circumstances, the trial court

committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under

Section 376 IPC. The High Court also completely overlooked this

aspect of the matter in affirming such conviction.

9.4. Learned counsel submits that from the facts and

circumstances of the case it is evident that the prosecutrix was

a consenting party. That apart, the medical evidence did not

disclose signs of any injury suffered by the prosecutrix because

of alleged forceful intercourse by the appellant; as per the

medical evidence, no internal or external injury was found on

the person of the prosecutrix.

9.5. To buttress his above submission that prosecutrix

was a consenting party, learned counsel submits that as per the

prosecution itself clothes of the prosecutrix were recovered from

the dicky of the scooter which clearly goes to show that the

prosecutrix came out of her home well prepared to stay outside

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for a couple of days and the consenting nature of the

occurrence.

9.6. That being the position, learned counsel submits that

the trial court committed a manifest error in convicting the

appellant under Section 376 IPC and the High Court also

mechanically affirmed the conviction, thereby causing serious

miscarriage of justice.

9.7. In these circumstances, he submits that the

conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant, as affirmed

by the High Court, may be set aside and the appellant be

acquitted of the charge of committing an offence under Section

376 IPC.

10. On the other hand, Ms. Nupur Kumar, learned

counsel for the State of Punjab submits that conviction of the

appellant under Section 376 IPC is fully justified and no

interference is called for.

10.1. From the evidence tendered by the prosecution, it is

fully established that appellant had subjected the prosecutrix

to sexual intercourse without her consent. Therefore, the

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learned trial court has rightly convicted the appellant for the

said offence which has also been affirmed by the High Court.

10.2. She also submits that as per the school certificate,

the age of the prosecutrix on the day of occurrence was about

15 years. Therefore, subjecting the prosecutrix, being a minor,

to sexual intercourse with or without her consent is immaterial.

This fact has been duly considered by the High Court. That

apart, the appellant could not discharge the burden of

presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872.

10.3. She therefore submits that there is no merit in the

appeal which is liable to be dismissed.

11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have

received the due consideration of the Court. We have also

perused the materials on record including the evidence

tendered.

12. Though the learned Sessions Judge had acquitted

the appellant of the charge under Section 366 IPC, since the two

charges i.e. charge under Section 366 IPC and charge under

Section 376 IPC, as it stood then, are intricately connected in

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the factual matrix of the case, it would be apposite to deal with

the scope and ambit of Section 366 IPC as well. Section 366 IPC

is extracted hereunder:

366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel

her marriage, etc. - Whoever kidnaps or abducts any

woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing

it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any

person against her will, or in order that she may be forced

or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely

that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also

be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal

intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of

authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any

woman to go from any place with intent that she may be,

or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or

seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be

punishable as aforesaid.

12.1. Thus, as per Section 366 IPC, whoever kidnaps or

abducts any woman with the intent to compel her to marry any

person against her will or for the purpose of forcing or seducing

her to illicit intercourse would fall foul of Section 366 IPC and

would suffer punishment of imprisonment of either description

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for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable

to pay fine. So, there are two expressions here: kidnapping and

abduction.

12.2. Kidnapping is defined in Section 359 IPC. In this

case, we are concerned with kidnapping from lawful

guardianship which is dealt with in Section 361 IPC. It says that

whoever takes or entices any minor under 16 years of age, if a

male, or under 18 years of age, if a female, or any person of

unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such

minor or person of unsound mind without the consent of such

guardian is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful

guardianship.

12.3. On the other hand, abduction is defined in Section

362 IPC which says that whoever by force compels or by any

deceitful means induces any person to go from any place is said

to abduct that person.

12.4. Therefore, it will be a case of kidnapping in the case

of a female if she is under 18 years of age if she is taken or

enticed away from her lawful guardian without the consent of

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such guardian. On the other hand, it will be abduction if a

person applies force or deceitful means to compel or induce any

person to go from any place.

13. Section 376 IPC had undergone major amendment in

2013. The incident or series of incidents with which the present

appeal is concerned relates to the period from 19.06.2009 to

25.06.2009. Therefore, Section 376 as it stood prior to 2013

would be applicable. Section 376 (1), as it stood prior to its

amendment in 2013, reads as under:

376. Punishment for rape. – (1) Whoever, except in the

cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall

be punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which shall not be less than seven years but which

may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years

and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is

his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which

cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to two years or

with fine or with both:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and

special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose

a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven

years.

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13.1. Rape is defined in Section 375. Prior to 2013, as

per Section 375, a man is said to commit rape except in the

cases excepted if he has sexual intercourse with a woman under

the circumstances falling under any of the six descriptions

mentioned thereunder. Basically, as per the descriptions,

sexual intercourse with a woman has to be against her will;

without her consent; by obtaining her consent under fear or

duress etc. including with or without her consent when the

woman is under 16 years of age.

14. Let us now examine the evidence of the prosecutrix.

15. In her evidence-in-chief, PW-1 prosecutrix stated

that she was a student of class VIII and that she knew Paramjit

Singh Bedi, the accused-appellant who used to visit their house.

Earlier, he was residing in their neighbourhood. His daughter

Nancy was her friend.

15.1. On 19.06.2009, at about 07:30 PM, she had gone out

to purchase some kirana articles. On way, she was accosted by

the appellant who was accompanied by two unidentified boys.

Appellant told her that he would like her to meet his daughter

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Nancy. Appellant took PW-1 in a car to the LIG Flats at

Ludhiana. The two boys came back in the car. Appellant kept

her (PW-1) in the said flat for two days. On 22.06.2009, the

appellant took her on his scooter to an abandoned factory in

Malerkotla. There, he kept her in a room and committed rape

on her. According to PW-1, she was kept in that room upto

25.06.2009. When she objected to the acts of the appellant, he

threatened to kill her. According to PW-1, during this period

upto 25.06.2009 no one came to the room.

15.2. Appellant brought PW-1 back to Ludhiana from

Malerkotla in a car on 25.06.2009. When they reached Railway

Colony No. 5 at Ludhiana, a police party alongwith the father of

PW-1 (PW-2) were present and they apprehended the two.

Appellant tried to flee. In the process, he fell down and received

injuries.

15.3. In her cross-examination, PW-1 stated that she was

enlisted as a voter but she had no voter card. She further stated

that she had gone to purchase ration from the kirana shop after

taking Rs. 5.00 only from her sister Poonam. She could not tell

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the number and colour of the car in which she was allegedly

taken by the appellant. She also could not tell the names of the

two persons who allegedly accompanied the appellant in the

car. Strangely enough, she stated that she could not remember

the date, month and the year in which the case was registered

against the appellant.

15.4. In her cross-examination, she stated that as she was

going in the car to the LIG Flats, there was rush in the bazaars;

there were many intersections on the way which were brightly

lit.

15.5. She further stated that appellant took her to

Malerkotla on 25.06.2009 on a scooter. Appellant was driving

the scooter and she was the pillion rider. There was rush on the

road. They crossed many intersections on their way from

Ludhiana to Malerkotla which were brightly lit. She did not try

to get down from the scooter whenever the scooter was stopped

by the appellant on those intersections; neither did she try to

run away. She also did not raise any hue and cry. The journey

from Ludhiana to Malerkotla took about one and a half hours.

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15.6. PW-1 contradicted herself when she stated that she

and appellant came back from Malerkotla to Ludhiana on

25.06.2009 on a train which they had boarded at the railway

station in Malerkotla. Both of them travelled ticketless. There

was rush in the said train with passengers in the compartment

in which they were travelling. She stated that she did not

disclose about the occurrence to any of the passengers who

were sitting near her in the train. She did not raise any hue and

cry. She requested the appellant to drop her home. She reached

home on 25.06.2009 whereafter she never visited Malerkotla

again. This is in complete contradiction to what she had

deposed in her examination-in-chief where she had stated that

they (she and the appellant) had come back from Malerkotla to

Ludhiana in a car and at Railway Colony No. 5 they were

apprehended. If this is accepted, what happened to the scooter?

15.7. Interestingly, in her long cross-examination, PW-1

stated that while she was in the one room at Malerkotla, she

had raised hue and cry but there was nobody to hear her

shouts. She admitted that appellant was residing in her

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neighbourhood on rent in the house of Major Singh. Appellant

was not paying rent to Major Singh for which a case was

pending. All the persons of the locality were aware about the

case. PW-1 stated that she knew the appellant for the last about

one year.

16. We will analyze the evidence of PW-1 the prosecutrix

more in detail a little later. In the meanwhile, let us see what

the medical evidence stated.

17. PW-6 is Dr. Hatinder Kaur, Medical Officer

(Radiologist) in the Civil Hospital, Ludhiana. She had conducted

the ossification test on PW-1 for age determination. She opined

that the radiological age of PW-1 was between 17 to 19 years.

She had prepared the original report which she proved. In her

cross-examination, she stated that there could be variation of

two years of age. Though the patient (PW-2) has disclosed her

age to be 15 ½ years, she had not seen any document regarding

the age of the patient. She finally stated in her cross-

examination that PW-2 may be more than 18 years of age but

less than 19 years of age at the time of her examination.

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18. Lastly, we may examine the evidence of PW-7 Dr.

Ananjit Kaur, who served as the Medical Officer in the Civil

Hospital at Ludhiana. She stated that on 26.06.2009, she had

examined PW-1. She found no external mark of injury on her

body. She had her menarche three years back.

18.1. In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not

see any document of PW-1 regarding her birth or age. Therefore,

she had sent her for ossification test for the purpose of age

determination. She reiterated that there was no external injury

mark on the body of the prosecutrix and that there was no

injury on her private parts as well.

19. Let us now examine how the trial court dealt with the

charge under Section 366 IPC.

20. Learned Sessions Judge observed that the charge

punishable under Section 366 IPC in the context of the present

case is two-fold:

(a) Kidnapping of any woman to marry her off to any

person against her will or that she may be forced or

seduced to illicit intercourse;

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(b) Abduction of a woman with intention to marry her off

to any person against her will or that she may be forced or

seduced to illicit intercourse.

20.1. Learned Sessions Judge proceeded thereafter by

observing that in order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution

had to prove that on the day the prosecutrix was kidnapped,

she was less than 18 years of age. After examining the

documentary evidence exhibited as well as the oral testimony of

the informant PW-2, PW-3 (Sarabjit Kaur, aunt of the

prosecutrix) and PW-11 (Swaran Kaur, ex-Head Mistress of the

school), learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the

oral and documentary evidence failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is

13.03.1994 which was the case of the prosecution. Thereafter,

learned Sessions Judge examined the deposition of PW-6, Dr.

Hatinder Kaur who had carried out the ossification test on the

prosecutrix and opined that age of the prosecutrix was between

17 to 19 years at the material time. Learned Sessions Judge

accepted the age of the prosecutrix to be 19 years.

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20.2. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge held that the

prosecution failed to prove that the age of the prosecutrix at the

material time was less than 18 years. Hence, the accused-

appellant could not be held guilty of the offence of kidnapping.

20.3. Insofar abduction is concerned, learned Sessions

Judge after examining the evidence tendered by the prosecutrix

(PW-1) opined that it is doubtful if the accused ever took the

prosecutrix to any place without her consent. Learned Sessions

Judge noticed that when the prosecutrix was taken to the LIG

Flats at Ludhiana in the car, there was rush in the bazaars with

many intersections on the way which were brightly lit. Again, as

per the prosecutrix herself, she was taken to Malerkotla from

Ludhiana on a scooter by the accused. After closely examining

her evidence, learned Sessions Judge observed that it is

apparent that if the prosecutrix had not consented to

accompanying the accused-appellant to the places under

reference, she could easily has disembarked the scooter on their

journey to Malerkotla from Ludhiana when the scooter was

stopped at several places due to rush of people. When she

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herself stated that when was confined in the room, she had

raised hue and cry, therefore, when she was being taken on the

scooter through the crowded streets and she did not raise any

alarm, it raises a serious question mark over the credibility of

the version of the prosecutrix. Therefore, learned Sessions

Judge held that had she not consented to accompanying the

accused, she could have easily run away from him. The fact that

she did not do so only strengthened the views of the learned

Sessions Judge that her consent in accompanying the accused-

appellant was not missing. In the circumstances, learned

Sessions Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed

to prove that the accused was guilty of the offence under Section

366 IPC and accordingly he was acquitted of the charge framed

under Section 366 IPC.

21. In our view, the analysis and findings of the learned

Sessions Judge, insofar the charge under Section 366 IPC is

concerned, stand to reason. Such observations and findings of

the learned Sessions Judge were neither challenged by the State

nor by the informant before the High Court. Therefore, such

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observations and findings of the learned Sessions Judge qua

Section 366 IPC against the appellant has attained finality.

22. After rightly disbelieving the testimony of the

prosecutrix PW-1 insofar the charge under Section 366 IPC

against the appellant is concerned, surprisingly learned

Sessions Judge held that as regards the charge under Section

376 IPC is concerned, the prosecution was able to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had raped the

prosecutrix. In this regard, learned Sessions Judge referred to

the evidence of the prosecutrix and noted with approval that

when she was in the room at Malerkotla, she had raised hue

and cry but there was nobody around to hear her cries. PW-2,

her father, deposed that his daughter PW-1 had gone missing

during the material time and was recovered from the company

of the accused-appellant on 25.06.2009. Reference was also

made to the evidence of PW-3 Sarabjit Kaur, aunt of PW-1, who

stated that around the time PW-1 went missing, she saw her in

the company of the accused-appellant. Adverting to the

testimony of Dr. Ananjit Kaur, PW-7, learned Sessions Judge

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held that the medical report showed presence of spermatozoa

on the vagina of PW-1. Applying the theory of last seen together,

learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that when all

the circumstances are put together, it becomes abundantly

clear that the version of PW-1 that she was raped by the

accused-appellant is true.

22.1. Learned Sessions Judge then put a question to

himself with regard to his findings as regards Section 366 IPC

that on the one hand he took the view that the prosecutrix who

as a major had gone with the accused-appellant willingly and

then when it came to Section 376 IPC, he accepted the version

of the prosecutrix PW-1 that she was raped by the accused-

appellant. Observing that such findings may appear to be

contradictory, he was however of the view that such

contradiction was not improbable. Thereafter, he explained on

the basis of his own value judgment that ‘some daring women

also choose to travel to far off places in the company of men’.

According to him, agreeing to accompany a man and even

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agreeing to spending a night with him, yet not consenting to

have sex with him is possible.

23. We are afraid the learned Sessions Judge has gone

completely wrong while justifying the conviction of the accused-

appellant under Section 376 IPC. The High Court also fell in

error in accepting such convoluted logic. High Court adverted

to Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that when

the prosecutrix had denied being a consenting party,

presumption has to be drawn that she did not consent to sexual

intercourse.

24. Let us now analyze the evidence of the prosecutrix,

PW-1. As noticed supra is noticed, PW-1’s version is a bundle of

contradictions. In her cross-examination, she had stated that

she had come out of her house at around 07:30 PM to purchase

some articles from the nearby kirana shop. For that, she had

taken Rs. 5.00 from her sister Poonam. She went with the

appellant in a car to the LIG Flats at Ludhiana where they

stayed for two days. From there, they went to Malerkotla on

22.06.2009 on a scooter. They stayed in an abandoned factory

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at Malerkotla. They had passed through bazaars and brightly

lit intersections, particularly when they travelled on a scooter.

No alarm was raised by PW-1. As noticed by the learned

Sessions Judge, she also did not disembark from the scooter. If

at all she was kept confined by the appellant against her wishes,

she should have raised hue and cry or alighted from the scooter

seeking help from the crowd. She did neither. Therefore, her

statement that she had raised hue and cry in the flat at

Malerkotla does not make any sense. In the absence of any such

hue and cry made by her on the streets and intersections while

travelling, learned Sessions Judge rightly held that PW-1 had

accompanied the appellant on her own volition; there was no

compulsion. In their return journey from Malerkotla to

Ludhiana, her statements are contradictory. In her evidence in

chief, she stated that she and the appellant had come back by

car but in her cross-examination, she stated that the two of

them travelled back on a train, travelling ticketless. Either way,

no hue and cry was raised by PW-1 in the entire journey back.

This is unbelievable. Therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix

cannot be said to be credible and worthy of acceptance.

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25. From an analysis of the evidence of the prosecutrix

PW-1, it is evident that she had willingly accompanied the

accused-appellant firstly to the LIG Flats at Ludhiana by

travelling in a car, stayed there for two days, and then travelling

in a scooter with the accused-appellant from Ludhiana to

Malerkotla. Despite passing through busy streets and

intersections, she did not raise any hue and cry. Neither did she

make any attempt to alight from the scooter to escape from the

accused-appellant. Learned Sessions Judge rightly pointed out

that if she had not voluntarily gone with the accused-appellant,

she could have easily raised a hue and cry or disembarked from

the scooter. PW-1 did not do so. Therefore, her statement that

she had raised hue and cry when she was in the room at

Malerkotla is extremely difficult to accept. Her evidence is

riddled with contradictions. Mere presence of spermatozoa in

the vaginal swab of the prosecutrix would not prove rape given

the surrounding circumstances.

26. Prosecutrix’s denial of consent must be seen in the

overall context of her testimony. If her evidence is taken as a whole,

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certainly a view can be taken that her version that the accused-

appellant had sexual intercourse with her forcibly without her

consent does not merit acceptance. The version of the prosecutrix

is not believable at all.

27. While the example given by the learned Sessions

Judge that a lady may travel with a man to a far-off place and

even spend a night with him but may not consent to having sex

with him (though the use of the word ‘daring’ prefixing ‘women’

is totally uncalled for) may be true, the context is different. In

the present case, PW-1, the prosecutrix, had absented herself

from home for 5/6 days, only to travel all around with the

accused-appellant voluntarily and stayed with him. It is

therefore difficult to accept that accused-appellant had forcible

intercourse with PW-1 without her consent.

28. While it is true that on the basis of the sole testimony

of the prosecutrix, an accused can be convicted of rape but for

such a conviction, it would also require that such statement of

the prosecutrix must inspire the confidence of the court. There

cannot be partial rejection of the evidence of the prosecutrix for

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the purpose of Section 366 IPC and partial acceptance of the

very same statement for the purpose of proving the charge

under Section 376 IPC. If the evidence of the prosecutrix is of

unimpeachable character, it has to be accepted in its entirety.

There cannot be part acceptance and part rejection of the

statement of the prosecutrix. It is for this reason that we had

analysed the materials for record qua the charge under Section

366 IPC though the accused-appellant was acquitted of the said

charge considering its inter-twinedness with the charge under

Section 376 IPC.

29. When the learned Sessions Judge had disbelieved the

prosecution version insofar the charge under Section 366 IPC is

concerned, the very same prosecution version could not have

been accepted to convict the accused-appellant under Section

376 IPC. While the conduct of the appellant may be immoral

and unethical, that by itself would not justify a conviction under

Section 376 IPC without any clinching evidence. Such a charge

must be proved on the basis of hard evidence and not on the

basis of the surmises and conjectures based on the value

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judgment of the presiding judge. Immorality of an act sans

credible evidence cannot justify a conviction.

30. For all the aforesaid reasons, the conviction and

sentence of the appellant under Section 376 IPC by the learned

Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court cannot be

sustained. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order

dated 01.06.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,

Ludhiana as well as the judgment and order dated 12.09.2013

passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Resultantly,

the appellant is cleared of the charge under Section 376 IPC.

31. Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed.

…...…………………………J.

[UJJAL BHUYAN]

…..….………………………J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 25, 2026.