As per case facts, the appellant, convicted for murder, sought premature release based on the 2002 Remission Policy after serving a significant period of imprisonment. His initial representation received no ...
2026 INSC 667 Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 1 of 16
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ................. OF 2026
(@Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9920 of 2026)
PARVEEN KUMAR@ PARVEEN CHAUHAN … APPELLANT(S)
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant’s
application for grant of remission to the State of Haryana will be governed by the
‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002
1
’ dated 12
th
April 2002 or the
subsequent Policy dated 13
th
August 2008 termed as ‘Premature Release of Life
Convicts 2008
2
’ as notified by the Jails and Judicial Department, Government of
Haryana.
1
2002 Policy
2
2008 Policy
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 2 of 16
3. Since we are only concerned with the question of applicability of a policy,
the facts in which the question arose has limited relevance, save and except to
note that the appellant stood convicted for murder of a 12 year old child, on 3
rd
January 2009 in connection with FIR No.670 of 2007 dated 25
th
September 2007
lodged at PS City, Gurgaon. He was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860
3
, five years of imprisonment under
Section 365 IPC and two years under Section 201 IPC. The High Court by
judgment
4
dated 16
th
July 2013 partly allowed the appeal setting aside the
conviction under Section 365 IPC. Appeal against the said judgment to this Court
was dismissed
5
by an order dated 15
th
September 2015 which has attained finality.
4. On 26
th
May 2022, the appellant filed a representation seeking release on
the basis of 2002 Policy, having served 14 years of actual imprisonment;
however, no response was received. Thereafter, he filed a writ petition
6
against
his pending representation, which was disposed on 16
th
August 2022, directing
the prison authorities to decide the same within a period of three months. The said
representation eventually came to be decided on 20
th
October 2022 and concluded
in a rejection on two grounds – (i) that the appellant would be governed by the
2008 Policy and not the 2002 Policy; (ii) that as per the former he had completed
only 13 years 7 months and 16 days of actual imprisonment and 16 years five
months and 16 days of total imprisonment as on 21
st
September 2022 and as such
was not eligible for not having completed the requisite period of twenty years of
actual sentence and twenty five years of total sentence. He then filed another writ
petition
7
challenging the aforesaid decision by placing reliance on State of
3
IPC
4
CRA No.198 of 2009
5
SLP (Crl.) No.2128 of 2014
6
CRWP No.7465 of 2022
7
CRWP no.12409 of 2024
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 3 of 16
Haryana v. Jagdish
8
. By an order dated 27
th
January 2025, this writ petition came
to be dismissed. Hence this appeal.
5. The substance of the appellant’s case as it appears, is that since the 2002
Policy had been brought in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution of India,
the coming into force of the subsequent 2008 Policy which was explicitly under
the exercise of power bestowed by Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973
9
, would not denude him of the benefits thereunder. Further, the
beneficial remission policy would apply instead of policy relevant on the date of
conviction. One more aspect of his submission is that the judgment in State of
Haryana v. Raj Kumar
10
would not have precedential value on account of the
fact that Jagdish supra is rendered by a larger Bench.
6. The State, on the other hand, submits that a policy which is referable to
Article 161/72 of the Constitution would override that enacted under the CrPC.
But in view of the holding in Raj Kumar supra which observed that both the
2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy were, in fact, in exercise of power traceable to
the provisions of the CrPC. Further, that since the 2008 Policy superseded the
earlier one and as on the date of conviction only the 2008 Policy was in force, no
question would arise of the applicability of the 2002policy to the appellant.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Hereinbelow is a chart referencing different remission policies issued by
Haryana, including the erstwhile State of Punjab, till 2008, particularly regarding
the power under which the same have been issued and the issuing authority.
8
(2010) 4 SCC 216
9
CrPC
10
(2021) 9 SCC 292
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 4 of 16
Sr.No Date of Policy Provision read therewith
1 10.11.1971 (Memo No.13311-6JJ-71/39656)
Amended by:
- 28.11.1977: (para 3)
(Letter No.7843/2JJ/77/30099)
- 09.06.1978: (pertaining of female and
juvenile prisoners)
(Memo No.8530-6JJ-78/21318)
- 27.02.1984 (Clarification on 28.11.1977
memo)
(Letter No.43/19/83-JJ)
Section 432 CrPC read with
para 516-B of the Punjab Jail
Manual
2 23.04.1987 (Memo No.36/11/86-JJ(2)
Amended by:
- 01.02.1988 (Upon announcement by CM)
(Circular No.1190-1209/GI/G-3)
Section 433 of CrPC
3 28.09.1988 (Memo No.38/11/86-JJ(2))
Amended by:
- 17.05.1989 (para 2(d))
(Memo No.36/48/89-JJ(2))
- 29.05.1990 (para 2(d))
(Memo No.36/155/89-1J)
Section 433-A CrPC
4 13.08.2008 (Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II) Section 432 and 435 of CrPC
Sr.No Date of Policy Provision read therewith
1. 19.11.1991 (Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II)
- 04.02.1993 (para 2(c))
(Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II)
- 22.02.1996 (adding to 1993 amendment)
(Memo No.43/20/93-1JJ(II)
Article 161 of the
Constitution of India
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 5 of 16
- 17.07.1997 (further amending para 2(a) of
1993 amendment)
(Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II)
- 16.03.1999(further amending para 2(a)
and 2(b) of 1993 and 1997 amendments)
(Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II)
2. 04.02.1993 Article 161 of the
Constitution of India
3. 08.08.2000 (Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II) Article 161 of the
Constitution of India
4. 12.04.2002 (Memo No.36/135/91-1JJ(II) Article 161 of the
Constitution of India
9. We have perused all the policies in detail, including the earlier policy of
the year 2000. It appears that the policies of the year 2000 and 2002 clearly state
that for orders to be passed under these policies, the papers are to be placed before
the Hon’ble Governor of the State for soliciting orders under Article 161 of the
Constitution of India. However, the later 2008 Policy specifically states that
papers shall be put up before the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 of
CrPC. This clearly shows the constitutional ambit of the former and statutory
ambit of the latter. It need not be said that a statutory policy, even if it may be so,
cannot override a exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct
and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature.
10. In Jagdish supra the question before the three-judge Bench was for
resolving the inconsistency between State of Haryana v. Balwan
11
, and State of
Haryana v. Mahender Singh
12
, on the one hand; and State of Haryana v. Bhup
Singh
13
, on the other. In doing so, the Court has discussed, extensively – (i) earlier
judgments on sentencing; (ii) scope of power under Article 161 of the
Constitution of India; (iii) the purpose of criminal justice and punishment, and;
11
(1999) 7 SCC 355
12
(2007) 13 SCC 606
13
(2009) 2 SCC 268
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 6 of 16
(iv) also the remission policies. It held that the 1993 remission Policy was in
exercise of Article 161 powers of the Governor, whereas the 2008 Policy (which
is also in issue before us) is a statutory policy, and as such, cannot override the
former. It has also been held that if on the date of consideration for remission, a
more liberal policy was in effect, then the prisoner should be given the benefit
thereof. In deciding the issue, the benefit of the 1993 Policy was given to the
respondent therein, Jagdish. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are:
“52. We have already noticed that the earlier policies including the policy
dated 4-2-1993 refer to the exercise of powers under Article 161 of the
Constitution whereas the policy dated 13-8-2008 is in exercise of the
powers under Section 432 read with Sections 433 and 433-A CrPC. The
restriction under Section 433-A is only to the extent of the powers to be
exercised in respect of offences as referred to under Section 432 CrPC.
The Notification dated 13-8-2008 is, therefore, under a rule of procedure,
which is subordinate to the Constitution. The power exercised under
Article 161 of the Constitution is obviously a mandate of the Constitution
and, therefore, the policy dated 13-8-2008 cannot override the policy
dated 4-2-1993.
…
54. The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise its
discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the convict,
at the time of his conviction that his case for premature release would be
considered after serving the sentence, prescribed in the short-sentencing
policy existing on that date. The State has to exercise its power of
remission also keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally
in favour of a convict which may depend upon case to case and for that
purpose, in our opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in the instant
case, was in favour of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on
the date of consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he
should be given benefit thereof.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. In Raj Kumar supra the question that arose was similar to this case i.e.,
the application of 2002 Policy or the 2008 Policy. It has been observed that none
of the policies apart from the one framed in 2008, after 1974 mention the power
under which the same have been brought in. Thereafter, with reference to para 9
of N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre
14
, it is concluded that the policy instructions
14
(2004) 12 SCC 278
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 7 of 16
would be statutory instructions framed either under the Prisons Act 1894 or
Section 432 CrPC. This is the background in which the Court holds the 2002
Policy also to be having statutory origins and not a constitutional one. Paras 17
and 18 of the judgment read as under:
“17. The policy of premature release dated 13-8-2008 was issued in the
name of the Governor and was published in the Official Gazette. Such
notification is said to have been issued in exercise of the powers
conferred under sub-section (1) of Sections 432 and 433 of the Code.
Keeping in view the principles of law enunciated above, such policy is
in exercise of the powers conferred on the appropriate Government in
terms of the provisions of the Code and is thus statutory in nature. The
other Policy dated 12-4-2002 is in fact a memo issued by the Financial
Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Haryana, Jails
Department, Chandigarh to the Director General of Prisons, Haryana,
Chandigarh. Such policy of premature release would again be traceable
to the provisions of the Code.
18. Mr Nikhil Goel, learned Additional Advocate General for the State
of Haryana, submitted that different policies have been issued from time
to time and the later policy has superseded the earlier one, so there was
no hiatus when a policy of premature release was not in operation or at
any given point of time, the two polices were operational. The argument
of Mr Goel merit acceptance inasmuch as the Policy dated 12-4-2002
is in supersession of earlier policy circulated on 8-8-2000 substituted
later on 23-2-2001. The Policy dated 13-8-2008 has substituted the
earlier Policy dated 12-4-2002 and such policy has been published on
behalf of the Governor of the State. The Policy dated 13-8-2008 has
been issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of
Section 432 read with Section 433 of the Code and in supersession of
Government Memorandum dated 12-4-2002 and all other policies. The
Policy dated 13-8-2008 is a statutory policy. The said policy cannot and
has not tried to take over the discretion vested in the Hon'ble Governor
to grant pardons, remissions or commute sentence in exercise of powers
conferred under Article 161 of the Constitution but it is the policy issued
under a statute and therefore, such policy has a statutory force. The
Policy dated 12-4-2002 is again a statutory policy and cannot be put at
a higher pedestal than the Policy dated 13-8-2008 for the reason that it
seeks approval from the Hon'ble Governor. Such policy has been
specifically superseded on 13-8-2008, ceases to be operative for the
convicts who are convicted after 13-8-2008.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 8 of 16
The co-ordinate Bench held that the respondent therein was not entitled to the
benefit under the 2008 Policy since he had not completed the requisite time period
thereunder, considering his case. It was observed that both 2002 and 2008
Policies were statutory in nature with the latter superseding the former.
Significantly it is observed that the remedy under Article 161 of the Constitution
remained open for the respondent therein to be pursued.
12. Jagdish supra had clearly observed that the power under 161 of the
Constitution is untrammeled and unaffected by the provisions of CrPC. The 1993
Policy was held to be in exercise of this power. The 2002 Policy, in our view, is
similar to the 1993 Policy, for it too contemplates orders to be passed by the
Governor under this power though it does not specifically states the source of the
exercise of such power. If we follow the dictum in Raj Kumar supra then despite
this, it would be deemed to be statutory since the provision under which the policy
has been brought in has not been mentioned. Hence, taking further, we endeavour
to juxtapose the two policies-specifically on the points of power being exercised
and the authority under whose signature, the notification was issued, in a tabular
form:
Date of Issue 04.02.1993 12.04.2002
Policy Letter From: The Commissioner
& Secy. to Govt., Haryana,
Jails Department
To: The Addl. Director
General of Prisons,
Haryana, Manimajra,
Chandigarh
Memo. No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II) Dated Chandigarh,
the 4-2-1993
From: The Financial
Commissioner & Principal
Secretary to Govt.,
Haryana, Jails Department
To:The Director General of
Prisons, Haryana,
Manimajra, Chandigarh
Memo No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II) Dated, Chandigarh
the 12-4-2002
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 9 of 16
Subject: Policy regarding premature
release of life convicts.
Policy regarding premature
release of life convicts.
Relevant paragraph “4. … Additional Director
General/Inspector General
of Prisons, Haryana, who
will place the matter before
the State Level Committee
alongwith his comments for
consideration. He will very
clearly indicate the category
under which each case is
covered. The Committee
will meet once in 3 months
according to the
convenience of the Minister
of Jails, Haryana so that
cases of review under this
policy are not delayed. The
Additional Director
General/Inspector General
of Prisons, Haryana, will
forward a copy of the
decision taken by the State
Level Committee alongwith
the roll of each of the life
convicts to the Government
within one week for further
action.
5. Such cases will be put
up to the Governor
through the Minister for
Jails and the Chief
Minister, with full
background of the
prisoner and
recommendations of the
State Level Committee,
alongwith the copy of
judgement etc., for orders
under article 161 of the
Constitution of India.”
“5. The Director General of
Prisons, Haryana shall put
up all such premature
release cases to the State
Level Committee for
consideration. The
committee will meet once in
three months according to
the convenience of the
Minister for Jails, Haryana
so that cases of review
under this policy are not
delayed. The Director
General of Prisons, Haryana
further will forward a copy
of the decision taken by the
committee alongwith the
roll of each of the life
convict to the State
Government within one
week for further action.
Such cases will be put up
to the Governor through
the Minister for Jails and
the Chief Minister, Haryana
with full background of
the prisoner and
recommendations of the
committee alongwith the
copy of judgement etc. for
orders under article 161 of
the Constitution of India.”
Undersigned Official Superintendent, Jails &
Judicial,
Under Secretary Jails &
Judicial,
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 10 of 16
for Commissioner &
Secretary to Govt.,
Haryana, Jails
Department.
No. 36/135/91-1JJ(II)
Dated 4 -2-1993,
Chandigarh.
for Financial
Commissioner &
Principal Secretary to
Govt., Haryana, Jails
Department.
Endst. No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II)
Dated 12 -04-02.
Chandigarh.
The effect of the discussion referred to above in Rajkumar supra would be that
despite clear observations by Jagdish supra, both 1993 and 2002 policies will be
treated as statutory. This clearly would be in the teeth of the decision in Jagdish.
Given its identical nature on the above counts, the 2002 Policy in our view is
under the provisions of the Constitution.
13. We now compare the 2002 and 2008 Policies by way of a tabular chart:
Date of Issue 12.04.2002 13.08.2008
Policy Letter From: The Financial
Commissioner & Principal
Secretary to Govt.,
Haryana, Jails Department
To: The Director General of
Prisons, Haryana,
Manimajra, Chandigarh
Memo No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II) Dated, Chandigarh
the 12-4-2002
No. 36/135/91-1JJ(II).— In
exercise of the powers
conferred by Sub-section
(1) of Section 432 read
with Section 433 of the
Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of
1974) and in supersession
of Haryana Government
Memo No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II), dated the 12th
April, 2002 and all other
earlier policies, the
Governor of Haryana
hereby frames the
following policy regarding
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 11 of 16
premature release of life
convicts…
Subject: Policy regarding premature
release of life convicts.
-----
Relevant paragraph “5. The Director General of
Prisons, Haryana shall put
up all such premature
release cases to the State
Level Committee for
consideration. The
committee will meet once in
three months according to
the convenience of the
Minister for Jails, Haryana
so that cases of review
under this policy are not
delayed. The Director
General of Prisons, Haryana
further will forward a copy
of the decision taken by the
committee along with the
roll of each of the life
convict to the State
Government within one
week for further action.
Such cases will be put up to
the Governor through the
Minister for Jails and the
Chief Minister, Haryana
with full background of the
prisoner and
recommendations of the
committee along with the
copy of judgement etc. for
orders under article 161 of
the Constitution of India.”
“8. The Director General of
Prisons, Haryana shall put
up all such premature
release cases to the State
Level Committee for
consideration. The
Committee will meet once
in three months, so that
cases of review under this
policy are not delayed. The
Director General of Prisons,
Haryana will forward a copy
of the decision taken by the
Committee along with the
commutation roll of each of
the life convict to the State
Government within one
week for further action.
Such cases will be put up to
the Chief Minister, Haryana
along with full background
of the convicts and
recommendations of the
Committee and a copy of
the Court judgement etc. for
orders under Section 432
Cr. P.C. It is reiterated that
no convict has fundamental
right of remission or
shortening of sentence. The
State Government in
exercise of its
executive/discretionary
power of remission is to
consider each individual
case keeping in view all the
relevant factors. This policy
is issued in exercise of the
power of the State in such a
way that no discrimination
is made while considering
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 12 of 16
the case of life convicts for
premature release. This
policy shall be applicable to
all premature release cases
of life convicts with effect
from date of notification
irrespective of their date of
conviction.
The date for consideration
of premature release of a
convict would be the date of
completion of his requisite
sentence mentioned in the
policy.
However, the powers of
pre-mature release of a life
convict in cases covered
under Section 435 of the
Cr. P.C. shall not be
exercised by the State
Government except after
consultation with the
Central Government.”
Undersigned Official Under Secretary Jails &
Judicial,
for Financial
Commissioner &
Principal Secretary to
Govt., Haryana, Jails
Department.
Endst. No. 36/135/91-
1JJ(II)
Dated 12 -04-02.
Chandigarh.
Financial Commissioner
and Principal Secretary to
Government Haryana,
Jails Department.
It appears quite plainly that the 2002 Policy, as already observed supra
banks on Article 161 while the 2008 Policy makes the Chief Minister, the
deciding authority under Section 432 CrPC. Only the latter specifically states the
origin of power. Though both the 2002 Policy and the latter were issued under
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 13 of 16
the signature of the ‘Financial Commissioner, Government of Haryana’, but for
Rajkumar supra to observe that the former Policy was merely a memo, perhaps
may be a mistaken position.
14. We have to specifically deal with a submission on behalf of the appellant
that the judgment in Rajkumar supra does not have value as precedent. When
‘does’ or ‘does not’ in a decision become per incuriam, is a question that has been
discussed in various judgments. Certain facets emerge from these discussions as
follows:
14.1 It is an exception to the rule of stare decisis and must be applied
sparingly;
14.2 A judgment is per incuriam:
(a) when its ratio is not reconcilable with an earlier decision
rendered by a Bench of equal or higher strength; or
(b) when a particular provision or a statute or a rule or a regulation
has not been brought to the attention of the Court;
14.3 It applies only to the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not to obiter
dicta;
14.4 Judicial discipline requires that if a bench disagrees with another
bench of co-equal strength the matter should be referred to a bench of three
judges to decide the issue;
14.5 The decision rendered by the Bench of largest strength binds any
subsequent Bench of co-equal or lesser strength. A Bench of lesser
strength cannot dissent from the view already taken by a Bench of larger
strength;
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 14 of 16
14.6 A judgment cannot be said to be per incuriam:
(a) if it makes reference to an earlier decision and then concludes
correctly or incorrectly; or
(b) if the ordinary reading of the judgment does not on the face
of it show it to be in conflict with earlier decisions, the court should
refrain adopting such an interpretation.
14.7 It is not the numerical strength of judges taking a particular view that
is relevant but it is instead the strength of the Bench, which is the
determinative factor of the binding nature of a particular view.
[See: Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra
15
; Shah Faesal v. Union
of India
16
; Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik
17
; Central
Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra
18
; Trimurthi
Fragrances (P) Ltd., v. State (NCT of Delhi)
19
.
15. Applying the facets as culled out above to the present case, we are of the
view that the submission of the appellant holds water. This is for the reason that
the Policies of 1993 and 2002 are, as already observed above, identical in terms
of their source of power under Article 161, and since the former has been declared
by a Bench of three judges to be an exercise under the constitutional power, the
inescapable conclusion would be that the identical later policy would also be the
same. But for reasons discussed above, the judgment in Rajkumar supra held the
2002 Policy to be of statutory origin. This would fall foul of the reasoning in
Jagdish supra and hence be rendered per incuriam. It may be noted here itself
that a reference to a larger Bench would have been the available course before us,
had it been that we differed with the learned judges in Rajkumar without there
15 (2014) 16 SCC 623
16 (2020) 4 SCC 1
17 (2002) 1 SCC 1
18 (2005) 2 SCC 673
19
(2024) 20 SCC 709
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 15 of 16
being a controlling precedent in the form of Jagdish supra. Since the latter is
already there, in our view, there is no conflict that needs deciding.
16. In light of the discussion as aforesaid, we proceed to decide the question
as has arisen in this case. Since the 2002 Policy stood framed under the
Constitution and such power is to be exercised by the Governor himself, the
subsequent Policy of 2008, cannot deter the effect of the former and the
observation that it supersedes the 2002 Policy, is untenable in law. In respect of
the appellant herein, it can be said that the 2002 Policy would still have its effect.
The holding in Jagdish supra would operate, and the appellant would be entitled
for the benefit of the lesser time served thereby making him eligible for remission.
17. It is clarified that the findings in this case shall apply prospectively and
shall not operate to reopen any applications for remissions that already stood
decided. In effect, now the respondent State shall have two distinct and separate
policies functioning. How is it that the State want to proceed further is for them
to decide.
18. The State shall take a decision regarding the remission application of the
appellant consistent with this judgment within four weeks from the date of this
judgment. Let a copy be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana, by
the Registry of this Court within four days for onward action to be taken by the
appropriate authority.
Crl.App.No….of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.9920 of 2026 Page 16 of 16
Appeal is accordingly allowed and pending applications if any are disposed
of.
……………………… ……………………… J.
(SANJAY KAROL )
……………………………… ………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
July 1, 2026
In a pivotal ruling now accessible on CaseOn, the Supreme Court of India has brought much-needed clarity to the application of the Haryana Remission Policy, specifically concerning the Premature Release of Life Convicts. This judgment, delivered in the case of Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana & Ors., addresses the long-standing question of which remission policy—the 2002 or 2008 version—should govern applications for premature release, a crucial aspect of criminal appellate jurisdiction.
The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant's application for remission should be governed by the 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12th April 2002) or the subsequent 'Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008' Policy (dated 13th August 2008) in Haryana. This involved deciphering the source of power for each policy—whether constitutional (Article 161) or statutory (CrPC)—and resolving conflicting judicial interpretations.
The Supreme Court analyzed the various remission policies issued by Haryana, tracing their evolution and the legal provisions under which they were enacted. Key to this analysis were:
The Court specifically examined two earlier Supreme Court judgments that presented conflicting views:
The appellant, Parveen Kumar, was convicted for murder in 2009. After serving 14 years, he sought premature release in May 2022, relying on the 2002 Policy. His representation was rejected in October 2022, with the authorities stating he would be governed by the 2008 Policy and was ineligible under its stricter criteria (requiring 20 years of actual and 25 years of total imprisonment). This led to the present appeal after his writ petition was dismissed by the High Court.
The Supreme Court meticulously compared the 1993, 2002, and 2008 policies. While the 1993 and 2002 policies explicitly or implicitly required placing papers before the Hon'ble Governor for orders under Article 161, the 2008 Policy explicitly stated that papers would be put before the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 of CrPC. This distinction was crucial: policies under Article 161 are constitutional in ambit, while those under CrPC are statutory.
The Court then tackled the apparent conflict between Jagdish supra and Raj Kumar supra. Legal professionals leveraging CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs will find these nuanced distinctions particularly valuable, quickly grasping how the Supreme Court reconciled earlier conflicting rulings. Applying the doctrine of per incuriam (meaning 'through lack of care' or 'mistakenly'), the Court determined that Raj Kumar supra, being a decision by a co-ordinate bench, fell foul of the reasoning in Jagdish supra, which was rendered by a larger three-judge Bench.
Jagdish supra had clearly stated that the power under Article 161 is untrammelled by CrPC provisions and that the 1993 Policy (similar to the 2002 Policy in its constitutional origin) was an exercise of this constitutional power. Therefore, Raj Kumar supra's observation that the 2002 Policy was merely a memo or statutory in origin was held to be a mistaken position, rendering that part of its judgment per incuriam.
Based on its analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2002 Policy, having been framed under the constitutional power of the Governor (Article 161), cannot be superseded or deterred by the subsequent 2008 Policy, which derives its power from statutory provisions (CrPC). Consequently, the appellant, Parveen Kumar, is entitled to the benefits of the more liberal 2002 Policy, which allows for earlier remission.
The Court, however, clarified that its findings would apply prospectively and would not operate to reopen previously decided remission applications. The State of Haryana now effectively operates with two distinct policy frameworks.
The Court directed the State of Haryana to take a decision regarding the appellant's remission application, consistent with this judgment, within four weeks from the date of the judgment.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the appellant's remission application should be governed by the 2002 Policy, which it deemed to be an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161. The Court found that a conflicting judgment by a co-ordinate bench (Raj Kumar supra) was per incuriam in its interpretation of the 2002 Policy's origin, given the larger bench's precedent in Jagdish supra. The decision applies prospectively, and the State has been directed to re-evaluate the appellant's case under the 2002 Policy.
This judgment is highly significant for lawyers, law students, and legal professionals for several reasons:
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice regarding any specific legal issue or case.
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