Dowry death, Section 304B IPC, Section 498A IPC, Suicide, Criminal appeal, Quashing FIR, Mental cruelty, Supreme Court India, Piyush Narlawar, Bhajan Lal case
 02 Nov, 2026
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Piyush S/o Deepak Narlawar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others

  Supreme Court Of India 2026 INSC 1183
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant's wife died by suicide in Canada, jumping from a residential apartment. A suicide note was recovered, attributing her decision to struggles with unemployment and ...

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2026 INSC 1183 1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.12158 of 2025)

PIYUSH S/O DEEPAK NARLAWAR APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of the order dated 08.01.2025 passed

by the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench in Criminal

Application No.725/2024 filed under Section 482 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) refusing to quash the

proceedings qua the appellant arising out of FIR No.212/2023

dated 30.06.2023 registered with Satara Police Station, District

Aurangabad Town under Sections 304B, 323, 498A, 504 read with

2

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, “DP

Act”). However, while dismissing the said criminal application with

respect to the appellant herein, the High Court granted the relief of

quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings thereto qua

the other family members of the appellant, namely, respondent

Nos.3 to 5. Aggrieved, the appellant, who is the son-in-law of the

complainant-respondent No.2, has preferred the present criminal

appeal.

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant

married the daughter (hereinafter “deceased”) of respondent No.2

on 03.01.2021 as per Hindu traditional rites and rituals and

thereafter the couple started cohabiting in Chandrapur along with

the family of the appellant. On 28.02.2022, the couple shifted their

matrimonial home to Toronto, Canada and resided together.

4. On 11.06.2023, the wife of the appellant died by jumping from

the 22nd floor of her residential apartment where she was residing

with the appellant. A hand-written suicide note was recovered from

the shared apartment which reads as follows:

3

“I Failed in my life. It's been more than a year but still

struggling to find a job. I feel like I am Stupid and useless

person. I don't want to live with this feeling, so I quit. I

don't want to live so I am leaving.

Just donate my all organs to the needy people and bury

me here, its my last wish.”

5. Alleging foul play on the part of the appellant in the suicide of

his daughter, respondent No.2 filed FIR No.212/2023 d ated

30.06.2023 before Satara Police Station as against the appellant

and his family members including his parents and sister. The

allegations contained in the said FIR are as follows:

i. The daughter of respondent No.2 was married to the appellant

on 03.01.2021 and even before the marriage, the appellant

and his family made unlawful dowry demands including

fifteen tolas of gold. The said unlawful demand was fulfilled

due to the fear of breakdown of solemnization of marriage.

ii. After marriage, the couple started residing at Chandrapur

with the family of the appellant and in the initial six months

of marriage the deceased had confided that the appellant was

quick-tempered, easily irritable and would get angry over trifle

issues.

4

iii. That on the occasion of Diwali, respondent No.2 gave a gold

bracelet to their daughter, a gold ring to the appellant as he

had demanded two tolas of gold as dowry.

iv. After shifting to Toronto, Canada, the appellant adopted a

fault finding attitude towards the deceased and used to

frequently point out her mistakes and called her names such

as “stupid and useless” predominantly due to the fact that

she was not able to find a job for herself in Canada.

v. In September 2022, the deceased came to India to attend the

wedding of her cousin, where the appellant unlawfully

demanded three tolas of gold. The said demand was acceded

to in order to avoid further confrontation and disrepute. Even

at the time of the wedding, the deceased was subjected to

repeated abuse and torture including deceased being slapped

under the ear by the appellant.

vi. On 11.06.2023, at 6:00 a.m., the appellant called respondent

No.2 to inform that his daughter had committed suicide by

jumping from the 22nd floor of their residential complex and

that, at the time of the incident, the appellant was not at home

but rather was attending an event.

5

vii. After the said incident, respondent No.2 came to know about

multiple extra-marital affairs of the appellant which could

have been a contributing factor for the unfortunate step taken

by his daughter.

6. On 12.10.2023, the Ministry of Solicitor General of Canada

issued a coroner's investigation statement along with the post-

mortem examination report wherein the cause of death was

attributed to multiple blunt impact trauma due to fall from a

height. It was also stated that the deceased had no prior medical

history and was not on any prescription medications. It was further

observed in the said report that while residing with her husband

i.e. the appellant herein, there were no instances of police

interactions but rather the deceased had been stressed by her

studies lately and she was unable to find a suitable employment

which further exacerbated her stress. It was further observed that

the local residents of the apartment complex saw the descent of the

deceased from the twenty second floor till the impact on the

ground. The apartment was found in a tidy and neat condition with

no drugs or alcohol found therein and no signs of struggle by the

6

deceased or foul play on the part of the husband who was not

present when his wife committed suicide.

7. On 08.01.2024, the Toronto Police Department filed a police

report closing the investigation qua the appellant herein. The

closure was based on two findings: (i) the handwriting in the

suicide note of the deceased victim matched her own handwriting,

and; (ii) there were no signs of struggle or scuffle in the apartment.

In the said police report, it was further observed, that upon

examination of the video footage of the surrounding area it was

apparent that at the time of the incident, the appellant was not at

home as he could be seen coming up the elevator and onto the floor

about half hour later and then returning quickly down again upon

realizing what had transpired.

8. Aggrieved by initiation of criminal proceedings at the behest

of respondent No.2, the appellant, along with respondent Nos.3 to

5 preferred Criminal Application No.725/2024 under Section 482

of CrPC seeking quashing of FIR No.212/2023 before the Bombay

High Court, Aurangabad Bench.

7

9. The Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench vide order dated

06.01.2025, dismissed the said criminal application qua the

appellant herein. On the other hand, the same was allowed qua

respondent Nos.3 to 5. While doing so, the High Court observed

that upon perusal of the FIR, it was apparent that soon before her

death, the deceased was not living with respondent Nos.3 to 5 and

therefore the investigation proceedings emanating from the FIR qua

them would tantamount to abuse of process of law and therefore

the same was set aside in the interest of justice. However, taking a

contrary view with respect to the allegations levelled against the

appellant, the High Court proceeded to deny the relief of quashing

the FIR and consequential proceedings to appellant on the ground

that the allegations contained in the FIR against him were related

to the illegal gratification of dowry and had elements of mental

cruelty and therefore raising reasonable suspicion so as to let the

investigation proceed and reach its logical conclusion in the

interests of justice.

10. In the interregnum, a chargesheet was submitted against the

appellant which was taken on record by the Trial Court and

8

consequently, non-bailable warrants were issued against him vide

order dated 04.02.2025.

11. Aggrieved by the order dated 08.01.2025 passed by the

Bombay High Court and the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR

No.212/2023, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

12. This Court, vide order dated 11.08.2025, issued notice in the

said appeal and directed that no coercive steps shall be taken

against the appellant with respect to the impugned FIR subject to

his cooperation in the future investigative and judicial proceedings.

13. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned

counsel for respondent No.1-State as well as respondent No.2. We

have perused the material on record.

14. It was contended by learned counsel for appellant that the

incidents and allegations mentioned in the FIR are general in

nature and a sweep of unsubstantial and frivolous allegations

which do not constitute any offence as per IPC. It was pointed out

that as per the Coroner's report the cause of the death of the

deceased was due to heavy physical trauma commensurate with

the forceful impact of the body hitting the floor and nothing on

9

record evidenced that there was any foul play on the part of the

appellant. It was submitted that upon a bare perusal of the suicide

note recovered from the apartment, it was apparent that the

deceased was under severe stress due to her employment status

and studies and that had no reasonable nexus with appellant and

the said suicide note has exonerated him completely especially

when the handwriting of the suicide note was later confirmed to be

that of the deceased.

15. It was further submitted that the CCTV footage of the

surrounding area clearly recorded the appellant’s movements

wherein it was apparent that he was not in the residential complex

either before, or at the time of the incident. It was vehemently

argued, while placing reliance on the Coroner’s report and the final

report of the Toronto Police authority, that there were no signs of

struggle in the apartment, no hint of any drug or alcohol and no

history of mental and psychological distress that could point

towards a probable cause of suicide apart from the suicide note. It

was also contended by the counsel for the appellant that there was

not even a whisper of any allegation related to demand of dowry

made, either by the husband or his family from the inception of the

10

marriage till the death of the deceased and further such dowry-

related grievance is not reflected from a bare perusal of the material

on record. It was therefore contended that the theory of prosecution

alleging foul play in the death of the deceased is completely

fictitious with no evidentiary support and therefore any allegation

pertaining to the same should be nipped in the bud. It was

submitted by the learned counsel that upon a bare perusal of the

monetary transactions of the appellant, it would reveal that there

were many instances where the appellant had transferred money

to the account of the deceased and her family members purely on

account of love and affection and thereby showcasing his care and

affection towards the deceased.

16. Furthermore, it was contended that the appellant went ahead

and made the deceased his nominee in respect of his investments

thus making the allegation of dowry demand highly improbable.

Appellant’s counsel, further submitted that despite his repeated

refusals, the brother of deceased transferred a sum of

Rs.1,00,000/- to his account to help him bear the travel expense

of the deceased for her cousin’s wedding and these facts remove

the substratum of allegations of unlawful dowry demand made by

11

him and his family. Lastly, it was contended that the prosecution

case made out against him is completely vague and baseless as

there is no evidence on record to substantiate any alleged pre-

marriage gift received by him or his family nor is there any material

on record to justify the allegations of cruelty made out against him.

Therefore continuation of any criminal proceeding arising out of

FIR No.212/2023 is an instance of abuse and misuse of process of

law and therefore the same should be set-aside in the interest of

justice.

17. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for

respondent No.1-State submitted that the course of investigation

revealed that the deceased was subjected to repeated acts of

violence, both mental and physical at the hands of the appellant

and the members of his family with respect to unlawful dowry

demands which was further substantiated by several unexplained

monetary transactions vis-à-vis the account of the deceased. It was

submitted that it was highly improbable that the deceased would

have suggested in her suicide note to donate her organs post her

death, given the fact that she had jumped from the 22

nd floor of the

apartment complex whereby no organ would naturally survive the

12

fall and its impact. Learned counsel for the State vehemently

opposed the criminal appeal on the ground that a non -bailable

warrant was already issued by the Trial Court and that the

appellant’s custodial interrogation was of paramount importance

as he was in custody of the deceased’s laptop, mobile phone,

personal diary etc. Further, considering the nature of allegations

against him, his proximity to the deceased and the unnatural

circumstances under which the death occurred warranted the

continuation of the trial and letting it reach its logical conclusion.

Thereby the prayer to dismiss the present appeal was made by the

learned counsel representing respondent No.1-State.

18. Adopting the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for

respondent No.2 contended that the Canadian Police enquiry erred

in treating the incident as a case of suicide whereas it was clearly

a case of dowry death as per Section 304B of the IPC which

provision does not exist under the Canadi an penal law and

therefore the said reports are invalid. To substantiate the claim of

unlawful dowry demand, it was submitted that the appellant

demanded 15 tolas of gold as a wedding gift which was complied

with by respondent No.2 and consequently the same was given to

13

the appellant and the deceased as a wedding present. Further on

the allegation of illegal dowry demand, learned counsel for

respondent No.2 submitted that on the occasion of first Diwali after

the solemnisation of their marriage, the appellant demanded a gold

ring for himself, a gold bracelet for the deceased and clothes for his

parents which were again complied with. It was contended the said

illegal demands came within the contours of dowry as defined

under Section 3 of the DP Act.

19. It was next contended by learned counsel that the appellant

was not producing crucial evidence related to the deceased and

thereby showing clear non -cooperation and intentional

suppression of facts. That the delay in lodgement of FIR was due

to the refusal of the police authorities to register the FIR as the

incident had occurred in Canada and therefore only after repeated

requests, the FIR was registered on 30.06.2023. It was submitted,

that the appellant has admitted that he had received the amount

of Rs.1,00,000/- from the brother of the deceased out of

compulsion.

20. It was further contended by learned counsel for respondent

No.2 that the appellant used to verbally abuse the deceased, calling

14

her "useless" and "a burden," which ultimately drove her to take

such a drastic step, and therefore strongest action in accordance

with law was warranted against the appellant-husband. Finally,

learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that hours before

her death, the deceased had video-called her mother, during which

she was seen wearing a new dress and spoke of attending a social

function, without even a hint of any mental turmoil that would

necessitate such a drastic step. It was therefore submitted that this

Court ought to allow the trial to proceed.

21. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments

advanced at the Bar and to the material on record.

22. In the instant case, the allegations in the FIR are under

Section 304B, 323, 498A, 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC and

under Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.

23. Section 304B of the IPC deals with the offence of dowry death

and penalises the acts or omissions committed by the husband or

relative of the husband resulting in the death of the said woman

victim in relation to the said demand for dowry. The said provision

reads as under:

15

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is

caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise

than under normal circumstances within seven years of

her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death

she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or any relative of her husband for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall

be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative

shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”

shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven

years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

24. Section 323 of the IPC provides for punishment for voluntarily

causing hurt as defined under Section 321 of the IPC. The said

provisions read as hereunder:

“321. Voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever does any act

with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person,

or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause

hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any

person, is said voluntarily to cause hurt.

xxx

323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. —

Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334,

voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one

thousand rupees, or with both.”

16

25. Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the

husband or relative of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the

wife. The said provision read as hereunder:

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman

subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband

or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such

woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for

a term which may extend to three years and shall also be

liable to fine.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”

means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is

likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause

grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether

mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is

with a view to coercing her or any person related to her

to meet any unlawful demand for any property or

valuable security or is on account of failure by her or

any person related to her to meet such demand.”

26. Further, Section 504 of the IPC penalises the offence of

criminal intimidation, which is defined in Section 503 of the IPC.

The said provisions read as under:

“503. Criminal intimidation. —Whoever threatens

another with any injury to his person, reputation or

property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom

that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that

person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is

not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that

person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding

17

the execution of such threats, commits criminal

intimidation.

Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any

deceased person in whom the person threatened is

interested, is within this section.

504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach

of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby

gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to

be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the

public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with

both.”

27. Lastly, Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act talk about penalty for

giving or taking or demanding a dowry which are extracted

hereunder:

“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.—

(1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives

or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be

punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not

be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be

less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the

value of such dowry, whichever is more.

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special

reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence

of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation

to,—

(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage

to the bride (without any demand having been made

in that behalf):

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Provided that such presents are entered in a list

maintained in accordance with the rules made under

this Act;

(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage

to the bridegroom (without any demand having been

made in that behalf):

Provided that such presents are entered in a list

maintained in accordance with the rules made under

this Act:

Provided further that where such presents are made

by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the

bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the

value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial

status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such

presents are given.

xxx

4. Penalty for demanding dowry. —If any person

demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other

relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case

may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six

months, but which may extend to two years and with fine

which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and

special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose

a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six

months.”

28. Before delving into the merits of the case and the contentions

of the parties, we find it apposite to discuss the aforementioned

sections invoked against the appellant in the FIR. A bare perusal

of the said FIR reveals that offence of dowry death as punishable

19

under Section 304B of the IPC has been invoked. To establish the

offence of dowry death, the following essential ingredients need to

be established:

(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily

injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance;

(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her

marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by

her husband or any relative of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection

with demand of dowry; and

(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out

to the woman soon before her death.

29. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the

necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section

304B of the IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the

rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-

B of the Evidence Act, 1872 operates against the accused.

30. Now, to establish an offence of voluntarily causing hurt

punishable under Section 323 of the IPC, one has to satisfy the

20

essential ingredients of the said section. That is to say, the

prosecution has to lead evidence in order to show that bodily pain,

disease or infirmity was caused by the accused, in order to qualify

as voluntarily causing hurt.

31. Similarly, in order to establish the offence of criminal

intimidation as defined and punishable under Section 504, the

prosecution has to lead evidence to the effect that

(a) there was an intentional insult,

(b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person

insulted, and

(c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation

would cause another to break public peace or to commit any

other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree

that should provoke a person to break public peace or to

commit any other offence. The person who intentionally

insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will provide

provocation to any other person and such provocation will

cause to break public peace or to commit any other offence.

In such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are

satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the

21

offence is that there should have been an act or conduct

amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the

accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient

by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 of the

IPC. Similarly, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or

insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within

the meaning of Section 504 of the IPC if it does not have the

necessary element of being likely to incite the person

insulted to commit a breach of peace of an offence and the

other element of the accused intending to provoke the person

insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the

person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace.

32. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when

a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may

result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and

a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines

“cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of

the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a)

of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that “cruelty”

means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to

22

drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a)

of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty

means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave

injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)

of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section

498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment

of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any

person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any

property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or

any person related to her to meet such demand.

33. Lastly, Section 3 of the DP Act deals with the penalty for giving

or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving,

taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment

of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less

than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever

is greater. Section 4 of the DP Act talks of penalty for demanding

dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or

indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a

bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than six months, but which may

23

extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten

thousand rupees.

34. Before delving further into the merits of the case, we also wish

to underline the contours and extent of inherent powers envisaged

under Section 482 of CrPC with respect to quashment of criminal

proceedings arising out of an FIR or a criminal complaint. The said

Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court but

rather saves the inherent power which the court possessed before

the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under

which the said inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely; (i)

to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the

process of the court, and (iii) to secure the ends of justice. The

principle and purpose behind Section 482 of CrPC has been

perfectly encapsulated by this Court in Central Bureau of

Investigation vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad, (2009) 6 SCC 351,

wherein this Court categorically observed that inherent powers of

High Court, under Section 482 of CrPC are meant to act ex debito

justitiae i.e. to do real and substantive justice, for the

administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent the abuse of

process of court. The Court then further went on to observe that

24

the exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend upon the

facts and circumstances of each case and the same can be

exercised where the allegations made in the FIR or a complaint,

even when taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety,

do not prima facie constitute an offence or make out a case against

the accused.

35. While the inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle

the legitimate prosecution but at the same time no person should

be compelled to face criminal prosecution if the basic ingredients

of the alleged offence against him are totally absent. The said

powers of the High Court in dealing with an extraordinary situation

is in the larger interest of administration of justice and for

preventing manifest injustice being done. Therefore, it is a duty on

the part of the High Court to undo a wrong and to preven t

continuation of unnecessary judicial process. It may also be

necessary in order to curb an unwarranted criminal prosecution

becoming an instrument of harassment and abuse. A person

cannot be allowed to unleash personal vendetta to harass any

person needlessly and therefore it becomes the paramount duty of

the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to protect an

25

innocent person and not subject him to prosecution on the basis

of wholly untenable criminal complaint.

36. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present

case, the issue for consideration, is, whether, given the facts and

circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, the High

Court was justified in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal

proceedings against the appellant arising out of FIR No.212/2023

dated 30.06.2023.

37. Upon careful perusal of the material on record, pleadings and

submissions of the all the parties, this Court is able to discern that

respondent No.2 has alleged that the appellant and his family

repeatedly indulged in unlawful demands for dowry and thus

created a hostile environment that exacerbated the mental agony

of the deceased who, when left with no other option, committed

suicide under extreme pressure and vulnerability. In this regard,

respondent No.2 referred to certain instances when he delivered 15

tolas of gold to the appellant as a wedding gift. It is also alleged

that the appellant, on the first Diwali after the solemnisation of

marriage illegally demanded a gold ring for himself, a gold bracelet

for the deceased and clothes for his parents which were duly

26

complied with by respondent No.2. Lastly, it has been further

alleged that the appellant received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (One

lakh only) from the brother of the deceased as a further

gratification of the illegal demand of dowry. However, this Court,

upon examination of the relevant material on record, does not find

force in the aforementioned allegations and the averments due to

the reasons discussed below.

38. The appellant married the deceased on 03.01.2021 and from

that date until her death on 11.06.2023, there was not even a whiff

of allegation regarding any demand for dowry by the appellant or

his family. The allegations pertaining to illegal dowry demands

relate to the years 2021 and 2022, whereas the FIR itself was

lodged only after the death of the daughter of respondent No.2. This

leaves considerable room for doubt and suspicion in the mind of

this Court as to the truth and veracity of the allegations made. This

Court cannot help but note that no such grave and severe

allegations were raised during the period immediately preceding

the wife's untimely demise. There is nothing on record to show that

respondent No.2, upon being apprised by his daughter of the

alleged dowry demands, took any tangible action against such acts

27

by the appellant and his family. A logical step would naturally have

been to raise the concern with the appropriate authorities, Indian

or Canadian, regarding any alleged mental or physical harassment

being meted out to the deceased or to respondent No .2 by the

appellant and his family. No dialogue or any discussion between

the two families has been referred to in the FIR.

39. On the contrary, upon perusal of the Coroner's report and the

final report furnished by the Toronto Police Department, it can be

discerned that the report itself states that there was no prior

history of any interaction between the couple and local police

officials, indicating a relatively calm and smooth marital life

between the appellant and the deceased until her death. The

suicide note, the handwriting of which is not in question, clearly

states that the deceased was under stress and duress on account

of her employment status and her studies, which made her feel

"useless" and "stupid." Had there been even an iota of mental or

physical agony caused by the unlawful demands of dowry by the

appellant and his family, the same would, in the natural course,

have found mention in the suicide note. However, the reality is that

there is no mention of the appellant or his family in the said suicide

28

note. Nothing in the suicide note attributes the cause of death to

alleged illegal dowry demands by the appellant or his family, or to

the alleged mental and physical cruelty to which the deceased was

purportedly subjected to.

40. Further, upon a bare perusal of the statement of respondent

No.2 recorded under Section 161 of CrPC, it is apparent that he

has stated that the said 15 tolas of gold were given to both the

appellant and the deceased, i.e., his own daughter. Very often, out

of genuine love and affection, the parents of either party gift

ornaments and jewellery to the newlyweds to mark the auspicious

occasion. In this context, it would not be out of place for the father

of the bride to give the newlyweds gold, which appears to be the

case in the present appeal. The father of the bride, respondent

No.2, on the occasion of the wedding, out of love and affection, may

have presented the appellant and the deceased jewellery made of

gold, which cannot be construed as dowry, since it was given not

merely to the appellant but also to the daughter, as a wedding gift,

a tradition quite common in Indian households, when not

attributed to a demand as dowry.

29

41. Furthermore, it has been alleged by respondent No.2 that on

the first Diwali after the wedding, the appellant illegally demanded

a gold ring for himself, a gold bracelet for the deceased, and clothes

for his parents, all of which were duly complied with. The said

allegations, when read in conjunction with the surrounding facts

and circumstances do not have legs to stand upon. A perusal of the

material and documents on record would reveal that the

prosecution has not been able to satisfy this Court that the said

gifts were given as part of a dowry demanded by the appellant and

his family. The very first Diwali after the solemnization of marriage

marks a special milestone in the life of newlyweds, where usually

both families exchange gifts such as new clothes, jewellery, and

sweets as a tradition. In these circumstances, it is very plausible

that, while extending gifts to his own daughter on the occasion of

Diwali, respondent No.2 extended the same courtesy to his son-in-

law and his parents, as a part of custom and tradition. To taint this

exchange between the parties with a criminal colour, without any

antecedents or substantial material on record, runs afoul of the

very basis of the case. Furthermore, such isolated acts of exchange

of gifts on an auspicious festival, when seen in the larger context,

30

cannot be a factor of cause-and-effect with the suicide of the

deceased, which occurred nearly a year thereafter. Nor does the

suicide note make any mention of the involvement of the accused-

husband or his family, in the context of dowry demands, cruelty,

criminal intimidation, or causing grievous hurt. What transpired

in the mind of the unfortunate victim cannot be extended to drag

the husband and his family members to the cause for suicide in

the absence of any material on record to prove or substantiate their

culpability. To attract the rigours of Section 304B of the IPC, the

prosecution has to prove that soon before her death, the woman

was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any

relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for

dowry. In this aspect, the prosecution has failed to produce before

this Court any cogent evidence or material that may substantiate

its claim that the appellant made illegal demands for dowry and

that the said demand had a reasonable nexus to the suicide

committed by the deceased-wife. In absence of any evidence to

support the allegation of demand for dowry, the offence under

Section 304B cannot be attracted. In this case, any prosecution

31

with respect to the same, in our view, would be nothing but an

abuse of the process of law.

42. Lastly, it has also been alleged by respondent No.2 that the

appellant received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) as

dowry from the brother of the deceased. However, upon perusal of

the records of the case and the material placed before us, we

cannot but notice that the said transaction was undertaken

around the same time that the appellant booked flight tickets for

the deceased from Canada to India and a bare perusal of the

appellant's bank statement makes it amply clear that there were

multiple transactions reflected in his and the deceased's accounts;

therefore, singling out any one transaction, out of context, cannot

be determined to be inculpatory so as to warrant prosecution of the

appellant either under Section 304B of the IPC or Sections 3 and 4

of the DP Act. The prosecution has also failed to place any material

on record to show that the said amount was demanded by the

appellant in the nature of dowry, nor has it succeeded in prima

facie satisfying this Court as to how the alleged dowry demand,

coupled with the other allegations of mental and physical

harassment, established a causal relationship with the suicide of

32

the deceased. Therefore, the only conclusion this Court can draw

is that there is no nexus established between the allegations

levelled against the appellant and his family, on the one hand, and

the death of the deceased, on the other. Therefore, any legal

process emanating from the impugned FIR against the appellant is

an unfortunate instance of a father, grieving the bereavement of

his daughter, searching for some semblance of reason as to why

the deceased took such a drastic step to commit suicide. In such

circumstances, this Court cannot permit the prosecution of the

appellant to continue as the same amounts to an abuse of the

process of law. The same is therefore liable to be set aside in order

to meet the ends of justice.

43. We further opine that courts have to be extremely careful and

cautious in dealing with such complaints and must have a

pragmatic approach by taking into consideration the realities while

dealing with matrimonial cases, where the allegations have to be

scrutinised with great care and circumspection in order to prevent

miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of law. If we

consider the facts of this case, the allegations put forth by

respondent No.2 with respect to mental and physical cruelty

33

allegedly meted out by the appellant and his family, apart from the

allegation of demand for dowry as discussed above, we have not

come across any instances of cruelty meted out to the deceased. A

bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by

respondent No.2 with respect to grievous hurt and criminal

intimidation are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that the

husband, along with his family, mentally and physically harassed

her, respondent No.2 has not provided specific details or described

any particular instance of harassment. He has merely alleged that

the appellant physically abused and harassed the deceased and

called her names, which were contributing factors to her untimely

demise, but has failed to place any supporting material on record

to elaborate or substantiate the same. The allegation that the

appellant used to call the deceased "stupid" and "useless," even if

accepted prima facie, cannot to any extent qualify as an offence of

cruelty or criminal intimidation. At best, it reflects on the

temperament of the husband, but it cannot be given a criminal

colour so grave as to become the reason for the suicide of his wife.

Similarly, the allegation that the appellant was short tempered and

used to scold the deceased over trifle issues is also not sustainable

34

as respondent No.2 has failed to put forth any material evidence

on record so as to satisfy this Court of the merits of the said

allegations. A temperamental issue of a spouse cannot be equated

with the offence of criminal intimidation or grievous hurt so as to

make him criminally liable for the suicide of his wife as the same

tantamounts to abuse of process of law, particularly when material

in support of the same is conspicuous by its absence. We

understand the plight and pain of the family members of the

deceased who have gone through the tragedy of losing their

daughter but the husband and the in-laws, cannot be made to bear

the brunt of the same without first demonstrating any act or

omission on their part that coerced the deceased to such an extent

that committing suicide was the only way out.

44. We observe that in order to attract the rigours of Sections 323

and 504 of the IPC, the prosecution must lay cogent facts and

circumstances, backed by material on record, to show that the

accused committed acts or omissions that threatened the victim

with injury to her person, reputation or property or to the person

or reputation of anyone in whom she was interested. Merely stating

that the accused indulged in verbal and physical cruelty, is

35

insufficient by itself to raise a prima facie presumption that such

acts and omissions could be the basis to set the criminal

machinery in motion.

45. Furthermore, respondent No.2 has failed to satisfy this Court

as to how any alleged harassment caused the deceased any injury,

mental or physical, establishing a reasonable nexus to her death

by suicide. There is no proximate act or omission attributable to

the appellant in the instant case that could implicate him or assign

him any role under Section 498A of the IPC in the said FIR. Merely

stating that the appellant mentally harassed the deceased with

respect to a demand of dowry does not fulfil the ingredients of

Section 498A of the IPC, especially in the absence of any cogent

material or evidence on record in support of such allegations. The

term "cruelty" cannot be established without specific instances of

commission or omission. The tendency to invoke these provisions

without mentioning specific details weakens the prosecution's case

and casts serious doubt on the viability of the complainant's

version. This Court cannot, therefore, ignore the missing specifics

in an FIR, which forms the very premise for invoking the criminal

machinery of the State. In cases involving allegations of cruelty and

36

harassment, there would normally be specific offending acts, which

the complainant would be required to spell out in specific terms

against the perpetrators in order to implicate them in the criminal

proceedings sought to be initiated. Mere general allegations of

harassment, without specifics against such persons, would not

suffice to continue criminal proceedings. This holds true even when

the prosecution seeks to establish a reasonable nexus between the

commission of suicide and the alleged harassment, cruelty, and

criminal intimidation.

46. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in

the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)

SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph

102 therein, where this Court observed thus:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases

by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

37

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the

Accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the Accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

Accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

38

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge.”

47. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial

dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against the

appellant herein has been made out. In fact, we find that the

allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and voluntarily causing

hurt against the appellant herein have been made not with a bona

fide intent as they are vague and general in nature and therefore,

the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and

particularly sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5) and (7) of paragraph

102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. It is

neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present

prosecution emanating from FIR No.212/2023 to continue.

48. In view of the aforementioned discussion and keeping the

judicial dicta of this Court in mind, the impugned order dated

08.01.2025 of the High Court is set aside and consequently, FIR

No.212/2023 dated 30.06.2023 registered with Satara Police

Station, District Aurangabad Town and consequent proceedings

initiated pursuant thereto stand quashed.

39

The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J.

(MANMOHAN )

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 02, 2026.

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